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The last four decades have shown an especially intense and thorough academic 
reflection on the relation between man and animal. This is evidenced by the 
rapid growth of journals on the question of the animal within the fields of the 
humanities and social sciences worldwide.1 Yet also outside the academy 
animals now seem to preoccupy the popular mindset more than ever before. In 
2002, the Netherlands was the first country in the world where a political party 
was established (the so-called “Partij voor de Dieren” or PvdD: Party for the 
Animals) that focused predominantly on animal issues. Heated discussions about 
factory-farming, the related spread of diseases (BSE/Q Fever), hunting and 
fishing practices, the inbreeding of domestic animals, are now commonplace. 
Animals, as we tend to call a large range of incredibly diverse creatures, come to 
us in many different ways. We encounter them as our pets and on our plates, 
animation movies dominate the charts and artists in sometimes rather 
experimental genres engage in the question of the animal.2 Globally speaking, 
animals might be considered key players in the climate debate insofar as the 
alarming rate of extinction of certain species is often taken to be indicative of 
our feeble efforts at preserving what is commonly referred to as “nature.” At the 
same time, these rates serve, albeit indirectly, as a grim reminder of the possible 
end of human existence itself. In light of all these intertwining developments the 
debate on animal rights appears today more pressing than ever.  
To be sure, the question of the animal and its possible moral standing in 
the world has its own history and is probably as old as philosophy itself.3 From 
Aristotle to Aquinas, Descartes and Kant, to mention but a few key figures who 
have shaped the history of Western philosophy, the animal has been defined in 
                                                 
1 See for example: Journal for Critical Animal Studies. Institute for Critical Animal Studies 
(ICAS), eds. Johnson, L. and Susan Thomas. URL: http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/journal-
for-critical-animal-studies. See also: Humanimalia: A Journal of Human/Animal Interface 
Studies. DePauw University. URL: <http://www.depauw.edu/humanimalia/>. For an adequate 
overview of the growing field of animal studies see: McDonell, Jennifer. “Literary Studies, the 
Animal Turn, and the Academy.” Social Alternatives, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2013: 6-14. URL: 
<http://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=115441073550414;res=IELLCC> ISSN: 
0155-0306. 
2 For an example from the literary domain, see: J.M. Coetzee, The Lives Of Animals, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999). For an overview of a number of important contemporary artists 
working on, or with animals and the controversy their work raises, see: <http://www. 
blouinartinfo.com/news/story/762027/dont-feed-the-artists-10-contemporary-artworks-that-
outraged>. For two Dutch artists, see: <roosmarijnmascini@blogspot.com> and <www. 
tinkebell.com>. 
3 For an instructive work that traces the question of the animal in philosophy from antiquity to the 
present, see: Animal Rights: A Historical Anthology, ed. Andrew Linzey and Paul Barry Clarke, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). 
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opposition to the human, mostly because it was believed to lack rationality and 
the sort of consciousness rationality implied, which was held to constitute an 
exclusive human trait. Of course, there have always been other voices. For 
example, in his Apology for Raymond Sebond (1588), Montaigne suggested that 
when we play with our cat we cannot be sure the cat is not playing with us and 
thereby challenged the established philosophical norm.4 In 1789, the utilitarian 
philosopher Jeremy Bentham famously wondered if, in the future, the traditional 
demarcation line of rationality would not be replaced with the question whether 
animals could suffer.5 In general, however, the overriding view on animals as 
non-rational beings that are, consequently, not to be thought of as entities that 
might be attributed a moral standing ‒ let alone rights ‒ has been widely 
accepted throughout the history of Western philosophy until well into the 
twentieth century.  
 In my view, the latest philosophical giant who represents this traditional 
line of thought would be Martin Heidegger. Indeed, in his lecture course “The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics” (1929-1930), Heidegger’s complex 
musings on the question of the animal remains very much in line with the 
history of Western philosophy since he ultimately opposed the human to the 
animal by depriving the animal of language.6 Yet, I believe we can discern in 
Heidegger the beginning of a break with the past since the animal in Heidegger 
is no longer merely placed in opposition to the human for lacking language, the 
age old marker for rationality, but this opposition is arrived at through a 
profound contemplation on the relation between the human and the animal in 
terms of the world we inhabit and share with animals. Since my argument will 
be that such a perspective in terms of the world we share with animals is lacking 
within our modern animal rights debate, it is my aim to re-connect this broader 
perspective with the thinking through of the question of the animal that has 
spurred the animal rights debate since the 1970s, the decade in which Peter 
Singer’s Animal Liberation was written.7  
The reason for my wishing to do so has everything to do with the way I 
interpret the unprecedented attention paid to the question of the animal since the 
1970s. Effectively, the question of the animal has now taken on a global 
                                                 
4 Michel de Montaigne, Apology for Raymond Sebond, trans. Roger Ariew and Majorie Grene, 
(Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003). 
5 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. J.H. Burns 
and H.L.A. Hart, (London/New York: Methuen, 1982), 283. 
6 Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. 
William McNeill and Nicolas Walker, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1995). 
7 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for our Treatment of Animals, (New York: 
Random House, 1975).  
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dimension, both within and outside of the academy, which suggests that we are 
passing through a critical phase on many fronts. Some, like Peter Singer, have 
argued that it has been philosophy itself that has awakened us from our 
dogmatic slumber and set the animal and its possible moral or legal status back 
on the agenda.8 Notwithstanding the invaluable work of those preoccupied with 
the question of the animal since the 1970s, I believe the critical phase we are 
passing through is symptomatic of a much wider paradigm shift within our 
modern world.  
This paradigm shift is marked by a growing public unease with the way 
we treat animals, which perhaps becomes most apparent if we consider the 
different treatment of pets on the one hand, and factory-farmed animals on the 
other. At the same time, this public unease is matched with a profound 
insecurity that may at least in part be attributed to the fact that science, 
especially biotechnology, has enabled us to learn more about animals than ever 
before, which has caused the traditional boundaries between the human and the 
animal to come under strain. In my view, the resulting “status anxiety” about the 
place of the human in the order of things has caused the modern animal rights 
debate to revolve around what I would like to call the central issue of 
demarcation. It is this issue of demarcation that, rather than inviting a 
renegotiation of the most adequate criteria for demarcation between the human 
and the animal per se, demands a broader exploration of what it means to share 
the world with animals.  
Let me first sketch the specific way in which the central issue of 
demarcation has come to characterize our modern animal rights debate. The 
central issue of demarcation within the context of the animal rights debate is 
accommodated by a shift from if animals should be granted right towards how 
and on the basis of which criteria this is to be effectuated. This shift has been the 
result of a growing and now widespread academic consensus that there is no 
longer a position that can convincingly argue ‒ i.e. on the basis of academically 
sound criteria ‒ for not attributing rights to at least some animals.9 By the same 
                                                 
8 In the preface to the edited volume Animal Philosophy Peter Singer comments on the rapid 
growth of animal ethics since the 1970s and states: “For those who think that philosophy follows 
trends rather than instigating them, it is significant to note that in this instance it was the other 
way around.” See: Animal Philosophy, Ethics and Identity, ed. Matthew Calarco and Peter 
Atterton, (London, Continuum, 2008), 7. 
9 Exemplified by Paul Cliteur in: “De filosofie van dierenrechten,” in Ethiek van DNA tot 9/11 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2005), 135-144. In this text Cliteur tackles a number 
of standard objections to animal rights that in contemporary debates have been voiced by 
opponents such as, amongst others, Roger Scruton and Carl Cohen. He shows how those 
objections are each and every time reliant on the positing of a difference between the human and 
the animal that on closer observation cannot be maintained, at the very least not for some animals. 
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token, not granting rights to at least some animals would be an unjustifiable 
withholding, a failing to meet our (legal) obligation to protect animals from 
harm.10 Hence, we are witnessing an expansion of what was, until very recently, 
a strictly human domain of rights. This expansion leads to a model that places 
animals within a human order centred on personhood, which poses two 
interrelated problems. First, it does not account for the shift in register from 
human to nonhuman and the consequences this might bear on the (legal) 
conception of personhood.11 Second, it leads to a demarcation problem that 
becomes a central issue in the debate because it remains unclear which animals 
might be included or have to be left out of the system.  
 This demarcation problem has inspired a lively polemic on which criteria 
would provide the most adequate basis for conferring a moral and possibly a 
legal status to at least some nonhuman animals.12 This polemic is no longer an 
issue that is left to the professional practitioners from the fields of Law and 
Philosophy. Rather, the question of the animal is now taken up in an 
interdisciplinary manner within a wide range of other academic fields, such as 
literary studies, political theory, biology and sociology. This is evidenced by the 
growing number of universities around the world that have recently begun to set 
up new academic courses, with Animal Studies and Law and Literature Studies 
as arguably the most prominent representatives of this trend. On a par with these 
developments the number of Animal Rights, Animal Studies and Animal Ethics 
handbooks that have been published in recent years is simply mind-blowing.13  
                                                                                                                                                        
A proponent of animal rights himself, Cliteur then draws on the work of those who advocate 
animal rights at least for some animals such as, amongst others, Tom Regan, James Rachels and 
Paola Cavalieri, to unsettle the decisive differences assumed by these opponents of animal rights. 
For an instructive insight in these debates between opponents and proponents of animal rights see: 
Carl Cohen and Tom Regan, The Animal Rights Debate, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, 2001). 
10 For a brief overview of the animal rights debates that inform and defend the position that we 
owe at least some animals rights see: David Degrazia, Animal Rights, A Very Short Introduction, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). For an elaboration on why animals should not be 
excluded from the scope of principles of justice within political liberalism, see: Robert Garner, A 
Theory of Justice for Animals: Animal Rights in a Nonideal World (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2013). 
11 For a poignant example of this tendency to take the shift in register from human to nonhuman 
for granted in an otherwise impressive work see: Paola Cavalieri, The Animal Question: Why 
Nonhuman Animals Deserve Human Rights, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).  
12 Amongst others: Peter Singer, 1975; Tom Regan, 1983; Martha Nussbaum, 2004; Jacques 
Derrida, 2008 and Kelly Oliver, 2009. 
13 See for example: The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp and R.G. 
Frey, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Catharine Grant, The No-Nonsense Guide to 
Animal Rights, (Toronto: New Internationalist Publications, 2006). Dawne McCance, Critical 
Animal Studies: An Introduction, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2013). 
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It shall not come as a surprise that this development has led to an 
enormous diversification of the positions held within the animal rights debate, 
which sometimes makes it hard to identify and recognize its most important 
strands. Yet, however divergent the academic fields and the positions taken in, 
the most important strand may in its most general sense be identified as 
revealing a concern with demarcation; that is, with the understanding of the 
relation between the human and the animal as being, in some way or another, 
key to the manner in which, if at all, animals should be entitled to moral 
consideration and possibly rights. In the field of Animal Studies, for example, 
this concern typically takes the form of a renegotiation and refinement of criteria 
that would single out certain capacities some animals may share with humans, 
which then provide a basis for either excluding or including some animals 
within the moral and sometimes the legal community of equals under an 
expansive model.14  
This predominant focus on demarcation may be illustrated by looking at 
the two most prominent voices that have stirred up the animal rights debate 
since the 1970s and whose work remains indispensible to understanding the way 
things stand today, those of Peter Singer and Tom Regan. Singer, as a utilitarian 
philosopher inspired by Bentham’s famous proposition on the capacity to suffer 
as potentially the future demarcation line, suggested that sentience must be the 
defining criterion that would allow nonhuman animals to be included within the 
moral community of equals.15 Regan, a rights theorist, apart from sentience 
defined a cluster of capacities that would make some nonhuman animals, mostly 
mammals, qualify as “a subject of life” and hence, warrant a form of legal 
subjectivity, namely personhood.16 Taking the work of Singer and Regan as 
points of departure, theorists around the world have developed stances that vary 
considerably, but in which the focus on demarcation on the basis of the criteria 
Singer and Regan proposed has remained paramount throughout.17 
                                                 
14 For an example, see: The Great Ape Project: Equality beyond Humanity, ed. Paola Cavalieri 
and Peter Singer, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993). See also: Martha. C. Nussbaum, Creating 
Capabilities, The Human Development Approach, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2011); especially the last two chapters in which Nussbaum argues for extending 
the capabilities approach to animals in a modified form, by postulating that animals may be 
viewed as having dignity, which would entitle them to certain basic rights. 
15 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 2nd ed. (London: Random House, 1995). Tom Regan, The 
Case For Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 
16 Ibid. 
17 For an argued critique on Singer’s criteria for including animals within the moral community of 
equals and especially of Regan’s criteria for animals as subject-of-a life, see: Carl Cohen, “Reply 
to Tom Regan.” In: The Animal Ethics Reader, ed. Suzan J. Armstrong and Richard G. Botzler 
(London, New York: Routledge, 2010), 26-29. 
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Within this discursive context, those in favour of attributing (some) 
animals a moral status typically accuse those who hold divergent opinions of 
ignoring scientific-philosophical evidence that suggests some animals do 
possess what are considered to be valid criteria for subjectivity; say, rationality, 
consciousness, sentience, or whatever capacity happens to be in view. Those 
who argue against the moral consideration of animals on the basis of such and 
such capacities typically accuse the opposing party of anthropomorphism, which 
is then understood as a rather sentimental projecting of human characteristics, 
values and desires upon animals instead of recognizing the difference both 
species would “naturally” assume.18 Hence, the polemic within today’s animal 
rights debate seems potentially endless, for no matter the general consensus on a 
basic notion of sentience and its varying complements as the most adequate 
criteria for demarcation, the underlying demarcation problem and the way in 
which it translates to demarcation decisions that eventually will have to be made 
within the juridical sphere, is not resolved.  
A practical example of this insistent demarcation problem and the polemic 
it breeds may be provided through a brief reconsideration of the famous Great 
Ape Project. In 1993, Peter Singer and Paola Cavalieri published an impressive 
volume under the title The Great Ape Project.19 The book holds a collection of 
texts by scientists from even more diversified fields than those I mentioned 
earlier and opens with “A Declaration on Great Apes.” In this declaration, the 
rights of great apes are proclaimed and summed up as the right to life, the 
protection of their individual liberty and the prohibition from torture. Since 
1993, however ‒ with the notable exception of Spain ‒ great apes still have not 
been attributed personhood, while the controversy that marked the project from 
the beginning has even turned inward. One of its initial advocates, for example, 
the philosopher Gary Francione, later on withdrew his support from the project 
because he ultimately found it ill-conceived as long as animals were being 
considered as human property.20  
More comprehensively, the controversy within a modern animal rights 
debate that remains focused on its central issue of demarcation through the 
renegotiation of capacities may be illustrated if we consider two books that were 
published in, respectively, 1999 and 2009, and in which Peter Singer, arguably 
                                                 
18 For an example of this type of critique see: Roger Scruton, “Animal Rights,” City Journal, 
2000;<http://www.city-journal.org/html/10_3_urbanities-animal.html>. For a disavowing analysis 
of the critique on anthropomorphism as a scientifically unwarranted issue see: “Anthropo-
morphism and Cross-Species Modelling.” In: The Animal Ethics Reader, ed. Suzan J. Armstrong 
and Richard G Botzler, (New York, Routledge, 2010), 88-98. 
19 Ibid.  
20 See: <http://www.animalfreedom.org/english/column/francione.html>. 
11 
 
the most influential philosopher within the animal rights debate, enters into 
discussions with his critics.21 Anyone going through these volumes will not just 
notice the elegance and clarity of Singer’s style, but also his philosophical 
consistency. He is holding on to his most basic convictions overtime. 
Effectively, what becomes clear from a rough comparison between these two 
books is that Singer has not compromised on his position that we must extend 
the basic principle of equality to animals that are sentient, while his critics put 
their feet down just the same and, in one way or another, keep arguing against 
the philosophical underpinnings that underlie Singer’s position.   
Admittedly, the overall consensus on sentience as perhaps the most 
adequate criterion for the inclusion of at least some animals within the 
community of equals has to some extent caused the polemic on which criteria 
should inform our demarcation decisions to die down. It has not, however, 
resolved the demarcation problem and how it informs the polemical context in 
which animal rights are being discussed today. Rather, it seems that the initial 
polemic on which criteria would resolve our demarcation problem has now 
provoked another polemic on precisely which animals are sentient and on why 
those animals should or should not be entitled to moral consideration or rights.22 
In other words, the demarcation problem seems to have merely repeated itself in 
a different form, which has caused the animal rights debate to result in a 
deadlock.  
The reason for this deadlock and for its implied polemic, I propose, is that 
the question of the animal within today’s animal rights debate is framed from 
within the subject-object relation that the traditional Human-Animal opposition 
presupposes, which provokes an endless demarcation problem that turns on a 
renegotiating of the criteria that would enable a strengthening or weakening of 
this relation. Hence, if the resulting polemic has generally led to proposals for 
the refinement of the criteria proposed by Singer and Regan, such as we 
encounter, for example, in the Capabilities Approach of Martha C. Nussbaum,23 
it has not led to initiatives for confronting the persistent problem of demarcation 
that is left unresolved within such proposals. What is also left unaddressed, as 
we will see, is that the factory- farming industry presents a special problem for 
the persistent demarcation problem within the animal rights debate, not in the 
least for the growing awareness that factory-farmed animals might equally meet 
                                                 
21 Singer And His Critics, ed. Dale Jamieson, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1999). Peter Singer 
Under Fire: The Moral Iconoclast Faces His Critics, ed. Jeffrey A. Schaler, Volume 3 in the 
series Under Fire, (Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company 2009). 
22 For an illustration of this debate see: Alasdair Cochrane, Animal Rights without Liberation: 
Applied Ethics and Human Obligations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 19-54. 
23 Ibid, supra note 14. 
12 
 
the criteria of sentience, consciousness or some other cognitive capacity as the 
other animals in the race for personhood.24  
This is why the aim of my project is to explore the central issue of 
demarcation to move beyond the deadlock that characterizes the animal rights 
debate today. More specifically, I view the demarcation problem within Animal 
Studies as a problem of the way in which the difference between the human and 
the animal is thought through within an expansive model because it revolves 
around a basic principle of equality or inequality between the species. 
Effectively, what is left unaddressed within this discursive frame is the manner 
in which our thinking through of difference installs and sustains those 
categories. In other words, what characterizes the animal rights debate today is 
that difference is only thought through from within a discursive framework that 
describes difference as something in-between two poles, namely the human and 
the animal. The problem with this descriptive framework is that it leaves no 
space for an exploration of the way in which the animal, or for that matter, the 
human are categories that are produced within our thinking of difference to 
begin with. 
This is why I propose that this fundamental lack in the animal rights 
debate may be addressed if we attempt to think through the rhetorical strategies 
that produce our thinking of difference other than in terms of the typical criteria 
for demarcation mentioned above. In other words, if we concede that 
demarcation is not merely a constative matter of description on the basis of 
categories that underlie certain philosophical truths, but always also a 
performative act, close reading the texts that underlie today’s philosophical and 
juridical demarcations between the human and the animal is not merely a 
formalistic exercise.25 On the contrary, I believe that close readings within a 
performative rather than a descriptive framework might serve to expose the way 
in which the philosophical truths that inform the expansive model’s demarcation 
problem are rhetorically performed, which may shed a different light on the 
problem of demarcation and the limits posed by an expansive model.  
By implication, my close readings here will have to be more than what we 
generally understand by close reading a text. Effectively, it concerns an attitude 
                                                 
24 For an illustration of the growing awareness of the capacities of factory-farmed animals, in this 
case concerning chickens, see: Smith, Carolynn L. and Jane Johnson, “The Chicken Challenge: 
What Contemporary Studies of Fowl means for Science and Ethics.” In: Between The Species: An 
Online Journal for the Study of Philosophy and Animals; <http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ 
vol15/iss1/6/>. 
25 I am referring her, but will not elaborate on, the distinction that was made between constative 
and performative speech acts by J.L. Austin. See: J.L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962). 
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that may stand alongside the reading of animals in relation to human animals 
and ponders how the situation we find ourselves in within the animal rights 
debate has been created through language. More specifically, this attitude 
concerns a strategy of the “and” in that it combines close readings of texts that 
address the question of the animal with close readings that explore the relation 
between our conceptualizations of language and the way in which those texts 
work. Hence, if my focus on the insistent demarcation problem within our 
modern animal rights debate will necessarily have to diverge from the way in 
which the question of the animal is taken up within Animal Studies, let me now 
clarify in which way it differs from the approach to the question of the animal 
within the field of Law and Literature. 
In the field of Law and Literature, the question of the animal is generally 
approached by framing the discussion on animals and animal rights in either one 
of two different ways. On the one hand, we may recognize a strand that frames 
law-in-literature, whereby specific juridical issues and court cases within literary 
texts are studied and traced back to legal texts. On the other hand, we may 
recognize a strand that frames law-as-literature, whereby the primary issues 
under discussion within juridical texts are taken up within a narratological, 
semiotic or rhetorical analysis of those texts.26 The difference between the 
approach within Law and Literature studies and my strategy is that although I 
will also analyse literary and juridical texts, I will not generally read one text as 
being in some way representative of the other. Rather, it will be my aim to 
analyse literary texts in order to explore and call into question a number of 
fundamental juridical concepts implied within demarcation, such as personhood, 
harm and rights. This alternative strategy not merely requires a rhetorical 
reflection on the way in which one text might represent or help to analyse 
another, but asks for a more radical exploration of the role of language and how 
it operates the tropological formations that are performed to install those 
fundamental juridical concepts as always already implied within a discourse that 
hinges on the problem of demarcation. It is in this sense, then, that I wish to 
intervene within the discourses that structure today’s animal rights debate. 
 This is why I will begin each of the first three chapters with a case study 
                                                 
26 Since the 1970s the law-as-literature strand has become the focal point of attention for 
contemporary scholars around the world who corporate in Law and Literature programs and study 
groups. For example, in the Netherlands there is now a branch of the European Network for Law 
and Literature run by Jeanne Gaakeer, Professor at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, and Greta 
Olson, Professor at the Justus-Liebig Universität Giessen. For the classic text that is commonly 
regarded as initiating the Law and Literature movement and, hence, the law-as-literature studies 
of today see: James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination: Studies in the Nature of Legal Thought 
and Expression, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973).  
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that allows me to explore a different aspect of the problem of demarcation. My 
strategy here entails a strategy of double reading, whereby I will each time 
position a literary text alongside a politico-juridical case.27 This will enable me 
to address the questions on the fundamental juridical concepts both texts raise 
and to bring into focus the conceptual problems of demarcation that in the 
specific juridical-political case under discussion have remained implicit in spite 
of the controversies these cases have inspired. In the fourth chapter, I will put 
my findings on the tropological and performative confrontation with the 
problem of demarcation to the test and radicalize its implications through a 
reflection on the way in which language itself operates within the animal rights 
debate. It is here that I wish to connect the modern animal rights debate with the 
broader view on the question of the animal Heidegger introduced. 
 Now, if an expansive model centred in personhood installs a potentially 
endless demarcation problem, the question of personhood must be of central 
concern to my project of exploring its demarcation problem. This trajectory 
requires a thorough understanding of what Esposito has called “the juridical 
regime of personhood” and its subsequent relation to subjectivity.28 More 
specifically, since I intend to explore the tropological formations and conceptual 
nuances that operate the concept of person, the question of personhood and the 
way in which it installs subjectivity raises anthropomorphism as playing a key 
role in the person-ification of the animal.  
For this reason, I will start the first chapter with an exploration of the 
question of personhood by focusing on the intimate dynamics between the trope 
of personification and anthropomorphism. This exploration at once necessitates 
a fundamental concern with how language operates the notion of person and 
therefore offers a very precise theoretical reflection that I will need to develop 
the close reading attitude required for addressing the question of the animal in 
the remainder of this project. This is why I will explore the relation between 
anthropomorphism and personification by close reading Barbara Johnson’s 
valuable essay “Anthropomorphism in Lyric and Law.”29 In this essay, Johnson 
focuses on the question of anthropomorphism and its relation to the trope of 
personification by following up on “Anthropomorphism and Trope in the 
                                                 
27 I take the work of Soshana Felman as a source of inspiration for my strategy of double reading. 
See especially: Soshana Felman, The Juridical Unconscious:Trials and Traumas in the Twentieth 
Century, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 2002).  
28 Roberto Esposito, Third Person, trans. Zakiya Hanafi, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 2. 
29 Barbara Johnson, “Anthropomorphism in Lyric and Law.” In: Yale Journal of Law and the 
Humanities 10, 1998. 549-573. Reprinted (abridged) in: Material Events: Paul De Man and the 
Afterlife of Theory, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001).  
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Lyric,”30 a text by Paul de Man. If Johnson ultimately concludes there is no 
practical distinction to be made between anthropomorphism and trope, it is my 
intention to pick this matter up where Johnson left it, to advance her initial 
question. I will do so by carefully tracing back the way in which the specific 
concept of “person” Johnson brings to her study might have informed her 
conclusion on the relation between anthropomorphism and the trope of 
personification. This will provide me with an alternative framework for looking 
into the relation between anthropomorphism and trope, which will then help to 
develop a different reading of “person.” As we will see, this different person 
challenges the conventional understanding of what a person is and, as such, 
allows for distinguishing between anthropomorphism and trope on a practical 
level; that is, distinguishable within concrete texts. Once I have put my 
alternative framework in place, informed by this different “person,” I will 
pursue my project of exploring other ways of reading the construction of animal 
subjectivity and address the new questions this exploration raises in the chapters 
that lie ahead.  
In the second chapter I wish to explore the fundamental concepts of harm 
and cruelty and the way in which those are implied within an expansive model 
and the demarcation problem it poses. In my reading, if prior to the coming into 
being of the expansive model, the harm animals were potentially exposed to was 
exerted outside of the juridical sphere ‒ as animals were virtually non-existent as 
legal persons ‒ the implication of the current expansive model and its 
conceptualization of animal subjectivity through personhood, is that the harm 
animals are potentially exposed to ‒ those animals not considered fit to be 
attributed personhood ‒ is dictated and legitimized by the model itself and 
exerted within a juridical sphere. It is here, I argue, that we can perceive ‒ 
without having yet explored these concepts but by understanding them in a 
heuristic vein only ‒ a moment where “harm” seems to topple over into 
“cruelty,” at which stage the expansive model seems to turn against itself, 
especially as the grounds on which to attribute personhood remain unclear.31  
In order to address this issue, I will read the inclusion of essentially 
nonhuman animals within the expansive model as the creation of a single 
discursive space. In literature the equivalent of such a move would be 
introducing allegory. Exploring the way in which tropological formations 
                                                 
30 Paul de Man, “Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric,” The Rhetoric of Romanticism (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 239. 
31 For one of many alternatives proposed to the cluster of capacities that would make animals 
qualify for personhood such as we encounter in the work of Tom Regan, see: Steven M. Wise, 




construct animal subjectivity and how this relates to our more conceptual rather 
than my heuristic conception of harm and cruelty, I will reserve the second 
chapter for a close reading of George Orwell’s Animal Farm (1945) by taking it 
out of its defining historical frame as an allegory of the Cold War. The reading I 
propose instead takes Animal Farm as an allegoresis of animals seeking 
protection from harm, which will enable me to relate my findings back to the 
expansive model and to address the issues the concepts of harm and cruelty raise 
as a problem of the way in which language is taken up within allegorical 
reading. The concept of allegory as a historical mode that carries a preservative 
impulse here will enable me to bring into focus the animals that ‒ as Jonathan 
Safran Foer has stated elsewhere ‒ we are most directly involved with, the 
animals that we eat, and which present a specific if often neglected aspect of the 
demarcation problem within our modern animal rights debate.32 At the same 
time, addressing harm and its relation to cruelty through my allegoresis of 
Animal Farm will be the first step to bring, via the literary, the notion of 
suffering back to the heart of the animal rights debate. 
 In the third chapter, my exploration of the demarcation problem will focus 
on crossing the divide between Kant,33 and the way in which he attributed a 
sense of intrinsic worth (or dignity) to the human person, and the notion of 
person in the work of philosophers who, in the last three decades, have been at 
the forefront of the animal rights debate.34 Analysing the flaws of today’s 
juridical conception of personhood through this framework, I will suggest that 
working out an alternative conception of animal subjectivity necessitates a 
rethinking of what today is taken for granted as perhaps the most valuable idea 
the animal rights debate has produced yet: the idea that nonhuman animals share 
with human beings the capacity to suffer and therefore deserve our consideration 
and at least some juridical protection from harm. 
 As I will argue, this position, even while seeming to convey a radical turn 
away from Kant, has successfully turned the capacity to suffer into a modern 
day substitution of Kant’s idea of the distinguishing feature of the human being 
as a rational being. This amounts to a massive limitation because Bentham’s 
commitment to suffering does not have to be thought through as merely a 
scientific issue, but can also be thought of as inviting us to connect with the 
victimhoods of others. This is why, diverging from today’s interpretation of 
Bentham’s question as a radical turning away from Kant, my reading will be 
                                                 
32 See: Jonathan Safran Foer, Eating Animals (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2009). 
33 Immanuel Kant, The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), trans. Mary J. Gregor, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
34 Ibid supra note nr. 12. 
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informed by an alternative outlook on the notion of suffering. This alternative 
outlook is fostered by an understanding of suffering as something that is not to 
be thought of as a capacity, as something to be measured scientifically, but 
rather as the product of a problematic categorization of difference that infects 
today’s discourse on animal rights. This renewed focus on suffering will bring 
my work into dialogue with theorists such as Singer, Rachels, Heidegger and 
Derrida. Scrutinizing their work will provide a basis for, first, explaining how 
today’s ideas on the animals’ capacity to suffer differ from my own thinking 
through of suffering and the way in which it might inform animal subjectivity. 
Second, using the insights gained in the previous two chapters, I will develop an 
alternative approach to both my heuristic distinction and the conceptual 
distinction between harm and cruelty I explored in the second chapter by 
outlining an alternative notion of suffering. This effort will pave the way for 
examining the constructions of animal identities in George Orwell’s “Shooting 
an Elephant.”(1936). Close reading this text, I will put my findings on 
anthropomorphism and trope to the test and look at how the text constructs 
victimhood through the interactions of tropes. Consequently, alternatives to the 
text’s identity politics will be worked out through a different reading of those 
interactions.  
In the fourth chapter, I will argue that the traditional relation between the 
human and the animal still impinges on our juridical sphere today, whereas our 
modern understanding of the animal no longer bears any resemblance to this 
traditional understanding. To address this issue and the problem it gives rise to, 
namely our increasing inability to accommodate the animal both within our 
modern collective imagination and within our juridical discourse, I will book a 
return passage to the initial tri-partition Heidegger set up for thinking through 
the question of the animal. More specifically, taking in the position of a third 
myself, I will close read the way in which Derrida, in The Animal That 
Therefore I Am, deconstructed the Human-Animal opposition in Heidegger, in 
an attempt to read against this impingement and propose that the traditional 
Human-Animal opposition cannot be thought through without introducing a 
third category.35 It is my aim here to demonstrate that the coming into being of 
an expansive model, notably a few decades after the advent of factory-farming, 
is not just symptomatic of the way in which the Human-Animal opposition 
translates to and impinges on the juridical sphere today, but also, and more 
fundamentally, that it should be read as an urgent demand for a different 
division of space, both discursive and practical, in our time. It is here that art, 
                                                 
35 Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet, trans. David Wills, 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2008). 
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science and technology can intervene, in renegotiating the limits of this space. 
This, I believe, is already happening all around us and to this my current project 





Demarcation through Naming 
Rethinking Personhood by Way of Anthropomorphism 
 
 
They called him Klaus, after Lotte’s maternal grandfather, although at some 
point Lotte thought about calling him Hans, after her brother. But the name 
doesn’t really matter, thought Lotte, what matters is the person. 
 
(- From 2666, Roberto Bolaño) 
 
 
1. Introduction: Indian Dolphins 
 
In May 2013, the Indian government announced that dolphins were to be 
considered nonhuman persons who deserved their own specific rights. This is a 
passage taken literally from the official legal circular that was issued by the 
Central Zoo Authority. The text shows some grammatical inconsistencies that 
may be attributed to the specific juridical jargon in which it is conveyed: 
 
Whereas cetaceans in general are highly intelligent and sensitive, and 
various scientists who have researched dolphin behaviour have suggested 
that the unusually high intelligence; as compared to other animals means 
that dolphin should be seen as “non-human persons” and as such should 
have their own specific rights and is morally unacceptable to keep them 
captive for entertainment purpose,  
 
Whereas, cetaceans in general do not survive well in captivity. 
Confinement in captivity can seriously compromise the welfare and 
survival of all kinds of cetaceans by altering their behaviour and causing 
extreme distress. 36 
Various international broadcasters picked up the circulation. Deutsche Welle 
published an article that was headed: “Dolphins Gain Unprecedented Protection 
in India.”37 The Animal Liberation Front (ALF), in an equally celebratory tone, 
                                                 




stated: “Dolphins Granted Personhood by Government of India.”38 In both 
articles, a representative of the Federation of Indian Animal Protection 
Organizations (FIAPO), Puja Mitra, was cited: “This opens up a whole new 
discourse of ethics in the animal protection movement in India.”  
Effectively, what the Indian Government had ordered was not for dolphins 
to be granted legal personhood, but that dolphins, because of their intelligence 
and sensitivity, should no longer be held in captivity. As a result, the use of 
dolphins in aquatic theme parks was abolished. The scientific evidence that 
informed this decision was already there, since a few years before (2010) a 
group of scientists from different fields of expertise, law, behavioural biology, 
bioethics, marine biology, under the name of The Helsinki Group, had issued a 
declaration of rights for all cetaceans. This declaration was based, as their 
program states, on the principle of equal treatment for all persons.39  
The widespread confusion in the international press was in all likelihood 
caused by the text of the circular itself. The statement that dolphins “should” be 
viewed as nonhuman persons had all too readily been interpreted as if dolphins 
were granted legal personhood. Of course, one might attribute this confusion to 
broadcasters being too rash with their commentaries. However, since this 
“should” ‒ a verb that generally indicates an obligation to do whatever “should” 
be done ‒ was pronounced by the Indian government, i.e. the lawmaker itself, 
there is in principle no reason to assume it would not immediately follow up on 
its own imperative and grant dolphins legal personhood. 
And yet none of this happened. The Indian government’s explicit 
reference to dolphins as nonhuman persons did not warrant dolphins entering the 
human domain of rights through an expansion of India’s juridical model, nor did 
the Indian government take steps to ensure this was going to be realized in the 
near future. International broadcasters had not been too rash with their 
commentaries but were simply wrong. At the same time, the confusion as to 
why the Indian government did not follow up on its own imperative was left 
unresolved and appears to revolve around the notion of “person” as an 
ambiguous instance of language. This begs the question of what we are to make 
of the notion of person and whence the disparity between the facts presented by 
the Indian government and the journalistic reception of the case originates.  
The nature of the disparity is clear. Within the journalistic coverage of the 
case, the Indian government’s attribution of personhood to dolphins is 
                                                 
38 http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/Actions-India/DolphinsGetPersonhoodIndia.htm. 
The Animal Liberation Front cites from the following article on the website naturalnews.com. Mike 
Adams, “Dolphins Granted Personhood by Government of India.” 9 August 2013. See also 




confounded with the granting of legal personhood, whereas the Indian 
government’s decision to ban aquatic theme parks is centred on a clear-cut 
distinction between personhood and legal personhood, even if the text mentions 
that dolphins should have “their own specific rights.” Hence, within the 
journalistic coverage of the case, the concept of person is taken out of its 
immediate context and transferred to the predominantly human plane of rights, 
which suggests that the concepts person, humanity and legal person are 
understood as necessarily implying one another. In other words, the language of 
journalistic coverage does not present the facts of the case, but rather slips into a 
mode that anthropomorphizes “person” as human and thus as “legal person.” In 
this respect, the journalistic coverage of the case begs the question as to why 
there is apparently such a strong urge to make the concepts person, humanity 
and legal person imply one another in spite of the fact that the Indian dolphins 
case demonstrates that these concepts must be distinguished from one another in 
principle.  
My basic premise here is that treating something as a person implies more 
than making a juridical-political, philosophical or moral choice. In other words, 
what I think the confusion the Indian dolphins case gave rise to illustrates is that 
treating something as a person is not only a constative matter of voicing our 
convictions and opinions as a way of asserting our view of the world. Rather, it 
is always also a performative act embedded within particular rhetorical 
strategies that revolve around addressing something as a person and speaking 
about something as a person, etc. Indeed, I propose the animal rights debate to 
be so ridden with complexity precisely because the rhetorical logic of the key 
terms within which animal rights are discussed does not always follow its 
juridical-political, philosophical and moral underpinnings. In the case under 
discussion, for example, Western reporters immediately started anthropo-
morphizing the whole case despite there being no conceptual basis to do so at 
the time the circular was issued.  
With respect to this issue, the question of anthropomorphism can be said 
to run through the Indian dolphins case in two distinct but related ways. First, 
there is the concept “person” that is anthropomorphized by Western reporters. 
Second, there is the Indian government’s reliance on a vast body of scientific 
evidence testifying to the dolphin’s unusual intelligence and sensitivity that 
informs its decision to view dolphins as persons. This evidence is necessarily 
anthropocentric and hence, reliant on anthropomorphism, since characteristics 
that are commonly viewed as predominantly human ‒ intelligence and 
sensitivity ‒ are attributed to nonhumans. Of course, one might object that the 
dolphin’s intelligence and sensitivity must be conceived of as wholly different 
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from human intelligence and sensitivity and hence, that qualifying these 
characteristics as anthropomorphic attributions amounts to an unwarranted dis-
acknowledgement of the fundamental otherness of dolphins that scientific 
evidence presents. My answer to this objection would be that I am not disputing 
the rather obvious “otherness” of dolphins, but the terms in which this otherness 
is registered. Moreover, let us recall that in their declaration, the Helsinki group 
(as the original source of the evidence) strived for legal personhood for dolphins 
because of their profound likeness to human beings. 
 The more fundamental issue here, however, is that both forms of 
anthropomorphism apparently have a limit, since they do not warrant the 
inclusion of dolphins within the moral community under the guise of legal 
personhood. It is not my aim to explain away this limit by exploring the politics 
of the specific situation. One could, for example, argue that the Indian 
government simply used the scientific evidence on dolphins that was already in 
place to put a stop to the growing number of aquatic theme parks in order to 
meet the demands of certain pressure groups. However valuable such an analysis 
might be, it fails, firstly, to address the ambiguous stance of “person” that the 
case turns upon, the limit it installs and the confusion it breeds. Secondly, it does 
not allow for a better understanding of the ambiguous stance of personhood and 
of the role anthropomorphism plays in the personification of the animal.  
This is why I wish to zoom in on the confusion the case under discussion 
gave rise to as a result of the contradictory status of the term person and how it 
operates as a tool to demarcate entities both within and outside of the juridical 
sphere. Hence, I will not so much look at the term person as a constative matter 
‒ of interpretation or politics ‒ but rather as a problem of how difference is 




The etymology of the concept “person” can be traced back to the word phersu, 
which originally denoted the mask that performers in Etruscan rites wore and 
which, in the ancient Roman theatre, came to denote persona. In ancient Rome, 
the word persona took on a legal meaning and if it used to connote the role one 
played in the theatre it now becomes tied to the role one has to play in life. As 
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Richard E. Epstein40 has observed, this legal meaning of persona was much 
more complex than it is today: 
 
Given the divisions amongst human beings, the law of persons was always 
more complex in ancient legal systems than in modern ones. The Roman 
rules for men within the power of their fathers and for women and for 
insane persons all differed from each other in important particulars. Men 
within the power of their father could become heads of their own families 
at the death of their father; they had full rights to participate in political 
life even while consigned to a subordinate position within the family. 
(149) 
 
What becomes clear from the above passage is that the different degree of 
complexity between the Roman law of person and the law of person today must 
be attributed to the fact that modern law does not permit divisions into human 
beings and surely cannot subscribe the roles individual human beings are to play 
in life. In the words of the Italian philosopher Roberto Esposito,41 the Roman 
tradition has been overturned by what he views as a sharp subjectivist turn taken 
by legal theory: 
 
This is what happened to the idea of ‘person’ during the epochal transition 
from the objective formalism of Roman law to the individualistic 
subjectivism of modern rights. The moments these were awarded – at least 
since the French revolution, but already by the time of Hobbes – to all 
humans, who were thus made equal by their common status as subjects, 
and then as citizens, at the moment the Roman separation between distinct 
human categories is said to have collapsed, along with the original 
distance between mask and face: not only because every individual now 
had its own mask, as it were, but because the mask adhered to the face so 
intrinsically that it became an integral part of it. (11)  
 
The advent of human rights, then, no matter what exact historical origin one 
wishes to retrace it to, has had severe implications for the juridical notion of 
person today. Roughly, the notion of person has come to denote the individual 
                                                 
40 Richard E. Epstein, “Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights.” In: Animal Rights, Current 
Debates and New Directions, ed. Cass. R. Sunstein and Martha C. Nussbaum, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 143-161. 
41 Ibid, supra note nr. 28. 
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human being as a subject of law that has certain inalienable rights, at the very 
least to life, to property, liberty and well-being.  
These rights no longer permit divisions between human beings but are 
considered universal rights that are equal to all persons. According to Esposito, 
we are still living under a regime of personhood whereas the modern notion of 
person has largely remained unquestioned: 
 
Nowhere to my knowledge, not even in the midst of the most profound 
disagreement of what may or should be defined as a person (not to 
mention the equally problematic distinction between a potential and an 
actual person), is what we, by habit or choice, call ‘person’ ever 
questioned – much less its absolute onto-theological primacy. (2) 
 
Having begged the question, Esposito challenges the regime of personhood. He 
does so through a profound analysis of the person as a legal category. More 
specifically, he traces back the history of the legal category “person” as a 
dispositif: as key to a bio-politics that functions as a tool for demarcation by 
excluding others from the juridical sphere. Hence, what Esposito’s focus on 
person implicitly acknowledges is that person is a much more complex 
phenomenon than the characteristic polemic on criteria for personhood within 
the animal rights debate would suggest. With respect to the Indian dolphins case, 
it shows, first, that person is not merely an empty form on which certain 
characteristics or capacities, like intelligence and sensitivity can be inscribed. 
Second, it suggests that the notion of person is so deeply enshrined within our 
juridico-political sphere that we cannot simply work our way around it by 
mending it to suit our changing ideas about the legal status of animals.  
What Esposito does not address, however, is how the personification of 
entities from outside of, to within the juridical sphere comes about. Hence, his 
concern with person hinges on (bio)-political argumentations rather than on an 
exploration of person as an ambiguous instance of language performed through 
anthropomorphisms and personifications that are embedded within rhetorical 
reading strategies. As such, his valuable approach remains blind to the 
ambiguous stance of the term “person” that we detected within the Indian 
dolphins case. Since I view this ambiguous status as the most important 
unresolved issue within the animal rights debate, I choose to follow a more 
radical logic by focusing on person as a performative instance of language. This 
is why I wish to explore the role of the personification and its relation to 
anthropomorphism in what lies ahead.  
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 Before I zoom in on the relation between anthropomorphism and 
personification, however, it is important to note that within the animal rights 
debate today anthropomorphism is generally not understood as a rhetorical 
strategy at all. In this respect, the following comment by Sandra D. Mitchell is 
particularly telling of the approach to anthropomorphism within today’s animal 
rights debate:42 
 
However, even though anthropomorphic models can be treated as science 
as usual, unique problems for these models still remain. These problems 
have to do with the way in which language descriptive of our experience 
travels back and forth between scientific and social domains. (89) 
 
In this passage, Mitchell addresses the problem of anthropomorphism by 
treating language as something descriptive of our experience within specific and 
separate domains. This understanding of anthropomorphism corresponds to the 
way in which anthropomorphism is conventionally defined, namely as the 
attribution of something human to something nonhuman.43 It rightfully suggests 
that anthropomorphism plays a key role in presenting something nonhuman as 
human, but ignores the role anthropomorphism plays as a rhetorical strategy that 
performs personification. In order to address this characteristic lack within the 
animal rights debate, I first wish to provide a framework that allows for a clear-
cut distinction between anthropomorphism and the trope of personification. Let 
us, therefore, turn to a text that seems to present a welcome exception to taking 
up anthropomorphism in a conventional manner and which therefore will be key 
to my immediate purpose of resolving the paradoxical stance of the word person 
within the animal rights debate.  
 
 
3. Anthropomorphism and Personification 
 
In Barbara Johnson’s valuable essay “Anthropomorphism in Lyric and Law,”44 
Johnson explores the question of anthropomorphism and its relation to the trope 
of personification by following up on “Anthropomorphism and Trope in the 
Lyric,”45 a text by Paul de Man. Roughly, Johnson’s essay reflects the following 
position of both herself and De Man on the difference between anthropo-
                                                 
42 Sandra D. Mitchell, “Anthropomorphism and Cross-Species Modelling,” ibid, supra note 18. 
43 “The attribution of human characteristics or behaviour to a god, animal or object,” Oxford 
Dictionary of English, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
44 Ibid, supra note 29. 
45 Ibid, supra note 30. 
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morphism and trope: If De Man maintains it is possible to make an essential 
distinction between anthropomorphism and trope, Johnson disagrees. She 
motivates her disagreement with De Man by turning the trope of personification 
into a primary example of this impossibility, claiming: “on the level of text the 
mingling of personifications on the same footing as real agents threatens to 
make the uncertainty about what humanness is come to consciousness […]” In 
short, Johnson argues it is impossible to distinguish between anthropomorphism 
and the trope of personification in any given text because we can never be sure 
what humanness means. Johnson thus follows, but also goes against De Man 
because she argues that his notion of an essential difference between 
anthropomorphism and trope can only be thought as an abstract matter, since 
establishing such a difference would necessarily be reliant on a positive 
knowledge about what humanness is.  
As much as I agree with Johnson on the impossibility of defining 
humanness, conceiving of the difference between anthropomorphism and trope 
as an abstract matter only, and leaving it at that, would prove quite useless to my 
project of resolving the ambiguous stance of person within the Indian dolphins 
case, in particular, and the paradoxical stance of person within the wider animal 
rights debate in general. More specifically, it hinders studying the interaction of 
trope and anthropomorphism within concrete texts, which is a prerequisite for 
my further exploration of the construction of animal subjectivity within an 
expansive model. For this reason, I will now zoom in on Johnson’s text to see if 
we can tease out a practical distinction between anthropomorphism and trope 
that can inform a different outlook on “person” and its relation to subjectivity. 
Johnson begins her investigation into the nature of anthropomorphism by 
identifying lyric and law as two very different ways of instating what a person 
is, in order to see how these persons can illuminate one another (550). Johnson’s 
framework thus revolves around personhood as both a rhetorical and juridical 
question. In an attempt to address these two questions, she effectively posits the 
lyrical person on the one hand, and the legal person on the other, through a 
juxtaposition of texts from the fields of literature and law. First, by discussing de 
Man’s analysis of two sonnets by Baudelaire; second, by offering us insight into 
a text, or multiple texts, regarding a Supreme Court opinion from 1993: 
Rowland v. California Men’s Colony.46 In what follows, I will analyse the way 
in which Johnson reads into the texts she has selected from both fields. Before I 
do so, however, it is noteworthy that apart from mentioning lyric and law as two 
different ways of instating what a person is, Johnson does not start her essay 
with an explanation of the term person as such. Instead, the only clue Johnson 
                                                 
46 Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). 
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provides at this point is the dictionary definition of anthropomorphism as a 
heading for her essay. This is why I will now first analyse this heading to try and 
come to a better understanding of her notion of person. Here it is:  
 
Anthropomorphism. n. The attribution of human motivation, character-
ristics, or behavior to inanimate objects, animals, or natural phenomena. 
(549)  
 
The word person is not mentioned in the definition. I take this to suggest that 
Johnson reads anthropomorphism as a form of person-ification as I do, but also 
that she here chooses to read the concept of person in its conventional sense, as 
connoting the human person. What is left unaddressed in this approach, then, is 
precisely the conventionality of the relation between human person and 
“person.” In other words, if the concept of person is not a constitutive element of 
the conventional (dictionary) definition of anthropomorphism, this suggests that, 
outside the strictly juridical sphere, an anthropomorphism does not necessarily 
concern the attribution of personhood to what is considered an essentially 
nonhuman entity. It implies that even if person is conventionally understood as 
human it does not mean that human has to be understood as person. Rather, what 
is considered human at any given stage could also be something else, like a 
motivation or certain characteristics. Hence, the word person could – as with any 
noun that does form a constitutive element of the above definition – be subject 
to further definition and inspire debates about what it supposedly conveys in 
terms of meaning.  
It is here that my investigation into anthropomorphism begins to diverge 
from Johnson’s, because it will turn upon an exploration of just such a non-
conventional understanding of person. To illustrate my argument let us 
momentarily read this conventional definition of anthropomorphism in the 
following more schematic manner to see what it might be about if not 
necessarily about “person:” 
 
human, motivation, characteristics, behavior attributed to inanimate, 
objects, animals, natural phenomena  
 
The term anthropomorphism here functions in the same way as the word person 
and as the words that form the elementary parts of its definition: as a non-
specific noun subject to further definition. In fact, understanding what the 
sentence comprising the above definition of anthropomorphism means would 
imply agreeing upon every part of it and on the way these words relate and 
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interact within a certain (fixed) context. It would require a system that contains 
meaning within strict boundaries, a self-enclosing hermetic unity within a 
context-less space, resembling the picture of a prison without an outside. 
Obviously, this impossible figure is not a viable option for reading into the 
conventional definition of anthropomorphism. The only thing that in my view 
does become clear from this definition is that there must be an attribution of 
something human to something nonhuman and that anthropomorphism is 
undeniably an act, an act of attribution. Yet, the definition does not provide any 
clue as to what exactly marks the shift in register that it bespeaks (human to 
nonhuman). At most it says: anthropomorphism is the undoing of the shift from 
human to nonhuman by attributing to the nonhuman something human. This 
may seem paradoxical and indeed it is.  
For the attribution of something human to something nonhuman to be 
conceivable, there has to be an imaginary moment, perhaps in a no longer 
retrievable past, when the human decided to distinguish itself from what it 
regarded as essentially different from itself, as nonhuman. I do not mean 
anthropomorphism effectuates some longing for a beginning, wholeness and 
connection to what is considered essentially lost or other. I only wish to suggest 
that in the act of anthropomorphism there is a mechanism at work that attributes 
to the nonhuman something human and that in this act, in this moment of acting, 
the human seems to exert itself by carrying off the suggestion, a suggestion that 
was not there before the act, as if this nonhuman has always been human after 
all. In other words, if this essentially nonhuman entity has now – through an act 
of anthropomorphism – become somehow human, it must always have been 
somehow human, since otherwise the human cannot be maintained as an 
essential category. The nonhuman does not become human, then, in the act of 
anthropomorphism, but through a corrective measure only now has been 
(re)cognized and labelled as such.  
This state of affairs seems, first, to defer the question of what 
anthropomorphism is to the question of what it means to be human and second, 
render the term human meaningless. I will return to this deferral and the 
concurrent inflation of the term human shortly. Here, I only wish to observe that 
although “person” is a key concept in law and conventionally connotes the 
human person, the conventional understanding of anthropomorphism – whether 
the one I just deducted or the one conveyed in the heading of Johnson’s essay – 
does not warrant an understanding of the relation between anthropomorphism 
and person as fixed. In fact, zooming in on the claim that informs Johnson’s 
juxtaposition of lyric and law and the way in which it relies on the convention of 
the human person, suggests that there is something contradictory about this 
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claim itself. I consider it, therefore, worthwhile examining it further. Here it is, 
in the first sentence of the following passage: 
  
More profoundly, though, lyric and law might be seen as two very 
different ways of instating what a ‘person’ is. There appears to be the 
greatest possible discrepancy between a lyric ‘person’ – emotive, 
subjective, individual – and a legal ‘person’ rational, rights-bearing, 
institutional. In this paper I will try to show, through the question of 
anthropomorphism, how these two “persons” can illuminate one another. 
(550, italics mine, BV) 
 
First, here “person” is treated as a self-same and single phenomenon, whereas 
the very different ways (plural) in which this person is instated (legal or lyric) 
apparently capacitate its meaning. Second, the claim does not read that lyric and 
law might be seen as two very different ways of what person is, but rather of 
what a person is. The specific reference that is made to person by the indefinite 
article “a” is left unmotivated and registers person as nonspecific. It makes me 
wonder why it is brought up and why in this way, so surreptitiously, i.e. without 
fitting this “a” in between quotation marks as well? The self-sameness and 
singleness of this person is further emphasized when, in the following lines, 
Johnson states: “In this paper I will try to show, through the question of 
anthropomorphism, how these two “persons” can illuminate each other.” (550) 
We have now shifted from a person to two persons who in terms of their identity 
– supposedly – remain self-same.  
Naturally, I cannot trace the motivations that underlie Johnson’s choice of 
words. What I can do is examine how those words work. Here, I would argue, 
the mentioning of this “a” without fitting it in between the quotation marks 
works – disguised as a manner of speech – to stress the singleness of this person, 
a singleness once more disclosed by contrasting it with the explicit plurality (the 
very different ways) of the adjectives that supposedly determine its meaning. 
One might object that my argument is far-fetched here because asking the 
question about what person is without mentioning this “a” at all would be 
grammatically incorrect. Yet, considering this grammatically incorrect not only 
betrays a conventional approach to person as human person, but also implies 
conforming to a convention that insists on infecting the word person with 
singleness as the result of a conventional grammatical rule.  
In short, using the figure of contrast as Johnson does here, not only 
encourages us to conceive of person as a single phenomenon, but also 
legitimates the conflation or rather, substitution, of singleness with individuality 
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and thereby works to add a human dimension to the noun person. Compared to 
animals, plants or objects – although these terms equally remain subject to 
further definition – individuality is generally regarded, if not as specifically 
human, then as a paramount human trait, justifying human treatment. Of course, 
the difference between individuality and singleness is still more complex as we 
would probably not kill the last chicken, in spite of the fact that we do not 
generally regard chickens as individuals. The point here, however, is that 
Johnson’s angle on person as a single phenomenon operating within two 
juxtaposed but separated domains of lyric and law allows the terms singleness 
and individuality to be subjected to conflation. This procedure can only be 
understood if Johnson has – however unwillingly – on this human/nonhuman 
axis taken the lyrical person to implicitly connote the human (individual) person. 
This human (individual) person then is made to perform a stand-off with the so-
called legal and potentially nonhuman (non-individual) person who, or which, 
does not strictly need these implicit qualifications in the shape of fixed 
adjectives.  
Thus, instead of addressing the relation between the concept of person and 
human person that “humanness” conventionally connotes, Johnson uses a 
framework that can only take this relation as given. This “taking as given” 
consists of investing the noun person with an intrinsic humanness instead of 
questioning the conventionality of this procedure. It now becomes clear why 
Johnson opts for the personification as the most important trope to be examined, 
since reducing the differences between anthropomorphism and trope to the 
difference between anthropomorphism and personification both presupposes and 
reinforces the conventional relation between person and human person. In other 
words, it betrays a reading of the trope of personification quite literally as a 
person-ification, whilst considering anthropomorphism to be such a person-
making concept as well. Hence, Johnson’s framework here contradicts itself 
because it relies on reading the trope of personification as an anthropomorphism 
prior to the exploration of the differences between those terms.  
Within such a framework the potential for difference between the two 
concepts is cancelled out before it can take root; or, as can be gathered from 
Johnson’s conclusion, can be conceived of as a highly abstract matter only. 
Johnson’s understanding of person, then, is contaminated by an unwarranted 
investment with humanness and thus with the implied notion of individuality 
that humanness connotes; not because Johnson does not appreciate person as not 
necessarily human, but because the specific way in which she juxtaposes lyric 
and law is necessarily reliant on this contamination. In fact, each time she tries 
to loosen the fixity of the relation between person and human person by 
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uncritically transposing her contaminated person to another plane, it becomes 
clear how Johnson’s person is always already informed by this human 
individuality (by this “a” person”). And it is this attempt at loosening that 
suggests something is sticking. This human individuality, however, does not 
stick to this person of itself, but is forced into being by treating these very 
different persons as nouns that rely for their meaning on their accompanying 
adjectives – as identical containers that can be filled with meaning. It is as if 
Johnson is asking the question: What if this human person is not human?  
This particular conception of person might be considered to stem from a 
statement Johnson formulates earlier on in her essay, when, after quoting the 
Keatsian chiasmus “Beauty is Truth, Truth Beauty,” she states that: “a common 
contemporary way of viewing the relations between law and literature is through 
the relation between epistemology and rhetoric.” (551). To be sure, Johnson here 
does not state her own opinion on the matter but points out the conventional way 
of framing the relation between law and literature. However, neither does she at 
this point provide an alternative to what seems an all too rigid divide between 
the interrelated textual fields of literature and law. In fact, Johnson’s reference to 
the “contemporary commonness” of her statement can not just be read as 
pointing to a convention, but also as working to gloss over the fact that the claim 
itself is not motivated. Hence, referring to the “contemporary commonness” of 
her statement without addressing it critically here comes to function as a rhetoric 
tool that substitutes the motivation itself. In this respect, the brackets are 
particularly telling: (“which can stand as a common contemporary way of 
framing the relations between law and literature”), as they work together with 
the notion of “contemporary commonness” to construe an aura of factuality, of 
the matter-of-factness of what is being claimed. A logical thinking through of 
this rigid framing, however, would result in having to regard (A): beauty, 
rhetoric and lyric/literature and (B) truth, epistemology and law as part of an 
elaborate and immensely vague binary which, nevertheless, draws a neat line 
between epistemology and rhetoric as strictly corresponding to what 
consequently comes to be considered as the separate(d) domains of lyric and 
law.  
Now, if Johnson’s framework hinders developing a clear-cut distinction 
between anthropomorphism and trope because it fosters a conventional 
confusion of persons, I now wish to carve out an alternative framework by 
letting go of the conventional relation between person and human person 
altogether. I do so, first, by understanding Johnson’s person as a homonym. I 
imagine this homonymic person as a word that does not necessarily have any 
inherent meaning in common with a word that happens to constitute the same 
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name.47 In fact, as a homonym, this person has nothing in common with any 
interpretation that would allow for treating it either in some aspects or entirely in 
the same vein in terms of meaning, i.e. as synonymous or as synonyms that have 
somehow reached perfection and become identical. Admittedly, this is a 
nonsensical remark: synonyms cannot reach perfection but exist because of the 
difference they assume. It is, however, the theoretical (logical) outcome of 
thinking through Johnson’s confusion of persons and thus illustrates the need for 
another framework. Second, the homonym person does not inhabit a spectrum 
that allows for gradual scaling. It is a piece of language, a free-floating signifier. 
Third, my specific understanding of person as a homonym implies that 
Johnson’s very different ways of instating what a person is (legal and lyric) are 
not so very different at all. Rather, they are alike, in that they both function and 
find their meaning exclusively in and through the very (text) system (legal by 
law and lyric by literature) that happens to proclaim them. Finally, the changed 
status of person along the lines I propose here must also have consequences for 
the status of its adjectives. Those adjectives (lyric and legal) no longer 
determine its meaning. Therefore, I suggest that from now on we treat both 
lyrical person and legal person as one single phrase, as a name, as a first name 
accompanying a surname and together, only together, making up an official sort 
of identity. If the reader is not immediately convinced please consider this 
aggregation as a heuristic tool that will enable me to provide a workable 
definition of anthropomorphism in what lies ahead.  
So, let us – informed by my homonymic understanding of person – take 
on the question of anthropomorphism through a discussion of Johnson’s 
dialogue with De Man. Prior to presenting us with De Man’s definition of 
anthropomorphism, Johnson follows him in quoting Nietzsche’s famous 
aphorism on what truth is: “A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, and 
anthropomorphisms.”48 Johnson adds:  
 
De Man claims that metaphor and metonymy are tropes whereas 
anthropomorphism, while structured similarly, is not the name of a pure 
rhetorical structure, but the name of a comparison, one of whose terms is 
treated as a given (as epistemologically resolved). To use an 
anthropomorphism is to treat as known what the properties of the human 
are. (551, italics in text) 
 
                                                 
47 Via Latin from Greek: homos (same) onoma (Name). OED. (Oxford, 2003). 
48 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Truth and Falsity in an Ultramoral Sense.” In: The Complete Works of 
Frederick Nietzsche, ed. Oscar Levy, (New York: Macmillan, 1924). 
33 
 
From this introductory and clarifying comment on De Man’s exact words it 
logically follows that Johnson, in following De Man, has fixed the tropes within 
the lyric-beauty-rhetoric part of the binary that results from the conventional 
confusion of persons I have just discussed. By the same token, 
anthropomorphism is placed within the truth-epistemology-law part. At this 
stage of her essay, Johnson thus not only agrees with De Man’s argument of 
anthropomorphism and trope as two essentially different concepts, but also 
chooses to put emphasis on this difference, stressing it and interpreting it in a 
particular way by appointing these concepts two separate domains.  
In this context, the fact that Johnson has italicized the word known, is 
significant, as it de-emphasizes the treating as known, which would complicate 
a clear-cut division between anthropomorphism and trope, suggesting mingling 
or overlapping domains. Johnson then cites De Man’s exact words in order to 
zoom in on the problem:  
 
“Anthropomorphism” is not just a trope but an identification on the level 
of substance. It takes one entity for another and thus implies the 
constitution of specific entities prior to their confusion, the taking of 
something for something else that can then be assumed to be given. 
Anthropomorphism freezes the infinite chain of tropological 
transformations and propositions into one single assertion of essence 
which, as such, excludes all others. It is no longer a proposition but a 
proper name. (552, italics in text) 
  
Please note the not so slight but instead significant difference in Johnson and De 
Man’s respective angles on anthropomorphism. Whereas Johnson focuses on 
treating terms as known, de Man focuses on the treating as known (the taking of 
something for something else that can then be assumed to be given). De Man 
thus explicitly talks about an act, whereas Johnson’s comment relays attention 
from the active verb “to treat” to the more static “to treat as known” in a matter-
of-fact way, emphasizing it by means of italicization. What strikes me as odd in 
Johnson’s further comment is that after quoting De Man’s definition in full she 
proceeds to ignore the body of it as she only mentions the beginning 
(anthropomorphism is not just a trope) and the end (anthropomorphism is a 
proper name). I will discuss the differences between trope and anthropo-
morphism in relation to defining anthropomorphism as a “proper name” shortly. 
First, I will continue to follow Johnson and explore why she might have chosen 
to leave the entire body of De Man’s definition out; to find out what is meant by 
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this “not just a trope”; to then work towards a clarification of the relation 
between person and anthropomorphism from the perspective of the law.  
What makes Johnson’s framework so relevant to this purpose is its 
reliance on a conventional understanding of the word person as human person, 
because it is precisely such a conventional understanding of person that also 
seems to inform the bypassing of the question of personhood within an 
expansive model. In this respect, Johnson’s framework parallels the journalistic 
coverage of the Indian dolphins case. Both within and outside of the law, 
however, as also became clear from the Indian dolphins case, personhood is not 
exclusively attributed to humans, nor is legal personhood, since, for example, 
corporations are commonly granted the status of legal person.49 In other words, 
the attribution of personhood to nonhuman entities at once contradicts the 
expansive model’s own conventional understanding of person. Hence, the 
expansive model does not imply: this entity, this animal, is a human. Instead it 
implies: this entity, this animal, can be attributed personhood and thus becomes 
a legal person. Once this confusion of person with human person has been 
effectuated, the entity, whether essentially human or not, becomes a legal 
person, no longer necessarily essentially human. If such a contradictory 
confusing of persons can, at most, result in differentiating between anthropo-
morphism and personification on an abstract level, disentangling this confusion 
is key to distinguishing between anthropomorphism and trope on a more 
practical level.  
Now, if Johnson investigates what constitutes a legal person whilst relying 
on a framework centred in a conventional – synonymic – understanding of 
person, my homonymic understanding of the word person provides me with a 
framework that reads legal person as an aggregation. Bearing this difference in 
mind, I will now analyse Johnson’s reading of the court case and try to do 
justice to its complexity by carefully moving back and forth between these two 
different stances of person.  
 
 
4. Anthropomorphism and Law and the Lyric 
 
The court case Johnson discusses is about a group of prisoners that wishes to sue 
the prison for abolishing a policy that previously secured the entitlement to free 
                                                 
49 For an exploration of how business corporations evolved into legal persons see: Gregory A. 
Mark “The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law.” In: Yale Law Journal 




tobacco for prisoners who lacked sufficient funds. Since the prisoner’s council is 
not allowed to possess any funds of its own and thus cannot finance a lawsuit, it 
attempts to lay claim to a provision in the United States law known as in forma 
pauperis proceedings. This provision allows persons to be exempted from the 
prepayment of legal fees if they can prove to be indigent. Hence, before the 
court can even begin to consider whether or not the prisoners can get their 
cigarettes restored, it first has to decide if the prisoner’s council can be attributed 
the legal status of person.  
The court case thus indisputably seems to be about personhood, about 
what constitutes a person. Within my homonymic understanding of person, 
however, it is not, or only to the extent that the case is treated as such. In my 
view, the case is about what constitutes a legal person. Without wanting to 
rehearse all the arguments put forward in this particular case to either grant or 
deny the prisoner’s council the status of legal person, let me rephrase the 
problem in a somewhat oversimplified but clear way: The issue the court faces 
turns upon whether a council can be poor and thus be qualified person or be 
qualified a person and thus be poor. This issue can be outlined schematically as 
resembling the figure of the following chiasmus: “Poor is Person, Person is 
Poor.” However, there is something odd about the way in which this chiasmus 
works. Whereas the chiasmus is the rhetorical figure that both separates and 
binds, this chiasmus only binds because it treats as given these two words – poor 
and person – by fixating them through a swapping of attributes in order to turn 
them into “perfect synonyms.” I am using the nonsensical term “perfect 
synonyms” here to illustrate how the differences between the word person and 
poor are blotted out to the point of substitution by cutting off the chiasmus 
before it can realize its potential.  
It is this procedure, this application of what could at best be qualified as a 
rudimentary chiasmus, which would enable the court to decide in favour of the 
council: which would ultimately imply naming it a legal person. Indeed, all the 
court has to do, (but, as we will see, never did) is to attribute the council either 
one of the terms – poor or person – and then substitute it for the other; that is 
then taken as given in De Man’s sense. Viewed this way, and more importantly, 
presented by the court in this way, it seems the court here is acting as an entity 
that is trying to deal with the question of what it can or cannot name person in a 
very sensible and responsible way. Yet in fact it did not. And the fact that it did 
not had everything to do with the confusion into sameness of the terms person 
and poor that stems from the conventional confusion of persons I have discussed 
earlier on. But how does this confusion of terms come to structure the court 
case? The rudimentary chiasmus “Poor is Person, Person is Poor” is read 
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through the lens of another rudimentary chiasmus, which then comes to motivate 
it: 
 
 “in forma pauperis is legal person, legal person is in forma pauperis.” 
 
In this particular case, the court does not distinguish between person and legal 
person because its conventional confusion of persons may conveniently result in 
the confusion of in forma pauperis with poor. The court reasons: Poor is in 
forma pauperis is person is legal person, whereby it can randomly substitute any 
of the above terms for the other if only each time it fits this magical word “is” in 
between. Strictly speaking, however, the prisoner’s council cannot sue in forma 
pauperis because it is poor or a person, but only as a legal person, which it can 
only become after being named legal person. The juridical term in forma 
pauperis, then, is not to be taken as meaning the same as poor in the sense in 
which I, for example, could claim to be poor for lack of money or imagination. I 
cannot be in forma pauperis. I can only sue in forma pauperis and only as a 
legal person. Thus, if in forma pauperis is not to be confused with poor, the 
confusion of person with legal person must also be unwarranted. In short, the 
juridical term in forma pauperis only acquires its meaning in the arena of the 
law as a position a legal person can entertain. The nonhuman/human discussion 
on the word poor is not the issue here, but merely serves to gloss over the 
pattern of unwarranted confusions (or rather substitutions into sameness) the 
court allows itself to fall prey to in order to come away with a responsible 
appearance. Bearing these dynamics in mind, the question becomes how the 
court case can be instructive in gaining a better understanding of anthropo-
morphism and its stake in the attribution of personhood.  
To begin with, we can now distinguish between three different definitions 
of anthropomorphism in play. The first definition resembles the dictionary 
definition heading Johnson’s essay and ultimately concerns, as I deduced, the 
attribution of something human to something nonhuman. I will, from now on, 
refer to this form of anthropomorphism as conventional. The second way of 
looking at anthropomorphism stems from the body of De Man’s definition, the 
taking of something for something else that is assumed to be given. I will refer 
to this form as strict because despite the fact that it is the human that takes 
something as given, the “what” that is taken as given does not necessarily 
involve something human, but, strictly speaking, concerns any “taking as 
given.” The third form of anthropomorphism I would like to distinguish here is 
De Man’s somewhat mystical description of anthropomorphism as a proper 
name, which logically follows from the second. Let us now bring these 
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provisionally distinguished forms of anthropomorphism back to the court case 
and examine how conceiving of them as such would work out in practical terms. 
If the court had decided that, yes, the prisoner’s council is admitted into 
the system, then it relies on an anthropomorphism in the conventional sense, in 
that it has somehow – through an ingenious language game – attributed human 
characteristics, motivations or behaviour, let us say “something human,” to this 
entity previously considered nonhuman. Whereas the court might feel the need 
to consider something as human for practical purposes and without considering 
the entity it takes to be human as essentially human per se, such a decision 
would, in principle, imply that the law pretends to know what is essentially 
human.  
If the court decides not to admit the prisoner’s council, which it actually 
did, it means that the anthropomorphism in the conventional sense – if we were 
still to follow the court and Johnson in confusing persons – is lost; but, not the 
anthropomorphism in the strict sense, because it is the treating of the case 
through the frame of the aforementioned rudimentary chiasmus as given that 
remains anthropomorphic. In short, deciding not to let the council enter does 
nothing to prevent this strict form of anthropomorphism, but opens up an 
intrinsic arbitrariness, thereby revealing not a potential, but a fundamental 
arbitrariness, and by consequence cruelty, at the heart of the court’s operation.  
As I will show in my next chapter, my provisional qualification of this 
dynamic as cruel begs the question of how cruelty and harm relate to the 
ambiguous stance of person both within and outside of the animal right debate. 
For now, a look at the Oxford English Dictionary (2003) only underscores the 
need for such an exploration in what lies ahead. It denotes harm as causing pain 
or suffering to others, intentionally or not, and cruelty as wilfully causing pain 
or suffering to others, or, feeling no concern about it. Although these definitions 
suit my more immediate purpose, they surely do not provide any clue on the 
way in which these terms might be conceptualized in their specific relation to 
animals. The point here, however, is that the dynamic I have now provisionally 
qualified as installing a fundamental cruelty does not stem from not allowing in 
this entity that is asking for admittance. Rather, it seems that at the heart of this 
fundamental cruelty lies a systemic lack of curiosity, a legal disposition that 
prevents opening up to this entity. Indeed, as we have seen, the court has bound 
itself to a rudimentary chiasmus that it has installed as its mode of operation. If, 
in this particular case, we are talking about a group of prisoners and not about 
animals, the principle – from the perspective of my provisional definitions of 
harm and cruelty – seems to remain the same: not granting either group the 
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status of legal person installs a juridical order that legitimizes the harm they 
potentially suffer as a result of this decision.  
Hence, if we momentarily follow the dictionary definitions mentioned 
above, the harm the prisoners are potentially exposed to can be said to realize its 
potential for cruelty once they run out of cigarettes. This cruelty consists of not 
having to be concerned with the prisoners’ problem, once the decision not to 
qualify the prisoner’s council as a person has been effectuated. In short, instead 
of demonstrating sensibility and responsibility, the court’s decision as to 
whether the prisoners will be allowed to sue in forma pauperis clearly has 
nothing to do with the real life problem of the prisoners who want their 
cigarettes restored. Rather, the court’s decision relies solely on a formal 
procedure, a formality, however important that may be, especially in the 
juridical domain. 
 If De Man’s definition of anthropomorphism as a “taking as given” here 
exposes the fundamental cruelty a conventional confusion of persons may result 
in, it does not mean his definition is perfect. Indeed, adhering to De Man’s 
definition we would still potentially turn a blind eye if the court had ruled in 
favour of the council, and equally call it an anthropomorphism, taking/mistaking 
the conventional form of anthropomorphism as a taking as given quite literally, 
as a form of naming something human instead of attributing something human 
to something nonhuman. It is this interpretative pitfall – confusing naming with 
attributing – that I surmise to be the reason why Johnson has glossed over the 
body of De Man’s definition and focused on the known instead of the treating as 
known. It works to conveniently bypass the question of what it means to be 
human, whereas the anthropomorphic treating as given always takes place 
before the decision that only comes after the fact. Thus, the problem with De 
Man’s definition of anthropomorphism as a treating as given is that it potentially 
encapsulates the conventional anthropomorphic attribution of something human 
to something nonhuman because it cannot address the underlying confusion of 
personhood (attributing) with legal personhood (naming).  
In this sense, both definitions (conventional and strict) do not so much 
bespeak an anthropomorphism but curiously are – precisely by allowing for this 
confusion – made to work as anthropomorphisms themselves. This is 
problematic because each time the court says, “yes, you are admitted into the 
system” on this necessarily arbitrary basis, an entrance fee is paid and a 
potential other entity is thereby necessarily excluded through an 
unacknowledged anthropomorphism that Johnson’s conventional definition does 
not account for and that De Man’s definition fails to make explicit. By 
implication, a workable definition of anthropomorphism would have to 
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differentiate sharply between the conventional and strict form of 
anthropomorphism while simultaneously enabling any underlying confusion 
regarding persons to be exposed instead of adding to it.  
Let me recapitulate. The law can equally use an anthropomorphism to 
either grant or not grant entities the status of person, although I maintain that 
within a homonymic understanding of person the law can only grant or not grant 
the status of legal person. The question of what is to be taken as person always 
already relies on an anthropomorphism whereby “human person” is treated as 
something given. The fact, however, that “person” can be understood as a 
homonym implies that person has nothing to do with human per se, as the law’s 
operations in the court case paradoxically prove. The noun person, like any other 
noun, can never be a given of itself, but can only be taken as given. This implies 
that the law, in the process of deciding what qualifies as person, can never resort 
to objective criteria to inform its decisions. At most, it can bet on a resemblance 
with an entity that is fundamentally unknowable, and proclaim itself the expert. 
This contradiction – to be an expert in the unknowable – is ultimately resolved 
by resorting to pure power, saying: “I am law and therefore I name this entity 
legal person.”  
In the case of the prisoner’s council the law is anthropomorphic in its 
compulsive substitution of legal personhood with personhood. It is this same 
compulsiveness that characterizes its workings within an expansive model, 
because it is there that its conference of legal personhood to human individuals 
stretches to any animal to which it attributes something essentially human. In 
other words, notwithstanding what we established for a fact within the Indian 
dolphins case, namely that nonhuman animals may be treated as nonhuman 
persons while being carefully distinguished from entities that are granted legal 
personhood, the distinction between legal person and person cannot be viewed 
as merely a political decision to meet practical ends. Rather, this distinction 
appears to become inevitable when the notion of person is thought through on a 
more radical rhetorical plane. Hence, the confusion of person with legal person 
is uncalled for in a fundamental way if the law wants to lay claim to functioning 
in a non-arbitrary manner.  
In this respect, the emergence of the corporation as a legal person from 
the second half of the nineteenth century onwards can be said to operate on the 
axis of this distinction between person and legal person.50 The nonhuman 
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corporation was treated as a person and then attributed legal personhood to meet 
practical and political ends. This legal operation first confuses the human with 
the nonhuman only to then clearly separate the so-called human person from the 
legal person, as the corporation obviously remained nonhuman once the 
confusion was effectuated. At the same time, the distinction between the 
nonhuman corporation and the human person was not entirely effaced by this 
legal manoeuvre: if, for example, nonhuman corporations could not marry, 
which confirmed their nonhuman status under the law, they were afforded 
certain constitutional rights that previously had pertained only and typically to 
human persons, such as the right to property and privacy.  
Without wanting to enter the debate on corporate personhood here, which 
would seriously deflect attention from my more immediate purpose, my 
exploration of the ambiguous stance of the word person by way of 
anthropomorphism seems to suggest that, at least for some of the typical human 
rights for corporations, there appears to be no ground for embedding them 
within the construct of the legal person. In fact, scrutinizing and renegotiating 
the typical human rights of corporations that indulge in factory-farming might 
be a good point of departure for thinking through the way in which factory-
farmed animals can be protected from harm, a matter I will explore in detail in 
the next chapter. Let it suffice here to illustrate this point with a brief 
contemplation on the right to property and privacy.  
As Siobhan O’ Sullivan has observed, there is a gross internal 
inconsistency within the animal rights debate because the vast majority of 
animals, which are the factory-farmed animals that we eat, are made to suffer 
beyond comparison with any other group of animals that we generally 
distinguish within the context of what is commonly referred to as the animal, say 
pets and wildlife.51 She attributes this inconsistency to the sheer invisibility of 
factory-farmed animals and understands this invisibility in two distinct but 
related ways. On the one hand, the majority of people are no longer used to 
living with those animals that are typically processed on factory-farms. On the 
other hand, the general public is never exposed to the way in which factory-
farmed animals are processed, except on the rare occasions when illegal footage 
is smuggled out of a farm or (former) employees break the code of silence. 
Indeed, if there is any truth in the correlation between the level of visibility and 
the way in which we tend to treat animals, as O’Sullivan suggests, advocates of 
animal rights might want to raise the question of property and its specific 
relation to privacy as an unwarranted human attribute afforded to corporations 
                                                 




as legal persons. In other words, if the typical human right to privacy for 
corporations was curbed on the grounds that the corporate legal person is not a 
human person, the visibility of factory-farmed animals could at least potentially 
increase, as those who would want to visit such farms would no longer be held 
back by a legal prohibition of trespassing what is considered private property.  
Hence, if the right to property is essential to nonhuman corporations 
within the model of liberal democracy, the right to privacy within the construct 
“private property” could be up for renegotiation. Of course, this line of thought 
contradicts what I established earlier, and by which I still stand, namely that the 
notion of person is so deeply enshrined within our juridical-political context that 
any effort at mending it to suit our changing views on the legal status of animals 
would be a hard battle to fight. Indeed, it would invoke the haunting perspective 
of a return to a situation whereby the law of person would distinguish between 
legal persons and, in that sense, resemble the differential status of persons under 
Roman law, rather than the principle of equality of all persons that has marked 
the sharp subjective turn of legal theory since the advent of human rights. This is 
why in the next chapter I wish to develop a more modest approach to the 
question of factory-farming by addressing the incomparable suffering of factory-
farmed animals through an exploration of the way in which the terms harm and 
cruelty operate the differential status of factory-farmed animals on both a 
juridical and rhetorical plane.  
Whenever the law subjects itself to an unwarranted confusion of persons it 
claims “expertise in the unknowable” and, as a result, the nonhuman entity 
under discussion can be named a legal person. The way the law goes about 
attributing human essentiality to an entity previously considered nonhuman 
relies on a fundamental arbitrariness, as my analysis of the court case and the 
example of the essentially nonhuman corporation paradoxically reveals. First, 
because there is nothing essentially human about person. Second, because a 
typical human right, for example, the right to privacy, cannot be claimed to stem 
from some essentially human characteristic or capacity once it has been granted 
to corporations. The point here, then, is that the court, instead of asking, 
fruitlessly: what is a person? should ask the only question it can answer, namely: 
what is a legal person, as that concept of which I-law, and only I-law, am in the 
business of naming? But strangely, the law can neither answer, nor frame this 
question in any conclusive way as long as it regards itself in an anthropomorphic 
way; that is, as centred in the so-called human person.  
Hence, it seems the law, because it is centred in legal personhood, has to 
call into being the anthropomorphic fiction of personhood. It cannot, if 
confronted with digressive entities, understand those entities on their own terms. 
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Instead, it adopts a strategy that consists of taking a given person as human 
person. By implication, the law cannot proactively conceptualize wholly other 
categories. This leads to a remarkable paradox as it implies that the law can only 
operate autonomously, while it cannot at the same time. In other words, the law 
is not so much acting but reacting when it looks at what entities might qualify to 
shelter under its umbrella of legal personhood, which it confuses with a 
presupposed (human) personhood in a non-legal sense. It is this process of 
confusing that is anthropomorphic in both the conventional and the strict sense, 
which installs a limit to the law’s imagination of the nonhuman other. In short, 
the law cannot look itself in the face; it needs a mirror and that is where the 
lyric/literature comes in, and that is why, although for different reasons, I finally 
do find Johnson’s framework so relevant. The fundamental arbitrariness, which 
is the result of this lack of capacity of the law, can only be “resolved” or 
“silenced” by resorting to power, i.e. resorting to itself, saying I am law, 
freezing the infinite chain and closing the gap.  
As Alain Pottage has observed, Pierre Legendre traces this dynamic back 
to the Western representations of law as logos, which installs a myth of origin 
that symbolizes and legitimatizes a fiction of absolute power; what Legendre has 
coined the Reference.52 For Legendre this fictional founding supposition 
operates much like the point zero in mathematics, as a point of demarcation 
because of the combined quality of absence and presence that is necessary to its 
function. I agree with Legendre, but for my current purposes I choose not to 
emerge myself in the big question of legitimation. Rather, I would argue that it 
is precisely the distinction between legal person and person that the law, in its 
confusion of persons, at once performs and does not perform. I read this as 
operating the presence-absence of person within the concept of legal 
personhood and establishing and guaranteeing its function as a practical tool of 
demarcation. Hence, in my analysis, Legendre’s fictional foundation of law as 
logos is performed by the fictional (rhetorical) confusion of persons implied 
within a non-homonymic conception of legal personhood. At the same time, this 
confusion of persons unmasks the idea of law as logos because any demarcation 
through the notion of person cannot lay claim to an objective non-arbitrariness, 
but rather must be performed by an anthropomorphism. 
Thus, anthropomorphism ultimately is not simply a form of attributing to 
an entity something human or sufficiently humanlike (conventional), in law it 
also involves misreading such an anthropomorphic attribution through another 
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anthropomorphic move (strict) that regards the word person in personhood as in 
some way synonymous to person in what must be understood as the aggregation 
legal personhood. For this reason, the conventional form of anthropomorphism 
is always encapsulated by the strict form of anthropomorphism, whereas the 
strict form of anthropomorphism is not necessarily concerned with something 
human.  
Let us now take into account not just the body of De Man’s definition but 
also his emphasis on anthropomorphism as a proper name. The statement that 
this or that entity is a person, i.e. that it fits under the umbrella of personhood, 
must, in the final instant, be qualified as a proposition, for one can still argue 
that it is true or false. It would therefore qualify as an anthropomorphism in the 
strict sense, which encapsulates a conventional form of anthropomorphism. 
However, – and this is essential to my reading – the statement that this entity or 
person is a legal person can only be made by a singular act and by a singular 
entity: the law (however personified). It is, therefore, as De Man would have it, 
beyond proposition. This leads me to suspect that the aggregation legal person 
functions as a proper name in De Man’s sense. The legal person is named by the 
law and the law here has the first, last and only word. The “being subject” to 
further definition is both created and instantly halted by the law when coining an 
entity a legal person, naming it and, with that act, fitting it into its system. 
Hence, an anthropomorphism in the strict sense would be performed when the 
law states: “I take this entity, let’s say a dolphin, to be a legal person,” whereas 
the statement: “you are a legal person” concerns an act of naming. 
In other words, each time the law names an entity a legal person it is as if 
the law is giving birth to an entity, a nonhuman life that did not exist for the law 
before this act of naming. Only in and by the law, then, does the legal person 
thrive, in a sphere literally without space for further definition because only the 
law is in the business of naming and naming is its only business. The problem of 
cruelty resulting from this procedure structures the court case in the same way as 
it structures an expansive model, because it provides only one logical and 
chronological route for an essentially nonhuman entity to become a legal 
person. This route can be sketched as follows: An entity would have to be 
named: 1. entity. 2. person. 3. legal person. But, what if an entity cannot get 
from step one to step number two? There must be another way, then, of getting 
from number one to number three. Let us return to Johnson’s essay and see if 
exploring anthropomorphism in the lyric can be instructive in imagining this 
other way. 
 In her essay, Johnson contrasts the lyrical person with the legal person by 
mentioning the seemingly opposite labels conventionally attached to them. The 
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former is qualified as being subjective, emotive and individual, the latter as 
objective, rational and rights bearing (550). I will not presuppose these 
categories. In fact, for reasons already mentioned, I object to distinguishing 
between two persons on the basis of their accompanying adjectives, as I 
understand these persons as homonymic rather than synonymic. Instead, I repeat 
my earlier suggestion, here, to read legal person as one phrase, as a name, and to 
conceive of lyrical person as a name of equal weight in that it belongs to its own 
system, which gives it its name. Let us now contemplate the differences between 
the legal person and the lyrical person.  
On the one hand, the legal person can be regarded as single but not 
unique. In my view, because of this combination of singleness and the 
incapacity to be unique, the legal person is not (necessarily) human. It only 
exists as a name or, to put it in a better way and avoid the unanswerable question 
of what it is to be human: it is less likely to be treated as essentially human. 
Granted the legal person is not unique, the law, conferring one entity the status 
of legal person (say, the prisoner’s council discussed in the previous paragraph) 
must mutatis mutandis consider every prisoner’s council as a legal person. On 
the other hand, the lyrical person is not the poet and, thus, is just as essentially 
nonhuman as the legal person is. Rather than operating as a name, however, it 
functions as a voice, single, autonomous and, although not unique either, it 
seems to have a nonhuman sort of life in the sense that it does something. 
Effectively, it each time builds and breaks its own context and – unlike the legal 
person – instead of being pointed to, it has the ability to point to something other 
than itself.  
Thus, where literature has the power to pierce, rupture, (treat as other), the 
law has to be epistemological (compare: treat as known or, for that matter, treat 
as unknown). In this respect, it is not surprising that the lyrical person is coming 
to the surface when we explore the question of anthropomorphism. Not because, 
as Johnson would have it, the lyric is the most rule bound (550), but because it 
operates at the furthest remove from the epistemological. That is to say, in its 
poetical aspect it does not primarily refer to an extra literary reality, or to what 
would correspond with, say, a realistic prose, feeding into a referential view on 
language. Instead, each time it is calling its own world or system into being by 
saying “I.” In this sense, it is compulsory creative rather than compulsory 
repetitive. The lyric, therefore, is not so much the so-called opposite of law as 
the elaborate binary Johnson put in place would suggest, but resembles the law 
in exercising an almost tyrannical power to proclaim itself. The law shares this 
faculty with poetry in its procedures in that it desperately tries to contain and 
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control the slipperiness of language by forever trying and forever failing to set 
up a self-referential (hermetic) system.  
Bearing these contemplations on the relation between law and literature in 
mind, I will now scrutinize Johnson’s reading of Baudelaire’s poem “Correspon-
dances,” in which she again enters into dialogue with De Man.  
 
 
5. Anthropomorphism or Trope in the Lyric: Baudelaire’s 
“Correspondences.” 
 
The aim of this close reading is to illustrate how both Johnson’s and De Man’s 
reading of “Correspondences” ignore other interpretations in ways that work to 
reinforce their respective arguments on the nature of anthropomorphism and its 
relation to trope in a decisive manner. For this reason, I will begin by providing 
an alternative reading of “Correspondences.” This alternative reading will allow 
me, first, to put my findings on anthropomorphism to the test and to clarify 
Johnson’s and de Man’s respective positions on anthropomorphism and its 
relation to trope. Second, it will enable me to determine my own position on the 
distinction between trope and anthropomorphism in relation to the Human-






La Nature est un temple où de vivants piliers 
Laissent parfois sortir de confuses paroles; 
L'homme y passe à travers des forêts de symboles 
Qui l'observent avec des regards familiers. 
Comme de longs échos qui de loin se confondent 
Dans une ténébreuse et profonde unité, 
Vaste comme la nuit et comme la clarté, 
Les parfums, les couleurs et les sons se répondent. 
II est des parfums frais comme des chairs d'enfants, 
Doux comme les hautbois, verts comme les prairies, 
— Et d'autres, corrompus, riches et triomphants, 
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Ayant l'expansion des choses infinies, 
Comme l'ambre, le musc, le benjoin et l'encens, 




      
Nature is a temple, where the living pillars  
Sometimes utter indistinguishable words  
Man passes through these forests of symbols 
Which regard him with familiar looks 
Like long echoes that blend in the distance 
Into a unity obscure and profound, 
Vast as the night and as the light, 
The perfumes, colors and sounds correspond. 
There are some perfumes fresh as baby’s skin, 
Mellow as oboes, verdant as prairies, 
—And others, corrupt, rich, and triumphant, 
With all the expansiveness of infinite things, 
Like ambergris, musk, benjamin, incense, 
That sing the transports of spirit and sense 
 
 
Johnson explains how “Correspondences” “sets up a series of analogies between 
nature, man, symbols, and metaphysical unity, and among manifestations of the 
different physical senses, all through the word ‘comme’ (‘like’).” (555) Johnson 
agrees with de Man that the problem with this harmonious picture is that it only 
lasts until the penultimate line of the poem. At that point, instead of proposing 
analogies, the poem breaks into a stutter, by replacing the “like” that informs the 
analogies with a different “like” that makes the poem erupt into sheer 
enumeration, which ultimately undoes the metaphysical unity it supposedly 
embodies. Both Johnson and de Man, then, use this “stutter argument” to read 
“Correspondences” as a poem that breathes a comfortable harmony or meta-
physical unity; not the entire poem, that is, but up to the point the stutter sets in 
and because it sets up a series of analogies.  
My position is different, because I argue there is no “harmony” to be 
found in “Correspondences” in the first place. In my view, it is precisely due to 
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the way in which Johnson and de Man use their stutter argument that the idea of 
a given harmony is reinforced. In short, the stutter argument fixes the reading of 
the lines leading up to the stutter (the entire poem except for the last two lines) 
as breathing a singular metaphysical unity. Consequently, the (pre)supposed 
unity no longer solely feeds off the correspondences/analogies, but now has 
become the very condition for the stutter and vice versa. This procedure takes on 
the quality of yet another rudimentary chiasmus, not to be encountered in the 
text but fixing the attitude the reader is meant to bring to the text through a 
specific interpretation of the stutter in the poem: “metaphysical unity is stutter, 
stutter is metaphysical unity.” In short: if this stutter argument is turned topsy-
turvy in order to read the poem “Correspondences” as breathing a metaphysical 
unity, the idea that setting up analogies constructs a picture of Man in 
comfortable metaphysical unity with his surroundings per se is taken as given 
and thus left unquestioned. 
Whereas Johnson explicitly follows de Man’s analyses, I do not see why 
the setting up of analogies has to imply metaphysical unity or harmony. One 
might, for example, choose to read the “temple” in the first line of the poem as a 
secluded space that not just anybody can enter; as profoundly disquieting 
because its pillars appear to be living and are continuously moving away or 
closing in on Man whilst remaining forever beyond his grasp. Besides, Man 
(humanity personified, but also a synecdochical totum pro parte) passes through 
“forests of symbols,” but somehow it is not Man that glances at the (forests of) 
symbols but the (forests of) symbols that do the glancing. Man, looking back, is 
confronted or surrounded with long echoes, blending and obscure. In short, not a 
very clear and comforting picture at all and one in which the synesthetic device 
“long echoes” works in a particularly unsettling way. Man is lost, in the dark, 
nearly blinded.  
I choose to read “Correspondences,” then, as a poem reflecting Man in a 
state of anxiety and fear, precisely because he cannot get beyond 
correspondences. It seems that blinded Man must force correspondences into 
being, in a desperate attempt to come to terms with the otherness of his 
surroundings. Taking this view, even humanity personified becomes uncanny in 
a meaningful way, since it literally enacts what could be qualified as Man’s utter 
desolation. The point here, of course, is that it is of vital importance to my 
reading that the analogies in the poem are only proposed and not established, 
because humanity personified as a singular being has no self as other to turn to, 
to check and assure himself. It is precisely the word “like” that keeps the text 
open, serving to resist the fixation of the supposed analogies into comparisons. It 
is the fantastic quality of the familiarity of the (forests of) symbols’ looks that 
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strikes Man as disquieting, because Man cannot get beyond faint 
correspondences. The fact that the looks are familiar might, or, I would suggest, 
can only be read as man looking back at himself. The (forests of) symbols 
function like mirrors, and man sees himself, lost, in the dark. The 
correspondences bespeak the realization of Man’s own stake in the 
conventionality (familiarity) that the surrounding symbols convey. There is, in 
other words, the possibility that “in reality” there are no correspondences at all. 
The enumeration at the end of the poem adds to this awareness and – here I 
agree with De Man – makes it take on desperate forms.  
In my alternative reading “Correspondences” works as an Italian sonnet in 
which after the second stanza, precisely when we are made aware that man can 
hardly see anything, the poem breaks into sensations of smell/odour. The 
intensifying of the role of scent for this blinded Man here adds to the uncanny 
element of fear that collapses into enumeration in the penultimate line of the 
poem. In panic and fear our faculty of smell intensifies, but we can also become 
aware of smells (analogies) that are not actually there (compare the sensation of 
smelling something is burning that is not uncommon for people in an agitated 
state and which seems to enact a subconscious or archetypal fear the brain acts 
out to keep alert). The fear and desolation is subdued by proposing analogies 
that represent the extreme other side of a spectrum that ranges from fear to joy, 
analogies that are comforting, soothing and pleasant.  
If Johnson agrees with De Man on what “Correspondences” is about; say, 
about “Man in harmony with his surroundings,” she has more trouble – as she 
readily admits – digesting De Man’s other and apparently more debatable 
suggestion, which will be the focus of my analysis and therefore worth quoting 
in full. This is her comment:  
  
There is another, more debatable suggestion in de Man’s reading that 
attempts to disrupt the anthropomorphism of the forest of symbols. De 
Man suggests that the trees are a mere metaphor for a city crowd in the 
first stanza. If the living pillars with their familiar glances are 
metaphorically a city crowd then the anthropomorphism of nature is lost. 
Man is surrounded by tree-like man not man-like trees. It is not “man” 
whose attributes are taken on by all of nature, but merely a crowd of men 
being compared to trees and pillars. De Man notes that everyone resists 
this reading – as do I – but the intensity with which it is rejected does 
make visible the seduction of the system that puts nature, god, into perfect 
unity through the symbol, which is what has made the poem so important 




In the last sentence of the above passage Johnson conveys the importance of 
“Correspondences” for literary history in terms of its power to seduce readers to 
put nature and god into perfect unity through the symbol. However, as Jonathan 
Culler has observed, the reasons why “Correspondences” has been so important 
for literary history are arguably more comprehensive than Johnson suggests. 
Roughly, Culler distinguishes three main reasons for this importance. First, the 
fact that “Correspondences” registers our encounter with the world as a passage 
through a forest of symbols has been aesthetically productive since it portrays 
the world as a forest of signs accessible to poets and visionaries alike. Second, 
the poem echoes numerous statements of Baudelaire’s prose writings and 
thereby confirmed the possibility of a correspondence between poems and prose 
accounts of aesthetic principles. Third, “Correspondences,” because of its 
unique qualities, allowed critics to situate Baudelaire in the story of modern 
poetry. 54 
 In this respect, Johnson’s somewhat reductive focus on the poem as 
putting nature and god in perfect unity through the symbol can be read as a 
strategic choice, as a frame that enables her to deliver a specific argument. 
Effectively, it allows Johnson to underscore the unity “Correspondences” 
conveys as she follows de Man in resisting his optional reading of the living 
pillars as a city crowd, because it does not square with the picture of Man in 
harmony with his surroundings. Both Johnson and de Man, then, seem to 
consider this reading option only as a heuristic tool to illustrate the “seduction of 
the system that puts nature, god, into perfect unity through the symbol.” My 
alternative reading radically upsets this idea of perfect unity, changing the 
perspective on what Johnson and de Man have considered a given 
anthropomorphism in the poem. Hence, my alternative reading demonstrates 
that an anthropomorphism, whether conventional or strict, cannot be 
encountered in a text, but is constructed by a reader and depends on how a 
reader chooses to read a text.  
Johnson’s reading of “Correspondences,” condensed in her comment, 
constructs her understanding of anthropomorphism in a decisive manner as, on 
three occasions, it reveals that she substitutes one term with the other. First, 
following De Man, Johnson substitutes living pillars with trees, whereas the 
poem never even mentions trees. This substitution seems to be motivated 
metonymically, by the contiguity between trees and forests. Second, Johnson 
claims the forest of symbols to be an anthropomorphism. Significantly, the 
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poem, does not mention forest (singular) but only forests (plural). The third 
substitution occurs when Johnson suddenly talks about “living pillars with their 
familiar glances,” whereas in the poem it is (the forests of) symbols that do the 
glancing or, to be precise, the looking, whilst the pillars at most utter 
indistinguishable words (sometimes). Moreover, Johnson’s translation of the 
original French “laissent parfois sortir” provides her with a helpful registering 
of this phrase as a personification, for it literally connotes something like “let at 
times depart” disorganized words rather than “uttering” indistinguishable words. 
This latter substitution might, of course, be motivated by considering the 
word “these” in the third line of the poem to refer back to “the living pillars” in 
the first line of the poem. However, this is not compatible with Johnson’s 
reading because it would contradict substituting the plural forests of symbols 
with the single forest. Taking into account these three amendments 
(substitutions) – but still following Johnson – we can now look into her claim 
that the forest(s) of symbols is an anthropomorphism, which would be lost if we 
followed de Man’s suggestion that the living pillars with their familiar glances 
are metaphorically a city crowd and the “man-like trees” would become “tree-
like man.” Before considering whether this anthropomorphism would indeed be 
lost as a result of this reversal, it might be wise to investigate if this forest(s) of 
symbols is an anthropomorphism in the first place, and, if not, how it comes to 
be conceived as such.  
As discussed above, in her comment Johnson has substituted both the 
forest(s) of symbols with the living pillars and the living pillars with trees, 
making up the forest(s) in order to point to the anthropomorphism of the 
forest(s) of symbols she claims to encounter in the text. The problem with this 
reading is that the forest(s) of symbols is – in the poem – not (yet) an 
anthropomorphism, but a trope, a personification, in that it is only personified as 
being able to regard Man with familiar looks. It is only when the substitution 
with trees is effectuated by Johnson – not in the poem but in her comment – that 
this forest(s) of symbols comes to be taken as given; given, that is, a specific, set 
meaning. Besides, say we momentarily follow De Man’s suggestion and 
consider these forest(s) of symbols a city crowd and thus as tree-like man, again, 
only the anthropomorphism in the conventional sense is lost. What would still 
remain active is the anthropomorphism in the strict sense, for which it does not 
matter whether we choose the perspective of “man-like tree or tree-like man” as 
long as the metaphorical relation is not in play but the taking as given. Thus, it is 
not the poem, but Johnson’s reading of it that has forced this rudimentary 
chiasmus upon the text by way of an uncritical and unwarranted pattern of 
substitutions. This pattern of substitutions take as given, trees as living pillars, 
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and living pillars (trees) as forest(s) of symbols that make up the forest(s) of 
symbols by which, strangely, forest(s) of symbols would come to mean: trees of 
trees. Ultimately, such a reading rests on reading these forest(s) of symbols 
literally as a forest of trees, which would beg the question why does Baudelaire 
refer to these “trees” as symbols in the first place. 
If the second amendment Johnson has made – substituting forests (plural) 
with forest (singular) – is key to her reading of “Correspondences” as it 
constructs her exploration of anthropomorphism, this substitution is not to be 
considered as an isolated given. Rather, it is both the result and the condition of 
the other substitutions (amendments), which constitute a threefold interactive 
pattern that is carefully kept together and made to correspond with the 
presupposed interpretation of “Correspondences” as a poem about man in 
metaphysical unity with its surroundings. To put the fragility of this hypothesis 
to the test we would only have to close read in a very elementary way and stick 
to the plural “forests,” which would immediately open up to different 
(discursive) spaces and break, quite literally, the (pre)supposed singular unity 
the poem conveys. In other words, reading “Correspondences” as breathing a 
singular metaphysical unity relies heavily not on an inherent, but on an 
interpretative and strict – rather than on a conventional – form of 
anthropomorphism. This strict form of anthropomorphism activates an 
unwarranted pattern of substitutions that results in a reading of the poem as a 
permanent enumeration: Trees of trees of trees, etc. I consider this to be a strong 
indication for reading the poem in another way.  
In this view, and as I hope my reading demonstrates, an anthropo-
morphism in the strict sense cannot be encountered in a text for this would 
ultimately imply there is only one possible interpretation, whereas anthropo-
morphism is never about a known but always about a treating as known, and 
encountering a treating as known is – especially in lyric poetry – difficult if not 
impossible to prove. It would require reading a text as an allegory, which, I 
argue, is precisely what Johnson has done. Johnson has read “Correspondences” 
as an allegory of “man in metaphysical unity with its surroundings.” If 
allegorical reading thus seems bound up with anthropomorphism in the strict 
sense – an issue I will explore in detail in the second chapter – my analysis of 
“Correspondences” suggests that it requires a text to seduce us into activating an 
anthropomorphism in the strict sense to be able to point to an anthropomorphism 
in the conventional sense, and it seems that the identification of this dynamic 
might serve as a tool to distinguish between an anthropomorphism in the 
conventional sense and a trope.  
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Relevant to my alternative reading of “Correspondences” here has been 
the notion that De Man, when suggesting that the living pillars are 
metaphorically a city crowd, has not substituted living pillars with a city crowd, 
but only proposed to read the living pillars metaphorically so as to see what 
happens to the poem. This is an interesting exercise, not just because it forces 
into being the chiasmus “tree-like man and man-like trees,” but also because it 
ultimately reveals de Man’s own uncritical substitution of the forest(s) of 
symbols with living pillars, which implies de Man has also made an anthropo-
morphic (taken as given) move. The substitution of forest(s) of symbols with 
living pillars, I argue, bespeaks an anthropomorphism in the conventional sense, 
in that it is apparently much more likely for “living pillars” to do any looking 
than it is for forests of symbols. Unless they – these forests of symbols – are (no 
longer metaphorically) the living pillars. Here, precisely at this point, the 
metaphor is lost and becomes an anthropomorphism. It no longer builds up 
creative potential through a model of likeness that brings the differences 
between two entities to life, but instead turns upon a complete substitution as it 
is “motivated” by sameness.  
Both De Man and Johnson seem to have overlooked this problem and I 
suspect this has something to do with the powerful seduction of the conventional 
form of anthropomorphism de Man’s suggestion rests upon. It is not just a strict 
anthropomorphism at work here, not just a taking as given that is motivated 
metaphorically (by forcing likeness into sameness), but an anthropomorphism 
built on the attribution of (supposed) human essentiality. The strict form of 
anthropomorphism here encapsulates the conventional form as the “living 
pillars” share two “traits” that are commonly regarded as touching the essence of 
the human – as can be derived from the definition of anthropomorphism in the 
conventional sense heading Johnson’s essay – and work to contrast especially 
with its objects or animals, namely “living” and “erect.” One might argue that I 
have now tried to motivate part of my reading by referring to what is 
“commonly regarded as” in an effort to gloss over the fact that the question of 
what it means to be human cannot be answered, just as Johnson did when she 
chose to leave out the body of De Man’s definition. This would imply, however, 
that an anthropomorphism in the conventional sense can never be established in 
an absolute way. I agree. Yet in this case, the “what is commonly regarded as” is 
not to be understood as an argument in itself, but functions as what Michael 
Riffaterre called a hypogram, which must always be motivated and, as such, is 
never present in the text.55  
                                                 
55 Michael Riffaterre, Semiotics of Poetry (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978). 
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The comparison De Man instigates with his metaphor of the city crowd 
initially seems to undo the anthropomorphism in the conventional sense, but has 
revealed that in order to suggest it, De Man has to introduce another 
anthropomorphism in the conventional sense somewhere else in the system; an 
anthropomorphism that is motivated metaphorically, but then is characterized by 
an ontological shift that led Johnson into a repetitive pattern of substitutions into 
sameness. The anthropomorphism in the conventional sense (attributing living 
pillars something human) is not given, but had to be motivated through my 
reading, whereas the personification of either living pillars or forests of symbols 
is just there, explicit and unmotivated. Thus, personifications can be 
encountered (and counted) in the text whereas anthropomorphisms, whether 
conventional or strict, cannot. This is, in my view, a decisive difference that 
allows for distinguishing between anthropomorphism and trope. Let me clarify 
what this might mean for reading into the expansive model by providing a 
concrete example.  
The expansive model is centred on the idea that there is no absolute 
difference between the human and the animal. As a result, the question as to 
what is human cannot be answered, but becomes a matter of attribution. Now, 
“the wind cries” is a personification. It is not automatically an anthropo-
morphism. One also says a wolf cries, which theoretically would leave open the 
suggestion that the expression “the wind cries” does not need to be qualified as 
an anthropomorphism but could also be qualified otherwise, namely as a form of 
“morphism” that does not prioritize the anthrōpos. Indeed, “the wind cries” is 
only an anthropomorphism if we state or hold, that crying is something 
essentially human, which is what we do when we state that “the wind cries” is 
an anthropomorphism. Only then, we take, (in the sense of De Man’s taking as 
given) crying as “essentially human.” But, I ask, what is crying? The sound a 
human, a wolf, the wind produces? Or, more precisely: the verb used for these 
different sounds (or can one cry in silence too?) in different languages. (I can 
imagine languages in which the wind cannot cry). And so on. Let us now bring 
my notion of this decisive difference between anthropomorphism and trope back 
to Johnson’s reading in order to wrap up my argument on “Correspondences.”  
Johnson, in her quest to investigate De Man’s claim that anthropo-
morphism and trope are different concepts, concentrates on the personification, 
the trope that, being a particular type of metaphor (motivated by similarity), 
seems hardest to distinguish from anthropomorphism. In fact, at the end of her 
essay, Johnson still struggles with the difference between anthropomorphism 





Anthropomorphism, unlike personification, depends on the givenness of 
the essence of the human; the mingling of personifications on the same 
footing as “real” agents threatens to make the uncertainty about what 
humanness is come to consciousness. (573) 
 
But the very rhetorical slight of hand that would instate such 
unacknowledgement is indistinguishable from the rhetorical structure that 
would empty it. (574)  
 
Johnson here sticks to what I have defined as a conventional form of anthropo-
morphism, involving “the essence of the human.” As I have just established, 
however, the anthropomorphism in the strict sense potentially encapsulates an 
anthropomorphism in the conventional sense because it works by a taken as 
given that forces a rudimentary chiasmus upon a text, which substitutes 
similarity with sameness and produces an ontological shift. I would infer that a 
text is most likely to seduce us into strict forms of anthropomorphism when the 
metaphor potentially motivating it resembles “something human.” The 
personification is the metaphor that does exactly that since both the 
personification and the anthropomorphism in the conventional sense seemingly 
attribute something human. The poem “Correspondences,” has appeared to be 
exhausted with personifications, the living pillars “talk,” the forests of symbols 
“look,” the scents “sing.” Its combination of personifications with its prose-like 
presentation carries such a profound suggestive power that even de Man falls 
prey to the unwarranted substitution of living pillars with forests of symbols. 
The fact that the poem is presented as a micro narrative, comprising three 
sentences about (a) man wandering through a forest of symbols facilitates a 
referential/realistic reading whereby the text is read as one continuous metaphor; 
to be specific: as an allegory. This allegorical reading, which both Johnson and 
de Man have performed in their own particular ways, is further encouraged as 
the typical typographic particularities of the sonnet form are missing. In fact, 
there is not one suggestion in Johnson’s text that would induce us to read this 
poem as a poem in terms of rhyme, rhythm, sound, formal aspects or the 
experience of bodily sensations. The introduction of smell/odour at the 
beginning of the second stanza might stand as one example of something 
potentially meaningful that is thereby neglected. 
 I have now established the differences between a conventional and a strict 
form of anthropomorphism and between personification and anthropomorphism 
by exploring a text from the domain of the lyric through an alternative reading 
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of Baudelaire’s “Correspondences.” I will now take my findings to the domain 
of the law and zoom in on the prisoner’s council court case that Johnson 
discusses to explore the relation between personification and yet another, so far 
only vaguely distinguished, notion of anthropomorphism; namely, de Man’s 
understanding of anthropomorphism as a proper name. 
 
 
6. Anthropomorphism or Trope in the Law: The Proper Name 
 
Johnson’s comment on the judge’s interpretative strategy in the court case will 
function as my point of departure for investigating the nature of the proper 
name. Here it is:  
 
Souter’s text, in fact, is most anthropomorphic at those points where the 
infinite regress of language is most threatening. Congress is endowed with 
“natural” intentionality in order to sweep away the abyss of reference. 
Souter’s dismissal of the prisoner’s association as an “amorphous legal 
creature” is the counterpart to the need to reinforce the anthropo-
morphizability of the artificial legal creature Congress. Congress, then, is 
perhaps an example of de Man’s “proper name.” (561) 
 
If Johnson in the first sentence of the above citation claims that Souter’s text is 
most anthropomorphic at certain points, we can establish that there must also be 
a point at which the text becomes less anthropomorphic. In other words, 
anthropomorphism is reflected upon here in terms of gradual scaling, which 
simultaneously seems to inform Johnson’s inability to clearly distinguish 
between anthropomorphism and trope in practical terms. At the same time, the 
causal relation suggested between, on the one hand, Souter’s dismissal of the 
amorphous legal creature (the prisoner’s council) and, on the other, the 
anthropomorphizability of the artificial legal creature (Congress) is not 
motivated and it is hard to see what is causal about it. If we look at how this 
comment works, however, it becomes clear that it serves to motivate what 
Johnson understands by De Man’s “proper name,” because it allows her to take 
the term “proper name” as literally as possible, as beyond proposition.  
After conceding that anthropomorphism comes down to naming, Johnson 
wonders which names can be defined as proper and suggests Congress might be 
a suitable candidate. Contrary to Johnson, however, I have now come to 
understand anthropomorphism as an act that must be performed. By implication, 
I choose not to read De Man’s definition of anthropomorphism as installing a 
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proper name literally, but instead as a useful metaphor to illustrate what an 
anthropomorphism does rather than what it is. In fact, not reading de Man’s 
proper name as a metaphor would result in any proper name (say, Barbara 
Johnson) qualifying as an anthropomorphism. Although in a theoretical sense 
this might not even be untrue, and although it would indeed help to distinguish 
anthropomorphism from personification, it would not do so in a constructive and 
conclusive manner, since we would still be left with anthropomorphisms that do 
not necessarily install proper names. This is why, at this point, I prefer to 
explore De Man’s proper name as a metaphor by returning to the very beginning 
of his definition of anthropomorphism. De Man here states that anthropo-
morphism “is not just a trope.” This statement provides us with the first 
important clue on how to read De Man’s definition: An anthropomorphism, as 
the word literally encapsulates the word t(h)rope, is not just a trope, but more 
than a trope. In short, it has the potential to outgrow the status of trope and 
become something else. Bearing this dynamic in mind, let us now return to the 
court case. 
Souter, who apparently has an interest (probably a policy interest) in not 
admitting the prisoner’s council into the system of legal personhood, looks for 
an opening in the legal text, in this case the Dictionary Act, which can help to 
motivate his intention to not let the prisoner’s council enter the legal sphere as 
an entity that can sue in forma pauperis. The problem for Souter is that the 
Dictionary Act clearly states that the term person includes artificial entities 
unless the context indicates otherwise. Souter, focusing on “unless the context 
indicates otherwise,” then starts to look for definitions of the word context. He 
comes up with the following two definitions:  
 
 1. The context then, is the surrounding words of the act. 
 
2. “associated surroundings, whether material or mental” – a reference not 
to the surrounding text but to the broader reality or intentionality. 
 
 
Souter at once dismisses the second definition of “context,” arguing that this 
was surely not what Congress had meant (intended), because then it would have 
been natural to use a more spacious phrase. This is Johnson’s comment: 
 
The word “natural” which is precisely at issue here – since the Court is, 
after all, trying to find out whether the statute applies only to natural 
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persons – is here applied to an artificial person, Congress, which is 
personified as having natural intentionality. (560) 
 
Johnson here describes a rhetorical trick that Souter uses to make his argument, 
but at the same time sticks to the natural/artificial binary and, in that sense, 
follows Souter who accords Congress natural intentionality. More than that, in 
her attempt to clarify what exactly is at stake for Souter, Johnson reads Congress 
as an artificial person. But, I ask, in what sense is Congress a person in the legal 
sense (legal person) or a person at all? The personification of Congress may 
indeed endow it with intentionality, but it is Johnson’s own treating of 
intentionality (following Souter in this respect) as known, as a strictly or 
primarily human trait, which keeps the binary natural/artificial person in place. 
Besides, if Congress qualified as a proper name, as Johnson suggests, and 
thereby as the name of a comparison, as De Man’s definition would have it, with 
what, then, is it being compared? In other words, reading into Johnson’s 
suggestion of Congress as a proper name raises too many questions that cannot 
be answered in a convincing manner. Certainly, the name Congress is not so 
easily subjected to further definition, as with any historically shaped institutional 
body. But its position is not that of a proper name, because it is not beyond 
proposition. It might assume a strong analogy with the proper name, but it is not 
at one with it and therefore cannot qualify as an anthropomorphism in de Man’s 
sense. Instead, it is an entity personified, yes, and thus a metaphor motivated by 
similarity – which in this case is “intentionality” – but this “intentionality” is 
treated (both by Johnson and Souter) as given and as essentially human.  
Admittedly, Congress’ position is rather odd. Strictly speaking, for 
Congress to be qualified as an anthropomorphism (and not as merely a 
personification) it would have to be named a legal person. Only then would it be 
beyond proposition and no longer subject to further definition. In the comment 
provided by Souter, however, “Congress” is personified, but not named. Instead, 
it is an entity with the power to name. Souter is not naming, but only mentioning 
Congress. Congress cannot sue in forma pauperis on the grounds of being a 
person. Neither can it sue itself. The personification endows Congress with 
intentionality, which is a word treated as a proper name, in that it is not subject 
to further definition because it is – according to Johnson following Souter – 
taken as given, as essentially human, as natural opposed to artificial.  
Thinking through the odd logic of the above line of argument would lead 
to the conclusion that when something is considered essentially human, say, 
“intentionality,” it can no longer be defined, which reveals or rather covers up 
the more fundamental problem, namely, that it is the essentially human which 
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can never be defined. Hence, although words such as “intentionality,” “natural” 
and “artificial,” can be attributed to an entity, they cannot be considered to be 
anthropomorphic in the strict sense (taken as given). Unlike the proper name, 
those terms maintain within themselves the possibility of further definition and 
can at most be treated as given, which implies they could also not be treated as 
given. In this respect, not reading De Man’s proper name as a metaphor amounts 
to suggesting that a proper name is something that cannot be treated as given, 
while it is imagined as something that is always already given and beyond any 
treating, beyond proposition. In fact, radically thinking through my renewed 
understanding of anthropomorphism as an act, I suggest that a talking pig in a 
fable like Animal Farm is just a personification, a metaphor and not necessarily 
an anthropomorphism: for in what sense is it nonhuman if the question as to 
what is human cannot be answered. In other words, although attributing human 
characteristics, for example, speaking, to essentially nonhuman entities might 
conventionally be defined as an anthropomorphism, such an attribution will 
always have to be informed by a treating as given what being human is: 
“speaking,” in this case, is essentially human.  
With respect to this issue, I conclude that it is precisely the qualification 
of something as an anthropomorphism that betrays an anthropomorphism, for 
anthropomorphism is metaphorically speaking – and here I agree with De Man – 
a proper name. The rest is trope. Hence, if, contrary to Johnson, we have now 
read the proper name as a useful metaphor, rather than the name of a name, the 
proper name cannot be qualified as an anthropomorphism. Rather, 
anthropomorphism concerns the act of naming something as proper, as entirely 
fitting, fitting like a lid on a can, which at the same time closes off openings into 
other potential discursive spaces through a sequence of unwarranted 
substitutions that are fostered through a compulsory treating as known. But, of 
course, if there is no context, if the context is necessarily eliminated within a 
treating as known, then what is there to be known? The answer is: the only thing 
really worth knowing, namely, the fundamentally unknowable. This is the case, 
not because there is some metaphysically deeper or higher meaning hidden 
under the unbreakable shell of the proper name, but because the secret is that 
there is nothing. The act of anthropomorphism relies on the very mystification 
of this nothing. For Legendre this “nothing” operates as the number zero in 
mathematics that informs a foundational fiction of law as logos, while for me 
this nothing has appeared to destroy law as logos only to re-inscribe it as fiction 
through the notion of person. 
With respect to this issue, the act of anthropomorphism might be 
considered a defensive move that prevents the opening up to what Johnson 
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refers to as the infinite regress of language, the abyss. In contrast to Johnson, I 
think we should start to conceive of this abyss not as something dangerous and 
negative, but as positively as possible. Indeed, I would like to think of it as an 
infinite space we can enter and in which it is impossible to have any objective 
point of reference at all. As we have seen, this disposition would pose a serious 
problem for the law because it is its claim to an objective non-arbitrariness 
implied within its expertise in the unknowable that informs its foundational 
authority. In other words, if the act of anthropomorphism functions, while 
precisely meaning nothing in itself, as a mystification that protects language 
from an arbitrariness that would reduce it to no more than a silly game devoid of 
any “real” meaning, then the law is in trouble. Of course, the law can never 
admit this, for its task is to make meaning. It has to motivate its decisions by 
anchoring its language somewhere, at some point, but ultimately in texts 
(written or oral) endowed with – that it itself endows with – a higher authority 





I have now explored anthropomorphism as conventional, as strict and as a 
proper name. This has led me to move away from this tripartite distinction 
towards a dual distinction whereby I defined two interrelated forms of 
anthropomorphism: conventional, which involves an act of attributing; and 
strict, which pertains to the sphere of naming. The conventional form of 
anthropomorphism does not work like a metaphor, because it is not playing with 
the dynamics of difference and sameness. It concerns the categorization into 
domains by way of substitution. Within an expansive model this substitution 
concerns the attribution of something conventionally conceived of as human to 
the nonperson. This “attribute” then comes to substitute the nonperson and turns 
it into a person for the law. The strict form of anthropomorphism is about taking 
something for something else and treating it as given. Unlike common 
consensus would have it, neither form of anthropomorphism can be encountered 
in a text. Pointing to a conventional form of anthropomorphism would involve a 
poetic reading strategy in that it can at most be motivated by a hypogram. 
Pointing to a strict form of anthropomorphism (a treating as given) requires an 
allegorical reading strategy to be forced upon a text, a reading that potentially 
encapsulates diverse conventional forms of anthropomorphism. The so-called 
essentially human, then, has appeared not to be essential to our definitions of 
anthropomorphism. Rather, the conventional form of anthropomorphism 
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attributes something that is treated as essentially human to an entity and, 
therefore, always involves a strict form of anthropomorphism, a treating as 
given. The strict form of itself, the treating as given as such, does not necessarily 
rely on human essentiality.  
Anthropomorphism – whether conventional or strict – is characterized by 
an ontological shift whereby the metaphorical power of language is temporarily 
ignored. The law is anthropomorphic as its task of making decisions implies that 
it, at some point, has to treat as given. The law uses the device of the chiasmus 
(repetition in reverse order) in a rudimentary manner whenever it substitutes 
person with legal person, thereby ignoring the poetic potentialities of the 
chiasmus that would be implied within a homonymic understanding of person.  
The difference between trope and anthropomorphism has now become 
clear. Whereas the trope can be encountered in a text (and counted), an 
anthropomorphism will always have to be motivated. I have identified 
anthropomorphism as an act and conclude that the failure or unwillingness to 
recognize those acts as such – as acts – is what triggers the confusion of 
personhood with legal personhood that could be detected in the journalistic 
coverage of the Indian dolphin’s case. Now, my close reading of the prisoner’s 
council court case leads me to conclude that the law allows itself to fall prey to 
this same confusion within an expansive model. Consequently, the expansive 
model causes a demarcation problem as it opens up to a discrimination of 
anything the law considers essentially nonhuman. It thereby legitimizes, as a 
consequence, that those entities that are not included can be treated in what I 
have provisionally qualified as a cruel and ignorant manner. This demarcation 
problem and its implied cruelty are caused by a conventional confusing of 
person with human person, whereby the homonymic person is understood in 
synonymic vein and attributed a minimum of shared identity with the legal 
person. It would seem that the implication of such identity politics for the 
criteria to be developed in order to decide on animal rights in a non-arbitrary 
manner – which is our aim if we really wish to avoid cruelty and ignorance – is 
that those criteria can no longer lean on a conventional confusion of persons or 
on an essentialist (shared or separate) concept of identity defining the relation 
between the human and the nonhuman animal.  
However, before starting too eagerly with an exploration of such a 
different outlook on the relation between the so-called human and the so-called 
animal, it is important to realize that to conclude that the laws’ fundamental 
arbitrariness when granting or withholding entities the status of legal person 
results in a potentially cruel and ignorant treating of those very entities is one 
thing. Trying to avoid cruelty and ignorance by asking the law to function in a 
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non-arbitrary manner is a wholly different enterprise. At this moment, it is not 
certain whether (a) the law can function in a non-arbitrary manner at all; and (b) 
if the best way to go about avoiding cruelty and ignorance is striving towards 
such an ideal. I will return to this in chapter two. What I can establish here, is 
that the notion of a shared identity, a common ground, either implicit or explicit 
– which is more often than not a key element in all the different arguments put 
forward both by proponents and opponents of animal rights – has an underlying 
assumption that serves to keep the current expansive model in place. And as 
long as this underlying assumption, feeding into a discriminatory identity 
politics, is in place, it will continue to muddle the animal rights debate via the 
route that involves the bypassing of the question of personhood, namely by 
confusing person and human person and subsequently conflating person and 
legal person. This procedure does not even provide the beginning of a ground 
for breaking away from an expansive model and the fundamental arbitrariness 
on which it is centred.  
It will be of utmost importance for the animal rights debate, therefore, to 
undermine both this confusion and this conflation, to disentangle the legal 
person from person and to replace the question of what a person is with another 
question: who or what might be the subject of rights and what are the different 
routes towards imagining such subjectivity and acquiring that position? It will 
require a different view on the law and its procedures, especially on the way in 
which those procedures and the concurrent conventional confusion of persons, 
both within and outside of the juridical sphere, are informed by allegorical 
reading strategies. One thing that can be established in relation to this different 
view is that – as we can gather from our close reading of the court case – the law 
is not so much an authority that facilitates the arena in which its proceedings 
take place, but rather is itself an actor in a play in which it claims a leading role. 
However, this reading/leading role is just part of the play it plays out. It consists 







The Space of Allegory 
Demarcation through Correspondence 
 
 
1. Introduction: Lobster Cooking 
 
In April 2014, a Belgian chef called Piet Huysentruyt prepared a lobster for 
consumption on a live television show. He tore off the legs and claws of the 
animal while it was still alive, then cut it through the middle and threw it on the 
grill. “This way it will taste much better than when it is merely cooked alive,” 
the chef explained. The two guests on the show averted their faces in horror, and 
their response crawled out of the studio and spread to the public domain. A stir 
was born. The preparation of the lobster reached the national news in both 
Belgium and Holland and became a hot topic on social media. The 
representative of GAIA, the Belgian organization for the protection of animals, 
reacted furiously: “thousands of amateur cooks will follow this example. Piet 
Huysentruyt keeps the myth alive that animals have to suffer in order to taste 
good.” The representative of GAIA added that there were now machines on the 
market to sedate lobsters, which allowed them to die painlessly and declared that 
GAIA was planning to contact VIER (the Belgian Commercial Television 
Organization that broadcasted the program) “to charge them with a harrowing 
lack of ethics and to prevent this sort of barbaric television from being 
repeated.”  
It was not the first time that the preparation of a lobster on a Belgian 
television show had caused public expressions of protest and outrage. In 2010, a 
candidate in another television show had trouble putting two living lobsters in 
the cooking pan and in 2011 a lobster was cut up, alive, on the Masterchef 
television show. In fact, after charges by GAIA on those previous occasions, the 
Belgian broadcasting channels collectively agreed not to make animals suffer 
needlessly on entertainment programmes anymore. In this respect, the response 
of VIER to the latest charge that was now brought by GAIA only worked to fuel 
the controversy: a spokesman for VIER stated that the preparation of the lobster 
on their television show did not constitute a breach of the agreement they had 
committed themselves to, because the show was not an entertainment 
programme. The chef himself, interviewed on another television show called 
Reyers Laat was arguably less cryptic in his comments: “I have prepared lobster 
in this manner for thirty years. If I am to believe social media I am a murderer. It 
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is hypocritical to say: I have eaten the best lobster ever, but I do not want to see 
them die. I will always prepare lobster in this way.” 
A few days later, a meeting between the representatives of GAIA and 
VIER actually took place. Afterwards, both parties adopted an appeasing tone 
and stressed that their talks had been very constructive. A spokesman for VIER 
expressed their position as follows. “What has happened cannot be undone but 
we understand the position of GAIA and will take this position into account in 
our future programming. We hope our chef will want to consider alternatives.” 
A GAIA spokesman expressed himself as follows:  
 
I wish to come to a sustainable solution as soon as possible and hope Piet 
Huysentruyt will be ready to consider an alternative that accommodates 
all interests, respect for animals, gastronomic quality and the ethical 
image of the station. If Piet Huysentruyt feels so disposed, GAIA offers to 
organize a demonstration with the Crustastun, a device which sedates 
lobsters and crabs and kills them painlessly, which is already being used 
by a number of chefs in Great Britain.56 
 
On a very basic level, the Belgian lobster furore seems to confirm the claim of 
Siobhan O’ Sullivan that I discussed in the previous chapter, namely that there is 
a correlation between the visibility of animals and the way we tend to or wish to 
treat them. Effectively, the preparation of a lobster on a live television show 
presents us with the highest degree of visibility imaginable and, in that sense, 
could be said to occupy the extreme end of a spectrum, the other extreme end of 
which is factory-farming with its invisible animals. However, since within the 
journalistic coverage of the case no mention is made of the fact that the vast 
majority of lobsters – if not necessarily processed in Belgium – are factory-
farmed and distributed across the world, the Belgian lobster furore to some 
extent renders the factory-farmed lobster invisible on a rhetorical plane as a 
result of the high visibility of the individual lobster under discussion. It shows 
that the allocation of animals in the categories invisible/visible does not neatly 
correspond with their pertaining to different species, but that this allocation 
depends on the way in which animals are treated.  
In this respect, the film recordings on lobster farms by undercover PETA 
activists (People For The Ethical Treatment Of Animals) bears a striking 
resemblance to the preparation method promoted by the Belgian chef. In 2013, 
for example, when PETA investigated Linda Bean’s Maine Lobster Factory 
Farm, they uncovered that: 




Lobsters’ heads were ripped from their bodies and dropped into bins, 
along with their abdomens. Their antennae and legs continued to move 
after their bodies had been torn apart. 
 
Workers slammed live crabs onto spikes to break off their top shells and 
shoved the animals’ exposed organs and flesh against rapidly spinning 
brushes. The crabs were then tossed onto a conveyor belt and dumped – 
alive – into boiling water.57 
 
With respect to both controversies, what the vast majority of protesters called 
for was the humane killing of the lobsters that we eat and a more respectful 
handling of the animals in the process. Indeed, it seems to be the case that 
discussions over the humane killing of animals – whether concerned with 
factory-farming, incidents as described above, or, for example, with the 
unsedated slaughter of animals for kosher and halal meat in Holland in 2011 – 
repeat themselves each time a discussion on animal well-being and animal rights 
fires up.58 The central term in these debates appears to be cruelty, which not 
only must be avoided and replaced by a (more) humane treatment, but which is 
also regarded as a self-evident instance of excessive harm: as if the excess of 
harm such an understanding of cruelty embodies is so plain for everyone to see 
that the question of harm and its conceptual relation to cruelty no longer needs 
to be discussed. This notion of the self-evidence of cruelty in these debates 
appears to be paralleled by the way in which the notion of cruelty generally is 
conveyed in animal rights laws and statutes across the world. Indeed, the term 
harm is hardly ever mentioned and when it is mentioned it does not make up a 
conceptual legal term in its own right but is qualified as unnecessary and 
excessive suffering.  
In the British Animal Welfare Act of 2006,59 for example, the term harm 
surfaces in section four, which is called “Unnecessary Suffering,” as a heading 
that is entitled “Prevention of Harm.” In the remainder of this fifty-five pages 
long animal rights document the term harm is not used, except in one entry in 
section twenty-four, which concerns the right to search premises for the purpose 
of arresting a person who has inflicted unnecessary suffering as described under 
section four. If the term harm is virtually absent in the entire document and if 
harm only surfaces in section four as a heading of the entry “Unnecessary 
Suffering,” we may surmise that the harm is itself not conceptualized, at least 






not but in the sense of the non-specificity of the term “unnecessary.” The 
subentry at the end of section four only confirms this suspicion. It states that: 
“Nothing in this section applies to the destruction of an animal in an appropriate 
and humane manner.” This subentry draws our attention to the practice of 
factory-farming as embedded in a legal space where the relation between harm 
and cruelty is not conceptualized, and where even the self-evidence of cruelty 
suddenly appears to have its limits. In respect of the self-evidence of cruelty in 
both the popular and the legal sphere described above, it might not come as a 
surprise that my investigation of the entries of some of the seminal works within 
the animal rights debate and my going through numerous other animal rights and 
animal ethics handbooks that were published over the last twenty years has 
proved of no avail to historically ground a legal distinction between harm and 
cruelty whereby the latter concept would conceptually follow from the first.60 In 
most of these works there is plenty of talk about ways to avoid the cruel 
treatment of animals, about avoiding needless suffering and excessive harm, but 
the term “cruelty” itself and its relation to harm is left unaddressed, let alone 
subjected to a critical analysis.  
Yet the reason why it is so important to conceptualize this relation is that 
the framing of the element of cruelty as self-evident seems to register the 
arbitrary demarcation decisions the law has to make as more arbitrary than 
strictly necessary. It therefore calls for an exploration of the fundamental 
juridical underpinnings of this non-conceptualization. This takes on a sense of 
urgency if we want to investigate the demarcation problem an expansive model 
poses in light of the cruelty that I hinted at in the previous chapter. This is why 
in this chapter I wish to explore how a conceptual discussion on the element of 
cruelty and its relation to harm might inform demarcation decisions and how this 
relates to my provisional definition of cruelty as a wilful neglect of harm, both 
within and outside of the strictly juridical sphere.  
The context in which I will discuss these issues differs from the context 
sketched in the examples above in that it is not primarily confined to the 
slaughter or humane killing of animals. Rather, I will address the issues the 
Belgian lobster case raises as inviting a reflection on the concepts of harm and 
cruelty as not self-evident in order to examine how they operate as markers of 
difference when it comes to demarcating humans from animals and certain 
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animals from other animals. More specifically, taking my cue from the fact that 
the self-evidence of cruelty apparently reaches a limit when it comes to factory-
farming, I will turn the practice of farming and the change this practice has 
undergone since the advent of factory- farming into a heuristic modus operandi 
for exploring the way in which harm and cruelty can be thought in relation to the 
problem of demarcation. This framework will allow me to think through how 
the concepts of harm and cruelty have fared both before and since the coming 
into being of an expansive model in order to offer a different angle on the 
problem of demarcation that it installs. 
Before beginning to explore these issues, however, I will start this chapter 
with a positioning of the concepts of harm and cruelty within the context of the 
model from which the coming into being of an expansive model evolved, which 
is the model of human rights. Once I have addressed the implications of the shift 
from human rights to animal rights for the way in which the concepts of harm 
and cruelty operate, I will use George Orwell’s Animal Farm as an object of 
study to think through the wider issues the Belgian lobster case raises.  
To this end, I will take Animal Farm out of its context as an allegory of 
the Cold War and read it as a story about animals that are suffering from harm. 
More specifically, my allegoresis of Animal Farm as a story about animals 
suffering from harm draws on Animal Farm as an allegory of ideas and wants to 
reflect how these ideas have developed and where they stand today. Framing the 
element of harm in this way not only enables me to read Animal Farm as an 
allegory of ideas but also as an allegory of the expansive model. The analogy 
between the two is that within both allegories animals are subjected to a harm 
that topples over into cruelty. As I provisionally concluded in the previous 
chapter, the cruelty an expansive model incorporates constitutes a wilful neglect 
of those essentially nonhuman entities not granted legal personhood. In Animal 
Farm I identify the moment harm topples over into cruelty once the farmer starts 
neglecting his animals and the animals decide to rebel, a matter I will attend to 
in detail in what lies ahead.  
My overall strategy here consists of reading Animal Farm in its classic 
mode as the allegory it is famous for, as a forewarning of totalitarianism. It does 
not mean I read totalitarianism as resulting from a synthesis between the systems 
of capitalism and communism, which, as Roberto Esposito has observed 
elsewhere, would be a gross simplification.61 Instead, I choose to read totalita-
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rianism as a juridical streak that has nested itself in the animal cruelty laws and 
that, at the same time, is constitutive of a much wider variety of disciplinary 
discourses that operate the biopolitical situation we now live in under 
globalization.62 It does not mean I read globalization as totalitarianism. Rather, 
my strategy entails a proposal to explore the “cruelty” animals are subjected to 
today as resulting from their being subjected to a biopolitical regime that is 
characterized by a totalitarian streak wherein the human masses are not 
mobilized but the animal masses are fixed.  
This totalitarian streak, I propose, has become most explicit with the 
advent of factory- farming, which marks a major change in the way we relate to 
animals that runs parallel to the emergence of an expansive model and the shift 
in political constellations that has occurred from the second half of the twentieth 
century onwards. This change can be read in both qualitative and quantitative 
terms. Qualitatively, we might consider factory-farming as the modern human 
practice that is concerned with the animals we are most directly involved with, 
the animals that we eat. Quantitatively, the historical novice of the practice of 
factory- farming can at least in part be attributed to the unprecedented scale on 
which the processing of ever-larger numbers of animals takes place. But also, as 
my brief reflection on the Belgian lobster case demonstrates, to the all-
encompassing nature of this practice itself. I am referring here to the fact that 
our modern imagination of factory-farmed animals as say, poultry, pigs and 
cows (outnumbering other species of animals processed in this way) no longer 
holds, since basically any animal that we eat is now factory-farmed for the 
simple reason that mass consumption stimulates mass production.  
In order to make my exploration fruitful, I understand the expansive 
model primarily in spatial and symbolical terms, as the emergence of a single 
discursive space. Anything moving about in this space is and can only take on 
meaning as a person answering to a conventional conception of personhood. In 
literature, the equivalent of such a discursive space would be allegory. I am 
deliberately using Angus Fletcher’s most simple definition of allegory here, i.e. 
that “allegory says one thing and means another,” to suggest that the allegory 
allows one domain to envelop another, which then comes to answer to the 
overall story the allegory conveys.63 Since my preoccupation with allegory will 
be informed by a focus on its production of meaning within one discursive 
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space, I intend to bring literary reading strategies into play to address the 
problems allegorical reading poses for the law. Within the expansive model 
under discussion, and in view of my provisional definition of the cruelty it 
generates, the most pressing issue I wish to explore in this manner is its 
demarcation problem. Concretely, I wish to clarify in which way the production 
of meaning within one discursive space relates to this demarcation problem. 
Conversely, I wish to explore whether breaking open single discursive spaces 
can provide ways of working my way around the demarcation problem and the 
element of cruelty that the expansive model incorporates.  
 
 
2. The Conceptualization of Harm and Cruelty 
 
In the opening chapter, I explored the conventional conceptualizations of 
personhood and anthropomorphism in order to develop an argument for why 
expanding the juridical model to include animals without questioning the notion 
of personhood is unwarranted. As we have seen, within an expansive model, the 
uncritical transfer of personhood to animals is centred on an irreducible 
demarcation problem, because the decision regarding which animals are granted 
personhood takes effect on what must remain an arbitrary basis. By implication, 
those animals not considered fit to be attributed personhood would be subjected 
to a wilful neglect of harm, which I provisionally qualified as cruelty, because it 
would be sanctioned, and hence, legitimized by the expansive model. Here, I 
wish to deepen and complement my provisional understanding of cruelty by 
addressing the recurrent and as yet unresolved element of cruelty that I have 
now identified as symptomatic of the modern animal rights debate.  
This exploration must begin by looking sharply at the context that has 
allowed the expansive model to take shape; that is, the context of human rights. 
The Human Rights Reference Handbook64 conveys the historical antecedents of 
human rights as follows: 
 
The origins of human rights may be found both in Greek philosophy and 
the various world religions. In the Age of Enlightenment (18th century) the 
concept of human rights emerged as an explicit category. Man/Woman 
came to be seen as an autonomous individual, endowed by nature with 
certain inalienable fundamental rights that could be evoked against a 
government and should be safeguarded by it. Human rights were 
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henceforth seen as elementary preconditions for an existence worthy of 
human dignity. (3)  
 
In the last sentence of the above passage the concept of dignity is invoked as 
that which inalienable human rights were meant to protect. As is well known, 
the concept of dignity can be retraced to Kant, who in The Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals (1785) claimed that only human beings have an intrinsic 
worth, a dignity, as constitutive of their personhood: 
 
Humanity itself is a dignity; for a man cannot be used merely as a means 
by any man (either by others or even by himself) but must always be used 
at the same time as an end. It is just in this that his dignity (personhood) 
[Persönlichkeit] consists, by which he raises himself above all other 
beings in the world that are not men and yet can be used, and so over all 
things.65  
 
In The American Declaration of Independence of 1776 the inalienable rights that 
needed to be protected materialized in the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness. If the declaration did not literally mention the term dignity, I choose 
to interpret these inalienable rights as constitutive of an unarticulated conception 
of dignity for two reasons. First, because of the striking resemblance to Kant’s 
terminology mentioned before. Second, because the same appeal to life, liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness as inalienable rights is voiced in the preamble of 
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man of 1948,66 in which 
those rights are explicitly referred to as constitutive of human dignity.  
The inalienable rights that the American Declaration of Independence 
voiced were taken up in the Bill of Rights of the American constitution and 
inspired several other constitutions that were drafted in Europe at the time, most 
notably perhaps the French constitution of 1793. In short, overlooking the 
historical context of human rights we can already begin to surmise what human 
rights might generally considered to be for: to protect the subject from the harm 
that would be caused if his inalienable rights – which together make up the 
indispensable constituents of its dignity – were infringed by the State and for the 
State to warrant a protection of the individual’s dignity if those inalienable rights 
are tampered with by others. To avoid misunderstanding, I am not concerned 
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here with concrete legal definitions of harm, such as injury or the infliction of 
pain, but rather with defining harm in its most basic sense, in its core rhetorical 
relation to the concept of human rights. In this most basic respect, we may 
surmise that the protection from harm that a personhood-based model guarantees 
pertains to all human beings equally and that it is centred on the protection from 
infringements on the person’s dignity. The right to life, for example, implies the 
State must protect the right to life of human beings and sustain a juridical 
framework in the form of criminal law to punish murderers. For reasons that will 
become clear, it is important to observe here that this protection from harm does 
not primarily consist of the State protecting people from being murdered, but in 
protecting the right to life that sustains their dignity.  
With respect to this issue, we can gather that to protect at least some 
animals from harm under the law of personhood, which is advocated by those in 
favour of animal rights, is more complex than the emergence of an expansive 
model suggests. In principle, this complexity may be attributed to the fact that at 
least since post-structuralism we have moved beyond essentialism and, as I 
argued in my first chapter, we must look upon the categories of the human and 
the animal as rhetorically installed. This implies that, today, there is no longer a 
sound academic position that can defend the notion of an absolute difference 
between the human and the animal. However, whereas any criterion installed for 
either attributing or denying animals legal personhood would have to be 
qualified as necessarily arbitrary in nature, the absolute difference between the 
human and the animal is still a juridical fact. To put this matter in a different 
way: Animals are not granted a legal personhood because the idea of animal 
dignity is foreign to the law. 
In this respect, the call for a (more) humane treatment and a dignified and 
respectful processing of the animal that we use for food, such as we encountered 
in the Belgian lobster case, cannot concern the animal and its right to live, 
precisely because the dignity that is rhetorically invoked is a human dignity. 
Hence, the public expression of outrage and the resulting call to change the 
practices of preparing lobsters – if only on television shows – cannot be 
addressed from within the most basic legal conceptualization of harm, but would 
have to hinge on a certain conceptualization of cruelty from the start, because, 
for the law, animals, since they are not “bearers” of dignity, cannot be harmed 
but can only be subjected to cruelty. In short, once the Crustastun is employed 
as standard practice and the animal is processed and killed in what, at any given 
time, is considered a humane way, the killing of the animal can no longer be 
qualified as a cruel act. This sweeps away any notion of harm that could be 
implied with killing an animal.  
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If we look at what the public viewed as the inhumane cruelty inflicted 
upon the lobster in strictly legal terms, namely as an affront to human dignity, 
there is an implication that the cruelty at stake here concerns the infliction of 
harm on the chef rather than on the lobster. Since we can gather from the anger 
directed towards the perpetrator that this was obviously not what the public had 
in mind, we can identify a discrepancy here between the juridical and non-
juridical sphere. In short, within the non-juridical sphere there is still a minimum 
potential for sensible identification with the lobster and the harm it is caused. 
Here, the concepts of harm and cruelty are in line with each other and bear a 
semantic relation whereby cruelty necessarily follows from harm. From a 
strictly juridical point of view, however, killing the lobster in a humane way 
implies no cruelty is done to the animal that is killed, whereas the question 
whether painless killing harms the animal cannot be articulated. In spite of this 
important difference, what ties both conceptualizations of cruelty together is a 
shared focus on humane treatment, which resonates with a Kantian outlook on 
human dignity.  
In The Lectures on Ethics (1775-1780) Kant argued that we should not be 
cruel to animals for our own sake, to safeguard our human dignity:67 
 
 
If a man shoots his dog because the animal is no longer capable of service, 
he does not fail in his duty to the dog, for the dog cannot judge, but his act 
is inhuman and damages in himself that humanity which it is his duty to 
show towards mankind. If he is not to stifle his human feelings, he must 
practice kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes 
hard also in his dealings with men. (240) 
 
 
The problem, here, is different than the one posed by the law’s dealing with 
harm and cruelty. Since the law cannot ‘position’ the concept of harm as long as 
animals are not attributed legal personhood, the concrete extent to which 
animals might be subjected to harm or cruelty has appeared to take on yet 
another level of complexity, in addition to the dynamic I sketched in my 
introduction. On the one hand, harm cannot topple over into cruelty because 
animals are presently not included within an expansive model. On the other 
hand, the cruelty that animals might be subjected to is only curbed within the 
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context of their humane treatment, which hollows out the protective measure 
itself and legitimizes their subjection to a harm that cannot be articulated under 
the law. It begs the question, firstly, where does the juridical conceptualization 
of cruelty originate from if it indeed does not complement the concept of harm 
as an excess of harm? Secondly, it invites us to explore whether the specific 
juridical conceptualizations of cruelty in animal cruelty laws can actually 
guarantee humane treatment and what those laws purporting to humane 
treatment consist of.  
One notable exception to the trend in animal studies to take for granted 
that certain forms of harm cannot be articulated under the law which I briefly 
wish to touch upon to better position my argument is the work of Ted Benton. In 
Natural Relations, Ecology, Animal Rights and Social Justice (1993), Benton 
identifies a gap between what those in favour of animal rights aspire to, namely 
protecting animals from harm through legal means, and the reality that a liberal 
rights discourse cannot address the sources of harm animals are liable to in our 
modern world.68 For Benton, the liberal rights view has a defective character 
because it is concerned with individual persons and the nature of their interests, 
while the sources of harm that animals (or humans, for that matter) are liable to 
are not reducible to the action or inaction of individuals. This is why he 
proposes that we also need to consider typical socio-economic sources of harm 
if we want to protect animals from harm by legal means. He lists as primary 
examples that are rendered unthinkable under liberal rights discourse, the 
sources of harm caused by corporations, the harms related to injuries of class 
and to natural disasters.  
Benton argues that the conceptualization of person under a liberal rights 
discourse severely limits our understanding of harm, also if the context shifts 
from humans to animals. At the same time, however, his approach does not 
acknowledge the more fundamental issue that the law cannot articulate the 
category of harm as long as animal dignity does not come up for consideration, 
which might explain why he limits himself to broadening the scope of sources 
of harm. This is a problem that I believe should not be underestimated. First, 
because dignity necessarily pertains to all its “bearers” equally. This implies that 
if one animal were attributed legal personhood the practice of factory-farming – 
to mention but one poignant example – would have to be abolished as it would 
interfere with the right to life, which is arguably the most important constituent 
of dignity. Second, because if we agree that for the law dignity is effectively the 
last barrier that separates the human from the animal in absolute terms, the 
difference between the human and the animal would be blotted out once animals 
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are granted legal personhood. This would not just be a counterintuitive step to 
take and a gross simplification of the complex Human-Animal relation, but it 
would also call into question the foundation of human rights on which our 
society has been built.  
Thus, even though Benton’s analysis rightfully points out the sources of 
harm that a liberal rights discourse cannot address, his solution is far from 
convincing. The reason is that he does not stop to reflect on the status of the 
word person and its relation to dignity within the law; rather, he takes person as 
an unambiguous given in need of adjustment. I assume this is why he neither 
explores, nor historically grounds the way in which we might think the relation 
between harm and cruelty, within a rights view on animals that is centred on 
personhood. Admittedly, this is not an easy task. For a historical grounding of 
harm as a concept we must go as far back as the utilitarian philosopher John 
Stuart Mill, who in On Liberty (1859) formulated the so-called “harm 
principle.”69 Promising as this may sound, it does not offer any basis for further 
exploration of the relation between harm and cruelty for our present concern 
with animals. In fact, Mill’s harm principle, although he never mentions it, could 
stand as exemplary of Benton’s critique: Mill never really defined harm other 
than as an action that is wrong when interfering with the freedom of others, 
those others indicating individual human persons and not animals.  
In a sense, then, we are entering new terrain if we wish to explore the 
relation between harm and cruelty and its relation to the ambiguous status of 
person within the context of the animal rights debate. We can begin by 
establishing that the lack of critical reflection on the transposition of those terms 
from the human to the animal domain, which has characterized the debate so far, 
is centred on an equally uncritical transposition of personhood from one domain 
to the other. This lack might further be attributed to the practical absence of 
harm and cruelty as concepts that come up for scrutiny in their specific relation 
to animals within the history of the law. This can be illustrated with the 
following observation by Richard. A. Posner:70  
 
 
Not until the end of the nineteenth century were laws enacted in the 
nations of the West forbidding cruelty to animals. The laws were full of 
loopholes – essentially they just forbid sadistic, gratuitous, blatant cruelty 
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– but they still represented a dramatic change from the law’s traditional 
indifference to animal welfare. (53) 
 
If before the nineteenth century animal cruelty laws were virtually non-existent, 
the positive change Posner describes effectively registers cruelty as excessive 
harm. There is no indication here, however, that this excessive harm is 
conceptually indebted to a legal notion of harm. Rather, it seems that what 
blatant cruelty connotes is the kind of cruelty that is open for everyone to see 
and is so clear in its excessiveness that it can be regarded as self-evident. Its 
legal underpinnings, then, do not flow from a conceptualization of harm but are 
reliant on a circular reasoning that presents blatant cruelty as self-evident 
because it only concerns those acts of cruelty that are regarded as self-evident.  
Since the 19th century animal cruelty laws have varied across the globe, its 
regions and provinces. The fact that in some countries animals that are used for 
food, are considered pets in other countries will undoubtedly affect the nature of 
animal cruelty laws in different ways. In view of my present concern, however, I 
choose to limit myself to the overwhelming majority of animals, which are 
factory-farmed animals, and to draw on a comparative study of animal cruelty 
laws in the United States and on the European continent that was published by 
David J. Wolfson and Mariann Sullivan in 2004.71 In this study, Wolfson and 
Sullivan explore the impact of animal cruelty laws in focusing on the lives of 
animals that are factory-farmed. The most conspicuous element of their detailed 
account of animal cruelty laws and statutes across both continents is that it 
shows a persistent pattern of those laws exempting factory-farmed animals from 
the protection from cruelty. This persistent pattern is accommodated by the 
manner in which the legal texts are drawn up. The texts either literally exempt 
some categories of factory-farmed animals or are conveyed in such non-specific 
terminology that they allow for the exemption of a great many categories of 
factory-farmed animals in an indirect way.  
In the United States, Wolfson and Sullivan found that factory-farmed 
animals have even been made to disappear from the law altogether:  
 
Certainly, making this many animals disappear from the law is an 
enormous task. It has been accomplished, in significant part, through the 
efforts of the industry that owns these animals to obtain complete control, 
in one way or another, over the law that governs it. While this is not an 
                                                 
71 David J. Wolfson and Mariann Sullivan, “Foxes in the Henhouse, Animals, Agribusiness, and 




unusual effort on the part of the industry generally, the farmed-animal 
industry’s efforts have been exceptionally successful. The industry has 
devised a legally unique way to accomplish its purpose: It has persuaded 
legislatures to amend criminal statues that purport to protect farmed 
animals from cruelty so that it cannot be prosecuted for any farming 
practice that the industry itself determines acceptable, with no limit 
whatsoever on the pain caused by such practices. As a result, in most of 
the United States, prosecutors, judges, and juries no longer have the 
power to determine whether or not farmed animals are treated in an 
acceptable manner. The industry alone defines the criminality of its own 
conduct. (206) 
 
In the above passage, Wolfson and Sullivan point out that the animal cruelty 
laws in the United States are rendered ineffective as a result of a shift in 
jurisdiction. This shift has caused federal law and its primary animal cruelty 
statutes to become irrelevant: 
 
The Animal Welfare Act, which is the primary piece of federal legislation 
relating to animal protection and which sets certain basic standards for 
their care, simply exempts farmed animals, thereby making something of 
a mockery of its title. (206) 
 
As a result, The Humane Slaughter Act is the primary federal legislation 
affecting farmed animals. It requires that livestock slaughter “be carried 
out only by humane methods” to prevent “needless suffering.” (207) 
 
The problems with the Humane Slaughter Act, which Wolfson and Sullivan lay 
out, are manifold. Most astoundingly, perhaps, is that it exempts poultry, that 
there are no significant fines or penalties imposed for the violation of the Act 
and that its reinforcement is virtually non-existent. Hence, apart from the fact 
that the State in the United States has, in liberal fashion, retreated from the 
specific juridical sphere under discussion and can no longer judge what 
constitutes a cruel practice through a shift in jurisdiction, we can also establish 
that the implied conceptualization of cruelty within its central Humane Slaughter 
Act has nothing to do with the protection from excessive harm.  
Effectively, United States animal cruelty laws, instead of protecting 
animals from cruelty, protect the industry from the State. As Wolfson and 
Sullivan point out in their analysis, if federal law is rendered ineffective, the 




Criminal anticruelty statutes are also generally worded in ways that leave 
the court extraordinary discretion. By including in the definition of cruelty 
the otherwise undefined requirement that the conduct must be 
unjustifiable or unnecessary, the law may invite the conclusion that a 
practice, though capable of causing great suffering, is not legally cruel if it 
is related, in any way, to food production. (211) 
 
The European situation has not seen this complete shift in jurisdiction and, as a 
result, some of the standard factory-farming practices that are legal in the United 
States have been qualified as cruel by European courts and have actually been 
banned, such as battery egg production. For this reason, Wolfson and Sullivan 
are rather optimistic about the European animal cruelty laws and their 
effectiveness. However, a broader overview of European animal welfare 
legislation shows that the British Animal Welfare Act of 2006 appears to be no 
exception: the same conceptual gap between harm and cruelty emerges in the 
European situation as animals bear no dignity, factory-farming abounds and that 
which is considered a cruel practice does not stem from understanding cruelty as 
following from a conceptual understanding of harm in any juridical sense.72 
In this respect, the exemption that was made in Holland for the unsedated 
slaughter of animals for kosher and halal meat is particularly telling: In 2011 – 
in a move which, arguably, caused the greatest animal welfare stir in Holland in 
the last few years – the Dutch Partij voor De Dieren (Party for the Animals) sent 
draft legislation to the Dutch upper chamber in which it called for a ban on 
unsedated slaughter. The Dutch government amended the draft legislation by 
including the provision that animals could still be slaughtered unsedated if it 
could be proven that unsedated slaughter was no crueller than conventional 
slaughter. Eventually, this criterion fell away as the right to religious freedom 
prevailed over the humane slaughter of animals and unsedated slaughter within 
the realm of religion continues to be protected under the Dutch law. The point 
here, however, is that within this European animal cruelty case, the amendment 
that was made to the initial draft legislation installed a criterion for a juridical 
definition of cruelty that was not centred on a framing of cruelty as conceptually 
related to harm. Rather, even though jurisdiction resided firmly with the State, 
the gap that a non-conceptual and self-evident notion of cruelty installed was 
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filled by an amendment that subscribed to the customary practice of factory-
farming just the same.73 
In other words, animal cruelty laws, whether or not drafted by the industry 
itself, are more often than not embedded in a juridical framework that sustains 
the practice of factory- farming as a customary practice. This renders such laws 
ineffective for the vast majority of animals. Hence, the conceptual gap between 
harm and cruelty turns cruelty into a situational issue that facilitates a juridical 
order in which the grounds for exemption are potentially endless and can even 
become the rule. This is not to say that animal cruelty laws are largely 
ineffective because of the juridical sphere within which they are embedded. 
Rather, the more fundamental point is that we cannot expect anticruelty laws to 
protect animals from cruelty, just like we cannot expect the right to life to 
protect human beings from being murdered. In fact, as long as factory-farmed 
animals have no right to life it would only seem fair to expect that anticruelty 
laws will be even less effective in preventing cruelty than criminal statutes on 
murder are in preventing homicide.  
As we can now deduce from my analysis of Wolfson and Sullivan’s study, 
animal cruelty laws not so much narrow the gap between the human and the 
animal but construct a difference between animals within the category animal 
itself because of the structural exemption for factory-farmed animals. 
Effectively, every animal cruelty law is bound to generate its own specific group 
of animals that can be excluded from the protection of cruelty. Hence, the 
inevitable problem of demarcation between the human and the animal we have 
envisaged to occur within an expansive model repeats itself in an a priori 
manner within the animal cruelty laws that are already in place today, namely as 
a problem of demarcation between animals. Of course, there is no easy solution 
to this problem. There are, however, solutions that might make matters worse 
because they allow any consideration of the suffering of factory-farmed animals 
to further retreat into the domain of invisibility. In fact, we may identify a 
similar demarcation dynamic in the modern effort to think through animal rights 
through the envisioning of an animal dignity. I consider one poignant example 
of this to be the capabilities approach devised by Martha. C. Nussbaum.74  
Without wanting to rehearse Nussbaum’s entire argument, here, let me 
briefly bring into focus what the capabilities approach is about by drawing on 
Nussbaum’s own words. After discussing the problems the theories of 
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contractarianism and utilitarianism pose to dealing with the animal question she 
states that:  
 
The capabilities approach in its current form starts from the notion of 
human dignity and a life worthy of it. But I shall now argue that it can be 
extended to provide a more adequate basis than the two theories under 
consideration. The basic moral intuition behind the approach concerns the 
dignity of a form of life that possesses both deep needs and abilities; its 
basic goal is to address the need for a rich plurality of life activities. […] 
 
The idea that a human being should have a chance to flourish in its own 
way, provided it does no harm to others, is thus very deep in the account 
the capabilities approach gives of the justification of basic political 
entitlements. (305) 
 
The capabilities approach enlists a number of central human capabilities. It then 
explores the extent to which these capabilities can provide a framework for 
sketching animal capabilities and how those capabilities can guide law and 
inform basic political principles on the way in which we should treat animals. In 
accordance with my immediate purpose, I will only focus on the first and, 
arguably, most important capability Nussbaum mentions; that is, the right to life. 
This is what Nussbaum states: 
 
Life. In the capabilities approach, all animals are entitled to continue their 
lives, whether or not they have such a conscious interest. All sentient 
animals have a secure entitlement against gratuitous killing for sport. 
Killing for luxury items such as fur falls within this category, and should 
be banned. On the other hand, intelligently respectful paternalism supports 
euthanasia for elderly animals in pain. In the middle are the very difficult 
cases, such as the question of predation to control populations, and the 
question of killing for food. (314) 
 
As for food, the capabilities approach agrees with utilitarianism in being 
most troubled by the torture of living animals. If animals were really 
killed in a painless fashion, and free – ranging life, what then? Killing of 
extreme young animals would still be problematic, but it seems unclear 





We can see how in the same passage all animals are entitled to continue their 
lives whereas the killing of animals for food is not ruled out. This internal 
inconsistency is, to some extent, “resolved” by the rhetorical question in the 
second part of the passage: If animals were killed in a painless fashion and had a 
free-ranging life, what then?  
To begin with, that would be the end of factory-farming. First, because the 
economic cost caused by the exponential growth of space needed to 
accommodate a free-ranging life for every individual animal would be 
enormous. Second, because the problem with killing extremely young animals – 
a problematic demarcation issue in its own right because it conflicts with the 
right to life – would not be resolved. Indeed, if, as Nussbaum seems to suggest, 
“the right to continue their lives” was, in some way, limited to an animal 
reaching maturity, the killing, for example, of factory-farmed chickens after six 
months instead of after six weeks, which is standard practice, would still render 
these chickens extremely young given that the average life span of chickens is 
eight years. Hence, it would not be an economically viable enterprise either. 
The more important point I wish to make here, however, is that the focus 
on all animals and the concomitant exemption of factory-farmed animals 
effectively registers a vast quantity of animals as other than animals. This is not 
merely a huge practical problem but a fundamental problem as well because it 
raises the question of how we come to categorize the category animal as animal 
and what this means for the traditional demarcation between the human and the 
animal as a foundation for the concept of human rights in the first place. For 
now, suffice it to say that the way in which animal cruelty laws register a vast 
quantity of animals as other than animal seems to render future animal cruelty 
statutes that might be inspired by approaches such as the capabilities approach 
especially ineffective. Hence, before even beginning to consider the ramify-
cations of the demarcation problem within an expansive model, we can establish 
that the customary exemption for factory-farmed animals within the law cannot 
be explained away as merely a juridical problem of the inability to conceptualize 
animal cruelty. Apart from the fundamental issues it raises, and to which I will 
attend in my final chapter, it is equally installed by a recurrent element of 
cruelty that is sublimated into a focus on humane killing that has captured both 
the popular and the legal imagination. Effectively, this focus has turned the 
humane killing of animals into a myth, not primarily because it might very well 
be impossible to kill animals painlessly, but because it cannot be done with the 
vast quantity of animals that are processed on factory-farms. This begs the 
question whether more law would help to protect animals from harm. My 
analysis of the operations of animal cruelty laws suggests to the contrary, since 
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every law installs its own categories to be excluded; this effectively legitimizes 
the cruelty inflicted upon those excluded categories.  
In light of my analysis of animal cruelty laws, we can now surmise that 
the fact that rights are generally considered as instrumental in protecting 
subjects from harm does not necessarily imply, first, that rights are the best way 
to go about protecting animals from harm; and second, that it does not logically 
follow that the desire to protect animals from harm is what motivates the wish to 
grant animals rights as well. Of course one could ask whether it really matter 
what motivates the expansive model and the answer would be that, yes, it does. 
Not being predisposed to what motivates the expansive model offers a different 
perspective on the element of cruelty that it incorporates. This element of cruelty 
then no longer has to be understood as the unfortunate by-product of a well-
intended and “just” model. Rather, it might also be read as intrinsically bound 
up with the expansive model and thus as symptomatic of the wider juridical 
sphere in which it is embedded. With respect to this, I choose not to read the 
expansive model as resulting from a desire to protect animals from harm, but 
primarily as motivated by the factual and actual outcome of a scientific 
discourse. 
This scientific discourse, instead of being motivated by a concern with 
animal well-being, is the result of a not being able, a not seeing any reason not 
to attribute animals rights. This incapacity, this double negation, this “not being 
able not to” is “solved” by or “dissolved” into an affirmation, which takes the 
form of expanding the model instead of questioning it. Reading the expansive 
model as I do here, demands giving up on the more conventional urge to look at 
the expansive model as motivated by a desire to protect animals from harm, and 
raises the question which stakeholders carry an interest in the status quo of the 
scientific discourse that holds up the expansive model today. In what lies ahead, 
however, I will restrict myself to bringing the mistaking of effect for cause into 
play that confuses or, rather, substitutes, the desired result of the granting of 
rights to subjects – protection from harm – with its scientific motivation. Hence, 
I will examine what would happen if we really regard the premise that animals 
should be protected from harm as central to a future juridical model. To this end, 
and again with a focus on tropology, I will close read George Orwell’s Animal 





3. Animal Farm and the Nature of Absolute Difference 
 
Animal Farm, a book written by George Orwell between November 1943 and 
February 1944, was first published in August 1945, at the beginning of the Cold 
War.75 It tells a story about animals on a farm who successfully rebel against 
their master only to see the Rebellion turn into a struggle for power that ends in 
tyranny. As Michael Shelden76 has observed, Orwell got the idea for the book on 
his return from the Spanish Civil War, where he and his wife experienced the 
long reach of Stalinist influence and made a narrow escape from the communist 
purges that flooded the country. If this experience turned Orwell into an anti-
Stalinist for the rest of his life, the book was not meant as anti-communist but as 
a warning against the mythical proportions of Stalinist Soviet communism, 
which had blinded Spanish revolutionaries and socialists elsewhere to the ugly 
side of Stalin’s reign. On his return to Britain, Orwell experienced this blindness 
first hand when he initially had trouble finding a publisher for his book. No one 
wanted to hear any critique on Stalinist Soviet communism, especially now that 
Stalin had joined the allies against Hitler. 
I will begin my close reading by providing my own plot summary: 
 
 
The animals on Manor Farm, which is owned by Mr Jones, meet up one 
night to listen to Old Major, a white boar who has had a visionary dream 
that he wishes to communicate to all the other animals. He tells them that 
their lives on the farm are miserable and short and that Jones and his men 
steal the fruits of their labour. He assures them that the only way to put an 
end to the evil tyranny on the farm is Rebellion and teaches the animals a 
revolutionary song called “Beasts of England” to impel them to a spirit of 
brotherhood and comradeship. Soon after, when Jones takes to drinking 
and neglects to feed the animals, they break out of their cages and, in the 
resulting confrontation, they chase Jones away and take over the farm. 
The animals rename the farm Animal Farm and adopt the Seven 
Commandments of Animalism with “All Animals Are Equal” as the 
principle command. Two pigs that go by the name of Snowball and 
Napoleon naturally assume leadership and, at first, things seem to turn out 
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The Atomic Bomb.” In: Tribune (London, 1945).  
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well for the animals. As time passes, however, and as Napoleon gets rid of 
Snowball by using him as a scapegoat for everything that goes wrong on 
the farm, the animals find themselves working even harder than before 
under the ever more tyrannical leadership of Napoleon and the other pigs 
that figure as his accomplices. The pigs keep the milk and apples for 
themselves. The revolutionary song, “Beasts of England,” is replaced with 
an anthem glorifying Napoleon. The Seven Commandments of Animalism 
are secretly amended to make sure that the pig’s increasingly humanlike 
conduct can never be qualified as unlawful. Most importantly, the 
commandment “All Animals Are Equal” is changed into: “All Animals 
Are Equal But Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others.” In spite of 
their hardship, the animals are blind to the reality of their situation and 
even when Napoleon begins to purge the farm with his dogs, the animals 
remain loyal to the spirit of their revolution. The story ends with a dinner 
party to celebrate a new alliance between the pigs and the local farmers at 
which Napoleon insists on changing the name of the farm back to Manor 
Farm. When a row breaks out over cheating at cards and the other animals 
peep in to see what is causing the uproar, they can no longer distinguish 
between animal and man, at which point they finally come to realise that 
their Rebellion has been betrayed. 
 
As we can gather from the above plot summary, Animal Farm is about the 
revolution of animals on a farm seeking protection from harm. Significantly, the 
first thing the animals do after the Rebellion is install the laws of Animalism to 
guarantee the protection from harm by way of rights. This implies that the story 
is about rights. In the standard reading of Animal Farm, as an allegory of 
Stalinist Soviet communism and its tyrannical aftermath, the animals are read as 
representing people. The story then seems to be about human rights. More 
specifically, because of its focus on harm, the text seems to make the liberal 
Cold War point that communism is detrimental to the rights of the individual. In 
this sense, the text dramatizes the tension between two forms of justice: the 
justice of the community – the farm – and the justice of the individual. It can be 
seen as opting for the last form since, ultimately, the revolution is betrayed.  
It would be a gross simplification, however, to argue that Animal Farm’s 
allegorical structure impels us to read Animal Farm as conveying the message 
that communism or, more broadly speaking, communal justice does not work 
and that therefore the status quo under capitalism is the only feasible political 
alternative. The story, because of its predominant focus on the horrors the 
animals face after the Rebellion, can indeed invite such a reading, which 
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actually happened on various occasions after Orwell’s death in 1950. The CIA, 
for example, used Animal Farm for propaganda purposes in a cartoon version 
that was adapted in such a way that the closing parallel between capitalist and 
the pigs’ exploitation of the other animals was suppressed.77 By contrast, Orwell 
was always very clear about his views on Animal Farm being a warning of 
communism as totalitarianism and of the way it was meant to convey the 
prospects of capitalism. This can be illustrated with a quote, part from Michael 
Shelden’s longer citation of Orwell on Animal Farm in a letter to Dwight 
MacDonald, the editor of the New York magazine Politics in 1946: 
 
The turning-point of the story was supposed to be when the pigs kept the 
milk and apples for themselves. (Kronstadt). If the other animals had had 
the sense to put their foot down then, it would have been all right. If 
people think I am defending the status quo, that is, I think, because they 
have grown pessimistic and assume there is no alternative except 
dictatorship or laissez- faire capitalism […] What I was trying to say was, 
‘You can’t have a revolution unless you make it for yourself; there is no 
such thing as a benevolent dictatorship.’ (407) 
 
This caveat aside, the allegorical reading of Animal Farm as a story about 
human rights that informs these political readings is blocked by the text at 
several points. The animals are much more animal-like than a strict allegorical 
reading would demand. The chickens are chicken-like, the pigs are pig-like the 
cat is cat-like, etc. This element, albeit followed through consistently, becomes 
most apparent as each animal’s work on the farm is either accommodated or 
hindered by its species-specific bodily disposition and character. The cat, to 
mention but one example, never works but only shows up at meal times where 
she affectionately purrs to convince the other animals of her good intentions. 
The traditional political-juridical reading, in order to be coherent, has to remain 
blind to this element. Yet, the effect of the text, the way in which it captures the 
imagination, depends on just these aspects, which are therefore more than a 
compositional adornment. In fact, this small but important friction opens up the 
possibility for another reading that I propose here and whereby the text is still 
about rights and the protection from harm, but now with regard to nonhuman 
animals. Hence, my reading will still be an allegory – or rather allegoresis – but 
the story is now explicitly framed as an allegory about animal rights. This 
framework allows me to use Animal Farm as a model for exploring the 
                                                 
77 Paul Kirschner, “The Dual Purpose of Animal Farm.” In: Orwell, Updated Edition, Blooms 
Modern Critical Views (New York: Chelsea House, 2007), 759-786. 
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demarcation problem within an expansive model. More specifically, I will close 
read the way in which the difference between the human and the animal and 
between the animals themselves is thought through in Animal Farm and explore 
the effects this bears on the concepts of harm and cruelty in relation to 
accommodating animals within an expansive model. For this reason, I will begin 
my exploration with a comparison of how the difference between the parameters 
of the human and the animal is conveyed within Animal Farm, on the one hand, 
and within an expansive model, on the other.  
The expansive model is centred on the negation of an absolute difference 
between the human and the animal. As I concluded before, there is ultimately no 
way of telling what the essentially human is, on account of which any 
proclaimed difference naturally takes on a gradual quality. By contrast, in 
Animal Farm the sense of an absolute difference is not denied, but implicitly 
conveyed at the very beginning of the book, just before the Rebellion is sparked. 
At this stage, before the Rebellion, the animals enjoy no protection from harm as 
they are subjected to the laws of the farm under Jones’ reign. Their situation 
changes dramatically when Jones takes to drinking out of frustration with the 
law and wilfully neglects the animals trusted to his care, which is succinctly 
conveyed in the following passage:  
 
Now, as it turned out, the Rebellion was achieved much earlier and more 
easily than anyone had expected. In the past years Mr Jones, although a 
hard master, had been a capable farmer, but of late he had fallen on evil 
days. He had become much disheartened after losing money in a lawsuit, 
and had taken to drinking more than was good for him. For whole days at 
a time he would lounge in his Windsor chair in the kitchen, reading the 
newspapers, drinking and occasionally feeding Moses on crusts of bread 
soaked in beer. His men were idle and dishonest, the fields were full of 
weeds, the buildings wanted roofing, the hedges were neglected and the 
animals were underfed. (18) 
 
In view of the provisional definition of cruelty I have developed, I identify the 
dynamic described in the above passage as the moment when harm topples over 
into cruelty. On the one hand, Jones is described as a hard but capable master, 
which implies that under the old regime the animals were still cared for in a 
manner that never impelled them to rebel, because Jones exercised a minimum 
responsibility for the farm, which, for example, guaranteed their daily rations. In 
short, the animals might have been subjected to harm, but as long as they were 
subjected to the human laws of the farm and not ignored by them they were 
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safeguarded from the most blatant cruelty. On the other hand, when Jones takes 
to drinking the animals enter a lawless zone and are neglected as subjects under 
the laws of the farm that previously guaranteed them a basic protection against 
the most blatant types of cruelty, such as not being fed. Hence, the precarious 
situation the animals find themselves in and that this ignites the Rebellion may 
be read as a practical illustration of the implications that the wilful ignorance of 
those animals not granted legal personhood within an expansive model on a 
more theoretical plane could result in. 
After the Rebellion, the absolute difference between the human and the 
animal that is conveyed at the beginning of the book is compromised. Indeed, 
the fact that the animals become legal subjects under their own laws of 
Animalism seems to flatten out what distinguished the humans from the animals 
on the farm in absolute terms, namely the having of rights. Strictly speaking, 
however, the laws of Animalism, albeit affording the animals some protection 
from harm prior to the amends made by the pigs, are surely not drawn up as an 
expansion of the laws under the regime of Jones. On the contrary, they are 
formulated very much in opposition to those laws; this confirms rather than 
effaces the absolute difference between the human and the animal. Admittedly, 
this oppositional demarcation still does not completely cancel out the idea of a 
species’ overarching inclusivity, since the ground rule of Animalism – “All 
Animals Are Equal” – might very well be read as animals being entitled to rights 
just as much as humans. However, this would suggest that the oppositional 
manner in which the laws of Animalism are framed not so much represents a 
form of justice in terms of equality, but at best conveys the aspiration to upset 
the traditional opposition between the human and the animal in absolute terms in 
the spirit of Old Major’s revolutionary song. In this light, the text can be said to 
appeal to the potential for interspecies solidarity while dramatizing the problems 
the legal codification of interspecies solidarity poses. This implicit potential, 
however, is cancelled out at the end of the story as the animals are subjected to 
the laws of what is no longer Animal Farm but Manor Farm and human reign is 
reinstalled. 
Leaving this cancelled out potential aside, if only momentarily, the denial 
of the difference between the parameters of the human and the animal in the 
expansive model, on the one hand, and the focus on the oppositional nature of 
this difference in Animal Farm, on the other, suggests we might expect both 
allegorical models to differ from each other significantly with regard to the 
weight attributed to these parameters. Since in both models we come across laws 
that install a demarcation problem that turns on precisely the nature of this 
difference, we can now explore this issue in more detail.  
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Within an expansive model the demarcation problem necessarily remains 
an abstract matter, which hinges, as we have seen, on a conventional notion of 
personhood. In Animal Farm the demarcation problem is addressed in more 
practical terms when, after the Rebellion, a demarcation decision has to be made 
on whether or not to let the birds fit in within the other animals. After Snowball 
has declared that the Seven Commandments should, in effect, be reduced to the 
single maxim: “four legs good, two legs bad” and the birds object, he makes the 
following statement: 
 
 ‘A bird’s wing, comrades,’ he said, ‘is an organ of propulsion and not of 
manipulation. It should therefore be regarded as a leg. (31) 
  
This seemingly arbitrary way of demarcation invites us to explore, first, in 
which way the parameters of the human and the animal in Animal Farm inform 
the demarcation problem the birds are faced with. Second, it begs the question 
as to what the absolute difference the maxim “four legs good, two legs bad” 
installs amounts to and how this difference “translates” into the denial of an 
absolute difference on which an expansive model is centred. 
The best way of investigating the workings of those parameters in Animal 
Farm is by zooming in on the moments the human world and the animal world 
intersect. This intersection is exclusively reserved for the cleverest animals on 
the farm, the pigs. At first, the contacts the pigs entertain with the human world 
are established through Mr Whymper, an intermediary third party, a solicitor, a 
lower species of the humans in that he is working for a boss and not bossing 
himself, as the pigs aspire to. At the end of the story, the pigs’ efforts to operate 
on a basis of equality with their human counterparts are brusquely betrayed: the 
unity between the two worlds collapses just before it seems to take shape and 
human reign is reinstalled. This collapse can be said to literally reinforce the 
sharp division between the human and the animal and to enact the fable’s moral 
lesson. This lesson is at one with the enigmatic rule that has so surreptitiously 
come to govern the story, namely that: “All Animals Are Equal But Some Are 
More Equal Than Others”. Any attempt to tamper with this ground rule will be 
met with tyrannical violence.  
On the one hand, this rule can be read as demarcating the humanized pigs 
from the other animals; that is, if we momentarily read the pigs as symbolizing 
human beings. On the other hand, this rule can be read as demarcating some 
animals from others, which would suggest the demarcation problem that stems 
from the absolute difference between the human and the animal before the 
rebellion repeats itself in the form of a demarcation problem within the animal 
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species as constituted by higher and lower life forms. Let us now explore both 
reading possibilities and begin with the way in which this enigmatic rule 
performs an identity politics by focusing on the contradictory notion of 
difference implied within this rule. 
The fact that the lower human (the solicitor) intersects with the higher 
animal (the pig) gives way to a notion of gradual difference, both between and 
within the species. At the same time, however, the collapse of this intersection at 
the end of the story testifies to an absolute difference between the species, as the 
suggestion of a gradual difference is betrayed and appears to have worked as a 
smokescreen. In short, if the notion of a gradual difference both between and 
across the species is sustained throughout the story, notions of absolute 
difference, albeit discernible – for example, through an analysis of the laws of 
Animalism as oppositional instead of expansive – remain rather implicit until 
the collapse at the end. The fact that all the different animals on the farm, 
despite their different and species-specific whining, lowing, bleating and 
quacking, can communicate with each other but not with the humans, stands as 
an example of this implicit notion of absolute difference. It suggests that there is 
only one overriding, essential, absolute difference, a rigid divide between the 
human and the animal.  
On a character level, the horse Mollie operates on the axis of this divide. 
After the Rebellion, Mollie is the only animal that stubbornly persists in eating 
sugar cubes and in adorning herself with ribbons, which the other animals 
consider a token of human idleness. When another horse named Clover 
confronts Mollie with her unlawful behaviour she denies everything but cannot 
bring herself to look Clover in the face and runs off into the field. Clover, who 
has grown even more suspicious as a result of Mollie’s evasive behaviour, 
decides to search her stall: 
 
A thought struck Clover. Without saying anything to the others, she went 
to Mollie’s stall and turned over the straw with her hoof. Hidden under the 
straw was a little pile of lump sugar and several bunches of ribbons of 
different colours. (42) 
  
Clover never tells the other animals of his discovery and when, shortly after this 
incident, Mollie disappears from the farm none of the animals ever mention 
Mollie again. On the one hand, this unwritten code of silence over Mollie’s 
behaviour both prior to and after her disappearance works to sustain the myth of 
Animalism through a self-invoked and collective censorship; on the other hand, 
this code of silence turns Mollie’s stubbornness from a vice into a virtue because 
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it lends her desire, her indulgence, an apologetic aura of being a creature who is 
simply unable to resist the call of nature, answering – deep down inside – to 
higher, human laws. This “call of nature,” however, is not natural, but 
constructed by the other animal’s code of silence, which reflects their 
exceptionally mild reactions towards her humanlike behaviour. In total contrast 
to the death penalty awaiting the animals that do not strictly comply with the 
laws of Animalism, Mollie’s behaviour merely causes unease and the occasional 
reproach, but she is neither punished, nor banned from the farm. Moreover, it 
seems as if this mildness is informed by the animal’s general incapacity to 
understand Mollie as an individual because they are submerged in the collective 
myth of Animalism, which at once reduces the other animals to simpletons and 
makes their reactions take on a non-judgmental, non-condemning, justifying 
quality in yet another way.  
Hence, whereas the other animal’s mild reactions towards Mollie’s 
behaviour seem to convey a non-understanding of a fellow creature that stems 
from a non-articulated accepting, an acknowledging, of Mollie as other, of who 
or what Mollie “is,” this acknowledgement is not the acknowledgement of 
Mollie as an individual. Rather, this acknowledgement conveys the other 
animal’s humble bowing, their answering to the human at the top of the 
hierarchy, which is constructed by a narrative strategy that poses this hierarchy 
as natural, as always already in place. If the other animals are banned from the 
farm or an even more cruel fate awaits them should their conduct conflict with 
the laws of Animalism, Mollie, once humanized, leaves the farm of her own free 
will and literally crosses over to the other side. It is precisely at this moment that 
the gradual difference between the human and the animal that Mollie’s character 
operates until her disappearance is made explicit and performed as absolute 
after all. The price of Mollie’s humanization, however, is her willing submission 
to the owner of the neighbouring farm, where absolute difference reigns and the 
“natural law” is still intact.  
Now, if in Animal Farm notions of an absolute difference between the 
human and the animal remain rather implicit until the end of the story, there is 
one notable exception to this trend. This exception is formulated in explicit 
juridical terms and concerns the sheep’s repetitive bleating of the maxim “four 
legs good, two legs bad.” This maxim poses a rigid divide between the human 
and the animal, which appears to be centred on their different bodily 
constitutions. As we have seen, it is issued by one of the leading pigs, Snowball, 
after considering that the stupider animals, such as the sheep, hens, and ducks, 
are unable to learn by heart the Seven Commandments installed immediately 
after the Rebellion. At first glance, this maxim offers comic relief as it ridicules 
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the blind trust the animals display in their leaders through their exaggerated 
commitment to an ideological cause they cannot grasp. Yet, there is a more 
serious touch to this maxim in view of Orwell’s comments on his having trouble 
finding a publisher for Animal Farm in Britain when he returned from the 
Spanish Civil War.  
As Michel Shelden has observed, albeit without making the connection to 
the bleating sheep in Animal Farm, Orwell, in a preface for an English edition 
stated that the real enemy was not Soviet communism but the gramophone mind. 
Orwell was hinting at the fact that any ideology could encourage a state of mind 
such as was conveyed to him through the repetitive character of the explanatory 
excuses he got each time his manuscript was rejected. Roughly, publishers, each 
adding their different measure of pathos, rejected his manuscript on the grounds 
that Stalin was an ally of Britain and that Russian soldiers were dying on the 
battlefield. It all boiled down to any critique on Stalinist communism being 
either inappropriate or completely off the mark.78 Reading the bleating of the 
sheep’s maxim in this light, as an example par excellence of the gramophone 
mind, I will now take it seriously in my own way by focusing on the manner in 
which the maxim performs rather than delivers its four legs ideology in Animal 
Farm. 
To begin with, the maxim “four legs good, two legs bad” informs the term 
Animalism as an “-ism,” succinctly conveying, through a four legs ideology, the 
animal’s strife for independence and their subsequent craving for a self-
sufficient animal world after the Rebellion. The term Animalism formally 
denotes: the religious worship of animals, or, the behaviour that is characteristic 
of animals, particularly their being physical and instinctive.79 In other words, the 
text not just induces us to read the word Animalism allegorically, as a specific 
way of interpreting Animality as opposed to Humanity, but at the same time 
invites us to activate these latter terms as parameters. The text itself, however, 
never explicitly mentions Humanity or Animality, which suggests that we 
perhaps should not judge the other animals too harshly for being fooled by the 
“gramophone record” the maxim of the sheep plays. Rather, we might raise our 
awareness to the fact that the same maxim installs an -ism that invites us to 
inscribe parameters that are not literally there, in the text. This is why I will now 
zoom in on the animal’s maxim and explore this inscription in terms of the laws 
on Animal Farm. 
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79 OED. (Oxford, 2003). 
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The maxim “four legs good, two legs bad” substitutes all the other rules 
previously in place as it comes to regulate Animal Farm’s world by dividing it 
into two categories, the category of two legs and the category of four legs. It 
stands to reason that this is the most effective way of making sure no entity falls 
out of what we are invited to read as the categories of Humanity and Animality. 
Such categorization, succinctly condensed into a single rule of law, is not 
concerned with what the animals are or with what they do, but with isolating one 
from the other through an identity politics that defines this other as the two-
legged human. In other words, the rule “four legs good, two legs bad” does not 
invite an interpretative gesture, but demands a demarcation decision. It begs the 
question, first, in which way this rule appears to call for interpretation while 
only demanding a decision. I would argue that this has something to do with 
Snowball’s intervention that names the bird’s wings legs. As much as this 
intervention seems to be an interpretative gesture, it does not interpret the rule, 
which is already in place, but the bodily constitution of the birds. Second, it begs 
the question as to how the oppositional demarcation rule “four legs good, two 
legs bad” works, which I will now explore by examining the way in which the 
opposition between four legs and two legs is performed. 
In Animal Farm, in a world that acknowledges only two species (Animal 
and Man), four legs is the opposite of two legs as good is considered the 
opposite of bad. Yet, just as the opposition good vs. bad is more often than not a 
nonsensical simplification of reality, I propose that the opposition two legs-four 
legs must be considered a nonsensical opposition as well. Certainly, the 
mathematic doubling of the legs that informs the opposition lends the rule a 
scientific edge, but mathematically speaking, two legs do not stand in opposition 
to four legs. In fact, the irrational mathematics of the legs can be said to enact a 
conventional form of anthropomorphism since “the human” is commonly 
associated – synecdochically – with human person and hence, with walking 
upright, on two legs. More specifically, precisely because this irrational 
mathematics is reliant on a conventional form of anthropomorphism, the figure 
of the human is framed as a rational-scientific being. This figure of the rational-
scientific human being is kept in place by the sheep’s repetitive bleating, no 
matter the temporal reversal of power relations after the Rebellion.  
With respect to this issue, I consider the fact that the animals work out the 
maths as a foreshadowing of the collapse at the end of the story that works to 
affirm human leadership. More importantly, I understand this dynamic in terms 
of Judith Butler’s analysis of the difference between the constative and the 
performative, because it suggests that the hierarchical opposition between the 
human and the animal in Animal Farm is not a constative matter of fact but must 
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still be performed by those who master and who are mastered. This implies that 
the tyrannical power of the pigs is not an absolute given, but constructed as an 
absolute given.80 Since the birds in Animal Farm are the first animals faced with 
the practical implications of the rigid categorization the maxim “four legs good, 
two legs bad” imposes, I will now shift my focus from the rule to the 
proceedings the birds are put through as a test case for examining if a theoretical 
demarcation problem – the impossibility of having an objective standard in 
place to determine the nature of the difference between the human and the 
animal – can be reconciled with the practical demarcation decision of fitting in 
the birds with the animals.  
The birds, because they are only equipped with two legs, risk falling out 
of the category of Animalism. After Snowball’s consideration that “wings are an 
instrument of propulsion,” this problem is solved by making their wings count 
as legs as well, together with their two legs adding up to four and fitting them in 
with Animalism. The birds, then, are saved from becoming enemies of the 
animal order that has temporarily been installed through an un-
acknowledgement of their wings. Not coincidentally, those wings are what 
distinguishes them from the other animals in that all birds have wings. 
Consequently, the denial of their wings is the price the birds pay for being 
allowed to being subjected under the laws of Animalism. This denial enacts 
what I consider to be a captivating poetic cruelty, because it plays on a notion of 
freedom through the association of birds with their ability to fly. This poetic 
cruelty is significantly different from my provisional qualification of cruelty in 
the first chapter, which, let us recall, constituted the legitimization of a wilful 
ignorance of those entities not considered fit for inclusion in the system of legal 
personhood. Here, inclusion in the system installs a protection from harm but 
generates a poetic cruelty since it legitimizes the wilful ignorance of the 
fundamental otherness of the entity that is subjected.  
Even though the birds are, through a substitution of wings with legs – 
which is, because it is a substitution, a matter of naming and thus, not as it 
would seem, a matter of attributing, as nothing is added – incorporated in the 
seemingly higher category of Animalism, the hierarchical opposition between 
Humanity and Animality is not undermined, let alone reversed.81 Rather, and 
paradoxically, this hierarchy is reinforced. It is as if the animals are saving the 
humans the trouble of categorization here, by doing the categorization 
themselves. This is precisely what a totalitarian ideology would want: let the 
subjects do the subjecting themselves. The point here, however, is that the bird’s 
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case not just complicates my provisional understanding of cruelty but also my 
earlier understanding of anthropomorphism, whereby I distinguished between a 
conservative form (attributing) and a strict form (naming). In a sense, the birds’ 
case upsets and confuses these definitions, since the birds are attributed a 
characteristic, namely legs, through a substitution that names their wings legs. 
The attribution, at first glance, seems to constitute a conservative form of 
anthropomorphism because it can only be motivated by a hypogram, which 
Snowball invents when he defines wings as an instrument of propulsion and 
therefore as essentially animal.  
Strictly speaking, however, the absolute difference between the human 
and the animal in Animal Farm is centred on an Animalism that we have been 
invited to read as Animality and not as Humanity, even if the animals within the 
allegory Animal Farm function as veiled human beings. By implication, we 
cannot qualify the attribution of legs as a conservative form of 
anthropomorphism because the legs are attributed to animals. Rather, given the 
momentary reversal of power relations the laws of Animalism symbolize, this 
attribution could, at best, be qualified as a conservative form of zoomorphism. 
Yet, it would be a simplification to read this zoomorphism as oppositional to 
anthropomorphism because the confusion of naming and attributing that takes 
place to fit in the birds within the allegorical model of Animalism is arguably 
different from the confusion that underlies registering entities as person within 
an expansive model. In short, the “attributing” here is not an attribution of some 
inherent quality, but operates on the body of the animal by a taking away of the 
birds’ wings through a substitution with legs.  
In this respect, the expansive model under the laws of Animalism in 
Animal Farm shows the impotency of the human-centred expansive model to 
register what is fundamentally other about the animal, its body; because doing 
so would upset the neat distinction between naming and attributing that it relies 
on to mask its performative operations as constative. To put this complicated 
matter in another way, the poetic cruelty the birds are confronted with installs a 
hierarchy that both nests itself in and is masked by an expansive model because 
it presents itself as a system of equality. Hence, the law’s focus on abstract terms 
such as life, liberty and happiness as equally pertaining to all the entities it 
subjects might very well be read as conveying the universal values to which it 
aspires, but, paradoxically, these terms function as symbols that install a body-
mind dualism, which it needs to survive as a system of demarcation.  
The practical demarcation problem in Animal Farm has appeared not to 
be simply the result of the theoretical demarcation problem, of the impossibility 
to formulate absolute differences between the human and the animal. Rather, the 
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practical demarcation problem has surfaced in the guise of a demarcation 
decision to make the availability of an objective standard to measure those 
differences take shape in our imagination. The practical demarcation decision is 
produced by a categorization of difference that consists of activating the binary 
absolute/gradual through an act of anthropomorphism in the strict sense, which 
“takes as given” the human and the animal as parameters that can operate within 
the same discursive space without one enveloping the other. There is, however, 
only difference. Consequently, if within an expansive model a categorization of 
difference is embedded in a rhetoric of equality, which is centred on the premise 
that there is no such thing as an absolute difference between the human and the 
animal, I read Animal Farm as ridiculing this rhetoric of equality because it 
hilariously stresses its rhetoric of equality instead of the equality itself. This is 
exemplified by the enigmatic rule stating that: “All Animals Are Equal But 
Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others.” In short, it is the use of the terms 
human and animal as relevant parameters fostered by a categorization of 
difference throughout the story that reconciles a practical demarcation decision 
with the theoretical demarcation problem. 
I have now read the categories four legs and two legs as products of a 
categorization of difference that strategically functions to extrapolate the 
parameters of the human and the animal. If the mathematical doubling of the 
legs points to an absolute difference, the common denominator legs 
complements the binary because it activates the suggestion of a gradual 
difference, as both creatures are legged. In short, the mathematical doubling of 
the legs is not just an irrational construction, because two does not stand in 
opposition to four, but also because the word legs here is used in synonymic 
rather than in homonymic vein. It is in both these senses that the binary four 
legs-two legs is exposed as a construction itself. My reading of the practical 
demarcation decision the birds are faced with, then, not just addresses the 
categorization of difference that reconciles the practical demarcation decision 
with the theoretical demarcation problem, but also points to the obvious but 
often overlooked fact of how the practical demarcation decision does not 
involve the establishing of categories, as the categories themselves must be in 
place before a demarcation decision can be effectuated. It shows how the 
practical demarcation decision is strategically informed by a particular identity 
politics, which can never be the result of either an absolute or gradual difference 
between the species. In other words, we may now observe that the theoretical 
demarcation problem belongs to the sphere of categorization, whereas the 
practical demarcation decision belongs to the sphere of naming. The relevance 
of establishing this difference is that it suggests that the demarcation problem on 
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which the animal rights debate turns cannot be solved by a scientific progress 
that attempts to probe deeper and deeper into the nature of animals. Rather, it 
suggests as a matter of principle that the demarcation problem is endless, 
precisely because it is hard to see how we can come up with objective criteria 
for naming. It seems the only thing we can do to get out of this polemic is revise 
our categorizations, a matter I will explore in my final chapter.  
For now, my reading of the case of the birds has shown that the cruelty 
flowing from the demarcation problem within an expansive model not just 
concerns those entities not seen fit to be attributed personhood, but also the 
entities that do get to be incorporated within the model, a cruelty I have defined 
as a poetic cruelty. Both forms of cruelty concern the law’s right to arbitrarily 
neglect what it considers essentially nonhuman entities without and outside of 
the model, whereby the poetic form of cruelty installs a hierarchy that is masked 
by equality. For both forms of cruelty to be inscribed within a juridical model in 
the first place, however, they would somehow need to be perceived as just, as 
not allowing for arbitrary neglect but as fostering non-arbitrary and objectively 
informed decisions. This begs the question how the seemingly arbitrary and 
subjective practical demarcation decision that the birds face, namely the 
substitution of their wings with legs, manages to come of as a non-arbitrary, 
legitimate decision. In short, this raises the issue of arbitrary chance versus non-
arbitrary law and the illusion of non-arbitrary justice. 
 
 
4. Arbitrary Chance versus Non-Arbitrary Law: The Illusion of Non- 
Arbitrary Justice 
 
The answer to how the seemingly arbitrary substitution of the bird’s wings with 
legs comes of as a non-arbitrary decision is as simple as it is puzzling: It is not 
the in(ter)vention – the substitution of wings with legs – that is judged, but the 
decision that is its result. Once the substitution of wings with legs has been 
effectuated, the rule “four legs good, two legs bad” no longer leaves any space 
for doubt. Effectively, the rule at this stage no longer functions as a text as it 
cannot be interpreted. It may seem to have been transferred the power if not to 
interpret then to measure – which would be a personification in its own right, of 
the rule as a ruler – but it does not interpret or measure anything, some specific 
capacity or characteristic, say, the imaginary number of legs of a bird. In fact, 
the ru8le “four legs good, two legs bad” does not function as a rule at all, as it 
cannot be broken. It does, however, match the description of a rule of law: “the 
restriction of the arbitrary exercise of power by subordinating it to well-defined 
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and established laws.”82 In its capacity as a rule of law it restricts, or rather, 
neutralizes arbitrariness, because it is impossible not to fit in the birds with the 
category of the animals once the substitution of wings with legs has been 
effectuated. In other words, the practical demarcation decision, which is 
installed through a performative act, is not a decision because a decision 
requires choice and no choice is offered. Hence, this lack of choice makes the 
practical demarcation decision come of as a non-arbitrary decision because it 
generates the illusion of a supposed correspondence to the rule of law that 
happens to be in place, whereas what actually takes place is a demarcation 
through naming, which forces an entity into correspondence in an arbitrary way.  
The kind of arbitrariness implied within this practical demarcation 
decision can be qualified as conservative, because it rests on the binary 
subjective-objective that equates to arbitrary <-> non-arbitrary. Since such a 
binary can only be sustained hierarchically, it will always need the suggestion of 
a higher truth, be it scientific, metaphysical, or no matter what, to justify itself. 
The law presents this higher truth as an “expertise in the unknowable,” whereas 
the creative option would of course be to try and reconcile an idea of truth with a 
fundamental un-decidability. In this respect, my exploration of the practical 
demarcation decision through the case of the birds points to a lack of 
responsibility on the part of the law, because it demonstrates how the 
predominant moral informing the arbitrary substitution of wings with legs has 
detached itself from the rule of law from which it supposedly flows. In short, the 
predominant moral of the substitution of wings with legs is, of course, that birds 
are, after all, animals. The rule of law, however, contrary to what the 
qualifications “good” and “bad” so cunningly suggest, presents neither a moral, 
nor a decision. More than that, I argue it does not present a moral because it 
does not ask for a decision. The only real decision the birds are faced with 
consists of the in(ter)vention of the arbitrary substitution of wings with legs, 
which begs the question what kind of arbitrariness, if any, it is that the rule of 
law “four legs good, two legs bad” neutralizes.  
In this respect, I wish to observe that within a conservative understanding 
of arbitrariness, arbitrariness and non-arbitrariness form a binary that is morally 
charged. In short, non-arbitrariness is registered as informing objective and just 
decisions while arbitrariness connotes what is subjective, which automatically 
makes non-arbitrariness look good and arbitrariness look bad, unjust and 
suspect. In Animal Farm, however, the moral charge that is tied to either pole of 
this binary is not being followed through and appears to slip away: the law’s 
implicit claim to non-arbitrariness through the rule “four legs good, two legs 
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bad” does nothing to prevent the birds from being exposed to a poetic cruelty, 
whereas it is the arbitrary, subjective substitution of wings with legs that 
eventually saves them from the harm of being neglected as legal subjects. In this 
sense, my reading of the case of the birds shows that cruelty cannot be avoided 
by a juridical system that is centred around a conservative form of arbitrariness. 
Rather, it might be sustained by it when the rule of law that happens to be in 
place is imagined as restricting and neutralizing arbitrariness, a “promise” on 
which it can never deliver. 
As we can learn from the case of the birds, an understanding of arbitrary-
ness in its conservative sense, and not (as I do) as a categorization, is what traps 
the law in a game that requires non-arbitrariness to take root in the concept of a 
higher scientific or metaphysical truth. It implies that the problem of cruelty is 
no longer to be viewed as a problem of arbitrariness as such, but of the way in 
which arbitrariness is understood in relation to truth and how truth itself is 
understood. If Christianity could claim non-arbitrariness by siding with god’s all 
knowing truth, today, at least in secular states, the law can no longer point to 
god. Consequently, the law has to find other vehicles for truth. Since 
arbitrariness is considered as something that has to be avoided within a system 
of justice, I consider one of those vehicles to be allegorical reading. However, as 
long as arbitrariness is understood in its conservative form, neither siding with 
god, nor allegorical reading works to avoid cruelty. On the contrary, because an 
adherence to a conservative form of arbitrariness is likely to result in the 
application of a strict form of arbitrariness, a “taking as given,” it might come to 
justify it. This problem of justification begs the question as to which claim to 
non-arbitrariness, in its conservative sense, installs or justifies the expansive 
model. 
I propose the expansive model’s implicit claim to a conservative form of 
non-arbitrariness to be informed by the consensus posited by the philosophy of 
science or by the science of philosophy; that there is no absolute difference 
between the human and the animal. This consensus is paralleled by the 
consensus in Animal Farm that “All Animals Are Equal.” Both allegorical 
models perform the impossible exercise of bringing the parameters of the human 
and the animal within one discursive space, which results in a model that is 
hierarchically sustained. The naming that results from the predefined categories 
both models install is not a matter of interpretation, but is performed by an act of 
anthropomorphism that attributes a single name to an entity; or, reversely, 
attributes an entity to a name already in place, which strictly speaking is a form 
of naming and not of attributing, because nothing is added but everything is 
substituted. Since the entity cannot be both, nonperson and person, two-legged 
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and four-legged, there is only one way of reading. In other words, it is not the 
entity that is read but the allegorical code on how to read the entity, which 
becomes the reading of the entity.  
By implication, the confusion of persons within an expansive model may 
not just be read as serving to cover up the law’s inability to answer the question 
as to what a person and, hence, to what the human is. Rather, it must also be 
read as enacting the law’s refusal to acknowledge this inability, and under-
standably so, because by acknowledging this inability the law would no longer 
be able to pose as the expert in the unknowable and face a serious authority 
problem. Hence, it would expose the idea of non-arbitrary justice as an illusion 
and perhaps force the law to operate in a different manner. The law, however, as 
it cannot afford to have its lack of “expertise in the unknowable” exposed, turns 
away from the abyss of the unknowable and adopts a strategy of indifference. 
This strategy of indifference consists of not questioning the nature of person at 
all, but in taking person as given, as synonymous with human person. In this 
way, the law shelters its authority, feeding into the illusion that what is given no 
longer needs to be questioned. This strategy of indifference, however, comes at 
a price as it legitimizes the various types of cruelty I have now identified.  
With respect to this issue, the conventional confusion of persons within an 
expansive model can be read as operating an identity politics that veils what 
must remain an arbitrary attribution of personhood. The law, pretending to know 
an entity by naming it, imagines gaining access to a fundamentally unknowable 
body. This procedure can be qualified as perverse, first, because it at once 
equates naming with knowing and accessing and, thus, fails to respect the bodily 
integrity of the unknowable body. Second, because it enables the law to keep up 
its appearance, as an authority making non-arbitrary decisions through the 
objectification of the entities it subjects. Paradoxically, such an objectification of 
what the law considers to be an essentially nonhuman entity consists of granting 
a nonessentially human entity a conventional form of personhood, which is 
understood as essentially human and thus, somehow, as more than a name. In 
short, the expansive model treats the human person as a frozen metaphor, as an 
anthropomorphism, in order to sustain the illusion of non-arbitrary justice.  
Parallel to the practical demarcation problem with the birds, the rule set 
by the expansive model can now be envisaged as follows: “person is good, 
nonperson is bad.” Only an entity qualifying as person can be subjected. 
However, if we carry out a thought experiment and momentarily replace person 
with “two legs,” it becomes clear that the law – contrary to what the expansive 
model through its activating of the parameters of the human and the animal 
suggests – treats person not as an identity, a substance bearing figure of 
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wholeness, but as a trait it can or cannot attribute to an entity. It does so by 
looking for other traits that are person, which it names person, since, for the law, 
to name is to be. In other words, the law treats itself as an abstraction and the 
abstraction person as a trait, whereas the abstraction is the floating signifier 
person and the trait the law, which is, or is not, attributed. Thus, the question 
finally has come back to how one can understand personhood and person in 
view of this ambiguous functioning of the name person within the law. It is 
necessary, consequently, to explore what becomes of the animals within an 
understanding of person as a trait and what the implications of those 
synecdochical dynamics are for my conceptualization of anthropomorphism as 
an act. These interrelated questions can best be addressed by zooming in on the 
description of the conventional form of anthropomorphism that I adapted in the 
opening chapter. 
First, if an animal is attributed a certain trait that is qualified as human, 
say, intentionality, then this form of attributing can be understood as 
conventionally anthropomorphic, simply because something conceived of as 
essentially human is attributed to something essentially nonhuman. Strictly 
speaking, however, the status of “something human” is primarily attributed to 
the trait in question and not to the animal, which would raise the issue of 
intentionality as an essentially nonhuman trait prior to its attribution. This 
paradoxical dynamic illustrates that it takes a synecdochical operation for the 
animal to be defined by one of its supposed traits, as one of a potentially infinite 
number of supposed traits comes to stand in for the animal as a being, which 
only then can be understood as a being with substance, with wholeness and, 
hence, with a legal identity. Yet, if wholeness, or better, an idea of wholeness, is 
a prerequisite for the law to forge an identity upon an entity, the categories two 
legs and four legs that inform the birds’ case expose the categories person and 
nonperson that sustain the expansive model as problematic. Body parts clearly 
cannot not lay claim to wholeness without being subjected to a synecdochical 
operation. The legal fiction that they can may be visualized metaphorically as a 
“science fiction” of two legs or four legs walking around in a deserted 
landscape.  
Within an expansive model, then, the law, through a conventional form of 
anthropomorphism, introduces a procedural synecdochical pars pro toto, which 
would potentially inform the granting of rights to an animal. The bypassing of 
the question of personhood, through its subsequent confusion of personhood 
with legal personhood, constitutes a strict form of anthropomorphism. This 
encapsulates yet another kind of conventional anthropomorphism, since rights 
are, or have been prior to the expansion of the model, strictly human. At the 
100 
 
same time, to qualify rights as traits as I have done now is problematic, since the 
animals that we are about to grant rights do not have rights prior to this 
attribution, do not posses those rights as traits. It begs the fundamental question 
in what sense an animal could be said to possess a trait, say, intentionality. It 
cannot. The trait of intentionality can only be attributed to the animal. For now, 
suffice it to say that what remains clear is that what is being attributed as a trait, 
whether it is intentionality or, subsequently, “rights,” serves to subject the entire 
entity, which points to another fundamental problem with the law’s identity 
politics; namely, its being centred on the illusion of wholeness, a matter I will 
explore in the chapters that lie ahead.  
I have now distinguished three different forms of demarcation. First, the 
demarcation that operates on an absolute difference between the human and the 
animal. Within an expansive model this absolute difference is denied and within 
Animal Farm this difference is confirmed. In both cases, however, the absolute 
difference between the human and the animal appears to be sustained through 
the performance of a categorization of difference that imagines a continuum 
between the human and the animal. Second, there is the demarcation problem 
that surfaces once the laws of Animalism are installed. Here, there is still an 
absolute difference between the human and the animal while the potential for 
reading the ground rule “All Animals Are Equal” as animals being entitled to 
rights, just as much as humans, is not completely cancelled out. Third, there is 
the form of demarcation that follows from the amended ground rule of 
Animalism: “All Animals Are Equal But Some Animals Are More Equal Than 
Others.” It is here that within the category Animal the absolute difference 
between the human and the animal repeats itself as a gradual distinction between 
higher and lower life forms. On the one hand, we can now recognize this gradual 
distinction as a necessary element in the categorization of difference that 
sustains the overarching divide between the human and the animal as absolute. 
On the other hand, this gradual distinction invites us to explore the way in which 
demarcation between animals might come about.  
As Sheryl N. Hamilton83 has observed in her reviews of Canadian and 
American patenting cases, this issue is no longer merely a literary-rhetorical 
problem but has now turned into a practical and fundamental demarcation 
problem for the law as well. Let us, therefore, first pause a moment to reflect on 
this demarcation problem for the law as it stands today, in order to then read it 
through the lens of the rule that “All Animals Are Equal But Some Animals Are 
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More Equal Than Others,” in order to address its implications for my specific 
concern with factory-farming. 
 
 
5. Demarcation Between Animals 
 
According to Sheryl N. Hamilton, since the rapid advance of technology in the 
last few decades made it possible to modify the genetic structure of animals and 
even to clone entire mammals, there has been a growing public unease about our 
place as humans in the natural order of things. This unease is coupled with a 
legal anxiety over which animal life forms the law should allow to be patented. 
Reviewing court cases in Canada and the United States over the last twenty 
years, Hamilton convincingly shows that this anxiety may be attributed to the 
fact that the question of bio patenting, the patenting of life forms such as plants 
and animals, opens up the prospect of patented human life, which forces the law 
to think through the concept of an invented human being that can be owned and 
controlled.  
To many of us this seems a horrifying idea due to the Frankenstein 
connotation it bears and not least because it inevitably calls to mind the Nazi 
experiments on humans during the Second World War. More principally, from a 
juridical point of view, the prospect of a patented human being would upset the 
mutually exclusive terms property and person that have marked the juridical 
scene since the official abolishment of slavery and the advent of human rights. 
Hence, the patenting of animal life, if legally permitted, for example for medical 
research, seems to demand a sturdy legal framework that can fend off the 
prospect of a patented human life if we want to avoid the haunting prospects of 
the past to return. It forces the law to flesh out a renewed and absolute 
demarcation of the human from the animal, but also to secure a demarcation 
within the category animal itself.  
As Hamilton observes, these demarcations are more troublesome than 
ever before, precisely because the biological differences between the human and 
the animal hardly hold any currency since the advance of biotechnology. Indeed, 
Hamilton proposes that since the law can no longer resort to a biological 
vocabulary for demarcating the human from the animal the only obstacles to 
patenting human beings have become ethical and legal. Without wanting to 
rehearse Hamilton’s entire argument, the general thread in the court cases on 
patenting animals she discusses is that the law considers the highest life form the 
human being, whose commodification under patenting is viewed as an affront to 
human dignity. To protect this human dignity the law then tries to establish a 
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demarcation between higher and lower animal life forms whereby only the latter 
category may be subjected to patenting.  
If this seems a logical procedure to ensure that the law does not set the 
precedent for the future commodification of human beings, the demarcation 
between higher and lower animal life forms presents us with yet another 
problem because, as I observed before, animals bear no dignity, which makes it 
impossible, first, to repeat the demarcation between the human and the animal 
within the category animal. Second, because if the biological boundaries 
between the human and the animal are already blurred, the demarcation between 
different animals cannot be accommodated within a biological vocabulary 
either. This problem of establishing a steady ground for demarcation within the 
category animal is evidenced by the general tendency within the court cases 
Hamilton discusses to present the demarcation between higher and lower animal 
life forms as self-evident, without being able to resort to arguments that hold 
sufficient scientific rigor to appear non-arbitrary.  
In view of my immediate concern with factory-farmed animals, let us now 
use the amended ground rule of Animalism that “All Animals Are Equal But 
Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others” as a heuristic tool to explore 
whether the typical manner in which the law attempts to demarcate between 
higher and lower animal life forms in patenting cases can shed a different light 
on the exceptional status of factory-farmed animals as arguably lower life forms 
because of the way they are treated.  
The patenting case that Hamilton presents as installing the demarcation 
discussion on higher and lower animal life forms was Diamond v. Chakrabarty. 
In 1971, the microbiologist Anandan Mohan Chakrabarty applied for a patent on 
a genetically modified bacterium that was potentially very useful for cleaning up 
oil spills. After the patenting office refused his application he successfully 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which, in 1980, decided to grant 
the patent. As Hamilton observes: 
 
The court found that the bacterium, as a living organism, was a 
composition of matter, and therefore a human-made invention. Micro-
organisms were more akin to chemical compositions than complex 
organisms, the justices felt. (113) 
 
The description of lower animal life forms as “a composition of matter” that we 
encounter in the above citation appears to be a persistent element in all the other 
court cases Hamilton discusses. Effectively, the tendency of courts has been to 
register lower life forms as “composition of matter” in contrast to higher life 
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forms, which are typically more complex. The criteria courts put forward for 
showing enough complexity to qualify as a higher life form rather than as a 
“composition of matter” recur in a similar manner in all the subsequent cases 
Hamilton discusses. On the one hand, an animal is generally qualified as a 
higher, complex life form whenever science appears to be unable to fully control 
and reproduce the life form without an element of unpredictability. On the other 
hand, an animal is generally qualified as a lower life form whenever it can be 
produced and reproduced en masse because of its uniform properties and 
characteristics. 
In this respect, I propose that we now read the amended ground rule of 
Animalism that “All Animals Are Equal But Some Animals Are More Equal 
Than Others” in a most literal manner. The animals that are ‘less equal’ are 
qualified as the lower life forms because they are more equal; that is to say, they 
are more uniform than other animals. The point here is not that such a 
categorization obviously must remain an arbitrary affair because, as we have 
seen, the law cannot operate in a non-arbitrary manner. Rather, the point is that 
the demarcation within the category animal here does not primarily rely on the 
nature of the animal in question but on the way it can be treated by technology. 
Furthermore, in light of the Belgian lobster case and my subsequent 
contemplation on the practice of lobster farming, the relatively recent 
optimization of the factory-farming of lobsters illustrates that this demarcation 
line has the potential to shift upwards because it is correlative to the advance of 
technology. In short, if lobsters used to be considered to be too complex for 
factory-farming because of the element of unpredictability cannibalistic lobsters 
introduced, this problem has now been overcome with a technology that 
monitors and controls lobsters at each and every stage to prevent their 
cannibalizing one another.84 
This focus on treating the animal rather than on the supposed nature of the 
animal is always also a performative treating, a speaking about animals as lower 
life forms that becomes most apparent when we zoom in on the practice of 
factory-farming. The fact that pigs, cows and poultry, for example, are 
genetically engineered, produced and reproduced in horrifying conditions that 
cannot bear the light of day seems to have everything to do with the way they 
can be treated and talked about as uniform production units and, hence, as lower 
life forms. In this sense, factory-farmed animals are on the same side of the 
demarcation line as the bacterium mentioned before. The literal invisibility of 
                                                 
84 See: http://www.norwegian-lobster-farm.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Aquareg-




bacteria is paralleled by the invisibility of factory-farmed animals in the public 
domain. And the technology that installs this treatment is as much a technology 
of science as it is a technology of language, which invites us to register language 
as a performative technology, a matter I will discuss in detail in my final 
chapter. 
The point here is that if the level of complexity that animals are granted is 
installed through both a rhetorically operative technology and a technically 
operative rhetoric, the prospect of the patented human being continues to haunt 
us, not in spite of but because of the fact that our demarcations of animals into 
higher and lower life forms are installed by technology. The stage in which this 
anxiety is played out in our time is the practice of factory-farming, because it is 
here that a legal framework complements this technological rhetoric and 
rhetorical technology. This legal framework registers those animals as lower life 
forms through the consistent state of exemption that animal cruelty laws install. 
This effectively works to contain this anxiety by rendering the actors on the 
stage invisible. Such invisibility is not just a literal invisibility that withholds the 
practice of factory-farming from the public’s eye to avoid the exposure to the 
cruelty that factory-farmed animals suffer. Rather, it may very well concern the 
more specific avoidance of the exposure to their genetically engineered bodies 
and life spans. This would call on us to rethink the traditional category of the 
animal and hence, the human by working through the haunting prospects of the 
past. In other words, the problem of the incomparable cruelty factory-farmed 
animals experience is not primarily a legal problem but an ethical problem that 
requires an ethical solution. This ethical solution must begin by recognizing that 
the invisibility of factory-farmed animals in our time requires us to think 
through our place in the order of things if we want to face up to the taboo on 
factory-farming that the prospect of the patented human being installs.  
We have now seen that Animal Farm enables us to address the urgent 
juridical problem Hamilton attends to in light of the patenting discussion in a 
literary-rhetorical way. More specifically, the problem of demarcation between 
the human and the animal that has taken on a new sense of urgency in light of 
the law’s focus on the demarcation between lower higher life forms has 
appeared to repeat itself within the category animal. Contrary to what might be 
expected now that the traditional biological vocabulary for demarcation has 
fallen flat, this repetition of difference has appeared to be not simply a matter of 
philosophical categorization but the result of allegorical readings that are 
sustained through different tropological operations. At the same time, reading 
Animal Farm as an allegory of the expansive model has raised our awareness to 
the change the concept of the farm has undergone. This change is marked by a 
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vast quantity of animals being qualified as other than animal, both within the 
strictly legal, technological rhetorical and rhetorical technological sphere.  
 
 
6. Reflections on Allegory and Allegoresis  
 
What makes Animal Farm of interest from a literary point of view and in the 
context and frame of juridical decisions is that it criticizes the allegorical reading 
strategies and the demarcation problems that follow from it through the very 
rhetorical mode it chooses, the allegory. In a sense, then, Animal Farm, whether 
read as the traditional allegory it has come to stand for, or as an allegoresis of 
animals suffering from harm on a farm, defies its own rhetorical logic and 
thereby the contents of its own mode of representation. In short, as readers we 
are invited to read allegorically but the text itself problematizes this attitude by 
offering a meta-reflection on the mode that sustains it.  
 In this respect, we may now observe that I have distinguished three 
different forms of allegorical reading. First, the metaphorical reading that has 
appeared to be sustained through conservative and strict forms of 
anthropomorphism. Second, the allegorical reading that is sustained 
synecdochically, whereby the part, the trait that is attributed, comes to stand in 
for the whole in order to forge an identity upon an entity. Third, the allegorical 
reading that pushes both of the previous forms to their limits and radicalizes 
them as a non-propositional form of naming, which is what happens, for 
example, when the name of the Farm shifts from Animal Farm to Manor Farm. 
Since allegory is generally defined as only the first of the tropological forces I 
have distinguished, namely as a sustained metaphor, I will now contemplate the 
implications of my findings on allegorical proceedings for my allegoresis of 
Animal Farm. The aim here is to see if we can tease out some of the structural 
problems allegorical reading poses for the law and its demarcation problem by 
doing justice to the complexity of the tropological dynamics involved in its 
readings of difference in terms of the correspondence of entities to predefined 
categories. Let us, therefore, begin with a brief reflection on how allegory is 
traditionally understood. 
In literary theory, allegory is generally conceived of as a text in which the 
agents and actions, and sometimes the settings as well, are contrived to make 
coherent sense on the literal or primary level of signification and, at the same 
time, to signify a second correlated order of signification. Hence, allegory is the 
qualification of a text whereby the relation between the text and its meaning is 
assumed to be fixed. Here we can distinguish: (a) the political-historical allegory 
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and (b) the allegory of ideas.85 The allegory Animal Farm offers a mixture of 
both, because the consensus as to what it is about leaves plenty of room for 
drawing either concrete or more abstract parallels.86 As a political-historical 
allegory its characters and actions literally come to represent or “allegorize” 
historical persons and events; for example, the pig Napoleon – the cruel and 
paranoid leader of the animals – represents the historical figure of Stalin. If we 
choose to read Animal Farm as an allegory of ideas, the characters represent 
concepts and the plot allegorizes an abstract doctrine or thesis. Within such a 
reading the horse Boxer might stand in for the working class, depicted by Orwell 
as loyal and hard working, but also – rather unflatteringly – as stupid. 
 As I mentioned in my introduction, however, my particular reading of 
Animal Farm has been an allegoresis rather than an allegory, in the sense that I 
have not assumed the relation between the text and its meaning as fixed and thus 
as corresponding to one another. Rather, my interpretation of Animal Farm as a 
story about animals that wish to protect themselves from harm has challenged 
the traditional reading of Animal Farm as a story about the Cold War. By 
implication, the element of correspondence that a fixed relation between text and 
meaning is reliant upon has also been compromised. Yet, my reading of Animal 
Farm as an allegory of the expansive model still invokes a suggestion of 
correspondence between, for example, the laws of Animalism and the expansion 
of human rights under an expansive model. This would suggest that I have 
merely substituted one system of correspondence with another. This inescapable 
allegorical element in my reading, however, is different from the traditional 
allegorical reading of Animal Farm as a story about the Cold War because it has 
operated alongside this reading, rather than substituting it. More than that, it has 
been necessary to have the traditional allegorical interpretation of Animal Farm 
resonate throughout my interpretation to position the discussion on factory-
farming in a (bio) political framework under globalization.  
                                                 
85 M.H. Abrams: A Glossary of Literary Terms, 7th ed., (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1999). 
86 For an exemplary case study of Animal Farm as a political historical allegory and as an allegory 
of ideas see: Harold Bloom: Animal Farm, Bloom’s Modern Critical Interpretations (New York: 
Chelsea House Publications, 2009). See also the Cliffs Notes study guide to Animal Farm, in 
which Orwell’s comments on Animal Farm in a foreign language edition are paraphrased as 
follows: “Orwell says his main intention was to show how false the popular idea was that Soviet 
Russia was a socialist state: he wanted to save socialism from communism,” 9-10. In fact, 
throughout these Cliffs Notes we find the interpretation of Animal Farm as the allegory it is 
famous for, as might be illustrated with the following passage: “The two-year plan for building 
the windmill, and subsequent plans, are, of course, reminiscent of Stalin’s Five-Year Plans,” 24. 
David Allen in: Cliffs Notes on Orwell’s Animal Farm (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1999). 
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 This persistent notion of correspondence in my reading can be attributed 
to what Sayre. N. Greenfield has suggested elsewhere, namely that the 
distinction between allegory and allegoresis remains fundamentally “untidy.”87 
This untidiness stems from the fact that both allegory and allegoresis are 
conceptually indebted to a reading of a literal or primary order of signification 
which corresponds to a second correlated order of signification. This element of 
correspondence effectively registers the text Animal Farm as a code, as a 
communicative device with metaphor as its structural property waiting to be 
deciphered through procedures of decoding. In short, the allegory Animal Farm 
carries the suggestion that there is a fixed relation between text and meaning 
because it poses as a communication system within which the text is only 
momentarily veiled by an encoding as its drowsy metaphor awaits awakening. 
Yet, a supposed correspondence in the text must always be “measured” by texts 
that operate outside of the allegorical space it installs. Hence, the longstanding 
success of the allegory Animal Farm is not primarily to be attributed to the 
skilful way in which correspondences are woven into the text, but to a 
widespread consensus that is forged through external texts that cohere and that 
are invested with authority. In this respect, doing justice to the story requires a 
heightened awareness of the fact that Animal Farm acquires its meaning in no 
other way than by differing from other possible interpretations of the same story, 
whether those be literal, allegorical, political or no matter what. This relation of 
difference brings about a fundamental arbitrariness as to what the text 
supposedly is (all) about, in spite of the consensus that Animal Farm is a story 
about the Cold War.  
For heuristic purposes, I would like to start with qualifying this consensus 
– operating, as it were, outside the story – as a macro encoding, and the parallel 
characters and events – operating inside the story – as a micro encoding. The 
text on the back cover of my pocket edition clearly falls within the first 
category. It does not sketch a developing narrative, introducing characters and 
the unfolding of events, but limits itself to spelling out the allegorical code in 
unmistakable terms:  
 
First published in 1945, Animal Farm has become the classic political 
fable of the twentieth century. Adding his own brand of poignancy and 
wit, George Orwell tells the story of a revolution among animals of a 
farm, and how idealism was betrayed by power, corruption and lies.88  
 
                                                 
87 Sayre. N. Greenfield, The Ends of Allegory (London: Associated University Press, 1999). 
88 Animal Farm: A Fairy Story (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1983). 
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Encountering a macro encoding on a back cover might be a first indication we 
are dealing with a story that has acquired the status of allegory. The fact that the 
story’s ending is given away is a second indication, as an allegory cannot bear 
open endings, unless it states it has an open ending. In short, the suspense in 
Animal Farm does not rely on the whodunnit variety, but on how it is done. By 
implication, the only space for the imagination the macro encoding leaves, is for 
its micro encoding – the personified characters, the historical events – to be 
interpreted in terms of adequacy, accuracy, or, if it were a play, by the quality of 
the performance. In other words, the consensus on what Animal Farm is about, 
its allegorical status, does not concern the story itself, since it does not thrive on 
an actual or factual correspondence between historical events and the events in 
the story. Rather, it is a consensus on the code that directs us towards how the 
allegory it has come to stand for should be interpreted.  
  In this way, Animal Farm’s macrocode activates a semantic field of 
precision and accuracy that can only be measured by assuming a higher, 
imaginary objectivity. And the dynamic that works to reduce the readers of 
Animal Farm to ideal readers who interpret the characters, events and settings in 
both allegorical models, in terms of correspondences between a primary and 
secondary level of signification, is the same dynamic that helps judges to read 
the expansive model. The reading procedure – once exhausted – comes to 
substitute the story and eventually reduces the story to ever shorter summaries 
until only its title, the name Animal Farm or, alternatively, Human Person is left 
as the epitaph of a story on the brink of dying out. The issue here, as I deduced 
from my exploration of the demarcation problems that patenting cases pose for 
the law, is that if human person is a name on the brink of dying out, in that it 
does not correspond to its traditional definition anymore but becomes subsumed 
under the sphere of materiality, the traditional definition of the animal must also 
be under strain. This issue directs us to what has been conceptualized as the 
ornamental mode of allegory. 
According to Craig Owens, allegory’s ornamental quality is a historical 
mode that accommodates a preservative impulse.89 Angus Fletcher distinguishes 
two further manifestations of this preservative impulse, namely allegorical 
syncretism and allegorical synthesis.90 
 
                                                 
89 Craig Owens “The Allegorical Impulse: Towards a Theory of Postmodernism.” In: Art in 
Theory 1900-2000 (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 1025-1032. 
90 Angus Fletcher, “Allegory in Literary History.” In: Dictionary of the History of Ideas, Studies 
of Selected Pivotal Ideas, ed. Philip P. Wiener, (Virginia: University of Virginia, 2003), 41-48.  
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Syncretism may be icono-graphically distinguished from synthesis, 
insofar as the former preserves the individual traits of the combining 
beliefs, whereas the latter would achieve a radical transformation of 
disparate cultural forces, until a single set among them came to dominate 
and control the assimilation of other sets as minor premises in the logic of 
the culture as a whole. (43) 
 
 
In an effort to go beyond the commonplace explanations for why allegorical 
syncretism at times has appeared to out-favour allegorical synthesis, Fletcher 
inquires into possible motives for the occurrence of allegorical syncretism by 
making the following educated guess:  
 
A higher motive, which is harder to define, is the conciliatory and 
accommodating desire to permit a diverse world of many faces and 
characters. This motive comes into play when rival world views meet at 
their borders, when the opposite impulse would, as with iconoclasm, seek 
to destroy the rival iconography. Allegory here becomes a diplomatic 
medium of thought. (44) 
 
I take my cue from Fletcher, here, to contemplate the possible tension between 
allegorical syncretism and allegorical synthesis in Animal Farm. As an allegory 
of ideas, Animal Farm warns against the tyranny after revolution, resulting from 
the clash between the rival systems of capitalism and communism meeting at 
their borders. Reading Animal Farm from within a system in which the clash 
between communism and capitalism has been succeeded by an intensification of 
our biopolitical situation under the hyper capitalistic world of globalization, the 
preservative impulse Animal Farm accommodates can be said to condense in the 
concept of the farm. The “farm” in our globalized society denotes: “A place for 
breeding a particular type of animal or producing a specific crop.”91 In other 
words, today, a farm generally deals with one species only and is categorized 
accordingly by the singular species name it has been allotted, say, either a cow- 
or pig- or chicken farm.  
The farm in Animal Farm, however, is crowded with many different 
animals, whilst some of them, for example the cat or the crow, are not kept for 
breeding at all. In short, in its ornamental mode Animal Farm paints a picture of 
a past no longer existent and testifies at the same time to the way in which the 
concept of the farm has changed dramatically in the same decades that have 
                                                 
91 OED (Oxford: 2003). 
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witnessed a stepping up of the animal rights debate within a globalized world. 
Moreover, the fact that there are many animals on Animal Farm accommodates 
a preservative impulse in yet another way; it offers a perspective in which 
metaphor, whether or not sustained, is not the prevailing paradigm, simply 
because the animals do not stand in for something else as they cannot be 
subsumed under one name. Hence, the ornamental mode of allegory here directs 
allegory away from a discussion on metaphor and metaphoricity towards how 
things we now take for granted were done once and not so long ago. The 
comparison between the farm only half a century ago and the factory- farm 
today that Animal Farm instigates through its preservative impulse, not only 
demonstrates a major change in our relations with animals, then, but may also 
offer a changed perspective on the relation between human beings and animals, 
both within the collective imagination and within the modern juridico-political 
and scientific-philosophical understanding of this relation. This change 
manifests itself within an expansive model because it is based on a scientific 
discourse that understands the difference between humans and animals as no 
longer defined in absolute terms.  
 If the advance of science increasingly leads to a blurring of the boundaries 
between the human and the animal and if the expansive model is only one of the 
symptoms that makes this changing relation manifest, this can only be 
understood against the background of a biopolitical framework that has now 
moved into the area of separating not the human from the animal but life from 
life, whereby “equality” has appeared to take on a whole other connotation or, in 
a sense, is taken to its extreme. This I identified previously as the totalitarian 
streak of factory-farming. At the same time, this extreme notion of equality 
opens up to a different outlook on the place of human beings in the order of 
things, since it also affords a fragile basis for demarcation since the traditional 
framework that opposes the human to the animal is no longer in place. In this 
light, the practice of factory-farming calls upon us to rethink the way in which 
our traditional demarcation of the human from the animal relates to the way we 
envisage our current demarcation policies and the criteria that sustain those 





A predominantly spatial understanding of the expansive model has provided me 
with a framework for an allegoresis of the allegory Animal Farm through a 
focus on the figure of harm. This has allowed me to explore the ways in which 
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an expansive model allows harm to topple over into cruelty and has allowed me 
to gain a better understanding of the element of cruelty within animal cruelty 
laws today. My close reading of Animal Farm has resulted, that is, in a better 
understanding of the way in which conceptualizations of truth and arbitrariness 
are framed within an expansive model. With respect to this issue, it has become 
necessary to further distinguish between a conservative and strict form of 
arbitrariness. The conservative form of arbitrariness bespeaks a supposed 
subjectivity, as opposed to an objectively defined truth, informing juridical 
judgement. The strict form of arbitrariness is concerned with the putting in place 
of categories without as yet acting upon those categories. When it comes down 
to real acting, the kind of arbitrariness involved might be defined differently, 
namely as taking arbitrary but responsible decisions. The practical demarcation 
decision has appeared to be neither a “demarcation,” nor a “decision,” but rather 
to constitute an act of naming.  
My effort at reconciling the theoretical demarcation problem with the 
practical demarcation decision has demonstrated that demarcation is always a 
performative act that creates difference. In order to be effective it masks itself as 
constative as it invokes a difference that it poses as always already there prior to 
the practical demarcation decision, whereas this difference, which is meant to 
justify the practical demarcation decision, is only installed through this 
performative act. In short, it seems as if the problem with which Animal Farm 
starts, a situation in which the difference between humans and animals is such 
that the first are protected from harm and the latter not, is transposed to the 
animal world where the same conflict repeats itself. In other words, it seems that 
solving one demarcation problem automatically invokes another, which 
provokes the danger of an endless regression to be met by endless repetition. 
This shows that the practical demarcation decision can never be legitimized 
through a theoretical demarcation problem. 
Reading the expansive model as an allegory, I have identified its 
macrocode as the negation of an absolute difference between the human and the 
animal. The expansive model has not just turned out to be a model one can 
choose to read allegorically, as I assumed in the opening chapter, but as a model 
characterized by such a profound allegoricity that any attempt at reading it 
differently immediately results in blowing it up, which is what happens when 
(the relevance of) its parameters are called into question. Since allegorical 
reading lays an implicit claim to a conservative form of arbitrariness – to 
objectivity as opposed to subjectivity – I have scrutinized the way in which this 
binary might relate to the cruelty that the expansive model incorporates. This 
strategy has proved an adequate tool for exploring both the construction of 
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authority within the expansive model and the way in which this construction 
relates to its identity politics.  
My allegoresis of Animal Farm as an allegory of the expansive model has 
demonstrated that the expansive model sustains the parameters of the human and 
the animal as relevant parameters by operating on an unwarranted categorization 
of difference. Consequently, I have attempted to move away from those 
parameters and this categorization of difference and explored the way in which 
our qualifications of the interactions of trope might play a decisive role in 
sustaining the parameters of the human and the animal. This exploration has 
opened up the possibility of reading these interactions differently, which has 
appeared to destabilize these parameters in that they are no longer to be taken as 
given.  
With regard to trope and its interactions I must now observe the 
following: In this chapter I have demonstrated that within an expansive model it 
is a conventional act of anthropomorphism, which is encapsulated by a strict 
form of anthropomorphism, that makes an entity qualify as a person. At the 
same time, I have ultimately come to understand the attribution involved in such 
a conventional act of anthropomorphism as performing a synecdochical 
operation, whereby the part (the trait that is attributed) comes to signify the 
whole, the entity, first as a person (conventional) and then as a legal person 
(strict). The synecdoche has appeared not just to work as a neutral figure of 
speech that can be identified in any given text. Rather, it has become clear that 
as a trope it is charged ideologically, because it presupposes that the substitution 
of part with whole and vice versa is possible. This ideological charge comes into 
play once the trait attributed as a “human trait” comes to signify the whole, the 
entity, as human. Thus, the nonhuman entity, the nonperson, acquires its 
wholeness only at the stage at which it transfers into (human) person. In other 
words, the entity, amorphous, unknown, nonperson, loses itself in the human, 
regaining a wholeness it never possessed. It is this loss that comes to determine 
its identity as a person.  
The question as to how I can envisage animals as the potential subject of 
rights has been approached from a perspective that understands the expansive 
model not as primarily concerned with this issue at all, but with “doing justice” 
to what I have come to identify as its macrocode: the academic consensus that 
there is no absolute difference between the human and the animal. This 
framework has allowed me to renew my provisional qualifications of harm and 
cruelty. More specifically, my exploration of the dynamics of the first toppling 
over into the latter led to yet another outlook on cruelty, as I have now 
developed the notion of a poetic cruelty to point to a fundamental cruelty, both 
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within and outside of the expansive model. In the next chapter, the question of 
how a preoccupation with cruelty, as I have now come to understand this term, 
should inform a different juridical model, a model with a different identity 
politics, will be addressed by examining the capacity on which proponents of 
animal rights predominantly build their case, the capacity animals share with 








Victimhood and Identification 




Elephants in the Zoo 
 
in the afternoon 
they lean against 
one another 
and you can see how much 
they like the sun. 
        
  






In March 2014, the Washington Post published an article titled “If You Were a 
Crustacean Would You Feel Any Pain?”92 The question form here is intriguing. 
It conveys an appeal to the readers to make some sort of imaginative 
identification with crustaceans by putting themselves in their place in order to 
make sense of the possibility that crustaceans might suffer. One of the two 
photographs included in the article showed a lobster with the following subtext 
underneath: “some people are repelled by the idea of cooking a lobster alive or 
the practice of tearing claws from live crabs before tossing them back into the 
sea.” The other photograph shows a couple eating a live octopus at a festival in 
Seoul. The subtext underneath the latter photo runs as follows: “An evolutionary 
neurobiologist in Texas has found that octopuses show much of the pain-related 
behaviour seen in vertebrates.” In short, what the reader is asked to imagine is 
not merely if crustaceans can suffer but if they might suffer as a result of the 
way we treat them when we use them for food.  






 In the remainder of the article the intriguing appeal conveyed in the 
heading proves to be somewhat misleading. Rather than inviting us to make an 
imaginative identification with the crustaceans under discussion the article 
highlights the latest scientific but still very controversial advances in the field of 
evolutionary neurobiology. As one of the commentators succinctly puts it: 
“researchers are either certain the animals feel pain or certain they don’t.” What 
appears to be at stake in all the experiments on animals that are mentioned in the 
article is that the traditional demarcation line between vertebrates and 
invertebrates, whereby the first are considered to be able to suffer and the latter 
not is under considerable strain. In the article Antoine Goetschel, an 
international animal law and animal ethics consultant, is quoted as saying: “The 
global food industry farms or catches billions of invertebrates every year. But 
unlike their vertebrate cousins, they have virtually no legal protection. Early on 
in my career I realized that when the law speaks of animals, it does not mean 
invertebrates.” 
 However true this statement, in light of my exploration of the legal 
protection of the vertebrate animals in the factory-farming industry in the 
previous chapter, we can surmise that the significance of establishing that 
lobsters, for example, can feel pain, will not matter a great deal for the 
categorical exemption that befalls factory-farmed animals. More importantly, it 
seems highly unlikely that the traditional demarcation line between vertebrates 
and invertebrates will be upset indefinitely any time soon, precisely for the 
exclusive scientific approach concerning the question of suffering. This is 
evidenced by the note on which the article ends and which conveys that, in spite 
of the advances in science, the controversy around the question of animals and 
their susceptibility to suffering might be potentially endless because, as the 
author of the article, Tamar Stelling, puts it: “We are ultimately up against the 
problem of consciousness. Like all subjective experience, pain remains private 
to each individual, leaving us only with educated guesses.”  
 In short, the scientific framing of animal suffering reaches a limit when it 
comes up against trying to measure the conscious experience of pain through 
experimenting on animals. This scientific approach is arguably quite different 
from trying to imagine, as the header invites us to do, what it is like to be a 
crustacean. For this reason, in this chapter I will attempt a serious examination 
of the question that is posed in the heading and focus on the issue of suffering as 
a tool for demarcation by trying to imagine other ways of identifying with the 
victimhood of animals and the pain they might suffer. To this end, I will begin 
my exploration by reflecting on a famous text by Jeremy Bentham that put the 
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question of suffering on the animal rights agenda and that continues to inspire 
the modern animal rights debate.   
  
 
2. Bentham’s Legacy 
 
About two centuries ago, Jeremy Bentham (1789) suggested that the question of 
whether animals can suffer might come to inform future deliberations on their 
position as subjects of rights. At least, that is my – deliberately modest – 
interpretation of his most famous footnote, a text that I choose to present here, at 
the beginning of this chapter as it will be of central concern to the development 
of my argument. This is what Bentham stated:  
 
The day may come when the rest of animal creation may acquire those 
rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand 
of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the 
skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without 
redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be 
recognized that the number of legs, the villosity of the skin, or the 
termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for 
abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should 
trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the 
faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison 
a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a 
day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, 
what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason nor Can they 
talk? But, Can they suffer?93 (Italics and capitalisation in the last sentence 
in text.) 
 
What I want to do in this chapter is to examine the specific way Bentham’s 
footnote translates to today’s animal rights debate. Indeed, today, Bentham’s 
commitment to suffering has been embraced as a central idea in a variety of 
manners by theorists at the forefront of the animal rights debate, and although 
there are many important differences and nuances to be signalled in those 
diverging positions, what ties them together is the general and prevailing idea 
that essentially nonhuman animals share with human beings a “capacity to 
                                                 
93 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. J.H. Burns 
and H.L.A. Hart, (London, New York: Methuen, 1982), 283. 
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suffer” and, therefore, deserve consideration and possibly even some juridical 
protection from harm.94  
The problem with this Bentham inspired reasoning, however, especially in 
light of the provisional distinction I made between harm and cruelty in the first 
chapter, is that it seems to provide a philosophical basis for either more animal 
cruelty laws and its concurrent categorical exemptions or for an expanding of 
the juridical model to include at least some nonhuman animals within the regime 
of personhood. In both cases this generates the different types of cruelty that a 
juridical model centred in personhood presents. If in the previous chapter I 
explored the logic of exemption from outside an expansive model, here, I will 
focus on the cruelty that would flow from including at least some nonhuman 
animals within an expansive model. This cruelty, let us recall, consists of the 
arbitrary and wilful neglect of those entities not granted personhood and in a 
poetic cruelty that stems from including animals within a model that masks their 
hierarchical subjection by presenting itself as a system of equality. The paradox 
is clear: if such an expansive model necessarily involves harm toppling over into 
cruelty, a cruelty, furthermore, which was not characteristic of the model prior 
to its expansion, how can arguing in favour of expanding the model for at least 
some nonhuman animals be reconciled with a sincere commitment to the 
question of suffering. In the previous chapter I answered it cannot. In fact, if my 
initial framework was centred on the heuristic premise that the animal rights 
debate was not so much committed to the question of suffering as such, but 
primarily concerned with conforming to the macrocode of the expansive model, 
my subsequent exploration of the demarcation problem has demonstrated that 
there are also no scientific grounds for assuming the expansive model stems 
from a commitment to the question of suffering.  
In this chapter, however, I wish to move away from this rather 
unsatisfactory kind of moral claim, as one might simply choose to either 
disagree or agree, which would not further my project. I will do so by exploring 
what a commitment to the question of suffering might entail, not by 
understanding the question of suffering in terms of our measure of the capacity 
to suffer, but by looking at how what we consider objects of suffering come to 
be identified through our constructions of their victimhood. In short, if any 
concern with the suffering of animals necessitates some sort of imaginative 
identification with their victimhood, it is my aim to explore the way in which 
literary and legal trajectories construct victimhood and how those trajectories 
inform and sustain one another. The questions that need to be answered, then, 
                                                 
94 I am referring here to the animal rights field in general but also specifically to the works of 
Peter Singer, Tom Regan and Martha C. Nussbaum that I have discussed before. 
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are, first: What has happened to Bentham’s commitment to suffering to make it 
take on such a paradoxical stance within the animals rights debate today? 
Second: How can we refurbish the question of suffering in such a way that it can 
inform a future juridical model without incorporating the types of cruelty we are 
faced with in an expansive model?  
My basic premise here is that the way in which the modern animal rights 
debate has “embraced” Bentham’s question relies on a problematic 
interpretation of Bentham’s question as a radical turning away from Kant, who, 
as is well known, defined rationality as an essentially human asset, marking an 
absolute difference between the human and the animal. Since it will be my aim 
to challenge this modern line of thought I choose to explore two crucial Kantian 
citations from an entry by Lori Gruen in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy. It adequately reflects how the modern day utilitarian and animal 
rights positions on criteria for suffering are perceived as radically different from 
Kant’s focus on rationality. Roughly, what becomes clear from Gruen’s 
discussion of the modern day perspective on suffering is that pain (and not 
primarily rationality) exerts a moral force. By implication, those nonhuman 
animals who suffer have some sort of moral standing. If this line of thought 
indeed appears to be a radical turn away from Kant, the fact that Gruen in her 
entry points out that a contemporary Kantian like Christine Korsgaard suggests 
that we have moral obligations towards animals because we can recognize their 
expressions of pain, may be a first indication that the modern day focus on the 
capacity for suffering is not so radically different from Kant’s focus on 
rationality. Indeed, the fundamental problem that underlies the various modern 
positions on the experience of pain that Gruen discusses, cannot offer a way out 
of the underlying demarcation problem an expansive model poses. The notion of 
pain serves as an alternative to Kant’s rationality, which is required, but at the 
same time pain is still defined as a moral force. This does not suffice, as I will 
explore in an alternative notion of pain in what lies ahead.  
My exploration of the relation between our modern understanding of 
Bentham’s question on suffering and the Kantian position on rationality starts, 
then, with the crucial Kantian passages that Gruen cites, from respectively The 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (GMM) and Lectures on 
Anthropology (LA):95 
 
                                                 
95 Immanuel Kant, The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), trans. Mary J. Gregor, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Immanuel Kant, Lectures in Anthropology (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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[...] every rational being, exists as an end in himself and not merely as a 
means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will [...] Beings whose 
existence depends not on our will but on nature have, nevertheless, if they 
are not rational beings, only a relative value as means and are therefore 
called things. On the other hand, rational beings are called persons 
inasmuch as their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves. 
(Kant, GMM, 428) 
 
The fact that the human being can have the representation “I” raises him 
infinitely above all the other beings on earth. By this he is a person [...] 
that is, a being altogether different in rank and dignity from things, such 
as irrational animals, with which one may deal and dispose at one's 
discretion. (Kant, LA, 7, 127)96 
 
Admittedly, the fact that Bentham in his famous footnote explicitly rejects, not 
just skin colour, but also “rationality” as a valid touchstone for distinguishing 
absolutely between the human and the animal, makes it rather difficult not to 
consider Bentham’s rejection as a response to and a turning away from Kant. At 
the same time, however, I propose that this interpretation has successfully pre-
empted any suggestion of reading today’s interpretation of Bentham’s question 
as a mere substitute of Kant’s capacity for rationality; that is to say, as just 
another way of cutting the divide between the human and the animal. This is 
why the possibility of reading today’s interpretation of Bentham’s commitment 
to suffering as a substitute of Kant’s position on “rationality” will inform my 
reading against the current notion of suffering. The reason for this strategy is 
that it seems to me rather odd and therefore meaningful that such a reading has 
not really taken place. One reason for this negligence might be that such a 
reading would run the risk of significantly downplaying the achievements in the 
animal rights debate by Bentham inspired theorists so far. This, of course, is not 
my intention. My focus is exclusively on reading against today’s interpretation 
of Bentham’s commitment to suffering as wholly different from Kant’s 
preoccupation with rationality, because I look at the modern interpretation of 
both philosophers’ positions as the result of this tendency I have come to qualify 
as a categorization of difference.  
On the one hand, according to Kant, the human capacity for rationality 
distinguishes the human from the animal in absolute terms. On the other hand, 
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modern animal rights discourse has translated Bentham’s commitment to 
suffering as a capacity to suffer, which implies that if an animal can suffer it can 
no longer be distinguished from the human in absolute terms. In other words, 
whereas Kant’s capacity for rationality installed a species-specific difference, 
the capacity to suffer within modern animal rights discourse is centred on a 
cross-species sameness. In short, if Kant poses species as same but different in 
one aspect, namely rationality, Bentham is considered to have posed species as 
different but same with regard to the aspect of suffering. It is here that I identify 
a categorization of difference informing the interpretation of both philosophers’ 
positions within today’s animal rights debate. This interpretation, because it 
exclusively focuses on the difference between both philosophers, bypasses the 
question of what both philosophers have in common; namely, first, a 
problematic and unshaken commitment to a capacity, either for rationality or for 
sufferability; and secondly, a taking for granted of species as an essentialist 
construct. Hence, the reading against the capacity to suffer I propose to 
undertake not only has to work out a renewed commitment to the question of 
suffering, but will also have to explore the notion of species as other than an 
essentialist construct if such an attempt wants to succeed. 
In order to work out a renewed commitment to the question of suffering, I 
return to the heuristic vocabulary on harm and cruelty developed in the previous 
chapters. This is not a straightforward return, but marked by an important 
difference. Instead of a further deliberation on harm and cruelty, I choose not to 
return to what separates harm and cruelty, but to explore what I take to be their 
common denominator: pain. This notion of pain seeks to unsettle the dominant 
way Bentham’s commitment to suffering has been taken up by philosophers – 
most notably, Singer, Regan, Rachels and Derrida – at the forefront of the 
animal rights debate today, namely as in one way or another heeding a 
discussion on which nonhuman entities should be entitled to a form of moral 
consideration through a consideration of their supposed capacities, 
characteristics and/or subsequent bioethical status. It is of vital importance, 
however, to understand my concern with pain as only a first step towards 
gaining a different outlook on the notion of suffering, and not as a concept 
meant to substitute the capacity to suffer in any way. Hence, I am not concerned, 
here, with re-addressing the problem of cruelty, but with an attempt to 
momentarily put off and circumvent this problem to the extent that my notion of 
pain helps me get away from the vocabulary within which a commitment to 
suffering, in its guise as a “capacity to suffer” is generally registered. For this 
reason my notion of pain must remain essentially open to further definition. This 
openness serves two purposes. First, it enables me to momentarily circumvent 
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the problem of demarcation a modern animal rights discourse centred on a 
capacity to suffer ultimately will have to engage in. Second, using the notion of 
pain as I intend to do “safeguards” the question of suffering from being swept 
away in the process. Thus it allows me to address and renegotiate it in what lays 
ahead, as any sense of pain can hardly be thought without some notion of 
suffering.  
Let me now explain my deeper motivations for reading against the 
capacity to suffer as I propose to do and clarify the way in which my strategy 
fits into my overall project by putting the modern interpretation of Bentham’s 
question in its relevant context. First, I suspect a strict reliance on the “capacity 
to suffer” might breed its own exclusionary politics as it gives way to isolating a 
concern for animals from a concern for other nonhuman entities, isolating the 
so-called animal from the rest of existence. One might, for example, respectively 
ignore the wilful neglect of a rainforest by cutting down its trees or stop feeding 
animals wholly dependent on one’s care for their well-being, which is what 
happens in Animal Farm after Jones takes to drinking. Within a strict appliance 
of the modern Bentham-inspired notion of suffering as an exclusive capacity to 
suffer, and not as a systemic neglect, it would most likely follow that only the 
animals not being fed would qualify as having the capacity to suffer. This is not 
to suggest that, given my heuristic definition of cruelty as a wilful neglect, the 
trees under discussion suffer and should now be attributed rights as well. Rather, 
my point is that the notion of suffering as it is currently taken up, cannot 
adequately deal with such questions and therefore must be renewed. In fact, it 
gets even more complicated as my particular example here concerns animals on 
a farm, whose suffering within today’s factory-farming practices is generally not 
acknowledged to the same degree as, say, the suffering of pets, but made 
subordinate to other (socio-economic) interests.  
Second, and perhaps more profoundly, my atypical concern with reading 
against the “capacity to suffer” stems from a need, at this stage of my project, to 
explore the odd logic that underlies the embracing of the question on the 
capacity to suffer by those at the forefront of the animal rights debate. This odd 
logic becomes most apparent in the work of Singer, Rachels and Derrida and, to 
a lesser extent, in the work of Tom Regan and Martha Nussbaum. For Regan, 
the capacity to suffer is not enough to belong to a moral community, as he 
stresses the additional importance of also being “a subject of life.” Nussbaum 
has developed what to me seems a much more refined and complex “capabilities 
approach.” This approach, however, softening a lot of rough utilitarian edges, 
evokes the same kind of rhetoric I seek to get away from in that it is still about 
“measuring” and not so much about other ways of identification with nonhuman 
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others. In my view, it is a valuable “practical ethics,” based in an aesthetic 
notion of flourishing, but as such not suitable to my project as it does not 
radically think through its own modes of identification.  
 The odd logic that connects the key texts of the theorists mentioned 
above holds that a presumably real concern for the protection of animals from 
harm – after a long and intellectual debate on animal rights – has led to the 
general embracing of a central (and, to me, rather disappointing) question about 
whether animals have the “capacity to suffer.” It is not that I would be in favour 
of more complex criteria, far from it, but having looked into the problems the 
expansive model poses, most notably in respect of its insistent demarcation 
problem, I cannot but conclude that the embracing of this question and the 
concurrent championing of its simplicity by those at the forefront of the animal 
rights debate is not supported by arguments that hold sufficient scientific rigor to 
unsettle its implicit rhetoric. The implicit rhetoric at stake holds that animals 
would not have to be protected from harm if they could not suffer in the first 
place. This brings the debate back, once again, to the question of what an animal 
is and what a human – as its traditional other. It is a question that, as has been 
demonstrated in the previous chapters, cannot be answered. In this respect, the 
question that first needs to be answered is not only how and why Bentham’s 
question on suffering as a capacity to suffer has been embraced so massively, 
but also which mechanism underlies this question’s subsequent justification.  
Let me begin by explaining what I believe to be the mechanism 
underlying the embracing of Bentham’s question. The question of whether 
animals can suffer, once it enters the legal sphere, can no longer remain a 
question. It needs a rule to anchor it as a consequence in order to provide a solid 
ground for further classification. This anchoring changes the question, as it 
comes to assume a mystical unity with the rule suddenly imagined to be flowing 
from the question. This mystification consists of a blurring of the laws of 
causality with respect to the rule and the question by taking them together. This 
“taking together” transforms the question and grants it the status of a 
transcendental rule, giving birth to a self-inflicted sense of authority. The 
emergent rule could be envisaged as resembling the figure of the following 
rudimentary chiasmus: “No suffering no animal, no animal no suffering.” The 
problem with this rudimentary chiasmus is that it presupposes the animal by 
treating it as known and pretends to grasp the question of suffering. Conversely, 
it treats the question of suffering as known and pretends to grasp the animal.  
Since we cannot have it both ways, the question of whether animals have 
the capacity to suffer appears to be incapable of grounding its own imaginary 
rule. This, in turn, implies that the rule, which is not really a rule, cannot ground 
124 
 
the question either, let alone be at one with it. In other words, Bentham’s elegant 
question seems to be hijacked by those who embrace it, whereas Bentham never 
laid down a rule, but simply asked a question. Hence, the question as to whether 
animals can suffer, when translated to the modern legal sphere as the touchstone 
of their capacity to suffer, presupposes the unknown as known, which turns 
Bentham’s question into a question to measure the immeasurable. Of course, 
there are empirical tests that measure suffering and that seemingly have proved, 
beyond reasonable doubt, that certain animals – especially those whose capacity 
to suffer has often been disputed, such as fish and lobsters – can actually suffer. 
My point here is not to downplay these important scientific achievements, in 
spite of the lingering question of consciousness and the accusation of 
anthropomorphism and hence, of the critique of being unscientific that cannot be 
shaken off and that such research will continue to come up against. Rather, I 
wish to argue that this mechanism of measuring can only be sustained through 
the evocation of the figure of the animal – and, consequently, of its traditional 
other, the human – as transcendental parameters from which can be extrapolated 
at will in order to effect such measuring. Hence, the legal interpretation of 
Bentham’s commitment to suffering as a capacity to suffer reduces the notion of 
suffering to a scientific matter of measuring which, as the figure of the 
rudimentary chiasmus demonstrates, does not offer a way out of the demarcation 
problem and the types of cruelty it installs. 
This is why my renewed commitment to the question of suffering wants to 
escape this scientific capacity to suffer by probing the way in which victimhood 
might be constructed through the open figure of pain. Reading against today’s 
central notion of the capacity to suffer in this way, as no longer embedded in a 
rhetoric of sameness or difference between the species, I wish, by no longer 
understanding difference conceptually, to work towards a dissolution of the kind 
of identity thinking that the expansive model, with its parameters of the human 
and the animal and its Bentham-inspired notion of suffering, relies upon. The 
key texts in this chapter are: Peter Singer’s “All Animals are Equal,” taken up in 
his Applied Ethics (1986)97 and George Orwell’s “Shooting an Elephant,” 
(1936).98 Close reading Singer’s text will allow me to identify the key terms that 
conceptual differences manifest themselves in when it comes to the question of 
suffering. In my subsequent close reading of George Orwell’s “Shooting an 
Elephant,” these key terms will serve as heuristic tools to read against the 
                                                 
97 Peter Singer, “All Animals are Equal.” In: Applied Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1986), 215- 228. 
98 George Orwell, “Shooting an Elephant.” In: Shooting an Elephant and Other Essays (London: 
Secker and Warburg, 1950), 1-10.  
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modern interpretation of the question of suffering as a mere capacity to suffer. 
As my argument develops, I will use and elaborate on the relevant work in the 
field by, amongst others, Rachels and Derrida, theorists who have struggled with 
the question of suffering in ways that may be particularly fruitful for my project.  
Let me now start by examining Singer’s “All Animals are Equal” and 
identify the specific stakes involved in his notion of a Bentham-inspired 
“Practical Ethics.” The reason I choose to refer to Singer’s text from his Applied 
Ethics as “Practical Ethics” depends not just on the semantic similarity between 
the terms. Rather, I wish to point out that the passages of this text are a literal 
reproduction of those in his book Practical Ethics, which was published seven 
years before, in order to illustrate the importance of this text within Singer’s 
wider philosophical argument.99 
 
 
3. The Practical Measure of Suffering 
 
In “All Animals are Equal,” Singer stresses the viability of the capacity to suffer 
as a unique touchstone and takes Bentham’s famous footnote as a point of 
departure. Before moving on to discuss Singer’s position via a close reading of 
some of the key passages in his text, it is worth noting that my close reading will 
be different from the many other close readings and critiques this text has 
provoked over time. This difference lies in the fact that I intend to focus on the 
capacity for suffering as a unique touchstone, rather than on the principle of 
equality. Indeed, without wanting to rehearse the particularities of all those 
critiques of Singer’s “All Animals are Equal”, the general tendency has been to 
critique the principle of equality rather than the capacity for suffering and then 
to treat the capacity for suffering as a secondary problem only once the principle 
of equality, in the specific way that Singer envisages it, has been deemed 
untenable.100 One of the most lucid critiques on the principle of equality Singer 
adheres to has been provided by Richard J. Arneson,101 for instance, whose 
position resonates with many other critiques on this principle. Roughly, Arneson 
finds fault with Singer’s main argument that, given the incommensurability of 
intellectual capacities between humans and animals, we must judge the latter’s 
                                                 
99 Peter Singer, “All Animals are Equal.” In: Practical Ethics (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979), 48-71.  
100 For a valuable overview of these and related critiques and responses by Singer see: Peter 
Singer Under Fire: The Moral Iconoclast Faces His Critiques, Volume three, ed. Jeffrey A. 
Schaler, (Illinois: Open Court, Chicago and La Salle, 2009).  
101 Richard J. Arneson: “What, if Anything, Renders all Humans Morally Equal.” In: Singer And 
His Critics, ed. Dale Jamieson, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,1999), 103 -128.  
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moral standing different but never superior. Yet, as Arneson observes, this 
implies that humans are not equal either but have different interests as well, 
which would undermine the fundamental moral equality of all human beings and 
hence, the very principle of equality itself.  
Again, my focus concerns the capacity to suffer, not the issue of equality. 
This is what Singer says with regard to Bentham’s famous footnote: 
 
In this passage Bentham points to the capacity for suffering as the vital 
characteristic that gives a being the right to equal consideration. The 
capacity for suffering – or more strictly, for suffering and/or enjoyment or 
happiness – is not just another characteristic like the capacity for 
language, or for higher mathematics. Bentham is not saying that those 
who try to mark ‘the insuperable line’ that determines whether the 
interests of a being should be considered happen to have selected the 
wrong characteristic. The capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a 
pre-requisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied 
before we can speak of interests in a meaningful way. (221) 
 
Singer states an entity cannot have interests worthy of our consideration if it 
lacks the capacity for suffering and/or enjoyment. In order to stress the priority 
of this capacity over any other possible capacity, he mentions two examples he, 
at best, considers secondary and, as such, unfit to provide a basis for moral 
consideration: the capacity for language and, somewhat grotesquely, the 
capacity for higher mathematics. In my view, Singer’s preoccupation here with 
having interests and his subsequent choice for those two examples to support his 
argument is meaningful, because together they project the scope of a Kantian 
outlook on rationality. In short, if Kant argued that rationality bears a causal 
relation to having interests, and thus constitutes an absolute difference between 
the human and the animal, the two examples Singer mentions convey the range 
from a minimum to a maximum deployment of such rationality.  
In this respect, Singer’s comment registers Kant’s conception of 
rationality as itself a gradual phenomenon. Hence, Singer’s substitution of 
Kant’s rationality with the capacity to suffer as a touchstone for having interests 
draws on attributing the capacity to suffer a similar gradual quality that his 
examples ascribe to Kant’s rationality. The only real difference is that Kant 
positions his touchstone between and Singer across the species. In other words, 
what unites Singers interpretation of Bentham with Kant is not the specific 
capacity posed as a viable touchstone, but a prioritizing of which entities can be 
said to have interests and, whilst each draws the line in a different place, an 
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implied holding on to the notion of species as an essentialist construct that is 
sustained through a categorization of difference. In what follows, I will argue 
Singer’s Kantian mindset infects his practical ethics in a way that does not open 
up to dealing with the problem of cruelty and its implied notion of suffering 
because of the peculiar way Singer holds on to the notion of species as an 
essentialist construct.  
Having made his point on the capacity to suffer, Singer makes a strong 
case for extending equal consideration to animals sharing this capacity:  
 
My aim is to advocate that we make this mental switch in respect of our 
attitudes and practices towards a very large group of beings: members of 
species other than our own – or, as we popularly though misleadingly call 
them, animals. In other words, I am urging that we extend to other 
species, the basic principle of equality that most of us recognize should be 
extended to all members of our species. (216) 
 
In the passage above, Singer introduces the basic principle of equality, which is 
presented not as factual equality but as a moral idea, as equality of 
consideration. This is a valuable idea, because it would allow – although this is 
not specifically advocated by Singer – for reading the expansive model as the 
extension of a moral principle to animals by way of the attribution of rights, if 
not the exact same rights, which, from a practical point of view, would be 
nonsensical anyway. This basic principle of equality, however, if not 
committing Singer to extending moral consideration through the attribution of 
rights, also informs Singer’s conception of speciesism. For Singer, speciesism is 
a violation of this basic principle of equality if moral consideration for other 
species would be denied on the basis of their lack of any other capacity or 
characteristic than the capacity to suffer.102 
The theoretical problem with Singer’s definition of speciesism is that it 
still poses humanity as a homogeneous group. Contrary to the general line of 
critique against Singer’s principle of equality, I consider this homogenizing 
move problematic, because it installs the human species as a distinct species 
from the animal species, which suggests Singer here applies his own brand of 
what may be called a “strategic speciesism”. A further and more practical 
problem arises with Singer’s positioning of the capacity to suffer as a strict 
condition for extending moral consideration to essentially nonhumans. This 
condition, to be justified, requires some form of measurement and the 
                                                 
102 Singer borrowed the term speciesism from Richard Ryder. See: Richard D. Ryder: Animal 
Revolution: Changing Attitudes towards Speciesism (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1989). 
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subsequent exclusion of those entities not granted the capacity to suffer. This is 
how Singer proposes to solve the problem of measuring: 
 
No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires 
that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering – in so far as 
rough comparisons can be made – of any other being. If a being is not 
capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is 
nothing to be taken into account. This is why the limit of sentience (using 
the term as a convenient if not strictly accurate, shorthand for the capacity 
to suffer or experience enjoyment or happiness) is the only defensible 
boundary of concern for the interests of others. To mark this boundary by 
some characteristic like intelligence or rationality would be to mark it in 
an arbitrary way. Why not choose some other characteristic, like skin 
colour? (222, italics mine, BV) 
 
The problems such measuring poses become apparent in the first two lines of the 
citation. On the one hand, extending the moral principle of equality requires that 
suffering be counted equally, with the like suffering of any other being, but, only 
in so far as rough comparisons can be made. Admittedly, this contradiction 
between “counting equally” and “rough comparisons” has a lot to do with 
Singer’s wish to be practical, as Singer must be well aware suffering cannot be 
counted equally, if it can be counted at all. Suffering itself is of paramount 
importance however, otherwise there is no “account”. With respect to this, the 
point here is, however, that the question of suffering need not and indeed cannot 
be attributed to a concern with practical ethics alone. In other words: solving the 
problem of measuring by relegating it to a matter of practical ethics also points 
to the notion of the capacity to suffer as intrinsically problematic for the 
extension of moral consideration towards other beings. More than that, apart 
from the problems such measuring poses and of which the vagueness of Singer’s 
argument seems but a symptom, the underlying ethical issue is not so much 
resolved, but avoided and reduced to a matter of calculation, which leaves us 
with the impossible exercise of working out the numbers.  
In fact, in close reading Singer, it appears that his position on the 
relevance of Bentham’s question if animals can suffer as different from drawing 
an insuperable line on the basis of any other capacity or characteristic, results 
from interpreting Bentham’s footnote in a particular way. Singer understands 
Bentham’s famous footnote to point to the capacity for suffering and enjoyment, 
what Singer refers to as sentience, as constituting the insuperable line. Yet 
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Bentham never mentions enjoyment. As we can learn from the third sentence of 
his footnote, he only asks whether sensitive beings can suffer: 
 
It may one day come to be recognized that the number of legs, the 
villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons 
equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. 
 
In other words, if we stick to Bentham’s text, there is, in principle, no reason to 
understand it as conveying the capacity for enjoyment as a complementary 
criterion to the capacity to suffer. In this respect, we could also choose to follow 
up on Bentham in a more literal manner and understand the word “sensitive” as 
denoting: “quick to detect or respond to slight changes or influences,”103 in the 
way, for example, that spiders are said to be “sensitive” to vibrations of their 
web. Such an understanding of sensitivity in Bentham would complicate the 
notion of suffering and enjoyment Singer insists on in a significant way, because 
it opens up the possibility of taking into consideration movements and reactions 
that cannot be narrowed down or grasped by interpreting them as testifying to a 
capacity for suffering or enjoyment. It is not that I want to propose a new 
demarcation line here. Rather, I wish to point out that such an alternative notion 
of sensitivity would require us to rethink what, within the context of Singer’s 
criteria, would still have to be qualified as a merely mechanistic reaction. Hence, 
it would expose the way in which Singer’s insisting on the capacity to suffer and 
enjoyment installs this other sensitivity as irrelevant to the cause of rethinking 
animal subjectivity. 
I read Singer’s reductive rhetorical move here as indicative of the 
problems with his practical ethics, and I read Bentham’s refraining from 
mentioning the capacity for enjoyment as conveying a clear understanding of the 
problems such a complementary qualification would pose. Indeed, introducing 
the capacity for enjoyment, we might not just have to count suffering but also 
enjoyment equally, whereas one could imagine enjoyment to be a phenomenon 
much harder to detect or define than suffering, as it might be done in perfect 
silence or “experienced” after the fact, as a result of something commonly 
referred to as reflection. Conversely, looking at enjoyment in this way also 
points back to suffering as something that may very well go beyond immediate 
physical pain, as something that can be experienced in silence and be brought on 
by reflection as well. But, where “reflection” comes in, one cannot help being 
reminded of the Kantian touchstone of rationality, which would immediately 
                                                 
103 Oxford American Dictionaries, second edition, 2005. 
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upset the whole idea and call into question the capacity to suffer as a unique 
touchstone.  
With respect to this issue, the trouble with Singer’s practical ethics 
becomes still more apparent in the last sentence of his comment: “to mark the 
boundary in any other way than by the notion of sentience, would be to mark it 
in an arbitrary way.” As I see no reason not to, I understand this figure of non-
arbitrariness here in its conservative sense. This would imply that Singer claims 
that his posing of the capacity to suffer is to mark an insuperable line in a non-
arbitrary way. Any other (arbitrary) way of (de)marcation, like skin colour, 
would have to be condemned as speciesism. In other words, Singer, following 
up on Bentham, here explicitly repeats the comparison between what in 
Bentham’s footnote was still left somewhat unarticulated and what Singer – via 
Ryder – has popularized; namely, the comparison of racism with speciesism as a 
similarly discriminate affair. He does so in claiming that the accusation of 
speciesism would be justified if the insuperable line were any other than the 
capacity to suffer. In other words: species that lack the capacity to suffer may be 
ignored (then “there is nothing to be taken into account”).  
I wish to momentarily leave aside here the contradictory move Singer 
makes by first claiming that his Bentham-inspired touchstone of the capacity to 
suffer “is not just a matter of putting forward another characteristic and drawing 
an insuperable line,” to then end up stating that posing any other characteristic 
as a boundary would be a form of speciesism. What I want to do first is examine 
this notion of speciesism or, better, the accusation of speciesism, and the way in 
which its explicit comparison with racism works here, apart, of course, from the 
bleak connotation it transfers to speciesism. In order to do so, I read Singer’s 
notion of the capacity to suffer as the posing of an insuperable line resulting 
from a Kantian mindset. Within such a framework, if an animal is attributed the 
capacity to suffer, its protection from harm, whether by moral consideration 
only or by the granting of rights as well, is motivated by a claim to sameness. In 
short, its suffering is somehow considered to be of the same order, of the same 
kind, corresponding to or congruent with the like suffering of human beings. 
However, since I concluded that any appeal to sameness between the species 
installs a categorization of difference, the question becomes, firstly, how does 
this categorization take effect here and secondly, what sort of difference might 
be at stake? These questions can best be addressed by looking at the notion of 
speciesism and its rhetorical relation to racism, which could schematically be 





Speciesism Racism Discrimination 
 
Species Race  ---- 
 
The accusation of racism can be countered theoretically by the fact that race 
does not “exist” other than as an essentialist construct. What the racist and the 
speciesist have in common, then, is that they might be accused of discrimi-
nation, which is only a general term. The accusation or condemnation of 
speciesism, however, cannot be countered satisfactorily by referring to species 
as an essentialist construct, because Singer’s framework presupposes species in 
a different way than racism presupposes race. The accusation of speciesism 
presupposes the human vs. the animal species as essential and homogeneous 
categories, measuring all the different essentially nonhuman beings by the 
category of the human species, whereas racism remains an inter-human affair.  
The implications of this difference become clear from the following 
comment, which I take to be exemplary of Singer’s framing of speciesism as 
bound up with the sort of categorization of difference I seek to get away from: 
 
In this respect, the distinction between humans and nonhumans is not a 
sharp division but rather a continuum along which we move gradually, 
and with overlaps between the species, from simple capacities for 
enjoyment and satisfaction, or pain and suffering, to more complex ones. 
(227) 
 
In the above passage we encounter a condensed form of the sort of 
categorization of difference that my reading of Animal Farm presented. The fact 
that the different animals could all communicate with each other, but only the 
cleverest ones, the pigs, with the humans, categorized their differences as both 
absolute and gradual. Stressing this analogy, however, does not serve a critical 
purpose in itself. My point is that the analogy here works differently, because it 
exposes how the insuperable line of the capacity to suffer needs the idea of 
speciesism to extend the moral principle of equal consideration and, possibly, 
although not explicitly advocated by Singer, expanding the domain of rights to 
include animals. Conversely, if the accusation of speciesism is reliant on posing 
the capacity to suffer theoretically as a non-arbitrary demarcation line, in order 
to extend a moral principle, its implied concept of species is dependent on the 
essentially human set against its traditional other, the animal. This strategic 
speciesism, comfortably nesting itself within Singer’s own discourse, by 
insisting on the parameters of the human and the animal, fails to open up to a 
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vocabulary that can offer a way out of the constraints of the expansive model. 
More than that, its strategic nature suggests it might also turn against itself. This 
is why I wish to move away from any discourse that allows for the term species 
to be signified by the accusation of speciesism. At the same time, I do not wish 
to drop the term species altogether, as it is simply there and I can and do not 
wish to make it go away.  
This is where I differ in a fundamental way from Derrida, who, at the end 
of the first chapter of The Animal That Therefore I Am, coined the word animot 
to remind us that what we generally refer to as animal effectively denotes a 
multiplicity of different beings that cannot be subsumed under a species 
concept:  
 
I would like to have the plural animals heard in the singular. There is no 
Animal in the general singular, separated from man by a single, 
indivisible limit. We have to envisage the existence of “living creatures,” 
whose plurality cannot be assembled within the single figure of an 
animality that is simply opposed to humanity. (47) 
 
Derrida’s neologism animot, then, opens up the problematic of designating an 
incredible variety of creatures by the name animal. It does not, however, open 
up space for addressing the concept of species(ism). Rather, it leaves it intact as 
a biological determinate because it is primarily concerned with its object. This is 
why, instead of following up on Derrida’s wider argument, which will be 
discussed in my final chapter, I would like to deal with speciesism head on by 
reading it differently, namely not as a biological determinate, but both much 
broader and narrower. In order to do so, I turn to a meaning that may be derived 
from the Spanish “una especie,” which denotes the typical biological construct 
under discussion, but which in everyday speech also connotes “ kind” or “sort,” 
or “sort of,” as in “I feel kind of/sort of blue” or “it’s a kind of/sort of magic.” 
Here, the term species takes on the quality of non-specificity, which provokes an 
identification that is not an identification, the grammatical equivalent, if one can 
put it that way, of simile: the simile “like.”  
The object of comparison, however, the “with” with which it is being 
compared escapes essence, as it is only suggested and then falls back; it seems 
to almost incarnate in the “like.” This different reading of species, drawing 
attention not to possible objects of comparison but focusing on the comparison 
itself, opens up to speaking in terms of heterogeneity and difference instead of 
classification by homogeneous categories and thus allows for coming to terms 
with difference in a way speciesism as a biological determinate cannot. It opens 
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up to a framework that might grasp, by not grasping, the idea that a racehorse 
differs more from a workhorse than a workhorse from an ox, although I could 
mention an infinite amount of other examples, whereby I would not have to limit 
myself to “animals.”104  
Effectively, my argument here on not treating the term species as an 
essentialist construct per se resonates with that of Louise Economides, who has 
elsewhere drawn on Deleuze and Guattari’s theories of multiplicities and 
becomings to demonstrate that modern animal rights discourse cannot but 
adhere to an ethical individualism that cannot do justice to the question of the 
animal, if only, because animals’ identities are shaped by the collectives within 
which they live. In contrast to Economides, however, I do not so much wish to 
challenge the notion of species as an essentialist construct in animal rights 
discourse by drawing on the immanent multiplicities and heterogenetic 
structures that shape embodied beings. Instead, the focus on language itself 
brings me to the point that it would now become possible to talk about these 
“horses” as other than members of a species and to work towards other modes of 
identification with their victimhood without necessarily having to give up on the 
word species.105  
Before I move on to explore these other modes of identification, there is 
one more paradox to be solved. If, on the one hand, Derrida has coined the word 
animot to escape the classification of the animal under a species concept and, if I 
have, on the other hand, suggested that the capacity to suffer must be read as an 
insuperable line, since it is bound up with maintaining the concept of species as 
a biological construct, why is it, then, that Derrida seems to embrace Bentham’s 
notion of suffering in the same way as Singer does, i.e. as wholly different from 
the insuperable line of rationality Kant once proposed? A possible answer might 
be that Derrida stresses the importance of understanding the notion of suffering 
not as a capacity, but as an ability. Can they suffer, Derrida argues, amounts to 
can they not be able. This is what Derrida states: 
 
Once its protocol is established, the form of this question changes 
everything. It no longer simply concerns the logos, the disposition and 
whole configuration of the logos, having it or not, nor does it concern 
more radically a dynamis or hexis, this having or manner of being, this 
habitus, that one calls a faculty or “power” this can-have or the power one 
                                                 
104 An example I feel at liberty to cite from Deleuze and Guattari (in A Thousand Plateaus, p. 
257), whose work on “becoming animal” will be touched upon in chapter 4.  




possesses (as in the power to reason, to speak, and everything that that 
implies). The question is disturbed by a certain passivity. It bears witness, 
manifesting already, as question, the response that testifies to a suffering, 
a passion, a not being able. “Can they suffer?” amounts to asking can they 
not be able? (27, italics in text)106 
 
This “passivity argument,” however poetic and true, does not convince me for 
two reasons. First, because it constitutes a negation that opposes activity to 
passivity, which seems hardly relevant to the question itself since suffering is 
not by definition a passive undergoing that cannot be resisted or overcome. A 
picture of salmons swimming upstream, laying their eggs on the shore only to 
die of exhaustion comes to mind. Those salmons might be said to suffer all right, 
but not to passively undergo their suffering. Admittedly though, Derrida might 
be referring to a more fundamental vulnerability, in which case his observation 
seems quite right. But even if this is the case, Derrida’s connecting of the 
question of suffering with the notion of passivity within the specific context of 
the animal rights debate rather unfortunately links the animal to the notion of 
passivity, thereby feeding into the worn-out stereotypes in which the 
traditionally other, the animal, has been registered in ways unfavourable to both 
animals themselves and to the cause of those human beings that have been 
compared to animals in history. Second, because Derrida’s “passivity argument” 
treats Bentham’s broader idea of what Singer termed sentience in very much the 
same reductive way as Singer does. The only difference is that it occludes the 
idea of enjoyment and blurs the idea of measurement in an arguably more 
creative manner, namely by rhetorically weaving in the notion of passivity 
against the so-called activity of potential other capacities. Third, because 
Derrida’s notion of passivity is questionable in so far as it resides with the 
question-form itself and not with the notion of suffering such a question might 
be about, which is what I am after. Moreover, if Derrida argues that the 
supposed passivity the negation instigates makes the question of the capacity to 
suffer stand out as not just any characteristic, I would suggest conducting a 
thought experiment and replacing it with the capacity to sleep or, for that matter, 
to stay awake, which, in line with Derrida’s specific terminology here, can 
hardly be called a capacity either, as one cannot not be able to stay awake or 
sleep.  
I have now looked into what I have come to regard as Singer’s and 
Derrida’s reductive measure of Bentham’s valuable commitment to suffering. 
This brief exploration has opened up the prospect of looking at the animal as a 
                                                 
106 Ibid, supra note 35.  
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heterogeneous other, defying species qualification. In addition, it has outlined 
the formulation of a new semantics on the subject of species itself. It has 
demonstrated that today’s embracing of Bentham’s commitment to suffering as 
a capacity to suffer, is not a radical turning away from Kant, but that it may be 
read as a modern day substitution of Kant’s idea of the human being as a 
rational being. Since my analysis has shown such a reading to be unwarranted, 
because of the strategic speciesism it installs, I will now move away from the 
capacity to suffer and its implied species concept by returning to the common 
denominator of both the figure of harm and cruelty, which I have addressed as 
pain.  
There is, however, one important caveat to be made here, since my 
heuristic notion of pain as a force that binds harm and cruelty makes me liable to 
the accusation of installing a categorization of difference myself, substituting, as 
it were, suffering with pain. In order to avoid this trap, I propose to read pain not 
as a minimum but as a maximum ground; not just as physical or mental pain, but 
both as a scientific, linguistic and aesthetic phenomenon that involves literary 
and other creative strategies, as a common de-nomin-ator to be taken most 
literally, in that it names both harm and cruelty by a taking away (de) of their 
name (nomen). If this requires reading pain differently from the way modern 
animal rights discourse reads the capacity to suffer, namely as an exclusive 
capacity that ought to be measured scientifically, it also suggests this exclusive 
capacity to suffer cannot be excluded altogether since such would amount to a 
substitution. This is why I will start by exploring the position of pain and where 
it stands scientifically today in order to account for the way in which this 
standing relates to the immediate purpose of my project.  
James Rachels, who has written extensively on ethics and animal right 
issues, explains the scientific notion of pain and its relation to the animal rights 
debate as follows:  
 
 The question of which other animals feel pain is a real and important 
issue, not to be settled by appeals to common sense. Only a complete 
scientific understanding of pain, which we do not yet have, could tell us 
all that we need to know. In the meantime, however, we do have a rough 
idea of what to look for. If we want to know whether it is reasonable to 
believe that a particular kind of animal is capable of feeling pain, we may 
ask: Are there nociceptors present? Are they connected to a central 
nervous system? What happens in that nervous system to the signals from 
the nociceptors? And are there endogenous opiods? In our present state of 
understanding, this sort of information, together with the obvious 
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behavioural signs of distress, is the best evidence we can have that an 
animal is capable of feeling pain.107 
 
Rachels here establishes his basic point on pain by building up a confident 
picture of what we can know about pain. His argument resonates with Singers, 
despite the fact that his denial of an appeal to common sense in favour of a more 
thorough scientific approach somewhat downgrades Singer’s description of a 
practical ethics concerned with measuring equally what can only roughly be 
compared. Rachels adds: 
 
Relying on such evidence, some writers, such as Gary Varner, have 
tentatively suggested that the line between animals that feel pain and those 
that do not is (approximately) the line between vertebrates and 
invertebrates. However, research constantly moves forward, and the 
tendency of research is to extend the number of animals that might be able 
to suffer, not decrease it. Nociception appears to be one of the most 
primitive animal systems. Nociceptors have now been identified in a 
remarkable number of species, including leeches and snails.  
The presence of a perceptual system does not, however, settle the 
question of whether the organism has conscious experiences connected 
with its operation. We know, for example, that humans have perceptual 
systems that do not involve conscious experience. Recent research has 
shown that the human vomeronasal system, which works through 
receptors in the nose, responds to pheromones and affects behaviour even 
though the person is unaware of it. [...] The receptors for 
“vomerolfaction” are in the nostrils, alongside the receptors for the sense 
of smell; yet the operation of one is accompanied by conscious experience 
while the operation of the other is not. (12) 
 
If, as Rachels points out, we have not yet come to a full scientific understanding 
of pain, it would only be fair to say that a scientific understanding of pain has its 
                                                 
107 James Rachels, “The Basic Argument For Vegetarianism.” In: The Legacy Of Socrates: Essays 
in Moral Philosophy, ed. Stuart Rachels (Birmingham, Alabama: Columbia University Press, 
2006), 12. This text originally appeared in 2004, the same year in which the text “Drawing Lines” 
by James Rachels originally appeared in: Animal Rights, Current Debates and New Directions, 
ed. Cass. R Sunstein and Martha C. Nussbaum, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 162-
174. The more nuanced position Rachels takes on pain in the second quotation cited above is 
largely consistent with his argument in “Drawing Lines”. Yet, the way in which Nussbaum and 
Sunstein introduce Rachels’ position in “Drawing Lines” in their edited volume escapes this 
nuance when they introduce Rachels’ position as follows: “He urges that the appropriate 
protection of animals should depend in large part on what their capacities are”, p.13.  
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own limits, both scientific and non-scientific. Not just because science, as 
Rachels argues, never halts and always tends to move forward, but also because 
there is a limit to what we can know through science. This latter point seems to 
be illustrated in the last sentence of the above citation, which stresses the 
undecidability of questions of the conscious experience of pain in what, from a 
scientific point of view, are “identical receptors.” This fundamental 
undecidability, this liminality of science, allows me to substantiate and wrap up 
my argument on moving away from the capacity to suffer as an exclusive 
capacity towards an all-encompassing notion of pain that is and must remain 
open and essentially before definition. In order to do so, I propose to 
momentarily carry out another thought experiment through a contemplation of 
what might happen if we really did substitute the capacity to suffer with Kant’s 
capacity for rationality.  
If today, roughly two ages after Bentham’s famous footnote, the capacity 
for rationality is attributed to a larger and still growing number of nonhuman 
animals as scientific research into the capacities of animals has improved and 
because it is improving all the time, there is, in principle, no reason not to 
suspect the capacity for rationality might eventually come to equal or even 
outgrow the numbers now attributed to the capacity to suffer. In other words, 
and contrary to what Singer claimed, the capacity to suffer is not a unique 
demarcation line but, as a capacity to be measured scientifically, will always 
install other limits because it is defined as an exclusive capacity in Kantian vein. 
Keeping this in mind, and having established why moving away from such an 
exclusive capacity to suffer is important to my project, I will now embark on my 
close reading of George Orwell’s “Shooting an Elephant.” The aim of close 
reading this intriguingly dense text is, first, to explore its constructions of 
identity and victimhood by examining how those constructions are produced by, 
and infected with, the parameters of the human and the animal through a 
rhetorical interaction with the key figures that I have now identified within my 
close reading of Singer, those of racism and speciesism. Second, my aim is to 
explore the way in which working with the heuristic notion of pain I have 
developed might challenge those constructions. Third, I will explore how the 
genre choice – do we read the text as an autobiographical essay or as an 






4. George Orwell, “Shooting an Elephant.” (Essay, 1936): Racism vs. 
Speciesism 
 
In George Orwell’s “Shooting an Elephant,” the protagonist, an 
autobiographical representation of Orwell himself, is a police officer with the 
British Raj in Moulmein, now Myanmar, Burma, who is recalling what he refers 
to as a “tiny incident in itself.” In short, he is rung by a sub-inspector at the other 
end of the town and informed that an elephant has gone “must” and if he could 
please come over and “do something about it.” “Orwell”108 transports himself to 
the other end of the town, is confronted with the horrible sight of a man killed 
by the elephant and, not really wanting to, but spurred on by the locals, ends up 
shooting the elephant. 
In my view, the ways “Shooting an Elephant” presents the overt racism 
within the British Raj, although undoubtedly a harsh reality at the time, does not 
appear particularly shocking. This might be attributed to the distancing effect of 
the time and place in which the story is situated. Similarly, the postcolonial 
cliché, however true, that colonial powers acted out a racist ideology, in a sense 
breeds the idea of racism as just the kind of thing one would expect to encounter 
when reading about a colonial police officer recalling his experiences within the 
British Raj. Given this distancing time lapse and the fact that we have now 
“officially” moved into a postcolonial era, then, it would seem only fair to 
suggest the text, despite the clinical way it registers racist attitudes and mindsets 
as part and parcel of everyday life under imperialism, does not have such a 
chilling impact on the reader today as it might have done around the time of its 
publication. The relevance of providing arguments for what seems rather 
obvious, this lessened impact, is that it also suggests that the undeniably 
shocking impact of the story does not rest with the usual suspects, but must 
reside somewhere else, a matter I wish to explore in what lies ahead.  
Not uncommon either, is how this colonial racism is forged textually, 
namely by an insistent linking and comparing of the local humans to animals 
throughout the text. This issue has been taken up in a great many (post)colonial 
readings of “Shooting an Elephant.” In those readings, however, the text is 
generally framed as an autobiographical essay that can be read as an allegory of 
(post)colonial imperialism, whereas I intend to consider either genre choice as 
optional only for exploring the relation of genre choice to the construction of 
                                                 
108 Whenever I put Orwell in quotation marks I am referring to the protagonist of the story and not 
to the author. 
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victimhoods in the text.109 To mention just a few examples of how colonial 
racism is installed through animalizing humans: Local prisoners are “huddling in 
the stinking cages” of the lock-ups, they have “cowed” faces, and those who 
pester “Orwell” are described as “little beasts,” which, excited about the 
possible killing of an elephant, “flock” out of their houses. The most 
conspicuous Human-Animal comparison, however, the site, as it were, where 
racism and speciesism meet, concerns the description of the confrontation of 
“Orwell” with the man trampled by the elephant. When “Orwell” arrives at the 
place where the elephant is last seen he struggles to get a clear picture of what 
has happened, to the point of doubting whether what he was told over the phone 
really happened at all. The locals he questions (he does not ask them) or who 
approach him, come up with strongly divergent narratives and none of it seems 
to make any coherent sense to him. Then, his doubts are at once taken away by a 
brutal experience:  
 
I had almost made up my mind that the whole story was a pack of lies, 
when we heard yells a little distance away. There was a loud, scandalized 
cry of “Go away, child! Go away this instant!” and an old woman with a 
switch in her hand came round the corner of a hut, violently shooing away 
a crowd of naked children. Some more women followed, clicking their 
tongues and exclaiming; evidently there was something that the children 
ought not to have seen. I rounded the hut and saw a man's dead body 
sprawling in the mud. He was an Indian, a black Dravidian coolie, almost 
naked, and he could not have been dead many minutes. The people said 
that the elephant had come suddenly upon him round the corner of the hut, 
caught him with its trunk, put its foot on his back and ground him into the 
                                                 
109 For the way in which “Shooting an Elephant” is generally taken up as an autobiographical 
essay in modern post(colonial) debates see for example: Paul Gilroy, Postcolonial Melancholia 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). See also: Mohammed Sarwar Alam, ‘Orwell’s 
“Shooting an Elephant”: Reflections on Imperialism and Neoimperialism.’ IIUC STUDIES, Vol. 3 
(December 2006): 55-62. In this text Alam states that: “The Shooting of the Elephant is the 
incident that reveals imperialism inflicts damage on both parties in imperialistic relationships.” 
(55). See also James Tyner in: “Landscape and the mask of self in George Orwell’s ‘Shooting an 
Elephant”. (2005). Area 37 (2005): 260–267; <doi: 10.1111/j.1475-4762.2005.00629.x>. Tyner 
states that: “I contend that “Shooting an elephant” is not simply a polemic against British 
Imperialism; nor, for that matter, does the elephant signify the British Empire. Rather, Orwell 
employs the event as a more personal concern, namely as that of a loss of self in a de-humanizing 
landscape and the realization that with the masks of colonialism – and by extension whiteness – 
the colonizer likewise becomes non-existent.” Thus, Tyner arguably takes in a more nuanced 
position by questioning the notion of “self,” and all that this implies for our understanding of 
subjectivity and identity. Yet he does not radically pursue this question since he remains indebted 
to a reading of “Shooting an Elephant” as an autobiographical essay and, by consequence, as an 
allegory of imperialism. 
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earth. This was the rainy season and the ground was soft, and his face had 
scored a trench a foot deep and a couple of yards long. He was lying on 
his belly with arms crucified and head sharply twisted to one side. His 
face was coated with mud, the eyes wide open, the teeth bared and 
grinning with an expression of unendurable agony. (Never tell me, by the 
way, that the dead look peaceful. Most of the corpses I have seen looked 
devilish.) The friction of the great beast’s foot had stripped the skin from 
his back as neatly as one skins a rabbit. (3-4) 
 
The suffering that the man in his dead struggle must have been subjected to is 
conveyed by linking him to an animal in two different ways. First, preceded by 
an uncanny clicking of the local women’s tongues, an almost photographic 
reference is made to his “teeth bared and grinning.” Second, the elephant has 
apparently stripped the skin from the man’s back “as neatly as one skins a 
rabbit.” In short, both descriptions address the victim as a subhuman animal-like 
being and, therefore, could be qualified as bluntly racist. This racism, however, 
can also be read as being made so explicit only to invite us to condemn it, in 
which case the comparisons under discussion would have to be read as 
constituent elements of the overall moral of the story; that is, expressive of the 
subhuman condition under which all subjects are living under the colonial 
imperialism “Orwell” despises so much.  
Within such an allegorical reading we would, in all likelihood, qualify 
“Orwell’s” linking and comparing of the man trampled by the elephant to an 
animal as just another unfortunate feature of the condition of imperialism. At the 
same time, our possible moral indignation at the racist terms in which the man 
trampled by the elephant is registered would be deferred to, and brought in line 
with, “Orwell’s” moral judgement on colonial imperialism, which is presented 
as wrong, degrading, and perverting its subjects on either side. In fact, in the 
somewhat introductory second paragraph, notably before the encounter of 
“Orwell” with the man trampled by the elephant, this type of moral claim 
already seems to be hinted at, as “Orwell” explicitly attributes his own 
schizophrenic attitude to the condition he lives in as a servant of imperialism:  
 
All I knew was that I was stuck between my hatred of the empire I served 
and my rage against the evil-spirited little beasts who tried to make my 
job impossible. With one part of my mind I thought of the British Raj as 
an unbreakable tyranny, as something clamped down, in saecula 
saeculorum, upon the will of prostrate peoples; with another part I 
thought that the greatest joy in the world would be to drive a bayonet into 
a Buddhist priest's guts. Feelings like these are the normal by-products of 
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imperialism; ask any Anglo-Indian official, if you can catch him off duty. 
(2, italics mine, BV) 
 
The overall moral of the story, condensed, as it were, in this introductory 
passage, seems to bear an overarching influence on the subsequent victimhoods 
constructed. Both the man trampled by the elephant and “Orwell” are presented 
as victims of imperialism and, as such, degraded to, respectively, a subhuman 
animal-like creature and a schizophrenic evil-spirited colonial officer. 
Conversely, let it be noted straight away, and gaining a different outlook on the 
constructions of their victimhoods, this might allow for questioning and 
upsetting the overall moral that is offered through the lens of “Orwell.” In this 
regard, let me first examine the way in which “Orwell” registers the victimhood 
of the man trampled by the elephant by zooming in on the specific way he 
relates the condition in which he has encountered the man to the condition of 
imperialism.  
The man is described as lying down, flat and defeated, in a horrifying and 
disgraceful position. This description coincides with the word “prostrate,” which 
we already encountered in the passage from the introductory paragraph 
mentioned above, and which literally denotes: to put or throw flat with the face 
down.110 In other words, the description of the man trampled by the elephant 
harkens back to the overall moral conveyed in the introductory second 
paragraph. This textual dynamic makes the man trampled by the elephant take 
on an exclusive allegorical quality, as he is made to stand in for “all the prostrate 
peoples clamped down by the tyranny of imperialism.”111 If we follow this logic, 
the elephant comes to stand for the British Raj, which the protagonist will then 
try to kill. Consequently, the particular suffering of the trampled man is not 
addressed, but bypassed, and comes to function as a constituent element in the 
allegory of the condition of a beastly imperialism. This condition, however, – 
and this is the effect of the specific allegorical quality that is lent to the man 
through a subtle synecdochical operation – suddenly also implicates “Orwell,” 
                                                 
110 Etymology of the word prostate: classical Latin prōstrātus (adjective) lying flat, laid low, 
defeated, (noun) person lying prostrate, in post-classical Latin also (adjective) abject (late 2nd 
cent. in Tertullian), (noun) person who has been slain (Vetus Latina), uses as adjective and noun 
of past participle of prōsternere. Compare Anglo-Norman prostrat, Anglo-Norman and Middle 
French, French prostré (13th cent. in Old French), Old Occitan prostrat, Spanish postrado (mid 
13th cent. as prostrado). Denotation of the word prostrate: Of a person: lying with the face to the 
ground, in token of submission or humility, as in adoration, worship, or supplication; (hence more 
generally) lying stretched out on the ground, typically with the face downwards, OED 2012.  
111 For an example of the way in which this line is typically read as allegorically conveying 
Orwell’s position under imperialism as equally clamped down by its tyranny see: Herman 




because, in the second introductory paragraph, his schizophrenic mindset has 
already been attributed to the very same condition.  
If we decide to follow up on the overall moral conveyed in this manner, 
the only difference between “Orwell” and the man trampled by the elephant, to 
put it somewhat cynically, is that “Orwell” just happens to take up a different 
position within the system. This position lends his victimhood an allegorical 
quality as well, as the last sentence of the passage indicates it is not so much 
“Orwell,” but, in another synecdochical operation, his job as any other Anglo-
Indian official that is responsible for his schizophrenic attitude. Thus, reading 
this passage through the lens of “Orwell,” as we are invited to do, the 
victimhood of the man trampled by the elephant is presented as fundamentally 
identical to that of “Orwell.” The construction of this fundamental identical 
identity is reliant on not addressing both victims as bearing a particular agency, 
but as mere icons of the all-encompassing condition of imperialism that works to 
sustain the overall moral of the story. This begs the question whether the overall 
moral of the story sustains their victimhoods as fundamentally identical, or 
whether it is their fundamentally identical victimhoods that sustain the overall 
moral of the story, a matter I will explore in what lies ahead. At this stage, I only 
wish to establish that there seems to be a strong interdependency between the 
overall moral of the story and the victimhoods constructed as fundamentally 
identical. And yet, we clearly sense “Orwell’s” victimhood not to be identical to 
that of the man trampled by the elephant. To tackle this discrepancy, let me now 
look at both victimhoods up close. 
The man trampled by the elephant is degraded to the status of an animal-
like condition and left to function as a mirror, an object, reflecting not so much 
an object but a fixed condition, symbolically conveyed by literally being ground 
in the earth. Reduced to this fixed condition and stripped not just of his skin, but 
also of his individuality, the victimhood of the man trampled by the elephant, 
one might paradoxically argue, is sacrificed to the overall moral of the story. By 
contrast, “Orwell’s” schizophrenic, non-fixed condition, not just degrades him, 
but, as he expresses a high self-consciousness, a rather cunning awareness of his 
own state, bears witness to an extreme, albeit somewhat perverted, 
sophistication. Perverse, because he is wilfully prepared or disposed to go 
counter to what is expected or desired, but, at the same time, sophisticated, 
because he is aware of his own inconsistency. In short, if the condition of the 
man trampled by the elephant is conveyed in photographical, metaphorical or 
allegorical terms, literally as a picture of a dead animal-like being that the reader 
can control, take up and look at, “Orwell” acts out the ability or the astonishing 
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and almost superhuman capacity to construct, to narrate, to identify with and to 
reflect on his own suffering.  
Taking this view, when read in terms of their ability to narrate their own 
victimhoods, the difference we sense between the man trampled by the elephant 
and “Orwell” might seem to disavow the fundamental identical identity they are 
administered through the overall moral of the story. Yet, because this difference 
can still be read as centred on a form of strategic speciesism implied within the 
operation of a categorization of difference, it does not upset the overall moral of 
the story and, hence, does nothing to prevent their victimhoods from being 
registered as fundamentally identical. In short, the fact that both men are 
momentarily registered as belonging to an absolute different order of species, 
the human and the animal, is counterbalanced by the gradual difference implied 
within the sheer contingency of their positions under imperialism. Consequently, 
addressing the different victimhoods we clearly sensed here in the way I just 
proposed does nothing to upset the idea of those victimhoods as fundamentally 
identical. This is why I will now attempt to read those victimhoods as 
fundamentally particular through an exploration of the way in which the 
victimhoods conveyed as fundamentally identical relate to the overall moral of 
the story, other than through the allegorical identity forced upon the victims. To 
this end, I will inquire into the specific narrative underpinnings of the overall 
moral of the story and attempt to break it open.  
If there seems to be an interdependency between the construction of the 
victimhoods as fundamentally identical, on the one hand, and the construction of 
the overall moral of the story, on the other, both constructions are reliant upon 
following through the focalization position that is offered through “Orwell.” 
This focalization position not merely presents us with a neutral moral but, due to 
Orwell’s particular genre choice for the autobiographical essay, affords the 
focalizing party an implicit truth claim in the shape of a sort of first hand, 
eyewitness testimony. This particular quality invites an identification with 
“Orwell” as Orwell, making the story seem a genuine reconstruction of the facts 
experienced by Orwell and the moral delivered the result of its digestion by a 
moral authority, all the more reliable for not sparing himself in the process.  
If the genre choice of “Shooting an Elephant” as an autobiographical 
essay plays an important role in “Orwell’s” ability to reflect on his victimhood, a 
strong indication the story is perhaps not as autobiographical as Orwell wants us 
to believe, might be the odd circumstance that the man, the mahout – the only 
person that can manage the elephant – has apparently set out in pursuit and is 
now twelve hours away. In my view, the conveyance of what seems to me an 
excessively long time lapse as a kind of insignificant, almost casual remark, is 
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just the kind of narrative strategy a good storyteller would use. It gets the 
mahout out of the way indefinitely and sets the stage for arranging the 
confrontation between “Orwell” and the elephant. The more fundamental point, 
however, is that this genre choice for the autobiographical essay facilitates the 
aforementioned rationalization of “Orwell’s” irrational mindset: as if “Orwell” 
reflects on Orwell, seemingly constructing thereby “Orwell’s” subjectivity as an 
overwhelming rational subjectivity; that is, a human subjectivity because it is 
marked by a superior capacity for rationality in the Kantian vein.  
Yet, looking closer at the kind of rationality “Orwell” displays and at the 
way in which it is opposed to that of the man trampled by the elephant, exposes 
“Orwell’s” rationality not to be so Kantian at all. Rather, it should be qualified 
as a sensitivity, sharply contrasting with the “naturalized” insensitiveness of the 
dead man. At the same time, this sensitivity can no longer be considered 
sophisticated, but must now be registered as a very limited sensitivity, as it only 
concerns “Orwell’s” measure of his own victimhood. The strategic speciesism 
that registers the victimhoods of “Orwell” and the man trampled by the elephant 
by way of a categorization of difference here turns against itself, because the 
insensitiveness afforded the man trampled by the elephant makes it seem as if he 
does not have the capacity to suffer. In other words, the capacity for rationality 
has been substituted with a capacity to suffer, whilst nothing has changed in 
terms of their victimhoods being conveyed as fundamentally identical. It begs 
the question how “Orwell” measures his own victimhood, if his “rational” 
register is not suitable to the task?  
In the moral-conferring passage from the introductory second paragraph, 
“Orwell’s” feelings oscillate between the capacity to suffer from rage and hatred 
and the capacity to enjoy the prospect of driving a bayonet into a Buddhist 
priest’s guts; the capacity, that is, to enjoy the suffering of others. In short, 
“Orwell’s” identification with his own victimhood is marked by a fusion of the 
elements of joy and pain, which seems to disable his capacity to engage in the 
measurement of his victimhood as different from the other victims at the scene. 
This fusing of joy and pain not just hints at “Orwell’s” inability to move beyond 
his own victimhood, it also suggests that joy and pain are especially unfit as 
categories for the measurement of victimhood; not just because their 
susceptibility to fusion defies the illusion of measurement and the feasibility of 
their status as separate capacities, but also because, adopted as categories for 
measurement, they appear to almost inevitably narrate “the rational human 
being” in a strategically speciesist manner, in the final instance, as the only 
relevant parameter. As long as these elements are understood as concepts or as 
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categories, the factor ‘joy’ ranks higher, more human, than pain, as long as pain 
remains understood as a minimum ground. 
There is a striking analogy here with the allegorical reading in the extra-
juridical context of “Shooting an Elephant,” on the one hand, and the allegorical 
construct of an expansive model on the other. In both cases, the rational human 
being is hierarchically installed through a reductive reading of pain as a mere 
capacity to suffer as the animal (like) other is not allowed its own discursive 
space. This parallel is significant because it points to the expansive model’s 
reliance on an exclusive capacity to suffer as taken up with a strict 
understanding of the legal order as a moral order. The point here is that if I have 
now further refined the possibilities for distinguishing between the victimhood 
of the man trampled by the elephant and “Orwell,” by exposing his rationality as 
a poor sensitivity, these differences still remain caught up within a strategic 
speciesism and with the capacity to suffer as a distinguishing marker and, hence, 
with the fundamental identical victimhood sustained by, or sustaining, the 
overall moral of the story. Let us see, then, if besides “Orwell” and the man 
trampled by the elephant, bringing in the elephant as a third victim can help to 
explore the way in which alternative identifications with all three victimhoods as 
fundamentally particular might come about. To this end, and in order to break 
down the strategic speciesism that has appeared to inform the narrative 
construction of victimhoods as fundamentally identical for the victims discussed 
so far, I will now scrutinize, first, the comparison of the elephant with a piece of 




5. Re-sensing Victimhood: Particular Zones of Identification 
 
As we have seen, racism in “Shooting an Elephant” relies heavily on strategic 
speciesist Human-Animal linkages and comparisons. It manifests itself most 
conspicuously in the last paragraph, after “Orwell” has shot the elephant. This 
last paragraph presents all three of the “victimhoods” I am currently concerned 
with: 
 
Afterwards, of course, there were endless discussions about the shooting 
of the elephant. The owner was furious, but he was only an Indian and 
could do nothing. Besides, legally I had done the right thing, for a mad 
elephant has to be killed, like a mad dog, if its owner fails to control it. 
Among the Europeans opinion was divided. The older men said I was 
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right, the younger men said it was a damn shame to shoot an elephant for 
killing a coolie, because an elephant was worth more than any damn 
Coringhee coolie. And afterwards I was very glad that the coolie had been 
killed; it put me legally in the right and it gave me a sufficient pretext for 
shooting the elephant. I often wondered whether any of the others grasped 
that I had done it solely to avoid looking a fool. (10) 
 
The perspective in this last paragraph has suddenly shifted from the subjective 
and rather lyrical “I” in the face-to-face encounter with the elephant, towards a 
more impersonal third person “matter of fact” voice. Whereas the entire text up 
to this point has been shot through with racist overtones, repeatedly linking and 
comparing the man trampled by the elephant to an animal, here this consistent 
procedure spills over into a straightforward positing of the victim as lower than 
an animal. At this stage, however, the elephant is no longer depicted as an 
animal, but as a piece of machinery, considered more valuable than the man who 
was killed. On the one hand, the comparison of the elephant with a machine, 
crafted from a third person perspective at the end of the story, invites the kind of 
moral claim almost literally spelled out throughout the text; namely, that the true 
condition of imperialism consists of its subjects being bound to their inescapable 
fate, which is determined by their fixed place within the system. On the other 
hand, this type of moral claim also works to let “Orwell” off the hook, as the 
condition of imperialism seems to leave him just as helplessly subjected and 
equally clamped down by its “unbreakable tyranny” as the local victims or, for 
that matter, the elephant. Again, then, the differences between the three 
victimhoods under discussion are subdued as the victims passively undergo their 
inescapable fate(s). It suggests that if I would choose to take up the text’s 
invitation and read the above fragment as an allegory of imperialism, bringing in 
the elephant as a victim and the way it is staged as a piece of machinery does not 
further my project.  
However, as I concluded before, there are indications that the strong 
impact of the story does not reside with the usual subjects; that is to say, does 
not reside with reading the story as an allegory of imperialism. Instead, it seems 
to me that the impact of the story has much more to do with the shooting of the 
elephant and the way in which the pain involved – no longer understood as an 
exclusive capacity – is delivered through the face-to-face encounter with the “I”, 
the “Orwell” of the story. In this respect, the vocabulary adopted from within the 
third person perspective in the last paragraph can be considered wholly different 
from the vocabulary adopted from within the “I” perspective in the face-to-face 
encounter with the elephant we are confronted with earlier on in the text. 
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Whereas the first can be labelled strategically speciesist because it is caught up 
with activating the parameters of the human and the animal and, thus, ultimately 
with the allegorical reading or summary, as it were, of the story “Shooting an 
Elephant,” the latter generates a sensation of ‘pain’ that paints a completely 
different, and arguably much more disconcerting picture, of the victimhoods 
involved:  
 
But I did not want to shoot the elephant. I watched him beating his bunch 
of grass against his knees, with that preoccupied grandmotherly air that 
elephants have. It seemed to me that it would be murder to shoot him. At 
that age I was not squeamish about killing animals, but I had never shot an 
elephant and never wanted to. (Somehow it always seems worse to kill a 
large animal.) Besides, there was the beast’s owner to be considered. 
Alive, the elephant was worth at least a hundred pounds; dead, he would 
only be worth the value of his tusks, five pounds, possibly. But I had got 
to act quickly. I turned to some experienced-looking Burmans who had 
been there when we arrived, and asked them how the elephant had been 
behaving. They all said the same thing: he took no notice of you if you 
left him alone, but he might charge if you went too close to him. (7, italics 
mine, BV) 
 
The elephant is compared with a grandmother and since killing animals strongly 
contrasts with murdering a grandmother it seems the victimhoods constructed 
are altogether different. The fragment, however, because it presents yet another 
example of “Orwell’s” schizophrenic mindset as a victim of imperialism, still 
carries the allegorical tinge of the moral code of the story, which registers the 
victimhood of both “Orwell” and the elephant as fundamentally identical. 
Strictly speaking, then, neither the momentary comparison of the elephant to a 
piece of machinery, nor the comparison to a human grandmother open up the 
possibility of distinguishing between the different victimhoods at stake because 
the overall moral of the story is in no way undermined. Yet, in very much the 
same vein we sensed the victimhood of “Orwell” not to be identical with that of 
the man trampled by the elephant, we clearly sense the elephant’s victimhood 
not to be identical with “Orwell’s” either. To tackle this discrepancy, but this 
time outside of the context of a “strategic speciesism”, I will now use my 
heuristic figure of ‘pain’ to look at the construction of both victimhoods as 
fundamentally particular. 
The fragment not so much evokes the pain the elephant is about to 
undergo, but, on the one hand, the painful realization of the inevitability of the 
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elephant’s fate and, on the other hand, the painful realization that there is still a 
choice for “Orwell.” This pain does not primarily operate on the basis of an 
identification with either “Orwell” or “the elephant” as victims, but concerns a 
situation, which breaks the strategic speciesist terms in which the comparison of 
the elephant with a human grandmother is delivered into two ways of 
identification. First, the fact that the elephant is compared with a grandmother 
triggers an awareness that there is something wrong with what is about to 
happen to the, at this stage, humanlike elephant. This situation presents a clear 
moral choice, the problem of shooting a grandmother. Second, there is the 
identification with the suspension itself, with the uncomfortable sensation that 
the situation still presents a choice, that although all is lost somehow not all is 
lost as well as time is running out. In short, the pain evoked here is not the 
foreseeable physical pain that the elephant is about to undergo, it is not a matter 
of measuring its capacity to suffer, but is brought on by a sensation of 
indeterminacy, by a lack of a clear-cut moral standard to which to conform.  
Alternatively, the elephant’s pain upon physical impact is conveyed in the 
following subsequent paragraphs: 
 
 
When I pulled the trigger I did not hear the bang or feel the kick – one 
never does when a shot goes home – but I heard the devilish roar of glee 
that went up from the crowd. In that instant, in too short a time, one would 
have thought, even for the bullet to get there, a mysterious, terrible change 
had come over the elephant. He neither stirred nor fell, but every line of 
his body had altered. He looked suddenly stricken, shrunken, immensely 
old, as though the frightful impact of the bullet had paralysed him without 
knocking him down. At last, after what seemed a long time – it might 
have been five seconds, I dare say – he sagged flabbily to his knees. His 
mouth slobbered. An enormous senility seemed to have settled upon him. 
One could have imagined him thousands of years old. I fired again into 
the same spot. At the second shot he did not collapse but climbed with 
desperate slowness to his feet and stood weakly upright, with legs sagging 
and head drooping. I fired a third time. That was the shot that did it for 
him. You could see the agony of it jolt his whole body and knock the last 
remnant of strength from his legs. But in falling he seemed for a moment 
to rise, for as his hind legs collapsed beneath him he seemed to tower 
upward like a huge rock toppling, his trunk reaching skyward like a tree. 
He trumpeted, for the first and only time. And then down he came, his 
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belly towards me, with a crash that seemed to shake the ground even 
where I lay. (8-9) 
 
I got up. The Burmans were already racing past me across the mud. It was 
obvious that the elephant would never rise again, but he was not dead. He 
was breathing very rhythmically with long rattling gasps, his great mound 
of a side painfully rising and falling. His mouth was wide open – I could 
see far down into caverns of pale pink throat. I waited a long time for him 
to die, but his breathing did not weaken. Finally I fired my two remaining 
shots into the spot where I thought his heart must be. The thick blood 
welled out of him like red velvet, but still he did not die. His body did not 
even jerk when the shots hit him, the tortured breathing continued without 
a pause. He was dying, very slowly and in great agony, but in some world 
remote from me where not even a bullet could damage him further. I felt 
that I had got to put an end to that dreadful noise. It seemed dreadful to 
see the great beast lying there, powerless to move and yet powerless to 
die, and not even to be able to finish him. I sent back for my small rifle 
and poured shot after shot into his heart and down his throat. They seemed 
to make no impression. The tortured gasps continued as steadily as the 
ticking of a clock. (9-10) 
 
The comparison of the elephant with a human grandmother is left lingering here 
when, after it has been shot, its “mouth slobbers” and an enormous “senility” 
sets in. Similarly, the elephant’s dramatic rising on its hind legs, its trumpeting, 
are delivered in typical strategic speciesist vein, reliant, that is, on a most 
conventional form of anthropomorphism, opposing two legs to four legs. In 
short, the identification with the pain the elephant undergoes at the moment of 
real physical impact continues to be conveyed in strategic speciesist terms, as 
before. The difference, however, is that this strategic speciesism now turns to 
excess as the description of the elephant’s blood as red velvet lends the victim 
an almost aristocratic nobility, whilst its concurrent evocation in explicit 
poetical terms registers it as an archetypical elephant that “might as well be a 
thousand years old,” dwelling as a sacred object in a pristine landscape.  
By implication, the coverage of the elephant’s pain upon physical impact 
does not concern an identification with the elephant standing there beating its 
bunch of grass against its knees. Rather, it seems its pain can only be delivered 
in the form of an impotent approximation. This impotent approximation 
constitutes a narrative circling around the elephant’s pain through the evocation 
of an allegorical (strategic speciesist) and symbolical (archetypical) elephant we 
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can “identify” with and which keeps the elephant itself, the literary figure of 
what is supposed to represent an elephant, at a relatively safe distance. At the 
same time, however, and perhaps this is the crux, these approximative modes of 
identification enter into a relation with something else, and somehow the story 
breaks the distance. This makes me wonder if the distance is only built to be 
broken, a matter I will return to shortly.  
The point here is that the explicit linking and comparing of the elephant to 
a human grandmother, whilst adding a flavour of sacredness to this human 
grandmother through a poetic-archetypical touch, produces an excess that works 
to register its victimhood in the most severe strategic speciesist terms. This 
modus operandi suggests that reading through the lens of “Orwell,” as we are 
invited to do, leaves no space for other modes of imaginative identification with 
the elephant and, consequently, that its victimhood must always remain 
fundamentally identical to “Orwell’s.” In a strange twist, then, “Orwell’s” 
imaginative identification politics of impotent approximation justifies itself 
because it is the only narrative strategy available. However, if approximation 
generally is understood as a linear thing and, hence, assumes an essence to be 
encountered “out there” or “in there,” which is only blocked by obstacles or 
hidden beneath a veil, an impenetrable substance, I choose not to work my way 
through this impenetrable substance. Rather, I wish to look at this impotent 
approximation as primarily the result of a strategic speciesist mindset, which 
refuses or fails to acknowledge that there is no essence, let alone an approxi-
mation in the linear sense. This begs the question, first, what is it that brings 
about this sensation of pain, this shocking impact of “Shooting an Elephant,” if 
not “Orwell’s” approximative identifications? And, secondly, what kind of 
identification strategies might do justice to its victimhoods as particular? To 
address these questions, let us first look more closely at “Orwell’s” 
identification strategy when comparing the elephant to a grandmother.  
In a sense, of course, one might perfectly well be moved by the scene as it 
stands, because the prospect of shooting a grandmotherly elephant offers at least 
some sort of imaginative identification on an emotive plane. Looking at the way 
in which the comparison works, however, I would argue it to be reliant on a 
specific register of the emotive: the sentimental. This qualification is not an 
unscientific matter of personal taste and I do not wish to imply that there is 
something fundamentally wrong with sentimentalism. My point is not that the 
comparison of the elephant with a grandmother is sentimental, but that it is 
presented as sentimental, as a far-fetched whimsical fancy. The fleeting 
character of this fancy both plays a key role in its presentation as fancy and in 
relegating it to the sentimental domain. This relegation is effectuated by a 
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remarkable shift in vocabulary in the sentences following up “Orwell’s” 
comparison of the elephant with a grandmother: Once “Orwell” has commented 
it would seem murder to shoot it, the vocabulary shifts to his not being 
squeamish about killing animals, to then shift again as it registers the elephant as 
in the first place a machine, a commodity. This dazzling shift in vocabulary is 
not gratuitous. It conveys the extremely quick rationalization of “Orwell’s” final 
judgement, his unspoken “decision” to shoot the elephant, which takes place 
immediately after the shift in vocabulary has been accomplished, at the very 
beginning of the next paragraph. At the same time, this shift works to lend his 
decision a fatalistic aura of unavoidability, making it seem as if the situation 
presents no (moral) choice for “Orwell” at all. 
In this respect, it is noteworthy that the rejection of “Orwell’s” initial 
comparison of the elephant to a grandmother as a sentimental issue not just 
removes any possible moral objection to the shooting of the elephant, but that it 
also kills off the possibility of identification with the elephant’s particular 
victimhood and, in the process, with “Orwell’s” particular victimhood as well. 
In this sense, the shooting of the elephant is indeed inevitable in more than one 
way. It not just results from the pressure of a situation “Orwell” as a victim of 
imperialism cannot withstand, but is also instigated by a “narrative demand” to 
conform to the overall moral of the story, which needs the illusion of 
fundamentally identical victimhoods to sustain itself. This narrative demand is 
significant, because removing the moral objection that would hinder the 
shooting of the elephant does not need to imply there is an obligation to shoot it, 
which is what “Orwell’s” (non) acting would seem to suggest. Rather, it presents 
a choice lying outside of the sphere of morality, a sphere beyond or, better, 
before what might at any given time be deemed right or wrong. On a meta level, 
then, this narrative demand makes the moral of the story work as the law of the 
story, in that it has to treat all victims, whatever their differences, as essentially 
equal, as fundamentally identical victims. The paradox resulting from this meta 
perspective is clear: not shooting the elephant would appear to be “unfair” to the 
other victims.  
Besides removing any possible moral objections to the shooting of the 
elephant, “Orwell’s” rejection of his own fancy as sentimental is presented as a 
reality check. This reality check might be considered the way in which it is 
presented, as a perfectly sane and rational move. If we question what kind of 
reality is checked, however, we cannot but conclude that it is informed by 
“Orwell’s” understanding of the elephant as, after all, not a human but an 
animal. Consequently, it can be used and disposed of as a commodity. In other 
words, the rational argument at stake in the reality check, which informs 
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“Orwell’s” judgement, harks back to the parameters of the human and the 
animal as the only possible viable points of reference. Yet, this reference has 
nothing to do with reality as it might generally be understood, as in some way 
tangible, and on the extreme side of fancy, because it here reveals itself as an 
abstract matter tout court. More importantly, going along with the rejection of 
sentimentality demonstrated by this reality check does not ease the pain.  
What, then, I ask, again, may be the imaginative identifications that make 
the prospect of shooting the elephant such a horrific enterprise, and what kind of 
narrative weaving constructs this horror in “Shooting an Elephant?” Given my 
repeated failings to answer these questions it has now become clear that they 
cannot be answered by zooming in on “Shooting an Elephant” as an allegory of 
imperialism. This is why I will now attempt to read against this allegory by 
taking a closer look at why we are inclined to read the story as an allegory in the 
first place. To this end, I will now zoom out on the text and explore whether its 
presentation might suggest an opening up to alternative reading strategies.  
The presentation of “Shooting an Elephant” offers a relevant analogy with 
Baudelaire’s “Correspondences,” the poem I analysed in the first chapter, 
because both texts invite an allegorical reading. If “Correspondences,” despite 
its stature as a poem, invited an allegorical reading through its presentation as 
prose and its thick use of trope, “Shooting an Elephant” invites an allegorical 
reading because its presentation as prose logically follows from Orwell’s genre 
choice. Once engaged in the act of reading, however, both texts seem to be 
marked by recurrent poetic overtones. In “Shooting an Elephant,” these poetic 
overtones are its effective use of repetition, feeding into the suspension, the 
shifting perspectives with each paragraph and the emergence of an “I” more 
often than not on the verge of turning lyrical. I qualify this “I” as lyrical because 
the reader is put in the position of someone who is listening in, as scraps of what 
seems interior monologue are interchanged with emergent situations and stages. 
Admittedly, the last paragraph is a notable exception to this pattern as the figure 
of the “I” here comes to resemble the figure of a somewhat distanced reporter. 
Since the last paragraph clearly presents us with a reflection on the events 
that have unfolded, rather than letting us experience these events for ourselves, I 
propose to interpret this allegorical “I” as deflecting our attention from the 
lyrical “I” that operates the story and therefore as irrelevant for my reading of 
the story’s victimhoods as particular. Hence, if my analyses of 
“Correspondences” demonstrated that reading the interaction of its tropes 
differently unsettled the allegorical reading it invited and opened up its more 
poetical register, I will now attempt to do justice to the poetic factors in 
“Shooting an Elephant” and explore whether doing so can help to unsettle its 
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allegorical reading in an effort to address the victimhoods at stake as fundamen-
tally particular.  
The text offers a celebration of tropes. The man trampled by the elephant 
presents a strange case. Before being symbolized through a synecdochical 
operation that makes him stand for all the “prostrate” peoples, he must have 
been one of the locals and, in that sense, a particular individual. Yet, we can 
only infer this retrospectively, as he never enters the narrative in an individual 
capacity, but is linked and compared to animals in metonymic and metaphorical 
vein from the very start and ultimately posited as a commodity. The elephant 
undergoes the same fate, momentarily personified through the comparison with 
a grandmother, it at once gets caught up in “Orwell’s” reality check, which links 
it to its traditional other, the nonhuman animal, only to be posited as a 
commodity as well. In other words, both the man trampled by the elephant and 
the elephant loose their “metaphorical edge” as the same narrative pattern is 
followed through to its logical conclusion: 1. Linking 2. Comparing. 3. Positing, 
whereby the linking and comparing mingle and, more often than not, constitute 
one another. The main tropes involved in this pattern are metonymy, metaphor, 
synecdoche and anthropomorphism, both in its conventional and strict sense. 
The ways in which these tropes interact when it comes to the construction of 
“Orwell” as a victim follows a less straightforward pattern. 
The one trope that follows the same pattern in all three cases, however, is 
the synecdoche, because it works to present the man trampled by the elephant, 
“Orwell” and the elephant as interchangeable victims, as “parts” that each 
represent the fundamental and “whole” victimhood brought on by the weight of 
imperialism. The man trampled by the elephant as “prostrate,” the elephant as an 
archetypical elephant – as yet another copy of the original-mythical elephant – 
and “Orwell” as “any other Anglo-English official” can stand as concrete 
examples of those synecdochical dynamics. In this respect, the synecdoche 
could be said to fulfil its ideological charge here in a meta kind of way. 
However, the synecdoche can also be read as doing something else, precisely 
because, as I concluded in the previous chapter, it can never simply be a neutral 
figure of speech. In this case, I would like to argue that synecdochical operations 
run and spread through the text in ways that open up the possibility of 
transforming the interchangeability forced upon the victims into a full blown 
interaction of the spaces of their identity. Let me zoom in on this potentially 
subversive synecdochical dynamic by exploring the narrative weaving that 




“Orwell” gets caught up in the game of linking, comparing and positing 
from the very start. In the first paragraph we come across the following sentence 
(the italics are mine): “As a police officer I was an obvious target and was 
baited whenever it seemed safe to do so.” “Orwell” is presented as a target, an 
animal of prey, a therion, a wild beast.112 In the second paragraph, the locals are 
described as: “evil spirited little beasts who tried to make my job impossible.” 
Still later, the elephant is referred to as a great beast: “The friction of the great 
beast’s foot had stripped the skin from his back as neatly as one skins a rabbit.” 
In short, the text introduces our three characters as victims by comparing them 
with animals that are all accorded the same name. This homology points to a 
categorization of difference at work in the text, because the accompanying 
adjectival qualifications of the three characters under discussion, “little,” “great” 
and “baited,” convey their victimhood as different only in degree and, thus, as 
essentially identical from the very moment they are introduced.  
Once the characters have been introduced and the confrontation of 
“Orwell” with the elephant is set, however, other comparisons join in that work 
to disturb this picture. In fact, the second time “Orwell” is compared with an 
animal it is not with a beast but with a toad: “If the elephant charged and I 
missed him, I should have about as much chance as a toad under a steam-
roller.” This comparison is significant; first, because it is at odds with the earlier 
qualification of “Orwell” as a beast, which erodes the fixity of its status as a 
beast by offering a different identification. Second, because the comparison of 
“Orwell” with a toad not only upsets the introductory qualification of “Orwell,” 
the man trampled by the elephant and the elephant as fundamentally identical 
“beasts,” but simultaneously constitutes an imaginative identification with the 
wounded elephant, which, despite being shot repeatedly seems to remain 
unaffected and motionless as it keeps breathing as steadily as the ticking of a 
clock. For purposes that will become clear I repeat the passage in quoting it 
again: 
 
His body did not even jerk when the shots hit him, the tortured breathing 
continued without a pause. He was dying, very slowly and in great agony, 
but in some world remote from me where not even a bullet could damage 
him further. I felt that I had got to put an end to that dreadful noise. It 
seemed dreadful to see the great beast lying there, powerless to move and 
                                                 
112 Middle English: from old Norse beit, pasture, food, beita to hunt or chase. Interestingly, 
Homer did not have a word for the animal or for the living being (zoon). He only used the word 
“therion,” which specifically meant the animal to be hunted. See: A. Chorus, Het denkende dier: 
Enkele facetten van de betrekking tussen mens en dier in psychologische belichting (Leiden: 
Sijthoff, 1969), 39. 
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yet powerless to die, and not even to be able to finish him. I sent back for 
my small rifle and poured shot after shot into his heart and down his 
throat. They seemed to make no impression. The tortured gasps continued 
as steadily as the ticking of a clock. (9-10) 
 
The pain delivered by this picture of steady breathing and motionlessness 
effectively slows down our experience of narrative time and, in that sense, 
mirrors the comparison of “Orwell” with a toad, which, in its desperate 
slowness, would seem motionless and unaffected as long as the steamroller has 
not ground it into the earth. Moreover, this hint at the fate of being ground into 
the earth also connects “Orwell” with the man trampled by the elephant. In other 
words, “Orwell,” the elephant and the man trampled by the elephant here come 
to share what I want to call a zone of identification. Such a zone is no longer 
reducible to sharing a capacity; it is not brought about by an interchangeability, 
but by an interaction that connects their positions in terms of “situation.” Thus, 
the comparison of “Orwell” with a toad brings about connections that allude to 
the figure of identity as other than a fixed and marked off condition. These 
connections are sensed rather than deduced, whilst the emergent imaginative 
identifications are not produced by comparing one victim with the other but 
through an imaginary and intermediary third, in this case the figure of the toad. 
In fact, the toad itself seems to be the figure par excellence to convey this 
dynamic as the toad happens to be one of those animals that defies the strict 
rules of taxonomy, thereby resisting identification by designation into a category 
since there is no clear-cut taxonomic distinction, for example, between frogs and 
toads. 
The skin of the toad seems to play a key role in resisting clear 
identification because it is its slimy, metamorphic skin that allows for its shape-
shifting and its blending in with its environment. In this respect, the figure of the 
toad in “Shooting an Elephant” works to contrast the way in which the notion of 
the skin is conveyed through the victims under discussion, namely as an outer 
shape that might serve as a reliable figure of identity to our senses. The man 
trampled by the elephant has his skin scraped off, the elephant is scraped to the 
bone after “Orwell” has left the scene, and “Orwell’s” comparison of himself to 
a toad testifies to his own preoccupation, albeit only figuratively, with saving his 
own skin. Indeed, if the skin represents a conventional figure of identity that 
both the man trampled by the elephant and the elephant have involuntarily shed 
off, the comparison of “Orwell” with the toad affords him not the same, but a 
similar quality of nakedness, of vulnerability, bringing about another 
engagement, another interaction with the other victims.  
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This interaction, however, does not yet upset the notion of skin as a 
conventional figure of identity, marking off the inside from the outside, but still 
operates on this binary as complicit with a linear understanding of identity that 
can be approximated. It does, however, pave the way for yet another possible 
imaginative identification which works to question the notion of the skin as a 
figure of identity, thereby upsetting the conventional figure of identity itself. 
The trope involved in bringing this imaginative identification about is the 
synecdoche, which here not so much substitutes the “parts” with the “whole,” 
but allows for letting the identities at stake slip into one another. First, the 
conventional notion of the skin as a “part” holding together the supposed 
singular “wholeness” of each victim’s body is laid bare through the figure of the 
toad. Second, “Orwell’s” marked-off identity is absorbed by the crowd: as 
“Orwell” marches forward, the crowd marching at his heels is presented as a 
singular entity with a single throat producing one sigh: “The crowd grew very 
still, and a deep, low, happy sigh, as of people who see the theatre curtain go up 
at last, breathed from innumerable throats.”  
Shortly hereafter, it is into the pink caverns of the elephant’s throat that 
“Orwell” pours shot after shot. Note that “Orwell” does not “fire” shot after shot 
but “pours” it in, as if the elephant were thirsty and is drinking. Since “cavern” 
denotes a vast dark space, and because the elephant’s thirst cannot be quenched, 
it seems as if the shots fired are swallowed in the void. In other words, the 
bullets never reach their target because they cannot penetrate the impenetrable 
substance of the pink caverns. It suggests “Orwell’s” shooting no longer follows 
a linear logic, but takes on the quality of a last desperate effort at approximate 
identification doomed to fail. What is more, the pink colour of the caverns may 
be read as neither blood (inside), nor skin (outside) but as an inseparable mixture 
of both, which works to upset the binary informing the logic of linear 
approximation that the skin, as a conventional figure of identity, would assume. 
In short, the picture of helplessness so vividly painted here does not necessarily 
concern the poor elephant or “Orwell’s” inability to finish it off. It can also be 
read as conveying “Orwell’s” helplessness at establishing an imaginative 
identification with the elephant.  
At the same time, as the effect of the bullets is described, a disorienting 
implosion of terms is bestowed upon the elephant: “But in falling he seemed for 
a moment to rise, for as his hind legs collapsed beneath him he seemed to tower 
upward like a huge rock toppling, his trunk reaching skyward like a tree.” In this 
scene, the elephant, and not just “Orwell,” is no longer described as a fixed and 
marked-off entity held together by its skin. Rather, the elephant emerges as a 
metamorphic entity, not in the process of dying, but in the process of a fantastic 
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metamorphosis that has now come to implicate the organic as much as the 
inorganic.  
In fact, the elephant is registered in terms of what Marina Warner has 
suggested to be typical metamorphic imagery, involving processes of hatching, 
splitting and doubling.113 This fantastic metamorphosis differs from the classical 
Judeo-Christian conception of metamorphosis in a significant way, since the 
latter conveys a renewal in a linear development of an entity towards its final 
identity, whereas the first is understood as a continuous process of shape-
shifting life that takes place within a profound ecological interdependency. 
Unlike Warner, however, I choose to understand the terms hatching, splitting 
and doubling not literally, say, as hatching from eggs, but rather as the sudden 
emergence of a new being: The elephant suddenly emerges, when it appears 
round the corner and tramples the man, when it appears in the field, when it 
beats its bunch of grass against its knees, as it suddenly rises after being shot. In 
short, in my reading, the metamorphic imagery we are confronted with after the 
elephant has been shot breaks the linear pattern implied by reading “Shooting an 
Elephant” as an allegory; that is, as a story with a typical beginning middle and 
end. In this view, the end of the elephant is not the end of the story but just 
another emergence of the elephant that shapes the connections to the other 
victims at the scene.  
Yet, my attempt to address the victimhoods involved as particular by 
reading them as being played out against a constantly shape-shifting, rather than 
a linear process of metamorphosis, does not need to imply that the shocking 
effect of “Shooting an Elephant” can be attributed to close reading it as an 
allegory of this shape-shifting type of metamorphosis alone. Rather, it is a 
bringing into conflict of both forms of metamorphoses that sustains the shocking 
impact of the story. In short, the shooting of the elephant activates a reading in 
which it is put down by being shot at in the skin and a reading of the desperate 
shootings in its throat, this pink fleshy unidentifiable substance, which suggests 
that it cannot be put down by being shot in the skin. Similarly, the elephant’s 
rising on its hind legs and its trumpeting (the characteristic behaviour of 
elephants when giving birth) activates a reading that conveys some kind of 
resurrection fraught in the most conventional strategic speciesist terms and can 
be read be read as expressive of its horrible fate and of its connection to the 
different and particular fates of the other victims. 
 I conclude that reading “Shooting an Elephant” through the open figure 
of pain has opened up non-conceptual identifications with the different 
                                                 
113 Marina Warner, Fantastic Metamorphoses, Other Worlds: Ways of Telling the Self (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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victimhoods at stake in the text. The comparison of “Orwell” with a toad and the 
implosion of metamorphic imagery at the moment the elephant is being shot 
works to connect “Orwell” to the man trampled by the elephant and to the 
elephant in many different ways. These connections have been set in motion by 
close reading the explicit comparisons sustained by metonymy and metaphor in 
interaction with the workings of trope, especially the trope of synecdoche. This 
process opens up the closed off metaphorical edge within which the three 
victimhoods under discussion were framed by the overall moral of the story, by 
the allegorical reading of “Shooting an Elephant.” These victimhoods, released, 
as it were, from their fundamental identical identity, have come to constitute one 
another, because the interactions of trope instigated a doubling metamorphic 
dynamics that allowed for imaginative identifications pointing to the porosity 
and fluidity of identities. Consequently, the narrative intensity caused by the 
interaction of tropes could no longer be accommodated by the suspense of the 
story alone, but bred an implosion of perspectives and a concurring slipping of 
identities, which caused the interactions of the positions of the victims as 
situational. 
Thus, if the condition of imperialism in “Shooting an Elephant” exposes 
colonial imperialism as a system that effectively negates the pain of others, this 
only happens as long as this other is read in strategic speciesist terms. 
Alternatively, a poetic strategy can create an openness, a possibility for 
identifying with the pain of others, a possibility for a non-conceptual identifi-
cation in the gut. In other words, reading pain as I have done now invites the 
question not which rule I should apply, but asks for an inter-subjective 
engagement. In this respect, “Orwell’s” choice to shoot the elephant does not 
need to be interpreted as a strict moral or legal obligation, but may also be read 
as the possibility for solidarity with an(y) other. In an effort to further explore 
the implications of this conclusion I will now look closer at the ways in which 
“Orwell’s” decision might affect his position as both a legal and a moral subject 
within the allegory “Shooting an Elephant.” This will enable me to reflect on 
how those legal and moral positions relate to the structure of the expansive 
model within the law. 
 
 
6. The Legal and the Moral Subject 
 
When “Orwell” takes up a gun to see what he can do about the situation with the 




I took my rifle, an old .44 Winchester and much too small to kill an 
elephant, but I thought the noise might be useful in terrorem.114 (2-3, 
italics in text)  
 
A further explicit reference to the law is made in the last paragraph where 
“Orwell” declares having acted in accordance with the law:  
 
Besides, legally I had done the right thing, for a mad elephant has to be 
killed, like a mad dog, if its owner fails to control it. (10) 
 
“Orwell”, somewhat uncomfortable with the shooting of the elephant, not only 
blames the condition of imperialism for his actions, but also invokes the law as 
providing him with an adequate moral framework for having done so. In other 
words, “Orwell’s” comment poses the law as congruent with a moral order, 
whereas “Orwell’s” discomfort suggests this moral not to be in line with his 
choice to shoot the elephant. Apart from this troublesome discrepancy, what 
remains implicit in “Orwell’s” comment is that the legal standing of subjects 
also demands a legal form of consideration towards those subjects. In short, if a 
mad elephant has to be killed like a mad dog, “Orwell” would appear to have 
fulfilled his legal obligation and have done the right thing. He only did the right 
thing, though, if he insists on confusing the legal with the moral. This is 
problematic, as his unsuccessful attempt at absolving himself from guilt or, less 
dramatically put, his transfer of responsibility by pointing to the legal side of the 
matter demonstrates.  
Furthermore, the plain fact that the elephant has a legal status does not 
protect it from harm. This has everything to do with the way in which the 
elephant is framed in legal terms, since the elephant is only entitled to protection 
from the law as long as it qualifies as a tame elephant. And even this 
qualification can only protect it from harm to a very limited extent, because it 
merely implies the elephant cannot be killed by anyone but its owner. The more 
fundamental problem, however, is that because it has a specific legal 
subjectivity, its shooting can now be legitimized and be considered a legal 
obligation. In other words, the limits posed on the protection from harm here 
resonate with the limits installed by an expansive model, because a poetic 
cruelty is generated as the animal is synecdochically substituted with one of its 
supposed characteristics or capacities, in this instance, the elephant’s tameness. 
                                                 
114 In Terrorem: Latin, in fright or terror; by way of a threat. A legal warning, usually one given in 
hope of compelling someone to act without resorting to a lawsuit or criminal prosecution. Based 
on Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law, 2001. 
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What my reading of “Orwell’s” comment further suggests is that the limits an 
expansive model poses are not just installed through the synecdochical 
substitution of certain characteristics or capacities, but that those limits are 
installed and sustained by a narrative demand to confuse the moral with the 
legal. This does not in any way guarantee, as the shooting of the elephant 
demonstrates, the protection of such a legal subject from harm.  
Within an expansive model, this problem might, at least in part, be 
attributed to its being centred on the touchstone of the capacity to suffer, which, 
as we have seen, must ultimately result in registering the other in strategic 
speciesist terms. The paradox is clear: The expansive model’s moral is 
constituted by deeming speciesism as the wrong thing to do because it is centred 
on the basic principle of equality. Yet, in order to sustain this moral position it 
must introduce a strategic speciesism that registers some legal subjects as more 
equal than others, while other subjects cannot become legal subjects at all. In 
short, the expansive model poses, by way of yet another rudimentary chiasmus, 
“the moral subject as a legal subject” and “the legal subject as a moral subject” 
and centres this unwarranted presupposition on the basic principle of equality 
that Singer posits as the grounds for extending moral consideration towards 
other beings. This is why I will now explore what role Singer’s basic principle 
of equality plays in the confusion of the legal with the moral order within an 
expansive model. 
 Singer explains the extension of the basic principle of equality not as 
factual equality but as equality of consideration: 
 
The extension of the basic principle of equality from one group to another 
does not imply that we must treat both groups in exactly the same way, or 
grant exactly the same rights to both groups. Whether we should do so 
will depend on the nature of the members of the two groups. The basic 
principle of equality, I shall argue, is equality of consideration; and equal 
consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and 
different rights.115 (217)  
 
This seems a fair and nuanced position. Singer here treats the basic principle of 
equality as a moral idea but conveys an acute awareness that equal moral 
consideration can and must have different legal implications for different beings. 
At the same time, however, his position does not account for the logic of 
equality as a basic principle. This begs the question, first, why is equality a basic 
principle at all; and secondly, if it is not the only basic principle with what other 
                                                 
115 Singer, ibid., Practical Ethics. 
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basic principles does it compete? These questions may seem rather abstract. 
They are, however, highly relevant to my current project since, within a 
Bentham-inspired expansive model, another human aim, namely to prevent or 
reduce suffering, also appears to be accepted as a basic principle. This implies 
that one basic principle could potentially enter into conflict with another basic 
principle. The implication of this simple fact is that, as far as the expansive 
model is concerned, its basic principle of equality should not be read as a rule 
that may be taken for granted as some sort of natural law that cannot be 
tampered with. Rather, the basic principle of equality appears as a rule that 
follows from the position this basic principle entertains within a wider field of 
basic principles.  
If this is indeed the case, it now becomes possible to read the touchstone 
of the capacity to suffer as stemming from a new basic principle adopted by the 
theorists and philosophers at the forefront of the animal rights debate today. In 
short, the touchstone of the capacity to suffer has become the rule by which to 
measure suffering for those who hold as a basic principle that suffering must be 
prevented and reduced. By implication, the expansive model brings together a 
basic principle revolving around a notion of suffering with a basic principle of 
equality.  
The amalgamation of those two basic principles, I propose, must enter 
somewhere into conflict as it culminates in the types of cruelty that the 
expansive model generates. This conflict and the resulting cruelty stem from 
reading the basic principle of equality as a moral principle, whereas it is only 
implied as a legal principle because speciesism is legally deemed untenable. 
Conversely, the legal stance on preventing or reducing the suffering embodied 
in the touchstone of the capacity to suffer is read as a moral principle, whereas 
this moral principle is betrayed by the generation and incorporation of cruelty 
within the legal sphere. Effectively, what this confusion of the moral with the 
legal amounts to is that the expansive model extends the basic principle of 
equality to other “species” on the grounds of a continuum between the species. 
The (strategic) speciesism operated by this confusion consists of formulating the 
capacity to suffer as a bottom line, as an exclusive and minimum capacity that 
other species may share with humans. It is only then that those other species 
may be subjected to the basic principle of equality, which, as it comes second, 
reveals itself not to be such a basic principle at all.  
Thus, the common sense idea that the touchstone of the capacity to suffer 
leads to the rule that those nonhuman entities sharing this capacity might be 
granted consideration and, within an expansive model, at least some of those 
rights, amounts to a gross simplification of what is at stake within the expansive 
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model we are faced with today. Rather, it has appeared that a conflict of the so-
called basic principles of equality and the basic principle of preventing or 
reducing suffering installs a confusion of the moral with the legal subject, which 
informs the workings of the expansive model and the cruelty it generates. In this 
respect, it seems fair to conclude that the expansive model does not amount to 
the extension of a clear-cut moral principle as such, but that the morality it 
might at any given time convey must always result from a political Austausch. 
In other words, the question the expansive model is meant to answer, as to who 
or what is a subject of rights, cannot be answered within its framework because 
the expansive model appears to be the result of a political struggle in the guise 
of a polemic on possible touchstones. For this reason, I will now return to one of 
the most controversial but often bypassed issues woven into this polemic, the 
issue of dignity. In the previous chapter, I explored the theoretical and 
philosophical underpinnings of dignity and established that the problem of 
animals bearing no dignity severely complicated thinking through their position 
as subjects of rights. Here, I will draw on a recent political polemic in the Dutch 
context to contemplate how this weaving takes effect in practical terms in our 




7. Dignity in Practice 
 
In 2010, a Dutch political party proposed the introduction of five hundred 
animal cops to the national police force. Their specific task would be to combat 
animal abuse within the domestic sphere. This proposal met with severe 
criticism from other parties. The argument of those opposing parties ran as 
follows: it is sentimental and hypocritical to advocate the introduction of animal 
cops to protect one group of animals from harm – mainly pets – whilst not doing 
anything about the harm inflicted upon the masses of animals in the factory- 
farming industry. This seems to be a solid argument, especially given the fact 
that the inspection service that is meant to control the Dutch factory-farming 
industry is typically ill-equipped and undermanned. The point here, however, is 
that this criticism portrays the division into categories of animals to be protected 
and those to be left to themselves, or rather, to the factory-farming industry, as 
arbitrary in a conventional sense, using the adjectives “sentimental” and 
“hypocritical” to deem such arbitrariness untenable. In other words, the 
accusation of subjective arbitrariness is reliant on the fiction of an “objective,” 
“non-arbitrary” and consequently “just” but necessarily fictional contraposition. 
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This suggests that the parties opposing animal cops, contrary to what their 
accusative tone suggests, cannot provide objective alternatives either, but can, at 
most, resort to what they consider more practical alternatives, a better and more 
effective distribution of resources.  
Be that as it may, the political party advocating animal cops, perhaps 
aware of the futility of arguing about arbitrariness in conventional terms, has 
apparently chosen not to play that game at all. Instead, it has countered 
accusations of hypocrisy and sentimentality, not by laying a nonsensical claim to 
non-arbitrariness, but by introducing a rather more (or less) mysterious 
argument: it is not just for the sake of the animals that we want these animal 
cops, but we also desire animal cops because they can help us do something 
about a category of seriously mentally disturbed culprits that tend to engage in 
the cruel treatment of animals at a very young age.116 This argument brings 
about a shift in focus from “the protection of the animal” to “the protection of 
the human.” In other words, instead of answering to, this argument defers 
accusations of hypocrisy and sentimentality by extending the motivation for the 
installation of animal cops from an animal to a human interest. It is clear, 
however, that this shift is not primarily concerned with protecting the particular 
type of human culprit evoked, but that it concerns something else, the protection 
of something like “society at large”; not just of humanity as such, but of the 
humanity of humanity, which must be safeguarded from a specific type of 
human culprit by its timely (i.e. at a young age) but after the fact, arrest and 
imprisonment.  
This position might have something to do with a typical perspective on 
the humanity of humanity the political party under discussion might entertain. In 
fact, from its consistent commitment to the protection of domestic animals, and 
not to the animals in the factory-farming industry, we may gather that the harm 
done to domestic animals is considered as posing a threat to its conception of the 
humanity of humanity, whereas the kind of harm potentially caused to another 
and much larger category of factory-farmed animals is not. By implication, the 
resulting paradox is not the irreconcilability of the party’s desire to protect one 
category of animals, mainly pets, and not the category of animals in the factory-
farming industry. The real paradox here would be that if the humanity of 
humanity is considered at risk, it is allowed to use this same animal, the one that 
needed to be protected by animal cops, as bait in order to hunt down and catch 
the human culprit. In short, what this attitude represents is not so much a double 
                                                 
116 For a well-documented exploration of this pathology and its implications see: The 
International Handbook of Animal Abuse and Cruelty, Theory, Research, and Application, ed. 
Frank R. Ascione, (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2008). 
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standard but a moral idea reminiscent of Kant’s idea of an intrinsic worth or 
“dignity” of the human being.  
As we have observed in the previous chapter, according to Kant, dignity, 
the humanity of humanity, was defined by rationality and, as such, rationality 
was constitutive of an insuperable line that animals, by their very nature, could 
not cross. More specifically, Kant thought that rationality bore a causal relation 
to having interests, which implied humans possessed an intrinsic value, a 
dignity, which was why only humans could be entitled to moral consideration 
and why only humans could be regarded as bearers of rights. Consequently, 
Kant maintained that all our duties to animals are really indirect duties to 
humanity and the reason why we should not be cruel to animals for the sake of 
the animals themselves is because being cruel to animals might hinder human 
moral improvement. It is precisely in this respect that the argument provided by 
the Dutch political party advocating animal cops betrays a fundamental Kantian 
outlook. More importantly, since the parties opposing the introduction of animal 
cops have only done so by stressing the inadequate distribution of recourses that 
would be implied within the decision to introduce animal cops, we can surmise 
that the Bentham-inspired concern with the suffering of animals as a capacity to 
suffer betrays a Kantian spirit across the political spectrum that still seems very 
much alive today. 
 The point here, however, is that this Kantian attitude conveys a 
commitment to two notions I have rendered highly problematic in the previous 
paragraph: first, a belief in human morality as such; and second, in the law as a 
system, or structure that holds the power to distribute rights according to the 
moral standing of an entity. As we have seen, these Kantian notions infect 
Singer’s “practical ethics” and seem to have inspired the animal rights debate to 
take up its implied basic principle of equality as a justification for the expansive 
model. It shows how a conception of intrinsic worth, or dignity, whether 
slumbering or explicitly formulated, still bears a considerable influence on the 
harm to animals that the law is likely to permit or curb in our time. In short, if in 
the animal cops debate both pets and cattle are considered animals that suffer 
from harm, the different level of preoccupation with the harm of those victims, 
not just by the parties that advocate animal cops but across the political 
spectrum, suggests their identity and victimhood must legally be performed in 
very different ways. It suggests, once more but in yet another way that the legal 
weaving of their respective subjectivities cannot be interpreted as a 
straightforward moral or metaphysical issue at all. Rather, those subjectivities 
must be brought about by establishing artificial legal, moral and philosophical 
categories that somehow solve the political-juridical and not some “naturalized” 
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moral dilemma of granting one category of animal protection, whilst excluding 
the other. Hence, looking at the philosophical basis that enables the law to frame 
its different legal constructions and exploring the ways in which the literary can 
inform this framing might help to move away from the kind of nonsensical but, 
in my view, symptomatic and Kantian polemic the parties mentioned above are 





The expansive model, with its unique touchstone of the capacity to suffer, 
reduces ethics to a matter of calculation, because it is reliant on a unwarranted 
biological-scientific notion of suffering that works to sustain the fiction that 
suffering can somehow be measured. The law, however, is not only, and surely 
not necessarily, operative on either calculation or morality – with each right 
imagined as bearing some sort of intrinsic moral value in itself. Nor, as we can 
learn from the problem of cruelty an expansive model poses, is the law 
necessarily concerned with the moral standing of the entities it happens to 
subject. In short, the expansive model, because it centres itself on a basic 
principle of equality, betrays a perspective on the law as intrinsically moralistic, 
which it is not. The law, as much as it might be interpreted as a moral system 
fraught within a (metaphysical) strategic speciesism and all the polemic issues 
ensuing from such interpretations, might very well coincide with a prevailing 
popular moral at any given time. However, as thinking through the praxis of an 
expansive model has shown, it remains primarily an artificial category and thus 
should be approached as such. 
 Looking closer at the question of dignity by drawing on a concrete 
example from the political domain has suggested intrinsic value cannot be 
measured, because value can only ever be extrinsic, which implies 
measurement, or calculation, conflicts with ethics. My close reading of 
“Shooting an Elephant” has tried to imagine such extrinsic values through the 
open figure of pain and not by the measurement of some naked power or 
capacity like the capacity to suffer. What my reading has demonstrated is that 
literature is able to do more than just work though animals metaphorically, 
allegorically, with all the anthropomorphisms, both conventional and strict, 
implied. By implication, the working out of animals in the law, as another but 
still textual genre, does not have to be contained by the law’s seemingly more 
severe and sober categories either. Hence, if dignity is never intrinsic, but 
always extrinsic, the moral subject and the legal subject might be viewed as two 
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entirely different subject matters, in very much the same way as I concluded in 
the first chapter that person and legal person do not necessarily have anything in 
common. Instead of looking at the law and which rule to apply, then, doing 
justice seems to require an ethics not formed by and reduced to the supposed 
morality at stake, but by answering responsibly to a given situation.  
In this respect, my close reading of “Shooting an Elephant” has shown 
that we may envisage other subjectivities than those that are framed within the 
traditional Human-Animal opposition if we look at the way in which 
victimhoods are constructed not in opposition to one another but through 
connections that are sustained within a zone of identification. More specifically, 
my reading of “Shooting an Elephant” has suggested that such readings require 
not an oppositional but a tripartite structure, a matter I will take to a meta level 
in chapter four by introducing a third element to the traditional Human-Animal 
opposition so as to explore the limits I believe it still poses to our modern 
















In the previous chapters I established that the expansive model we are faced 
with today relies on what ultimately must be qualified as the fiction of the 
Human-Animal opposition to account for its expansion. Effectively, if the 
juridical model in place prior to the recent debate on expanding it to essentially 
nonhuman animals was already centred on the Human-Animal opposition, 
whereby the first were considered as subjects of rights and the latter not, an 
expansion by way of an uncritical transfer of personhood to animals, whilst 
seemingly opening up to nonhuman animals by generating a legal community of 
equals, does not so much upset, but, paradoxically, presents us with a continuity 
of the Human-Animal opposition itself. As long as the general singular person is 
upheld as the prevailing legal category, the animal rights debate remains caught 
up in an irresolvable and insistent polemic on demarcation, which hinges on the 
invocation of this very opposition.  
  On the one hand, this led me to touch upon, and call into question, the 
scientific, legal and philosophical underpinnings of the Human-Animal 
opposition. On the other hand, I concluded that the Human-Animal opposition 
not only functions as a – however fragile and, therefore, at times somewhat 
concealed – basis for legitimating the expansive model itself, but at the same 
time hinders thinking through animal subjectivity in terms other than defined by 
an expansive model. What has become clear in the process, then, is that any 
attempt at thinking through animal subjectivity by questioning the limits that 
today’s expansive model poses, cannot be achieved without readdressing the 
Human-Animal opposition itself and how it has managed to maintain its 
competitive stance overtime, especially within an expansive model that would 
seemingly open up to nonhuman animals by transferring to some of those the 
notion of personhood.  
One way to explore this complex issue would be to trace and reflect on 
the long history of the Human-Animal opposition as a philosophical tool for 
teasing out the uniqueness of the human condition, of establishing that what is 
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proper to the human comes at the expense of the animal.117 However, to 
establish and problematize that animals, or to paraphrase Derrida, “those 
creatures we have given ourselves the right to call animal” have forever been put 
in opposition to the human in order to define ourselves as human is one thing.118 
Quite another is to infer – and this is a suggestion, we will see, that I find 
implied within Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am – that if the Human-
Animal opposition must be recognized from a theoretical standpoint as an 
untenable fiction, it only needs to be analysed from within the terms of the 
opposition itself.119 Indeed, following up on the suggestion that the Human-
Animal opposition, because of its status as ultimately fictional, only needs to be 
deconstructed and can then, somehow, be left unaddressed once we attempt to 
imagine other, essentially nonhuman forms of subjectivity, as much as it might 
seem the correct way to move forward, is both too much and not enough. It is 
not enough, because it would not do justice to the way in which the Human-
Animal opposition impinges itself upon the historical, political, legal, 
philosophical and scientific context we are living in today. It is too much, 
because this would imply taking the Human-Animal opposition as a historical 
given without exploring the other ways of carving up the world with which it 
has had and continues to compete. Hence, it would seriously impede rethinking 
our complex relations with animals in the modern context. 
This state of affairs leaves us with two options for further exploring 
imaginative identifications with other, essentially nonhuman forms of 
subjectivity. First, we can try to work out alternatives to the notion of 
personhood. Although I would surely like to point in that direction, this would 
be an immense interdisciplinary task as it would require introducing a wide 
range of specialists from the field of law. The main reason for not wanting to 
develop alternatives to the notion of personhood here, however, is that I wish to 
continue exploring the Human-Animal opposition from a literary point of view 
by looking at it as, primarily, a language construct. Second, and consequently, 
since the Human-Animal opposition has, at this point of my research, acquired 
                                                 
117 For an instructive overview and critical analysis of this historical dynamic see: Kelly Oliver: 
Animal Lessons: How They Teach Us to Be Human (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2009). 
118 “The animal is a word, it is an appellation that men have instituted, a name they have given 
themselves the right and the authority to give to the living other,” Jacques Derrida, The Animal 
That Therefore I Am, ibid. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 23. 
119 Ibid. For a particularly useful overview of Derrida’s concern with the question of the animal 
throughout his career, see: Matthew Calarco, Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from 
Heidegger to Derrida (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). See also: Leonard Lawlor, 
“Animals Have No Hand: An Essay on Animality in Derrida.” In: The New Centennial Review, 
Volume 7, Issue 2 (2007): 43-69. 
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the status of a kernel fiction, we might start to question its status as fiction by 
looking at it as something not other than reality but as a performative language 
construct that impinges itself upon reality; or, better, as something that is a piece 
of the real itself. This latter view offers us the prospect that the Human-Animal 
opposition cannot yet be deemed irrelevant, but suggests that it will continue to 
haunt the animal rights debate for at least as long as no alternative 
categorizations are taken into consideration. 
In this chapter, then, I will take the Human-Animal opposition back to the 
heart of the debate. I will do so by booking a return passage to the initial 
framework that Heidegger devised for carving up the world and from which his 
particular outlook on the Human-Animal opposition evolved. Briefly, in The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics120 Heidegger set up the tri-partition Man-
Animal-Stone, attributed those categories a different order of reality, of being in 
the world, and then set the human apart from the animal by positing language as 
the decisive marker for distinguishing absolutely between the human and the 
animal. The reason I bring Heidegger into focus at this early stage, while only 
starting to explore his tri-partition at the end of this chapter, is that ever since 
Heidegger introduced his famous tri-partition theorists have left his stone 
unturned. This has allowed for this third element to shift into the background, 
giving way to an unwarranted reduction of focus on the Human-Animal 
opposition, a dynamic I first wish to retrace in order to provide myself with an 
adequate theoretical preparation for analysing Heidegger’s tri-partition. This 
effort is informed by my basic premise that the Human-Animal opposition, 
because of its status as ultimately fictional, must be thought of in terms of 
relation, not to either of its poles, but to something else. As I have concluded in 
the previous chapters and maintain here, there is nothing – and here I principally 
disagree with Heidegger – not even language, that on a scientifically or 
philosophically sound academic basis can be identified as essentially human, 
and, for that matter, animal.  
A good case in point of what I consider to be a valuable but nevertheless 
reductive focus on the Human-Animal opposition since Heidegger would be the 
work of Derrida, who, in the fourth chapter of The Animal That Therefore I Am 
(2008) performs a deconstructive reading of Heidegger on the animals. More 
specifically, Derrida reads against Heidegger’s conceptualization of language as 
essentially human through an extensive interrogation of Heidegger’s position on 
language as the unique human ability to respond and hence to deceive. Derrida 
does so, first, by exposing the way in which Heidegger’s conceptualization of 
                                                 
120 Martin Heidegger: The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. Trans. W. McNeil and 
N.Walker. ibid. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995). 
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language as the ability to respond and thus in terms of the ability to say “I”, as 
the ability, that is, to present a presence to the self, is anchored in a 
philosophical tradition that has forever set the human off against the animal. 
Second, by broaching the question of what it would mean for an animal to say 
“I” and, hence, to respond. Framing the matter in this way, however, Derrida 
does indeed trouble the traditional boundaries between the human and the 
animal, but he does not take into consideration Heidegger’s “third,” the stone. In 
fact, in my reading against Derrida I will argue that he has cancelled out this 
“third” in a way that I find symptomatic of a particular conceptualization of 
language adopted within his deconstruction of Heidegger.  
This conceptualization of language relies, in part, on the work of 
Benveniste and the way in which Benveniste conceived of the figure of the “I” 
as a condition for language. However, whereas Benveniste’s language 
philosophy opens up to thinking the relation between language and speech in 
both deictic and indexical terms, Derrida rather exclusively focuses on an 
indexical, or more specifically, autotelic register in terms of a presence to the 
self. This brings a philosophical rather than poetical outlook on language into 
the picture that I will be seen to argue against, because it gives way to what I 
consider to be an irresolvable loop within Derrida’s framework. This is why my 
alternative consideration of the figure of the “I” will evolve from exploring the 
relation between language and speech in deictic terms. What I Intend to show is 
how, already within Benveniste’s partition between language and speech, the 
potential of a third is cancelled out and that this cancellation impinges itself 
upon Derrida’s reading of Heidegger and his subsequent cancelling out of 
Heidegger’s “third.”121  
Because I share Derrida’s fundamental critique on Heidegger’s 
conceptualization of language as that which sets the human and animal in 
opposition, I remain heavily indebted to his work. However, my approach here 
differs from his in that I will try to move beyond deconstruction by moving 
before it, precisely by attempting to open up space for this third element, 
Heidegger’s stone, to re-join the Human-Animal opposition as a way of 
upsetting and reframing it. In other words, whereas Derrida puts the animal in 
the Human-Animal opposition under erasure by troubling the limits of the 
traditional conceptualization of response, I will diverge from Derrida by putting 
the Human-Animal opposition under erasure by bringing in a third. Let it be 
clear from the start, then, that it is not my aim to replace one opposition with 
another. What I wish to do is to multiply and thicken the Human-Animal 
                                                 
121 Emile Benveniste: “Subjectivity in Language.” In: Problems in General Linguistics (Coral 
Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1973), 223-230.  
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opposition by exploring how realizing the potential for alternative distinctions 
might help to work out different forms of subjectivity alongside the kinds of 
subjectivity haunted by the always already implied Human-Animal opposition.  
The literary work that I will use to address the issues sketched above is 
Jorge Luis Borges’ poem “El otro tigre” (“The Other Tiger,” 1960). The poem 
treats the Human-Animal relation as a problem of language. In doing so, it 
suggests a way of thinking about language that differs radically from the manner 
in which both Heidegger and Derrida, each in their specific way, conceptualize 
language to imagine this relation. In my view, the poem thereby invites us to 
take a next step in thinking through animal subjectivity and the role of language 
implied within the construction of the Human-Animal relation. For this reason, 
my close reading will focus on the various conceptualizations of the nature of 
language that the poem presents and I will attempt to explore the way those 
conceptualizations might foster alternatives to the traditional philosophical 
imagining of the nonhuman animal. I will do so by contrasting the role of the 
philosophical figure of the “I” as a general singular with the role the poetical 
figure of the “I” plays in such processes of the imagination. This will allow me 
to determine my own position on the figure of the “I” and to offer an alternative 
to the way in which it has been taken up by Derrida in his particular questioning 
of the notion of response in Heidegger. The aim of my trajectory in this chapter 
is, on the one hand, to effect a movement from thinking through subjectivity in 
terms of being, towards, if only very loosely, a Deleuzian-inspired sense of 
mobility, which is not premised on a primordial primacy of becoming over 
being, but on being as just another becoming. On the other hand, my aim is to 
explore the implications of such a movement for the notion of animal 
subjectivity within the animal rights debate.  
 
 
2. Borges’ Tigers 
 
In Borges’ poem “El Otro Tigre,” (The Other Tiger) the lyrical I deliberates on 
the processes that inform our modes of imagining the animal other, in this case a 
tiger. The poem starts with the following succinct statement: “I think of a tiger.” 
The “I” in question is thus presented as that peculiar instance of language from 
which, or through which, some sort of imaginative identification with the other 
might unfold. The rationality embodied by or transferred to the “I” within this “I 
think of” is then contrasted in the very same line as the poem takes on a 
dreamlike quality. The light fades and the lyrical I starts wondering about the 
nature of the tiger it intends to bring to life through the remainder of the poem. 
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This is Borges in the original Spanish followed by an English translation that I 
modified at one pivotal point:  
 
 
El Otro Tigre 
 
Pienso en un tigre. La penumbra exalta 
La vasta Biblioteca laboriosa 
Y parece alejar los anaqueles; 
Fuerte, inocente, ensangrentado y nuevo, 
él irá por su selva y su mañana 
Y marcará su rastro en la limosa 
Margen de un río cuyo nombre ignora 
(En su mundo no hay nombres ni pasado 
Ni porvenir, sólo un instante cierto.) 
Y salvará las bárbaras distancias 
Y husmeará en el trenzado laberinto 
De los olores el olor del alba 
Y el olor deleitable del venado; 
Entre las rayas del bambú descifro, 
Sus rayas y presiento la osatura 
Baja la piel espléndida que vibra. 
En vano se interponen los convexos 
Mares y los desiertos del planeta; 
Desde esta casa de un remoto puerto 
De América del Sur, te sigo y sueño, 
Oh tigre de las márgenes del Ganges. 
 
Cunde la tarde en mi alma y reflexiono 
Que el tigre vocativo de mi verso 
Es un tigre de símbolos y sombras, 
Una serie de tropos literarios 
Y de memorias de la enciclopedia 
Y no el tigre fatal, la aciaga joya 
Que, bajo el sol o la diversa luna, 
Va cumpliendo en Sumatra o en Bengala 
Su rutina de amor, de ocio y de muerte. 
Al tigre de los simbolos he opuesto 
El verdadero, el de caliente sangre, 
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El que diezma la tribu de los búfalos 
Y hoy, 3 de agosto del 59, 
Alarga en la pradera una pausada 
Sombra, pero ya el hecho de nombrarlo 
Y de conjeturar su circunstancia 
Lo hace ficción del arte y no criatura 
Viviente de las que andan por la tierra. 
 
Un tercer tigre buscaremos. Éste 
Será como los otros una forma 
De mi sueño, un sistema de palabras 
Humanas y no el tigre vertebrado 
Que, más allá de las mitologías, 
Pisa la tierra. Bien lo sé, pero algo 
Me impone esta aventura indefinida, 
Insensata y antigua, y persevero 
En buscar por el tiempo de la tarde 
El otro tigre, el que no está en el verso122 
 
 
The Other Tiger 
 
I think of a tiger. The fading light enhances 
the vast complexities of the Library 
and seems to set the bookshelves at a distance; 
powerful, innocent, bloodstained, and new-made, 
it will prowl through its jungle and its morning 
and leave its footprint on the muddy edge 
of a river with a name unknown to it 
(in its world, there are no names, nor past, nor future, 
only the sureness of the present moment) 
and it will cross the wilderness of distance 
and sniff out in the woven labyrinth 
of smells the smell peculiar to morning 
and the scent on the air of deer, delectable. 
Behind the lattice of bamboo, I notice 
its stripes, and I sense its skeleton 
under the magnificence of the quivering skin. 
                                                 
122 Jorge Luis Borges, El Hacedor (Buenos Aires, Emecé Editores, 1960). 
176 
 
In vain the convex oceans and the deserts 
spread themselves across the earth between us; 
from this one house in a far-off seaport 
in South America, I dream you, follow you, 
oh tiger on the fringes of the Ganges. 
 
 
Evening spreads in my spirit and I keep thinking 
that the tiger I am calling up in my poem 
is a tiger made of symbols and of shadows, 
a set of literary tropes, 
scraps remembered from encyclopaedias, 
and not the deadly tiger, the fateful jewel 
that in the sun or the deceptive moonlight 
follows its paths, in Bengal or Sumatra, 
of love, of indolence, of dying. 
Against the tiger of symbols I have set 
the real one, the hot-blooded one 
that savages a herd of buffalo, 
and today, the third of August, '59, 
its patient shadow moves across the plain, 
but yet, the act of naming it, of guessing 
what is its nature and its circumstance 
creates a fiction, not a living creature, 
not one of those that prowl on the earth. 
 
Let us look for a third tiger. This one 
will be a form in my dream like all the others, 
a system, an arrangement of human language, 
and not the flesh-and-bone tiger 
that, out of reach of all mythologies, 
paces the earth. I know all this; yet something 
drives me to this ancient, endless adventure, 
foolish and vague, yet still I keep on looking 
throughout the evening for the other tiger, 
the other tiger, the one not in this poem. 123 
                                                 
123 Jorge Luis Borges, El Hacedor, Buenos Aires, 1960, trans. by Alastair Reid, though slightly 
modified: in the original Spanish the fourth line of the second stanza reads: una serie de tropos 




At first glance, the poem conveys an awareness of the difficulty of establishing 
the difference between two tigers. First, there is the tiger it weaves through the 
texture of the poem, which, henceforth, I will refer to as the fictional tiger. 
Second, there is the real life flesh-and-bone tiger that must be prowling 
somewhere in its natural habitat, on the fringes of the Ganges, which I will refer 
to as the factional tiger. The vast and unbridgeable distance between the 
fictional tiger in the poem, on the one hand, and the factional tiger supposedly 
roaming on the fringes of the Ganges on the other, is illustrated metaphorically 
by the great geographical distance separating the lyrical I, geographically 
located at a far-off seaport in South America, from the tiger on the other side of 
the earth. From this very basic distinction between a fictional and factional tiger 
alone, a distinction that could also be read as an opposition and which I will 
endeavour to complicate in what follows, we can already surmise that the poem 
offers a profound contemplation on the nature of language and its role in 
imagining the other. More specifically, its basic demarcation of the fictional 
from the factional tiger raises the questions of how language might function as a 
tool for imagining the nonhuman other, and what limits the nature of language 
imposes to such processes of the imagination. Let us now explore these 
questions. 
 
      * 
 
The first part of the second stanza presents us with a reflection on the difference 
between the fictional and factional tiger by framing the complex issue of 
establishing this difference as a problem of language and how it fails to capture 
the living. 
 
 Evening spreads in my spirit and I keep thinking 
that the tiger I am calling up in my poem 
is a tiger made of symbols and of shadows, 
a set of literary tropes, 
scraps remembered from encyclopaedias, 
and not the deadly tiger, the fateful jewel 
that in the sun or the deceptive moonlight 
follows its paths, in Bengal or Sumatra, 




The lyrical I here conveys a keen awareness that the fictional tiger it brings to 
life is never at one with the factional tiger but no more than a language 
construct, a set of symbols, of literary tropes. In short, the only possible 
imaginative identification with the factional flesh-and-bone tiger, the lyrical I 
seems to suggest, always has to remain an approximative identification, a 
potentially endless linguistic and vain attempt to penetrate its inconceivable 
essence. The “solution” proposed to this irresolvable problem, conveyed in the 
first half of the last stanza, is therefore all the more puzzling. 
 
 Let us look for a third tiger. This one 
will be a form in my dream like all the others, 
a system, an arrangement of human language, 
and not the flesh-and-bone tiger 
that, out of reach of all mythologies, 
paces the earth. 
 
The role of language that was conveyed throughout the poem leading up to this 
last stanza gave way to the idea that the real life flesh-and-bone tiger cannot be 
identified through language, yet cannot be approximated otherwise, a matter 
which was left unresolved as it was implied within the troublesome distinction 
between a factional and a fictional tiger. Here, in this last stanza, it is as if we 
are encouraged to use a language that somehow escapes the confinements of the 
way in which the tiger is registered up to this point, as we are offered the 
prospect of looking for a third tiger. In the remainder of the last stanza this 
encouragement is played down significantly as the quest for a third tiger is 
registered as an endless adventure, both foolish and vague: as if the 
encouragement were just a folly testifying to the limits of language and not 
worthy to be followed up on. At the same time, this somewhat mysterious 
language is envisaged as a system, an arrangement of human language.  
In what follows, I will attempt to consider this third option seriously by 
taking as a source of inspiration what Derrida said in The Animal That Therefore 
I Am – but left undeveloped in the remainder of his book – about the role of 
language in thinking through the question of the animal. 
  
For thinking through the animal, if there is such a thing, derives from 
poetry. There you have a thesis: it is what philosophy has, essentially, had 
to deprive itself of. It is the difference between philosophical knowledge 




The third option that is offered up in Borges’ poem, then, marks a break with 
trying to imagine the nonhuman other, in this case a tiger, in terms of a language 
that is positively referential and in which the fictional tiger could be made to 
convey an approximate correspondence with a factional tiger whereby both 
tigers constitute a problematic binary opposition as quasi philosophical 
categories. In short, if I have now briefly considered the poem’s composition up 
to this last stanza to be “about” the nature and consequent limits of language in 
trying to imagine the other, we may now read the encouragement to look for a 
third tiger as an invitation to consider a poetical reading strategy of the poem in 
terms of what it does. In other words, the poem here offers us the prospect of 
imagining the tiger-other through a language that is poetical rather than 
conceptual-philosophical. This is why I provisionally choose to read this 
“arrangement” of human language as a plea for a poetical reading strategy 
whereby, just like in music, an “arrangement” denotes the adaptation of a 
composition for performance with instruments or voices other than those 
originally specified. Let us begin by zooming in on the way in which the 
seemingly odd encouragement to look for a third tiger is delivered and try to 
make sense of what this poetical reading strategy might amount to in more 
concrete terms. 
The explicit encouragement in the last stanza of the poem to look for a 
third tiger, not the fictional tiger constructed from the books and encyclopaedias, 
or the factional tiger the lyrical I “fictionalizes” at the very instant it attempts to 
describe it, seems highly paradoxical. The paradox I am interested in, however, 
not so much concerns the impossibility of establishing the difference between a 
factional and a fictional tiger, no matter how many tigers we seek to describe. 
Rather, the paradox I wish to address resides with the encouragement to look for 
a third tiger being presented as both a necessary and a vain enterprise. It is clear 
why it is in vain, because this third tiger must eventually remain a language 
construct all the same. But why is it necessary, if we momentarily choose, as I 
do, to read the voice of the lyrical I here as other than originally specified; 
namely, by not adhering to the somewhat stereotypical romantic and foolish 
disposition of the lyrical I in question.  
The immaculate last line of the poem: “the other tiger, the one not in this 
poem” might throw a light on what is at stake in presenting the encouragement 
to look for a third tiger as necessary. Indeed, the so-called third tiger we are 
asked to look out for, the one not in the poem, collapses our logical train of 
thought and triggers an awareness of what may be suggested by the seemingly 
odd, but still rather straightforward, encouragement to look for a third tiger. 
Especially when we draw our attention to a passage in the last part of the second 
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stanza, in which the lyrical I succinctly addresses the problem it is faced with as 
a problem of naming: 
 
but yet, the act of naming it, of guessing 
what is its nature and its circumstance 
creates a fiction, not a living creature, 
not one of those that prowl on the earth. 
 
The act of naming the factional tiger is said to create a fiction, causing a split 
between the fictional tiger and the factional tiger. This split, however, is at once 
dissolved as the factional flesh-and-bone tiger, once mentioned, named, takes on 
the quality of the fictional tiger, simply because it now becomes a set of literary 
tropes and can no longer be distinguished from it. This paradoxical dynamic, 
however, does not imply that the encouragement in the first line of the last 
stanza to look for a third tiger can only be read as a rather foolish-romantic and, 
therefore, vain enterprise. Indeed, it may also be read as an attempt to 
circumvent the seemingly irresolvable problem caused by mentioning, naming, 
this third tiger, since, strictly speaking, we are not encouraged to mention or to 
name the third tiger at all, but only to look for it.  
In this light, the encouragement to look for a third tiger delivers yet 
another and arguably more interesting paradox, as the last line of the poem 
registers this third tiger as “the one not in this poem,” which, despite not quite 
guessing its nature and circumstance, always already inscribes the third tiger 
within the poem in the form of a present absence. In other words, the lyrical I is 
encouraging us to look for a third tiger, a living creature, instead of a fictional 
creature, which it has to mention, to name, in order to deliver its encouragement, 
but which it cannot name at the same time because naming it, or, more broadly, 
guessing its nature and circumstance, at once inscribes the tiger in the poem, 
relegating it to the fictional domain and separating it from the living creature we 
are asked to look out for.  
In this view, comparing the impossibility of mentioning/naming this 
living creature conveyed in the last part of the second stanza with the explicit 
encouragement to look for a third tiger at the beginning of the last stanza does 
not result in an irresolvable paradox. Rather, the apparent paradox here is put to 
work because it effectuates a shift from an approximative and linear strategy 
doomed to fail towards a strategy of the unnamed; a strategy, if you will, of 
relation by deferral. In other words, the lyrical I is not so much asking us to look 
out for only a third tiger, but for a fourth, a fifth, a sixth. etc.; for as many tigers 
as we can construe in an imaginative effort that must, above all, keep running, as 
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every other tiger named blots out the previous one and is blotted out, in turn, by 
the next in an endless deferral necessary to be or, better, to remain able to 
envisage a living creature by tracing it, as a way of literally keeping it alive. 
This can be illustrated metaphorically as every other tiger construed becoming 
part of a network in a web of dispersed points in space and time of which not the 
points but the interconnected texture of the lines themselves make up the living 
fabric of the imagination. This is, then, how I concretely use a poetic reading 
strategy to read the “arrangement” of human language conveyed through the 
encouragement in the poem.  
This alternative strategy of the unnamed not just recognizes the 
impossibility of knowing and identifying with the other in its essence, in order to 
then suggest that “identification” relies on endless deferral and a continuous 
process of re-imagining. The poem does more. It does not simply ask us to 
choose one strategy over the other, but effects a doubling by taking them 
together as it relays our focus from identification towards imagination. It 
performs a transformation of what at first seems a nonsensical encouragement to 
stick with a linear strategy of identification into a radical openness implied 
within a strategy of the unnamed. In this way, slipping from one strategy into the 
other, the poem wrestles itself out of the grip of the Human-Animal opposition 
always already implied within a linear strategy of identification. It does so, not 
by deconstructing and, hence, ignoring the role of the Human-Animal 
opposition, but by working with it and showing how this traditional opposition 
takes effect in a strategy of the unnamed. At the same time, however, 
introducing the third tiger in this way immediately begs the question what this 
radical openness, implied within a strategy of the unnamed, might amount to in 
more concrete terms, thereby affording a sense of urgency to explore the relation 
of language, naming and their respective roles in imagining the nonhuman other 
and the subsequent constructions of its subjectivity.  
It is of interest, with respect to this issue, to recognize that the flesh-and-
bone tiger imagined to be prowling on the fringes of the Ganges is set at a 
distance from a lyrical I and not from a real life flesh-and-bone “I”, let alone the 
author Borges. The first implication of this simple fact is that the imaginative 
identification played out in the poem might be read as primarily concerned with 
a notion of language as a nonhuman vehicle, rather than with trying to convey 
how an essentially human being might identify with an essential animal being. 
In short, the impossibility of imagining the real life flesh-and-bone tiger in its 
essence here not just points to a certain conception of the nature of language as 
deceptive because it is not suited to the task, but also touches upon the problem 
of identifying language, here in the shape of a lyrical I, as corresponding to or 
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veiling something essentially human. In this light, the suggestion in the above 
fragment that the third tiger cannot be spoken of might have something to with 
the fact that, contrary to the lyrical I positioned as fixed and immobile within the 
confinement of a house, it does not concern a marked-off and fixed entity “out 
there,” but something fleeting, an event that, within a strategy of the unnamed, 
can never be caught in the act. Moreover, it is worth remembering that we are 
encouraged to look for it rather than being forbidden to speak of it. 
In fact, I would suggest it cannot be spoken of, and thus not be forbidden 
to be spoken of, even when imagined to be spoken of, because the problem with 
“speaking of” here does not reside with this “speaking”; that is, with forever 
being trapped within the prison of language. Rather, the problem of “speaking 
of” concerns the “of” in question. This “of” signals an “about,” which suggests a 
philosophical rather than a poetical knowledge of the essence of the animal in 
question to be at hand, which reversely implies the a priori ability of language to 
somehow correspond to or veil the essentially human. Yet, since the “I” in the 
poem is anything but essentially human, in this case a lyrical I for being the 
voice of a poem, the real life flesh-and-bone tiger can never be “spoken of.” 
Firstly, because this would imply the essence of humanness, and, consequently, 
the essence of tigerness, to be available to us through language and identifiable 
somewhere outside, in the real world. Secondly, it would hinge on mistakenly 
identifying the figure of the “I” with something essentially human, instead of 
thinking of whatever “I” we stumble upon as a piece of language and, therefore, 
always already nonhuman.  
By implication, a philosophical reading strategy in terms of “aboutness” 
would not just reinvigorate the Human-Animal opposition with its two 
essentialist poles, but also expose a fundamental connection between this 
opposition and the relation between the philosophical figure of the “I”, language 
and the human. In fact, language here would no longer function as the decisive 
marker floating about between the human and the animal, separating the human 
from the animal as some sort of threshold whilst at the same reiterating their 
opposition. Rather, language becomes no less than a substitute for the human, 
reducing the notion of “human language” not to an exclusive faculty but to a 
tautological construction. In this scenario, it is language that is not merely 
contrived as uniquely or exclusively human, but which is subsequently posed as 
essentially human for being attributed the power of “speaking of.”  
By contrast, aspiring to a poetical reading strategy to imagine the 
nonhuman other and taking our cue from the functioning of the third tiger we 
have now explored in Borges’ poem may warrant a different reading of the 
figure of the “I” and the way in which it relates to language. Indeed, in a 
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poetical-deictic reading, the figure of the “I” not so much resembles a piece of 
language that has momentarily cut itself loose from what generally, on a meta-
level and in tautological vein is referred to as human language, but concerns an 
act of speech that calls into being, and that even when it is suggested to be 
“speaking of,” cannot be qualified as corresponding to something essentially 
human. In short, the impossibility of a “speaking of” within a poetical reading 
strategy would imply that any attempt at imaginative identification through 
language must always amount to a speaking to, a tracing of the unspeakable, 
which, albeit hard to concretely envisage, one way or the other, involves 
addressing the other not in terms of correspondence, but as other.  
This begs the question, first, whether the lyrical I takes in an exceptional 
position within our conceptualizations of the figure of the “I”. Second, if so far I 
have considered the figure of the “I” in terms of what it is not, the question 
remains of how to understand the conceptualization of the pronoun “I” when it 
is considered to correspond to or to veil – and thus to literally stand for – what, 
at any given time, might come to qualify as an essentially human being.124 
Hence, the question becomes how to understand the conceptualization of 
language in relation to envisioning the figure of the “I” and the question of 
subjectivity. To further explore these complex matters, I will now zoom in on 
the way in which Derrida conceives of the figure of the “I” and its relation to 
language, to naming and to subjectivity by looking at what I consider to be two 
key passages on the figure of the “I” that not only foster Derrida’s exposition of 
the philosophical tradition he criticizes, but which also inform his deconstructive 
reading of Heidegger for cancelling out Heidegger’s third. Close reading the 
ways in which the “I” in Borges’ poem might interact with Derrida’s conception 
of the stakes of the figure of the “I” will, first, allow me to develop my own 
position on the figure of the “I” in order to, second, read against Derrida’s 
particular deconstruction of Heidegger’s Human-Animal opposition, which, 
third, will clear the way for re-introducing and critically reflecting on 
Heidegger’s third, the stone.  
 
 
3. The figure of the “I” and its Relation to Language, Naming and 
Subjectivity 
 
In The Animal That Therefore I Am, Derrida proposes that we are passing 
through a critical phase regarding the question of the animal due to the 
unprecedented way in which we have come to treat them in our industrialized 
                                                 
124 Pro/noun from Latin pro/nomen, literally meaning in place of/name. 
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world. In order to address this pressing matter through the metaphysical 
discourse that underlies our modern treatment of animals, he retraces a long 
philosophical tradition that has forever defined the animal in opposition to the 
human. Going back to Descartes, who defined Man as the only thinking species, 
Derrida discusses philosophers such as Kant, Levinas, Lacan and Heidegger and 
scrutinizes the way in which the traditional Human-Animal opposition surfaces 
in their works. What Derrida observes, through detailed deconstructions of the 
works of those philosophers, is that the traditional Human-Animal opposition 
they arrived at is still very much indebted to Descartes. In short, Man is still 
registered as a thinking animal, which implies Man is considered unique for 
having some sort of supreme consciousness, which is generally registered as the 
capacity for language and hence to respond, which the animal is deprived of.  
As Derrida demonstrates, in Lacan, although he does not deny the animal 
some capacity for signs and communication, this deprivation of response stems 
from a particular notion of the animal not being able to erase its traces; in 
Levinas the deprivation of response is bound up with his trouble with granting 
the animal a face, whereas in Heidegger the deprivation of response is ultimately 
arrived at as Heidegger considers the animal to be captive within its own 
environment without being able to comprehend its own captivity. In Heidegger’s 
terms this translates into being poor-in-world for being deprived of language. In 
his exposition of the way in which Kant defined the human as a rational being in 
opposition to the irrational animal, Derrida scrutinizes the idea of response as 
just another Cartesian “I think” by questioning Kant’s notion of an “I” that 
presents a presence to the self as a unique demarcation criterion for response, an 
issue we will see he later takes up in questioning the notion of response in 
Heidegger. For this reason, I will now examine how Derrida raises the stakes of 
the figure of the “I” by offering a reflection on his critique on Kant’s position on 
the figure of the “I”.125 
  
Power over the animal is the essence of the “I” or the “person,” the 
essence of the human (this conforms, moreover, to the divine injunction 
that, from Genesis on, assigned to man such a destination, that of marking 
his authority over living creatures, which can be effected only through the 
infinitely elevated power of presenting himself as an “I,” of presenting 
himself and just that, of presenting himself to himself, by means of a form 
                                                 
125 I refer here to, but will not expand on, Paul de Man’s dealing with Hegelian aesthetics, in the 
context of which De Man traces a similar problem with the term and use of the term ‘I’. On this 
see Paul de Man, “Sign and Symbol in Hegel’s Aesthetics”. In: Critical Inquiry 8 (1982), pp. 761-
775. For the importance of this issue in relation to aesthetics (and politics), see: Isobel Armstrong, 
The Radical Aesthetic (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell), 2000. 
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of presence to himself that accompanies every presentation and 
representation [sic]. This presence to oneself, this self of the presence to 
itself, this universal and singular “I” that is the condition of the response 
and thus for the responsibility of the subject – whether theoretical, 
practical, ethical, juridical or political – is a power, a faculty that Kant is 
prudent or bold enough not to identify with the power to speak, the literal 
power of uttering “I.” (93) 
 
In this passage, Derrida illustrates how Kant conceives of the figure of the “I” as 
a universal singular figure, essentially at one with the concept of person that I 
scrutinized in the first chapter. Interestingly, Derrida emphasizes the word 
faculty by italicizing it and comments that Kant is bold or prudent enough not to 
identify this faculty with the literal power of uttering “I”. Of course, Derrida 
here does not state his own position on this matter but merely seems to 
appreciate the philosophical consistency that Kant demonstrates by arguing that 
the power, the faculty, of the universal singular “I” concerns an aptitude of 
language that must, at all times, be abstracted from particular, concrete speech. 
Yet Derrida neither poses an alternative to Kant’s position at this point, nor does 
he do so in the remainder of his text. At the same time, for Derrida, this 
universal singular figure of the “I” conditions response and, thus, subjectivity – 
let us say, language – because it presents a power to perform a form of presence 
to the self.  
This latter point is highly relevant to my project because Derrida, in his 
reading of Heidegger, challenges the rigid distinction between response and 
reaction that informs Heidegger’s conceptualization of language as the unique 
and, therefore, essentially human ability to respond through an interrogation of 
the figure of the “I”. In the following passage, leading up to his deconstruction 
of Heidegger’s Human-Animal opposition, Derrida already starts to complicate 
the notion of response and its relation to the figure of the “I”.  
 
No one denies the animal auto-affection or auto-motion, hence the self of 
that relation to the self. But what is in dispute – and it is here that the 
functioning and structuring of the “I” count so much, even where the word 
“I” is lacking – is the power to make reference to the self in deictic or 
autodeictic terms, the capability at least virtually to turn a finger toward 
oneself in order to say “this is I.” For, as Benveniste has clearly 
emphasized, that is what utters and performs “I” when I pronounce or 
effect it. It is what says “I am speaking of me”; the one who says “I” 
shows himself in the present of his utterance, or at least of its 
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manifestation. Because it is held to be incapable of this autodeictic or 
auto-referential self-distancing (autotelie) and deprived of the “I” the 
animal will lack any “I think,” as well as understanding and reason, 
response and responsibility. The “I think” that must accompany every 
representation is this auto-reference as condition for thinking, as thinking 
itself; that is precisely what is proper to the human, of which the animal 
would be deprived. (94)   
 
What Derrida suggests here, and I propose to read the passage in a somewhat 
reverse order to deliver my point more clearly, is that philosophy has always 
entertained a deliberately narrow definition of the figure of the “I”, namely as an 
“I think.” In this way, it has enabled itself to set the human apart from the 
animal indefinitely. This poignant point delivered, Derrida, in the remainder of 
his text, starts to disengage the capacity to respond from this “I think.” He does 
so by dwelling on the question of what it would mean for an animal to respond, 
not as a way of saying “I think” but in what Derrida himself refers to as 
“deictic” or “autodeictic” terms, in order to convey a presence to itself. Yet let 
me note that Derrida’s understanding here of a presence to the self as deictic, 
would have to be understood as indexical rather than deictic since indexicality 
presupposes a relation of contiguity whereas a deictic relation is concerned with 
an “I” and a you that are necessarily other. This caveat made, it will be of central 
concern in what follows that Derrida focuses on an indexical, then, or, to avoid 
further confusion of terminology, autotelic understanding of the figure of the “I” 
in Benveniste’s Subjectivity in Language while leaving unaddressed the way in 
which Benveniste relates the figure of the “I” to a “you”. Hence, what is left 
unaddressed is an understanding of the figure of the “I” whereby it is the speaker 
who sets himself up as a subject. Within such an understanding of the figure of 
the “I” the speaker does not so much turn a finger towards itself to say “I am 
speaking of me” in order to convey a presence to itself, but it is the speaker 
speaking to the other that informs its subjectivity.126  
Hence, within Derrida’s understanding of the figure of the “I,” language is 
the technique by which “self-presence” is possible via language. The Kantian 
position reflected on by Derrida’s Benveniste-inspired understanding of 
language suggests that within every utterance an “I” is always already implied. 
For example, when one says “go away” there is an “I” present in this utterance 
in the form of an absence, because what is implied is “I urge you, go away.” For 
Derrida, this “I” presents a form of presence to the self, since with every 
utterance I present myself as present to myself. Within Benveniste’s 
                                                 
126 Ibid., 224. 
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understanding of the figure of the “I”, however, the “I” is connected to a you, 
which implies the possibility of being addressed. In short, whenever one utters 
“I” there is always already an opening up to the possibility of being addressed as 
a you. In this conceptualization, the figure of the “I” is not so much revealing a 
“presence to the self” but dialogical, whereas language, rather than being 
understood as a technique, implies a bodily constituted “presence to the other.” 
It is here that poetry may provide an instructive angle on the figure of the “I” 
because it opens up to an experience whereby a first person addresses a you that 
might very well not be present, rather than conveying a mere philosophical 
conceptual reflection about being present in third person descriptive terms.  
By implication, we may begin to surmise that Derrida’s deconstruction of 
the works of the philosophers that make up the metaphysical tradition he 
retraces is, primarily, a philosophical project undertaken by a language 
philosopher. In other words, Derrida’s one-sided focus on Benveniste’s 
understanding of language here seems to demonstrate that his understanding of 
language and its role in imagining the animal is not informed by the poetical 
outlook on language that he himself in the beginning of his book considered 
vital for thinking through the question of the animal. As we will see, this is 
further evidenced by the lack of poetical analysis in thinking through the 
question of response in Heidegger since, unlike in Borges, no “third” is brought 
into the picture. For now, let us try to clarify what Derrida’s philosophical 
understanding of language and its role in imagining the nonhuman animal 
amounts to in more concrete terms. This is perhaps conveyed most clearly in the 
following fragment from his famous interview “Eating Well”:127 
 
The idea according to which man is the only speaking being, in its 
traditional form or in its Heideggerian form, seems to me at once 
undisplaceable and highly problematic. Of course, if one defines language 
in such a way that it is reserved for what we call man, what is there to 
say? But if one re-inscribes language in a network of possibilities that do 
not merely encompass it but mark it irreducibly from the inside, 
everything changes. I am thinking in particular of the mark in general, of 
the trace, of iterability, of difference. These possibilities or necessities, 
without which there would be no language, are themselves not only 
human. It is not a question of covering up ruptures and heterogeneities. I 
would simply contest that they give rise to a single linear, indivisible, 
oppositional limit, to a binary opposition between the human and the 
                                                 
127 Jacques Derrida, “‘Eating Well,’ Or The Calculation Of The Subject.” In: Points, Interviews, 
1974-1994, ed. Elisabeth Weber, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). 
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infra- human. And what I am proposing here should allow us to take into 
account scientific knowledge about the complexity of “animal languages,” 
genetic coding, all forms of marking within which so-called human 
language, as original as it might be, does not allow us to “cut” once and 
for all where we would like in general to cut. (284-285, italics in text) 
 
In the above fragment we can see how – just as the figure of the “I” is taken up 
in autotelic terms within Derrida’s Benveniste-inspired reflection on Kant – the 
idea of language and, hence, response, is conveyed from within a framework of 
the Derridaean philosophy of differance, which hinges on an interrogation of a 
presence to the self. More specifically, language is approached as a system of 
signs, of traces that provide for the iterability of difference, a matter that has 
been key throughout Derrida’s work on deconstructing the “metaphysics of 
presence” tradition that philosophy according to Derrida represents. As Peter 
Benson has observed elsewhere, what Derrida means by presence in this context 
– and this amounts to a massive limitation – is that speech has traditionally been 
favoured over writing for the literal lack of mediation it was assumed to 
convey.128 Hence, Derrida’s vocabulary of the mark, the trace, which we will see 
he invokes in his reading against Heidegger’s position on language and thus 
response as essentially human, conveys an understanding of language as not 
essentially human for never fully being present to itself.   
 This Derridaean approach to the figure of the “I”, language and, hence, 
response to imagining the question of the animal here appears to result in an 
expansion of the idea of language as beyond any reductive “I think” and in a 
subsequent problematizing of the traditional demarcation line of language as 
separating the human from the animal. Before I move on to address the 
implications of Derrida’s language philosophy for reading against Heidegger’s 
notion of response, however, let me introduce what I find lacking, namely a 
deictic-poetical rather than an autotelic-philosophical reading of the figure of the 
“I”. To this end, I will now return to Borges’ poem, because I believe it suggests 
yet another way of thinking about the figure of the “I” that I wish to contrast 
with that of Derrida resonating both within the above two passages and within 




                                                 




Whereas Derrida focuses on the question of response for thinking through the 
animal in terms of the capacity to say “I”, Borges’ poem offers an exploration of 
the different ways in which the figure of the “I” may be uttered. More 
specifically, the figure of the “I” in Borges’ poem addresses the other through a 
deictic calling into being of a third that must remain unnamed. This exploration 
of the figure of the “I” not only defies the binary between a fictional and a 
factional tiger but, at the same time, disrupts a speaking of the other in terms of 
an “aboutness” that must, nevertheless, remain approximate. In short, Borges 
poem explores the I - You relation in two ways. First, thematically, through its 
reflections on the fictional and the factional tiger and the conceptual issues it 
raises by its insistent attempt at conceiving of a third tiger. Second, poetically 
and performatively, through its experiments with the lyrical “I”, which differs 
from the philosophical “I” of the “I Think.” Let us now explore the various ways 
in which the figure of the “I” in Borges poem is uttered. 
The figure of the “I” in Borges’ poem may be understood, at its most 
basic level, as a lyrical I for constituting the voice of the poem. However, this 
description of the “I” in Borges’ poem as a lyrical I is merely a formalistic 
exercise. It follows from nothing else than that we name the “I” that we 
encounter in a poem a lyrical I and, as such, merely constitutes a convention of 
genre, the categorical description of an instance of language. Another 
convention in literary theory, albeit less descriptive than the former, is the 
qualification of the figure of the “I” for the way it functions in a given text. This 
qualification of an “I” as lyrical is generally registered as concerning a 
communication situation whereby the “I” in a poem speaks out to another and 
the reader is placed in the position of overhearing. Since I am interested here in 
contemplating what the figure of the “I” in the poem does, rather than in fixing a 
label on it in literary terms, I choose not to apply the aforementioned 
qualifications too strictly, but to explore the operations of the figure of the “I” 
by considering it in light of the encouragement to look for a third tiger at the 
beginning of the last stanza.  
This encouragement is delivered in the following way: “Let us look for a 
third tiger,” which suggests, first, that the “I” in question has literally withdrawn 
from the scene of the passage. In other words, the “I” is at most implied here 
and, for all we know, could have turned into a “we” in the process, because the 
addressee, the “us” mentioned within the address, could be evoked by both an 
“I” and a “we.” Second, it suggests that this implied “I” – if we momentarily 
choose to accept the “I” to be implied within the address of the “us” and thus to 
“count” as an “I” – is addressing the reader directly. This indicates we are no 
longer in an apostrophic position of overhearing and thus not dealing with a 
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lyrical I for the way it functions in the text, but, at most, with a lyrical I in the 
formal sense, for being the voice of a poem.129 
These various guises in which the “I” in Borges’ poem manifests itself 
suggest that it cannot be qualified as a general and universal singular for the way 
it operates. Hence, the difference between, on the one hand, the universal 
singular “I” that, within Derrida’s reading of Kant is dealt with in terms of a 
presence to the self that conditions language and, on the other hand, the literal 
uttering of the “I” through speech is foregrounded here as the “I” of literal 
speech is not general, because at times it is literally absent or, is present but then 
shifts back and forth from lyrical to non-lyrical. Nor is this poetical “I” singular 
per se, because once it is implied within the address of the “us,” we can never be 
sure whether if it has not shifted into the plural “we.” This is why I propose that, 
if we momentarily stop and think through this difference between the 
philosophical figure of the “I” as a general singular and the poetical-literal “I” 
that speaks as constitutive of the difference between language and speech, 
Derrida’s claim in the third line of the passage above that the figure of the “I” is 
always implied, even when the word “I” is lacking, becomes problematic when 
read in a poetical vein.  
First, because this implied “I”, due to the fact that it is always implied, 
cannot belong to the literal “I” of speech that is uttered. Hence, it may at best 
correspond to the universal singular “I” that Derrida interrogates in autotelic 
terms, as the power to present a presence to itself. Yet, the concept of an always 
implied “I” in autotelic terms cannot be reconciled with the idea that the implied 
“I“ in question, because it is implied, would then have to be spoken for, 
whispered, so to speak, by the one that does not speak, because it makes the 
notion of “self” within this “presence to itself” dependent on another “I” as 
external to the “I” itself; that is, as caught up within a conceptualization of 
language as distinct from concrete speech. This, of course, is a fundamental 
distinction in Benveniste’s thinking through of subjectivity in language and the 
very reason why he does not only understand the figure of the “I” in autotelic 
terms but also in terms of deixis. Moreover, we can now imagine the “I” that 
speaks, or whispers, the “I” that does not speak, as an “I” that does not speak 
either, but that is spoken by yet another “I” that might or might not speak. Here 
the concept of the “I” as a universal singular, begins to reel, which suggests the 
notion of “presence to the self” implied within Derrida’s philosophical 
                                                 
129 For an instructive overview of the different functions of the apostrophe see: Jonathan Culler, 
The Pursuit of Signs, Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction (New York: Cornell University Press, 
2002), 135-154. See also: Op poëtische wijze, handleiding voor het lezen van poëzie, ed., Van 
Alphen, Ernst, (Bussum, Coutinho, 2006), 23-35.  
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conceptualization of the implied “I” must be read, from within a poetical reading 
strategy, as always already a “presence to the other.” Hence, the notion of ‘self’ 
can only be conceived of as pointing to a non-marked off entity, a fluidity of 
interconnected bodies of speech. 
Apart from my reservations concerning Derrida’s philosophical 
interrogation of the figure of the “I” as a universal singular through an 
alternative and poetical reflection on the differences between the lyrical I as 
such, the formal lyrical I and the conceptualization of an implied I, it is 
meaningful to note that there are yet two other specific “I” ’s to be distinguished 
within Borges’ poem. On the one hand, there is the “I” implied with the “I 
think,” as in “I think of a tiger.” On the other hand, there is the “I” implied 
within the “I dream you.” This “I dream you” is conveyed as follows in the last 
part of the first stanza: 
 
 In vain the convex oceans and the deserts 
spread themselves across the earth between us; 
from this one house in a far-off seaport 
in South America, I dream you, follow you, 
oh tiger on the fringes of the Ganges. 
 
The “I dream you” offers yet another way of imagining the tiger, namely 
through some sort of dream-language. It is in this dream-language that the “I” in 
question does not perform a form of presence to itself, but a presence to the 
other. In fact, if we agree that it is the dream that allows the self-critical 
conscience – or what Freud called the ego – to be subdued, we could infer that 
the “I” within the “ I dream you” is here no longer hindered by the “working 
through” of the laws of inherited social and cultural standards, naturalized, as it 
were, by the traditional Human-Animal opposition implied within an “I think.” 
Rather, the “I” dissolves within the dream, upsetting thereby in yet another way 
the whole conception of the figure of the “I” as a universal singular that 
performs a presence to the self. Thus, contrary to the “I” implied within an “I 
think,” and in line with a poetical thinking through of the concept of an implied 
“I” in Derrida’s philosophical interrogation of the figure of the I” as a general 
singular, we can here no longer “speak of” a fixed and marked-off self either. In 
other words, the “I” within the “I dream you” not just resists being qualified as a 
general singular “I” because it shifts back and forth from lyrical to non-lyrical, 
but also, I suggest, because the “of” – as in “I dream of you” – is missing. This 
holds for the original Spanish as well, in which “dreaming of” is grammatically 
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registered as “soñar con,” which would literally denote “dream with,” but 




As we have seen, Derrida reflects on Kant, who reads language as conditioned 
by a general singular “I” and then understands its functioning primarily in 
autotelic terms, whereas Benveniste also understands language as that which 
conditions deixis captured through speech. Notwithstanding these significant 
differences, both theorists thus share an understanding of the figure of the “I” 
not so much as a piece of, but as an aptitude of language that conditions 
subjectivity. This begs the question, in which way both theorists, but especially 
Derrida, conceive of the relation between the figure of the “I” within speech, on 
the one hand, and as a condition for language, on the other. Let us address this 
question by zooming in on what Benveniste has to say about the figure of the “I” 
as a general singular. 
 
Now these pronouns are distinguished from all other designations a 
language articulates in that they do not refer to a concept or to an 
individual.  
There is no concept “I” that incorporates all the “I’s” that are 
uttered at every moment in the mouths of all the speakers, in the sense that 
there is a concept “tree” to which all the individual uses of tree refer. The 
“I,” then, does not denominate any lexical entity.130 (emphasis in original) 
 
In this passage, Benveniste understands the figure of the “I” as a general 
singular in the “true” sense: it cannot be conceptualized and does not refer to a 
concept or to an individual, but, as it does not denominate any lexical entity, 
stands outside of speech as a purely grammatical function, as an always implied 
“I” without conceptual content. Hence, Derrida’s outlook on language is tied 
together with that of Benveniste because the figure of the “I” is viewed as a 
condition for language and thus posited, somehow, outside of or external to 
language, which registers language as a philosophical concept that can be 
abstracted from speech as a system of signs. For now, it is not my aim to contest 
the obvious possibility of this abstraction itself. Rather, I wish to use Borges’ 
poem to examine how it impinges itself upon Derrida’s framework and his 
subsequent reading of Heidegger in order to read against it and thicken the  
                                                 
130 Ibid., 226. 
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A good point of departure for exploring this complex matter seems to be to 
retrace how the poem invites a reflection on the nature of language through the 
opposition between a factional and a fictional tiger. As we have seen, the way in 
which this opposition is conveyed and complicated suggests language’s natural 
(fictional) disposition and makes it lack the power to lay bare the underlying 
(factional) truth of its words. Hence, on a thematic-conceptual level the nature of 
language conveyed in Borges’ poem may be qualified as deceptive for the 
insistent suggestion of correspondence with the factional tiger that every other 
fictional tiger inspires. This deceptive quality of language reaches its most dense 
peak whenever there is an “I” that speaks, lyrical or otherwise, which make it 
seem as if language could present itself, of itself, as disclosing, as being at one 
with the essentially human. In this respect, the deceptiveness of language played 
out in Borges’ poem draws on a particular allegorical notion of language as a 
veil. This allegorical notion of language, however, is simultaneously evoked and 
shattered in the poem and thus could be said to be deceptive in its own right.  
First, literally first, we are seduced into identifying a lyrical I with an 
essentially human being. I would qualify this as an allegorical operation because 
the suggestion of correspondence between a lyrical I and a human being here 
comes to function as a catalyst for entering into the impossible figure of a linear 
strategy of approximation, which, as I discussed in my second chapter, thrives 
on the old misconception of language as an allegorical construct all the same. By 
implication, the “I” in question here is not a general singular, but, as a result of a 
particular allegorical reading of language shifts into a general singular and is 
read as the most condensed sustained metaphor of the human subject. This shift 
itself is the shift in focus from language as it is used, speech, to philosophically 
conceptualizing language as an abstract system of signs. The problem this shift 
conveys is that we are thus presented with a reading of both the figure of the “I” 
as a general singular, on the one hand, and language, on the other, as no longer 
standing in metaphorical relation to one another. In short, the figure of the “I”, 
once conceptualized as a general singular within an allegorical reading – and 
this is the problem with Derrida’s autotelic reading – does not so much illustrate, 
but kill off its supposed metaphorical power, which ultimately results in the two 
concepts, the figure of the “I” and “language” being read in a synecdochical vein 
as perfectly congruent substitutes, which causes the conditionality upon which 
the distinction rests to evaporate.  
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At the same time, in the poem, the idea of language as a veil, as an 
allegorical construct, is shattered, because ultimately its implied strategy of 
linear approximative identification is deemed untenable as we are offered an 
opening towards an alternative strategy of the unnamed. This “shattering” of the 
idea of language as a veil by opening up space for a strategy of the unnamed 
offers a different perspective on the nature of language as deceptive, whereby 
language is no longer understood as a veil but as a performative instance that 
calls into being. This does not imply, however, that we should now read this 
performativity as some sort of corrective measure applied to an allegorical 
conception of language. Rather, instead of reading the performative character of 
language the poem brings to bear as effectuating a reverse shift from 
philosophical thinking of language as an abstract system of signs towards a 
poetical thinking of language for the way it is used, I choose to read it as 
pointing to the problem of registering language as a philosophical system of 
signs for the thinking through of nonhuman subjectivity since it causes the 
nonhuman entity to be read in terms within which the figure of the human is 
always already inscribed. 
With respect to this issue, I argue that Derrida’s treating of language as a 
philosophical system of signs that can be abstracted from speech raises a 
problem for his exposition of the general singular “I” as traditionally an “I 
Think.” The reason is that an understanding of language as a system of signs 
that can be abstracted from speech implies that without speech there would be 
no such thing, no such system of signs we refer to as language. We can speak, 
our bodies can speak, but we cannot “language.” There simply is no verb that 
allows us to speak language, we can only speak and talk “about” language. In 
this light, thinking through animal subjectivity seems to require a 
counterintuitive leap of faith because it forces us to let go of any philosophical 
idea of language on a conceptual level and to focus instead on a heterogeneous 
multiplicity of languages, of intertwining and overlapping structures of speech. 
In other words, first there is embodied speech, only then there is the possibility 
of abstracting language as a system of signs. Hence, instead of working within 
the language - speech distinction we would have to understand language as 
embodied speech. It is here that I diverge from Derrida since the figure of the 
“I” loses its non-conceptual status precisely when we start thinking “about” the 
animal for always already inscribing the human within our thinking. In other 
words, whereas the distinction between language and speech implies language to 
be philosophically conceived of as an abstract system of signs, as a technology 
that is external to the human being, the poetical performativity of speech as 
embodied expression and not primarily as something from which language as a 
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philosophical system of signs can be extrapolated, has appeared to defy the non-
conceptuality of the philosophical “I,” because the philosophical “I” can only 
think of the animal in terms of “aboutness.”   
 
      * 
 
I have now concluded that Derrida’s interrogation of the figure of the “I” as a 
general singular is bound up with a view on language as a system of signs that is 
understood in an allegorical vein. To put it somewhat crudely, Derrida, in his 
valuable critique on the philosophical tradition, does not problematize the idea 
of the figure of the “I” as a general singular beyond delivering a critical 
reservation on the traditional reading of the figure of the “I” as always, and 
unfortunately so, an “I Think.” This is, of course, a very important philosophical 
gesture. It creates space for disengaging the figure of the “I” from the “I Think” 
and allows for rethinking the figure of the “I” as a condition for response, 
opening up an immense field we are only beginning to explore today. At the 
same time, Derrida’s autotelic, rather than deictic concern with the figure of the 
“I” as a condition for response still does nothing to radically contest, on the one 
hand, the figure of the “I” as a general singular, and, on the other, the 
inextricable taking up of language allegorically; that is, as a philosophical 
system of signs that would be perfectly interchangeable with conceptualizing the 
figure of the “I” as a general singular. In other words, the figure of the “I” in 
Derrida shifts from being a condition for language towards being at one with it, 
which introduces an irresolvable loop within his framework.  
For this reason, I will now explore the way in which this loop affects 
Derrida’s complex line of thought on the question of response, first, by looking 
at what he problematized as this other general singular, the animal, and which he 
subsequently proposed to put under erasure by imaginatively substituting it with 
the neologism animot. Second, by looking at what his Benveniste-inspired 
adherence to the figure of the “I” in terms of conditionality means for his 
articulation of language as a philosophical concept and, consequently, for the 
exploration of subjectivity within his deconstructive reading of Heidegger.  
 
 
4. The “I” and the Animot  
 
In the first chapter of The Animal That Therefore I am Derrida introduces the 
neologism animot for the first time. The word animot is a pun on the word 
animal – Derrida aims to have the plural heard in the singular. According to 
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Derrida, the animot, contrary to what the tradition of the “I Think” has forever 
defined as the general singular animal, designates “a heterogeneous multiplicity 
of living creatures” and, in that capacity, allows for a reconsideration of the 
notion of response, which Heidegger (and the wider tradition he represents) 
denied the animal. This is why Derrida proposes to imaginatively substitute the 
word animal with the word animot, which not only enables him to work out a 
specific way of opening up to the notion of response, but, eventually, also leads 
him to conclude that the capacity to respond might not be distinguished so 
absolutely from the capacity to react as Heidegger has suggested.  
This begs the following questions: first, how does Derrida envisage the 
animot as potentially opening up to the notion of response in a way the general 
singular animal cannot; and, second, what are the implications of introducing the 
neologism animot while remaining indebted to setting it off against what I have 
now come to consider Derrida’s problematic critique of the figure of the “I” as a 
general singular in autotelic rather than deictic terms? The third question I wish 
to pose is whether we can think of a different angle to read the Human-Animal 
opposition. This different angle must not only enable us to address the specific 
way in which Derrida, through the notion of animot, destabilizes Heidegger’s 
absolute distinction between reaction and response. It must also confront 
Derrida’s ultimate negation of this distinction as absolute in a manner that 
allows for breaking free from the implied continuity of the Human-Animal 
opposition on which it relies.  
With respect the first two issues, it is important to note that when Derrida 
develops his idea of animot and the way in which it might open up to the notion 
of response, he sketches what, at first glance, appears to be a level playing field 
for both the figure of the “I” and the animal. Indeed, he begins his 
deconstructive reading of Heidegger by framing both figures as general 
singulars. This affords both terms some sort of positional equality with regard to 
one another: 
 
It happens that there exist, between the word I and the word animal all 
sort of significant connections. They are at the same time functional and 
referential, grammatical and semantic. Two general singulars to begin 
with: the I and the animal designate an indeterminate generality in the 
singular and by means of the definite article. (49) 
 
The positional equality afforded both the general singular “I” and the animal as 
a general singular in the above passage might lead one to expect that Derrida 
critiques the figure of the animal as a general singular in very much the same 
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manner as he did the traditional philosophical figure of the “I”. Yet, at the end of 
the very first chapter of The Animal That Therefore I Am, Derrida not so much 
critiques what he defines as this other general singular, the animal, in autotelic 
terms but primarily finds fault with the name animal:  
 
 Whenever “one” says “The Animal,” each time a philosopher, or anyone 
else, says “The Animal” in the singular and without further ado, claiming 
thus to designate every living thing that is held not to be human (man as 
rational animal, man as political animal, speaking animal, zōon logon 
echon, man who says “I” and takes himself to be the subject of a 
statement that he proffers on the subject of the said animal, etc.), well, 
each time the subject of that statement, this “one” this “I,” does that he 
utters an asinanity (bêtise). He avows without avowing it, he declares, just 
as a disease is declared by means of a symptom, he offers up for diagnosis 
the statement “I am uttering an asinanity.” And this “I am uttering an 
asinanity” should confirm not only the animality that he is disavowing but 
his complicit, continued, and organized involvement in a veritable war of 
the species. (31) 
 
As we have seen, on the one hand, Derrida delivers a critique on the figure of 
the “I” as traditionally an “I Think” and, consequently, as too narrow a concept. 
This fundamental insight allows him to reframe the figure of the “I” by looking 
at it in terms of the ability to respond and to contemplate what response might 
amount to apart from thinking. On the other hand, and herein lies a discrepancy, 
the term Derrida highlights in the above passage as this other general singular, 
the animal, is not so much registered as too narrow a concept, but as a word that 
is so horrific because it is a general singular and therefore complicit with no less 
than a veritable war on the species. Let it be noted in passing that Derrida here 
not just places the violence lodged in the word animal in a philosophical 
tradition but explicitly suggests this violence to be implicated whenever “anyone 
else” speaks of the animal as well. The point here, however, is that in view of 
this difference in critical treatment of both terms as general singulars, it should 
not come as a surprise that Derrida focuses on the general singular animal as the 
most urgent point of departure for thinking through the ability to respond and all 
that this implies.  
In the following passage, Derrida succinctly conveys the problem with the 
general singular (the) animal. He does so by pointing out that the conceptuali-
zation of the animal as a general singular must be placed in an age old 
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philosophical tradition that has registered the animal as a general singular for 
being deprived of language and, hence, from a response. 
 
Animal is a word that men have given themselves the right to give. These 
humans are giving it to themselves, this word, but as if they had received 
it as an inheritance. They have given themselves the word in order to 
corral a large number of living beings within a single concept: “The 
Animal,” they say. And they have given it to themselves, this word, at the 
same time according themselves, reserving for them, for humans, the right 
to the word, the naming noun (nom), the verb, the attribute, to a language 
of words, in short to the very thing that the others in question would be 
deprived of, those that are corralled within the grand territory of the 
beasts: The Animal. All the philosophers we will investigate (from 
Aristotle to Lacan, and including Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, and 
Levinas), all say the same thing: the animal is deprived of language. Or 
more precisely, of response, of a response that could be precisely and 
rigorously distinguished from a reaction; of the right and power to 
“respond” and hence of so many other things that would be proper to man. 
(32) 
 
As becomes clear from the above passage, this age old philosophical tradition 
has held, and most conspicuously so in Heidegger, that the animal, contrary to 
the human, is deprived of the ability to respond and can merely react. This idea, 
in turn, is centred on the belief that the animal does not have the ability to 
deceive, which, according to Derrida, is always already implied within the 
notion of response. In a complex reading of Lacan on the difference between 
pretence and lying in the third chapter of The Animal that Therefore I Am, 
Derrida has convincingly argued that the animal cannot be deprived of the 
quality to deceive but that this matter must remain fundamentally un-decidable. 
In fact, as we will see, it is precisely this notion of deception that will be key to 
Derrida’s use of the animot to read against the clear-cut distinction between 
reaction and response in Heidegger.  
To better grasp the specific way in which Derrida’s proposed substitution 
of the general singular animal with the neologism animot informs his 
deconstructive reading of Heidegger, let me bring into focus what, for the 
purposes of my current project, is essential to Heidegger’s complex position on 
the animal. In my view, Richard Iveson has formulated this position most aptly. 
I choose not to paraphrase Iveson here, but to quote his position on Heidegger in 
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full because I need both the specificity of its wording and its comprehensiveness 
to touch on all the relevant aspects we will need to address: 
 
In the fourth chapter of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, and 
via the work of the biologists Hans Driesch and Jakob Johann von 
Uexküll, Heidegger argues that the nonhuman animal is excluded from the 
worlding of world as a necessary result of its captivation (Benommenheit), 
that is to say, “(c) aptivation is the condition of possibility for the fact 
that, in accordance with its essence, the animal behaves within an 
environment but never within a world” (FCM 239). This is because, as far 
as Heidegger’s animal is concerned, there can never be anything beyond, 
nor any differentiation within, the disinhibiting ring which marks the 
absolute limit of her environmental capture. As a result of this essential 
undifferentiated absorption (Eingenommenheid), “the animal” can never 
apprehend (“have”) “its” own captivation- that is, can never apprehend 
“its” own capture within a set- and hence “it” is poor-in-world (weltarm).  
 
The condition of possibility of world, withheld as we have seen from the 
animal, “is” precisely the “having” of captivation as such, that is, the 
apprehension of the undisconcealedness of Being as undisconcealedness 
(i.e. of the withdrawal of Being). In other words, the human “is” only in 
this having of the “as” –structure (die ‘als’ –Struktur), which is the 
condition of possibility for the logos, as it is only in having the “as” that 
the human is given to apprehend beings as beings- the wonder that beings 
are which is the worlding of world- and thus, beyond the captivation of 
the disinhibiting ring, to perceive itself as an (individuated) being. 131 
 
As we can infer via Iveson, Heidegger claims that the animal, because it is 
deprived of the ability to respond, does not have language and thus cannot be 
thought in terms of being “as such,” a logic that ultimately allows him to 
attribute the animal, one the one hand, and the human, on the other, a different 
ontological status. What Derrida aims at in his deconstructive reading of 
Heidegger, then, is precisely a renegotiation of the ontological abyss Heidegger 
has put in between the human and the animal. He does so, first, by rejecting the 
idea of the animal as a general singular and proposing to put in under erasure by 
                                                 
131 Richard Iveson, “Animals in Looking-Glass World: Fables of Überhumanism and 
Posthumanism in Heidegger and Nietzsche.” In: Humanimalia: A Journal of Human/Animal 
Interface Studies, volume 1, number 2 (winter 2010), 49-50. 
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imaginatively substituting it with the neologism animot.132 Hence, the way in 
which Derrida envisages the animot to open up the notion of response must be 
understood as an opening up to at least a consideration of the possibility of what 
Heidegger would call – but denied – the being “as such” of the animal. Second, 
Derrida questions Heidegger’s rigid distinction between reaction and response in 
a particular way; namely, through a contemplation on whether the animot and its 
leaving of marks and traces could not be viewed as conveying the capability of 
deception, as just another way of responding. 
With respect to both issues, it is important to observe that Derrida remains 
indebted to approaching the Human-Animal opposition in Heidegger from the 
same vantage point as the tradition he traces has done since time immemorial, 
namely in terms of the relation between reaction and response. This framework 
is – in accordance with his autotelic understanding of the figure of the “I” as a 
general singular – still reliant on taking up language in a profound allegorical 
sense. As I concluded before, such a traditional framing fails to account for the 
way in which the figure of the “I” shifts from being posited as a condition for 
language towards simultaneously being at one with language whenever the role 
of language is exclusively thought as a philosophical system of signs that may 
be abstracted from bodily speech. 
In fact, I would argue, it is the specific quality of deception implied within 
such an allegorical outlook on language, this notion of veiling, covering and, 
alternatively, uncovering, that not merely informs the traditional notion of 
response, but that, given Derrida’s contemplations on the animot and its marks 
and traces to be covered or uncovered, remains key to his argument in a most 
literal way. Admittedly, we do not have to read Derrida’s language of marks and 
traces in a literal way, especially not since Derrida has in mind the metaphorical 
language of marks and traces that he uses to deconstruct the metaphysics of 
presence we discussed earlier. Yet, even if we choose not to read Derrida in such 
a literal manner, the allegorical outlook on language within Derrida’s framing is 
not destabilized. Rather, it seems as if the allegorical outlook implied within the 
difference between language and speech in Derrida brings forth a potentially 
endless deferral of binary oppositions whereby the question of the animal is 
alternatively traced in terms of the Human-Animal, Reaction-Response and 
Presence-Absence. In other words, language, both in Heidegger and Derrida, can 
only be attributed to a body if it is defined in traditional allegorical terms, as 
betraying some sort of mysterious extracorporeal essence; the Cartesian essence, 
if you will, of the “I Think” always already implied once we set the nonhuman 
                                                 
132 “I’ll do it several times but each time that, henceforth, I say “the animal” I’ll be asking you to 
silently substitute animot for what you hear.” Ibid., The Animal That Therefore I Am, 47. 
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other – whether conceived of as animal or animot – against the figure of the “I” 
as a general singular caught up within a one-sided autotelic understanding. 
This begs the question, first, how to confront the category of the human as 
other than a general singular still tied up with the traditional “I Think” for being 
conceived of in autotelic terms. Second, it asks for a further exploration of the 
notion of animot, not just of the way in which it supposedly opens up to the 
possibility of the “as such” of the animal, but more specifically of the way in 
which it evolves from Derrida’s as yet unquestioned adherence to the general 
singular human as not primarily problematic for its name. In order to do justice 
to the complexity of these interrelated issues, I will now, rather than dealing 
with each question separately, try to address them in conjunction. Let me start 
by zooming in on the role the animot plays in Derrida’s renegotiation of 
Heidegger’s position on the rigid distinction between reaction and response, 
which, as we have inferred via Iveson, is centred on the animal’s captivity and 
its subsequent lack of the “as such” structure.  
  
     * 
 
After broaching the question if the rigid distinction between reaction and 
response in Heidegger can be maintained, Derrida goes through great pains to 
question the uniqueness of the quality to respond. Indeed, in the two citations 
below, Derrida interrogates the way in which the philosophical tradition defined 
response by speculating on whether the ability of animals to cover their tracks or 
erase their traces cannot be understood as a way of responding. 
 
As we shall see, even those who, from Descartes to Lacan, have conceded 
to the animal some aptitude for signs and for communication have always 
denied it the power to respond-to pretend, to lie, to cover its tracks or 
erase its own traces. (33, italics in text)  
 
Having or not having traces at one’s disposal so as to be able to 
dissimulate [brouiller] or erase them, in such a manner as, it is said, some 
(man, for example) can and some (the animal, for example, according to 
Lacan) cannot do, does not perhaps constitute a reliable alternative 
defining an indivisible limit. (33, italics in text)  
 
In the first quotation, Derrida’s critique on the philosophical tradition betrays an 
explicit literal rather than a metaphorical understanding of the animal’s capacity 
to cover its tracks or erase its traces, which is a matter I will address shortly. For 
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now, suffice it to say that Derrida posits that we can never know if the animal is 
not using its marks and traces as just another deceptive language, which is why 
language, the ability to respond, to deceive, cannot be distinguished absolutely 
from a reaction. Hence, the question of response must remain undecidable and, 
therefore, response cannot be qualified as exclusively and essentially human as 
Heidegger suggested.  
Of course, such a deconstructive reading of Heidegger is an important 
gesture, as it seems to once and for all settle the question on whether language 
can be defined as the decisive marker separating the human from the animal in 
essentialist terms. At the same time, however, Derrida’s conclusion on the 
undecidability of the difference between reaction and response opens up a whole 
different can of worms, since it would imply that we might have to revise the 
juridical conception of responsibility on which our traditional conception of 
personhood has been built.133 My immediate purpose here, however, is to 
explore what precisely informs Derrida’s conclusion on the undecidability 
between reaction and response, which, albeit a solid argument in itself, I find 
problematic; first, for the way it is arrived at through the notion of animot; and 
second, for the specific branch of ontology on which it is centred and from 
which I seek to get away from by bringing in Heidegger’s third, the stone. 
On the one hand, Derrida deconstructs Heidegger’s position on the rigid 
distinction between reaction and response and radically redefines response. But, 
on the other hand, he still operates from within a traditional philosophical 
framework, because he stills follows Heidegger and the wider tradition he 
critiques in registering response and, hence, deception, as key to distinguishing 
between different categories in essentialist terms. The reason I refer to these 
terms as essentialist is that the Human-Animal opposition implied within 
thinking through the difference between reaction and response still constitutes a 
binary, while, as a matter of principle, we cannot have a binary opposition that is 
not framed in essentialist terms unless we would have a positive knowledge of 
what those terms mean. To put this complex matter in a somewhat 
oversimplified way: Derrida works from within the same preordained 
framework as Heidegger, and the fact that he reaches a different conclusion does 
nothing to upset this traditional framework and; indeed, he thus ultimately 
reinforces it.  
                                                 
133 For an instructive introduction to Derrida’s thinking on responsibility that is not centered on 
the distinction between reaction and response but understood in terms of what Derrida calls the 
Aporia of the Law, see: “Derrida: The Impossible Origins of Responsibility.” In: François 
Raffoul, The Origins of Responsibility (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 282-299. 
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By implication, Derrida’s proposed imaginary substitution of the animal 
with the animot as a possible alternative to the general singular animal and as a 
way of opening up to the possibility of the animal “as such” becomes suspect. In 
short, Derrida’s notion of animot may put the animal under erasure but not the 
Human-Animal opposition itself. In this respect, and in light of Derrida’s 
explicit literal understanding of the language of traces and marks in the citations 
quoted above, the proposition to imaginatively substitute the animal with the 
animot becomes a symptom of an allegorical reading that ultimately re-installs 
the Human-Animal opposition. When he finally arrives at his conclusion, he has 
already taken for granted that he is speaking of certain animals: those that leave 
tracks and/or erase their tracks as a way of deceiving their enemies. In other 
words, Derrida has, in his valuable critique on a philosophical tradition that 
registers the deceptive quality of language as a unique and, therefore, essentially 
human phenomenon, taken the notion of language here as deceptive in terms of 
tracks and traces in a most straightforward allegorical sense, without accounting 
for the paradoxical status of his conceptualization of language as both at one 
with and a condition for the ability to respond. 
Of course, this does not mean that those animals that cover or veil their 
traces are performing allegorical operations. Rather, it suggests that their 
“literal” use of signs is read allegorically in Derrida’s critical reading of the 
philosophical tradition that Heidegger represents. This allegorical procedure, 
albeit testifying to the fact that the quality to respond might not be such an 
exclusively human affair after all, brings to mind the procedure we witnessed in 
my analysis of Animal Farm, whereby only certain animals, the most humanlike 
ones, could respond to the humans. Not only does this line of thought seem to 
run contrary to Derrida’s own notion of animot, but while seemingly doing away 
with the Human-Animal opposition on one level, it also brings a categorization 
of difference into play that causes the Human-Animal opposition to be 
surreptitiously reintroduced in the most essentialist terms on another.  
To be sure, the problem with Derrida’s foregrounding of the 
undecidability between reaction and response is not that this conclusion is not 
“true” from a philosophical point of view. Indeed, his argument is very 
convincing and I fully agree with it. Rather, the problem with Derrida’s 
conclusion on this undecidability is that it installs an argument that, ultimately, 
hinges on very much the same undecidability that characterized the scientific 
research on the animal’s capacity to suffer, which I sketched and analysed in the 
previous chapter. In short, the question of response is indeed undecidable. But 
not so much because certain animals may or may not cover their traces, whether 
literally or metaphorically, but because Derrida’s conclusion on this 
204 
 
undecidability ultimately raises the question of consciousness, the traditionally 
primary asset of human language, even while deconstructing the traditional 
Human-Animal opposition itself. 
This dynamic, I propose, may be attributed to what causes Derrida to 
introduce the neologism animot as an adequate way to deconstruct the 
ontological deprivation of the animal in Heidegger in the first place; namely, his 
understanding of the figure of the “I” in autotelic terms and his subsequent one-
sided focus on the general singular animal. In other words, finding fault with the 
word animal as a general singular and proposing to imaginatively substitute it 
with the animot is not enough if envisaging the figure of the “I” as a general 
singular to an important extent remains unquestioned. More than that, precisely 
because it is only questioned from within an autotelic understanding of the 
figure of the “I”, it is uncritically transposed to certain animals and, therefore, 
awkwardly reductive.  
In my reading, Derrida’s argumentation is simultaneously successful and 
flawed. He has framed his argument ultimately, but effectively a priori, in 
traditional terms, as a problem of demarcation that hinges on an undecidability 
about what may be considered human and what may be considered animal by 
looking at capacities, in this case the capacity to respond, however loosely, or 
creatively defined. Thus, the way in which the question of response is framed in 
Derrida results in a reinvigoration of the traditional Human-Animal opposition 
because of the allegorical outlook on language implied within his analysis. But 
also, I suggest, because it is precisely his not merely metaphorical but also 
literal thinking of the animot in terms of marks and traces that effectuates what I 
consider to be a one-sided ethological strand at the core of Derrida’s thinking. In 
short, thinking in terms of marks and traces as assets to be attributed to certain 
humanlike beings betrays a concern with the behaviour and organisation of a 
particular selection of the animal domain and harks back to looking at the 
question of the animal from a biological perspective. However important it is to 
learn more about animals, such a reductive focus on demarcation not only 
reiterates what Iveson in his comment succinctly conveyed as Heidegger’s 
concern with environment, on the one hand, and with world, on the other, but 
effectively veils what should really be at stake and therefore cannot but result in 
forever being locked up in the Human-Animal opposition, even whilst 





For this reason, I propose that what should really be at stake here is not how to 
deconstruct the traditional Human-Animal opposition, but how to demarcate the 
category of the animal/animot if we can no longer rely on opposing it to the 
human, which seems to be precisely what happens if, as Derrida concludes, the 
rigid distinction between reaction and response can no longer be maintained. 
This problem does not primarily ask for a deconstruction of the Human-Animal 
opposition by an imaginary substitution of the word animal with the word 
animot. Rather, it asks, first, for a further exploration of the word animot, both 
of the specific way in which it is conveyed within Derrida’s framework and as 
other than as a substitution for the word animal. Second, it asks not only for an 
interrogation of the animal as a general singular, but also for formulating an 
alternative to Derrida’s interrogation of the figure of the “I” as a general 
singular, not so much in terms of the way in which it is conceptualized in 
relation to language, but in terms of how it is used, both within and outside of 
the juridical sphere. Third, I would argue, it asks for bringing in a conceivable 
“third” that allows for the human and the animal to take in a veritable positional 




A good point of departure for exploring these complex matters might be to zoom 
in on the way in which Derrida approaches the problem of the animal as a 
general singular throughout his text, namely as a problem of naming. This is 
Derrida: 
 
The animal is a word, it is an appellation that men have instituted, a name 
they have given themselves the right and the authority to give to the living 
other. (23) 
 
On a very basic level, the reference in the above fragment to the word animal as 
a name is problematic because it suggests the name animal, once substituted 
with the neologism animot, is only substituted with another name. In other 
words, there seems to be no significant difference between using the word 
animot and the word animal, because it would be somewhat ludicrous to 
suppose that when we hear the word animal we are inclined to think of all the 
animals we can and cannot imagine as one and the same general, singular, 
animal. On the contrary, it seems to me that when we hear the word animal we 
immediately imagine an immense variety of creatures we, if only for being able 
to use the particular “language” in which we express ourselves, speak; that is, 
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generally refer to as animal. It is not so much, then, that we are not doing justice 
to “a heterogeneous multiplicity of living creatures” when we generally refer to 
those creatures as animal. Rather, it just happens that speech works by selecting 
and splitting, not within the abstract concept of language, but within itself.  
This is why I now propose we let go of the difference between language 
and speech as a conceptual tool for thinking through the subjectivity of the 
animal other. Instead of exploring subjectivity in language, as Benveniste and 
Derrida have done, I propose we must think through subjectivity as speech. 
Without wanting to fill in how to go about thinking through subjectivity as 
speech, but leaving it open, such a frame presents two concrete advantages. 
First, the continuous selecting and splitting of speech can no longer be 
understood as causing a split between the fictional and the referential “it” 
supposedly veils. There is no longer an “it”, no “language,” that is, that veils. 
Second, since this particular notion of speech cannot be understood in such an 
allegorical vein we avoid getting caught up in the loop we have now identified 
within Derrida’s framework. Instead of a loop, there is only a splitting within 




In my view, the loop in Derrida’s framework is not merely caused by his 
autotelic understanding of the figure of the “I”. It also stems from his finding 
fault with the general singular animal as a form of naming, whereas I conceive 
of our use of the word animal, and consequently, the human, as categories. My 
understanding of the terms “category” and “name” here is not indebted to a 
specific philosophical conceptualization of those terms. Rather, it follows from 
my earlier exploration of those terms in my reading of the bird’s case in Animal 
Farm. If in Animal Farm the name wings was substituted with legs and if the 
demarcation categories were the categories of the human and the animal we may 
now surmise that the difference between categories and names is that, unlike 
names, categories cannot so easily be substituted with one another. In other 
words, affording an entity a different name might very well allow it to be placed 
within a different category, as might happen, for example, with the notion of 
personhood within an expansive model. Categories, however, are formed 
ideologically in relation to the world we believe to inhabit. I must agree with 
David Wood on this point, who, in an essay on an excerpt from Derrida’s The 
Animal That Therefore I Am called “Thinking with Cats,” suggests that what we 
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do when we set the human against the animal is not a matter of naming but of 
categorization:134  
 
But I have doubts about this. The violence lodged in the word Animal is 
not the product of naming. We do not name the creatures of the world 
“animal” or “the animal.” Rather, “animal” is a category, one of the same 
order as “man.” To call it a category rather than a name is important. 
Categories are gross ways in which we (humans) carve up the world. 
(133) 
 
The point here is not that categorization is always also a performative act that is 
more complex than a straightforward philosophical designation, which is a 
matter that has been discussed at length in the previous chapters. Rather, I wish 
to raise an issue here in relation to Derrida’s argumentation concerning the 
animot; namely, that if the word animot helps us to think of animals not in terms 
of a general singular but as designating an incredible variety of living beings, it 
is also true that biology has done exactly that. Ever since Aristotle, it has 
endlessly striven to distinguish, classify and attribute different names to an 
incredible variety of nonhuman beings that it has categorized as either animal, 
plant or (in) organic matter. What is at stake here, then, is not the name animal 
that demarcates, but the demarcation such a category implies. It is noteworthy, 
in this respect, that Derrida does not offer the same treatment to the other pole of 
the Human-Animal opposition he is interrogating: he does not explicitly speak 
about the human as “designating an incredible variety of living beings that we 
have given ourselves the right to call human.” In short, whereas Derrida insists 
on imaginatively substituting the general singular animal with the neologism 
animot in order to point out and, to some extent, fend off, at least verbally, our 
complicit involvement with a horrific and organized injustice that he qualifies as 
no less than a veritable war on the species, the human remains the human.  
This might have something to do, first, with the fact that the human, the 
category human, although each of us is given a name, does not signal such an 
incredible variety of creatures as the category of the animal does. Not just 
because, I would suggest, our physiology is obviously much less diverse, but 
also because any attempt at distinguishing between humans on the basis of even 
the slightest physiological feature or behavioural characteristic within the 
category human, as the histories of women, slaves, colonialism and recent 
genocides have taught us, puts one at risk of entering the dangerous territory of 
                                                 
134 David Wood, “Thinking with Cats.” In: Animal Philosophy, Ethics and Identity, ed. Matthew 
Calarco and Peter Atterton, (London, Continuum, 2008), 129-144. 
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racist bias. In other words, Derrida’s ethological speculation on the animal in 
terms of marks, traces and behaviour cannot be administered to the other pole of 
the equation without upsetting the supposed positional equality – both in 
between and within – he has so generously afforded those poles at the 
beginning. In fact, we can now conclude that the “I” standing, so to speak, for 
the human in this equation not only immediately falls apart when not read within 
an allegorical conception of language, but also that framing the human and the 
animal as two general singulars can only be maintained if one of those general 
singulars is understood as a name instead of a category.  
This is why I now propose to diverge from Derrida, first, by insisting that 
addressing the question of the animal from the perspective of the animal 
necessarily involves a “passing through” rather than a deconstruction of the 
traditional Human-Animal opposition, precisely by looking at both terms as 
uneven categories and not as names. Second, I would argue that looking at the 
question of the animal asks for a framework that is not ontologically predefined 
by a clinging onto and, hence, setting the animal against the figure of the “I” 
conceptualized as a general singular. Let us now reflect on the human and 
animal as categories and try to imagine in which way the category of the human 




The category of the human, of the general singular human, differs from the 
category of the animal as it is necessarily universal; that is, if we aspire to not 
live in a (proto) fascist world. Indeed, to deny this universality would imply 
affording some humans a humanlike, animal status. In fact, I propose that the 
category of the human is, in the first place, at heart, a juridical figure, as Man is 
the same only for the law. In other words, the only way in which the category of 
the human can be sustained for the way in which it is used, is as a legal 
category; or, as Erica Fudge so aptly put it:  
 
In the late eighteenth century the American Declaration of Independence 
formulated the human in a slightly different way by arguing that ‘man’ 
had certain inalienable rights, such as ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness’ (and in the mid-nineteenth century Harriet Taylor Mill was to 
question the limitation of these rights to men). To say that a right is 
inalienable is to say that without those rights human status cannot be; is to 
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say that, if those rights are gone, so too is the human. The human here 
becomes a being with an essential status that is fixed, stable.135 
  
In this respect, the ontological difference between the human and the animal the 
philosophical tradition has established and that Heidegger reaffirmed in his own 
idiosyncratic way, has only partly been contested by Derrida, because he has 
remained indebted to the traditional vocabulary and limited himself to try and 
understand one category in terms of the other. The idea that the animot, a certain 
group of animals, might leave marks and traces in a way the general singular 
animal obviously cannot, does nothing to change this fact. Hence, the way in 
which the notion of animot is developed by Derrida, can never function as a 
lever to open up to the “as such” of this multiplicity of living beings we have 
given ourselves the right to call animal. First, because the resulting contradiction 
in terms would dictate we must do justice to a certain, homogenized and a 
heterogeneous multiplicity in terms of each “individual” being “as such.” 
Second, and more fundamentally still from a practical point of view, because 
setting the animot against the figure of the “I” as a general singular always 
already implies looking at the animot – and I agree here with Erica Fudge – 
exclusively from within, even if not explicitly articulated as such, a juridical 
framework which, under the regime of personhood is centred on a predefined 
ontological difference between the human and the animal.  
Finally, let me conclude that Derrida’s proposed substitution of the 
“name” animal with the “name” animot, rather than opening up to a strategy of 
the unnamed by bringing in a third, as my analysis of Borges’ poem 
demonstrated to be a possible alternative, a beginning of a way out of a 
predefined ontological difference, aligns his project with that of the endlessly 
named species of biology; that is, it gives way to a strategy of the named. 
Derrida has limited himself to questioning the figure of the “I” as a general 
singular, on the one hand, and the figure of the animal as a general singular, on 
the other, while not exploring the figure of the stone in Heidegger’s tri-partition 
and the ontological stage it sets for Heidegger’s denial of response to the animal. 
Returning to Heidegger’s stone, then, which I will now set out to do, might, 
first, provide us with another angle on how to read into the predefined 
ontological difference within both Heidegger and Derrida, so as to, second, 
explore possible alternatives for thinking through animal subjectivity and the 
way in which such subjectivity might be imagined, if at all, within a legal sphere 
not contained by an expansive model. 
 
                                                 
135 Erica Fudge, Animal (London: Reaktion Books, 2002), 63. 
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5. Heidegger’s Stone 
 
Within an ontologically predefined framework it has proved impossible not to 
end up with a demarcation discussion where liminality is negotiated on the basis 
of certain faculties; for example, response, which, as we have seen, is typically 
followed up by a renegotiation on how to interpret these faculties. This 
inescapable mechanism has appeared to characterize the way in which the 
Human-Animal opposition impinges itself upon our modern political, scientific 
and philosophical context, in which the expansive model has appeared to be 
symptomatic of the way this mechanism “translates” to the juridical sphere. This 
begs the question, what, if not in terms of a predefined ontology, might be a 
fruitful way of addressing the question of the animal, other than by placing it in 
binary opposition to the figure of the human, but also other than through the 
substitution of the word animal with the word animot such as proposed by 
Derrida. Again, Borges’ poem might guide us here, especially when we compare 
the way in which the “I” operates the poem with Erica Fudge’s reference to the 
figure of the human: the general singular “I” as fixed and immobile for the way 
it is contained within the juridical sphere.  
The figure of the “I” in Borges’ poem is imagining a tiger at the other end 
of the earth from within the fixed and immobile confinement of a far-off seaport 
house, whereas the tiger it is tracing is forever on the move, prowling around the 
fringes of the Ganges. In other words, the imaginative identification of the figure 
of the “I” at work in the poem could be said to revolve around a sense of 
mobility, whereby the figure of the “I” is registered as immobile and the figure 
of the tiger is registered as mobile. In contrast to this immobile “I,” the tracing 
of the tiger throughout the poem, first by way of a linear strategy of 
approximation, then through what I qualified as an opening up to a strategy of 
the unnamed, and ultimately through some sort of dream-language, suggests the 
occurrence of a multiple, heterogeneous, dividual figure of the “I” in Borges’ 
poem. This multiple, heterogeneous, dividual figure of the “I”, rather than 
conveying an attempt to identify the tiger in linear essentialist terms, betrays an 
insistent exploration at the threshold of the other as the driving force of the 
poem.  
Hence, what I propose the figure of the “I” in Borges’ poem is doing, 
through a combination of its inseparable yet distinct functionalities – and thus 
not through the myth of the general singular individualized figure of the “I” – 
can be illustrated metaphorically as the movements of a blind person groping 
for, with hesitation and uncertainty, and moving along with difficulty, that 
which it has to feel rather than to name, in order not to give or make meaning, 
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but to make sense. In fact, as it is well known that Borges suffered from a 
condition that verged on blindness as he grew older, this sensation lends the 
poem a magical-ambiguous quality, not in the shape of an aesthetic polish that 
can be brushed off, but as constitutive of its performance. In short, Borges’ 
poem confronts us with a performance that re-senses rather than rethinks the 
animal and its subjectivity. This re-sensing does not stand in binary opposition 
to thinking, because thinking here, far from being excluded from this re-sensing, 
appears to operate as one of its modalities. In other words, liminality is not so 
much perceived in terms of the literal physical mobility of the animal re-sensed, 
but operates through the mobilization of the modalities of the dividual figure of 
the “I”. 
This re-sensing splits the identifying party up in two distinct ways. On the 
one hand, ontologically, whereby the figure of the “I” is staged as fixed and 
immobile within the confinement of his house and the tiger is staged as mobile, 
forever moving. In this ontological staging we can see the allegorical figure of 
the “I”, the abstract figure of the human at work, extrapolated, as it were, from 
our being seduced into identifying the writer Borges with the figure of the “I”. 
On the other hand, if we wish to do justice to the multiple, heterogeneous, 
dividual figure of the “I” performing Borges’ poem, and of which, consequently, 
the “I” registered as fixed and immobile is only a modality, the identifying 
party’s supposed (human) subjectivity as ontologically predefined and 
essentialist shatters into a multiplicity whereby mobility seems no longer 
ontologically predefined. Taking my cue from Borges’ poem, then, what I 
propose to do now is to explore whether looking at Heidegger’s tri-partition 
Man- Animal-Stone, in terms of mobility, in both of its emergent forms I have 
now discussed, namely ontologically and non-ontologically, might shed a 
different light on the Human- Animal opposition and offer a way out of the 
limits an ontologically predefined framework poses. 
 To begin with, I suggest we do not take anything for granted and look 
upon Heidegger’s tri-partition Human-Animal-Stone as a strange and arbitrary 
categorization. It is arbitrary in a most fundamental sense: because, as I 
concluded in my second chapter, any categorization is necessarily arbitrary. Yet, 
it is a strange categorization as well, for if we take a closer look at Heidegger’s 
ontological framework; that is, at the way in which Heidegger fills out the 
relation of these respective terms to one another, a fourth terms surfaces, the 
term “world.” In short, the human has world, the animal is poor-in-world and the 
stone is world-less. If we zoom in on this tri-partition in relation to this fourth 
term, it immediately becomes clear that the stone is the odd one out for not 
having world at all. In fact, I would go further and suggest that it is precisely 
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because Heidegger positions the stone as world-less that the human and the 
animal, albeit differing in the way in which they relate to world, can be defined 
in ontological terms in the first place, i.e. in terms of world.  
In this view, the attribution of world-lessness to the figure of the stone 
enables Heidegger to position the Human-Animal opposition within a 
predefined ontological framework and, hence, is much more important to his 
framework than Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Heidegger’s Human-
Animal opposition suggests. This begs the questions, first, why has Heidegger 
chosen the figure of the stone to set up his ontological framework? And second, 
can a reading of the figure of the stone in Heidegger’s tri-partition, other than in 
terms of world, namely, in terms of mobility, provide us with another outlook on 
his framework? 
It is important to note here that if I have just now referred to Heidegger’s 
stone as part and parcel of what must be considered an arbitrary categorization, 
then I do not mean the conservative kind of arbitrariness that plays out the 
binary objective/subjective, since – as I concluded in my second chapter – there 
can never be an objective position from which to categorize. By implication, 
doing justice to Heidegger, one must read this arbitrariness in another way and 
infer that the term stone is not so much chosen subjectively, much less 
randomly, but well-informed. This would suggest that his choice for the stone 
enables him to set up a predefined ontological framework in a way that, let us 
say the plant, cannot. In other words, if Heidegger, within his tri-partition would 
have substituted the stone with the plant and have argued the plant to be world-
less, he would seemingly have arrived at the same conclusion.  
And yet, he has not done so. Thus, we might infer that, first, the figure of 
the stone, for Heidegger, presents us with something that can be put to work so 
as to correspond to something else in a unique way. Second, we may recognize 
that the figure of the stone informs Heidegger’s ontological framework not just 
by affording the human and the animal “world”, but in a manner that eventually 
allows him to further distinguish between kinds of beings and the way in which 
they relate to world, namely as either existing (the human) or merely living (the 
animal). In an effort to further explore the unique position of the stone within 
Heidegger’s framework, let us momentarily take a step back and begin by 
looking at the spheres within which the stone generally manifests itself, both 
traditionally and within everyday language. 
As Jeanne Gaakeer observes, the stone has traditionally served to 





Law is fond of boundaries. On the edges of the village in which I live the 
passer-by comes across two solitary stones. The one reads East of Stone, 
the other West of Stone. Both indicate jurisdictional boundaries from well 
before the time that the country of the Netherlands got its current form, 
both geographically and juridico-politically, as a nation-state. From times 
immemorial such boundary stones of the law have been used to demarcate 
spheres of power, indicating the consequences for the people inside the 
space of their influence, and fending off those deemed outsiders. 
Examples abound. In the Bible, the book Deuteronomy (19:14 and 27:17, 
King James Bible) gives express warnings in order to regulate human 
relations, “Thou shalt not remove thy neighbour’s landmark (i.e., 
boundary stone) which they of old time have set in thine inheritance […],” 
and to make sure that people suffer the consequences of transgression, 
“Cursed be he that removeth his neighbour’s landmark.” In Roman Law, 
the Julian Law on Agrarian Matters, approx. 58 BCE, instructs 




In this passage, Gaakeer points out that the figure of the stone has traditionally 
served as a symbol of liminality to regulate relations between human beings in 
terms of space. And I assume that Heidegger was well aware of this unique asset 
when choosing the stone over, say, the plant. This division of space, however, 
was not so much discursive, but practical in nature as it was concerned with the 
allocation of land, with the physical space in which bodies could lawfully move. 
Hence, if we compare Heidegger’s use of the figure of the stone to the 
traditional use reflected on by Gaakeer, we may observe that Heidegger has not 
so much used the figure of the stone in its traditional-practical sense but 
discursively: to separate the non-living stone from both the living and the 
existing (the animal and the human). The difference between the traditional-
practical division of space, on the one hand, and Heidegger’s modern-discursive 
division of space, on the other, is that even though both divisions install a 
juridical order, the former was not ontologically predefined. In fact, the harsh 
retribution that was promised on unlawfully removing the stone, suggests those 
boundaries were subject to change whenever power-relations demanded a 
different division of space.  
                                                 
136 Jeanne Gaakeer, “Subliminal Tensions in Law and Literature.” In: Liminial Discourses, ed. 
Daniela Carpi and Jeanne Gaakeer, (Berlin and Boston, De Gruyter, 2013), 15. 
214 
 
Now, if we momentarily read the figure of the stone for the way in which 
it is used within our everyday language, in phrases such as: “his face turned to 
stone” or “it is written/engraved in stone,” it becomes clear that in both 
expressions the figure of the stone serves as a token of immobile fixity; as if 
today the figure of the stone has shaken off its arguably more flexible and 
practical status it was once afforded by the tradition to which Gaakeer refers. In 
fact, the latter expression might provide us with a possible clue to where this 
emphasis on the fixity of the stone as ontologically predefined “originates,” if 
explicitly not on the tradition commented on by Gaakeer. Indeed, the latter 
expression almost inevitably calls to mind the Stone Tablets through which 
God’s Law was communicated to the people. Hence, this expression directs our 
attention to the function of the stone not so much within, but before (the 
inauguration of) the traditional juridico-political sphere – in this time before 
time – in which the stone functioned as an intermediary technical device, as the 
hardware, if you will, that enabled God to transmit his text.  
The immobile fixity of the figure of the stone within this biblico-techno-
juridico-political sphere before tradition, at this mythical originary moment, was 
presented as both everlasting and originary, as the laws of the world God’s 
(human) beings inhabited. This implies that the figure of the stone was not used 
in the traditional way Gaakeer invokes, but in very much the same way as 
Heidegger has done, namely as a token for immobile fixity within an 
ontologically predefined framework. Hence, Heidegger’s use of the stone can be 
qualified as non-traditional because he has not worked out a discursive system in 
which the figure of the stone might be re-inscribed within the modern techno-
juridico-political context, but merely substituted, as it were, God’s authority 
with his own and cast the stone aside. In another sense, however, Heidegger’s 
framework remains traditional in that it regulates relations between human 
beings, since the animal, in Heidegger merely living, bears no essential relation 
to the human being but remains separated from it by an ontological abyss.  
For this reason, I will now speculate on what I believe to be the 
implications of what Heidegger has not done with the figure of the stone. I will 
do so by following up on the potential that the traditional use of the figure of the 
stone Gaakeer describes might offer us today. First, by reading against the figure 
of the stone and the specific way in which Heidegger uses its immobility as an 
ontological marker. Second, through an analysis of the figure of the stone in 






The figure of the stone as an example par excellence of fixedness, of 
immobility, is key to Heidegger’s reading. In other words, if it seems that 
Heidegger uses the human to set apart the animal as its ontological other, it is 
even more true that he has used the stone as a figure of the inert, the immobile, 
to bind the human and the animal together. This binding consists of a sharing of 
that which opposes the inert, namely a mobility. Read in terms of mobility, a 
mobility that operates ontologically through the binary immobile/mobile, this 
strategy works to construct the human and animal as alike in that they are – in 
what I consider to be an important in-between moment – after being compared 
to the stone, but before Heidegger distinguishes further between the human and 
the animal, on the same ontological level. It is at this stage, after eliminating the 
stone from the tri-partition, that I propose the problem of differentiating between 
the mobile human and the mobile animal must have presented itself to 
Heidegger. Here, I would suggest, the body, which would have the ability to 
move around, and which binds them together, must be cut out of the equation if 
there is any additional ontological difference to be established. Hence, the 
theory of Dasein, the logos, response, deception, let us say language, and the 
shifting into the background of this bodily connection as potentially a 
constitutive element of a zone of identification.  
 In this view, however, there is something odd going on with Heidegger’s 
position on language, more specifically with the way in which it informs his 
further distinguishing between the human and the animal in additional 
ontological terms. As we have seen before, language, for Heidegger, is 
essentially human and therefore separates the human and the animal 
ontologically, whereby the first exists as a being “as such” and the latter is 
merely living. As a first step towards reading this distinction through a mobility 
that is not defined ontologically, but still on Heidegger’s own terms, I propose 
that within Heidegger’s framework, once he has cast aside the stone, not the 
human and the animal, but mobility is split into being “as such”; that is, into 
existing, on the one hand, and living, on the other.  
Now, if, as I concluded before, language as essentially human does not 
“exist” since we simply cannot define what the essentially human is; and if I 
have now demonstrated through my analysis of the heterogeneous, multiple, 
dividual figure of the “I” in Borges’ poem that speech is, essentially, a mobility, 
the stakes change dramatically. In short, if we choose not to read Heidegger on 
his own terms but in terms of a mobility not ontologically predefined, this would 
suggest that it is neither the animal, nor language, but speech that (merely) lives. 
In fact, it is precisely in this sense that I read language, contrary to Heidegger, as 
essentially nonhuman, and contrary to Derrida, as not essentially nonhuman 
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either. Indeed, in my view, language, in Heidegger, when read through the prism 
of a mobility not ontologically predefined does not “exist” but can only be 
maintained as speech and, as such, must be qualified as both essentially 
nonhuman and living. Paradoxically, this would translate back to Heidegger’s 
framework as being understood, primarily, as essentially animal.  
However, since it is impossible to attribute the animal an essence, I 
propose that we introduce here a different version of Derrida’s animot, namely 
as the embodied mobility of the living other. This notion of the embodied 
mobility of the living other opens up to a reading of this living other as not 
necessarily bound up with what we generally refer to as animal at all. In other 
words, instead of looking at the figure of the animot in allegorical terms, I infer 
that what Derrida’s animot is doing when covering and alternatively uncovering 
its tracks – whether understood literally or metaphorically – is not about 
response/deception, but, quite simply, moving. This alternative interpretation of 
the animal in Heidegger, as a category read in terms of mobility, leads me to 
conclude that the animal in Heidegger, without wishing to definitely qualify it, 
to name it, effaces itself or, better still, does not concern what Iveson in his 
comment referred to as an undisconcealedness; that is, a withdrawal from being, 
but a withdrawal from the animal. In this light, the animal in Heidegger comes 
as close as it gets to the word before the general singular animal, to the therion: 
the mobile body to be hunted. 
Here, the ontological distinction between the human and the animal in 
Heidegger collapses. More than that, it no longer makes sense. Not because 
language is not necessarily essentially human, as Derrida has demonstrated, but 
because it can only be thought of as a non-existing becoming-animal. This 
becoming-animal may, but also may not, be understood in a Deleuzian sense. It 
is Deleuzian because it has nothing to do with what we generally qualify as 
animal. Rather, it may be read as a becoming that “reveals the ontological 
primordiality of the in-between.”137 It is not Deleuzian because it may be 
understood in a far more literal sense; namely, as not yet animal but as a species 
of Therion, in the manner I used the word species in the previous chapter, i.e. in 
a deliberate non-specific way by drawing on the etymological root of the 
Spanish “una especie.” This alternative outlook on the animal in Heidegger does 
not erase the differences between the category of the human, on the one hand, 
and the category of the animal, on the other. By contrast, reading these 
categories in terms of a mobility not ontologically predefined, points to the way 
in which their difference is constituted by the way in which their space is 
                                                 
137 See: Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
trans. Brian Masumi, (London, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 293. 
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defined and contained in the techno-juridico-political sphere of our time. At the 
same time, it suggests that Heidegger’s ontology may be reliant on a confusion 
of what mediaeval philosophers referred to as Metaphysica Generalis with 
Methaphysica Specialis; between being “as such” and being of a certain kind.  
To be sure, setting the stone against both the human and the animal can be 
read – if considered in terms of mobility – as primarily a categorization of the 
being “as such” of the latter two terms, which, consequently, should have 
limited the theoretical space for Heidegger to distinguish between the human 
and the animal to a preoccupation with their being of a certain kind. This, in my 
view, is precisely what happens if we agree that existing in Heidegger does not 
“exist” when his tri-partition is read in terms of a mobility that is not 
ontologically predefined. It is here that we encounter in Heidegger what we have 
come to recognize as a categorization of difference running through all the 
discourses we have explored so far and which, ultimately, in one way or the 
other installed the Human-Animal opposition. In Heidegger, this categorization 
of difference is effectuated by a surreptitious replacement of a traditional 
ontology with a literary strategy, which seemingly enables a further 
distinguishing into ontological levels, a procedure that we usually encounter in 
literary genres that range from the literary fantastic to the postmodern.138 This 
strategy resembles what can be illustrated metaphorically by the unpacking of 
matryoshkas, whereby the human is hierarchically one up in the rank and has the 
ability to look down at the animal below. The animal cannot perceive the human 
but can, at most, perceive what is below as well, which, from the point of view 
of the human in question, can indeed be qualified in Heideggerian terms, namely 
as a captivity.  
* 
 
The question becomes what do living and mobility mean? More concretely, 
what should we make of the idea that the stone does not live for its immobility? 
Indeed, if we momentarily substitute the stone with the plant, we might infer 
that the distinction between living and non-living is not as solid as we generally 
think and as Heidegger’s particular choice for the stone suggests. Let us 
consider, for example, what Luc Ferry has to say about the figure of the plant 
and its relation to living about three ages ago: 
 
At the end of the eighteenth century, life was apt to be defined as “the 
faculty to act according to the representation of a goal” – which is why it 
                                                 




was believed that plants, which cannot move “because they have their 
stomachs in the earth,” were not living beings. This definition no longer 
has a place within the structure of contemporary sciences. It nonetheless 
continues to have meaning from the perspective of a phenomenology of 
the sign of freedom: finalized movement, or action, if one prefers, remains 
for us the visible criteria of animal nature, what distinguishes it from 
unorganized matter, but also from the vegetable world – which is why the 
intermediaries, anemones or carnivorous plants, are still somewhat 
mysterious to us.139 
 
This passage illustrates how the conventional understanding of an 
anthropomorphism, namely as endowing the nonhuman other with essentially 
human attributes, must be viewed, as I concluded in the first chapter, as a 
personification – at most, a trope. In short, the plant might be attributed 
something essentially human, like a stomach, but this attribution does not 
warrant a qualification of it as living, which ruptures the idea of the human and 
the living as strictly bound up with one another. Instead, the categorization of 
the plant into the domain of the non-living results from an anthropomorphism in 
the strict sense, as the supposed immobility of the plant is taken as given to 
imply its non-living. In other words, what my momentary substitution of the 
figure of the stone with the figure of the plant is telling us, is that what matters 
in demarcating the living from the non-living depends both on the specific 
techno-juridico-political sphere we inhabit, and on a concurrent and ontological-
ly predefined conceptualization of mobility.  
As Ferry notes, the idea of a non-living plant has no place in contempo-
rary sciences. This must, of course, be attributed to the fact that science and 
technology, and their marriage in our modern techno-juridico-political context, 
have enabled us to learn more about plants than ever before. In cinema, for 
example, the capacity to permanently record over a longer period of time and 
then to play what has been recorded at a very high speed, by using the narrative 
strategy of compressing time, has allowed us to meticulously visualize the 
mobility of plants and of a vast range of other living materials. In this respect, 
the advance of technology has made it become increasingly problematic to deny 
that the binary mobility versus immobility is a false one. Rather, we are forced 
to acknowledge this binary as performing a function for the conventional 
arbitrary way it operates a demarcation politics and for the specific ontological 
stage that it might set up in accordance with the requirements of the techno-
juridico-political sphere at any give time. But also, I propose, because Ferry’s 
                                                 
139 Luc Ferry, “Neither Man nor Stone.” In: Animal Philosophy, ibid., 148-149. 
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specific example of the changed ontological status of the plant demonstrates that 
pertaining to the category mobile or immobile and, hence, living or non-living, 
would just seem a matter of speed or flow, which opens up space for 
renegotiating the functioning of those latter terms as ontological markers. 
This may be illustrated by contemplating the figure of the sponge, in a 
sense the historical, biological predecessor of the stone. The sponge, it is 
estimated, started moving about five million years ago. Until that time, it was 
immobile for it did not need mobility, because its sustenance circumstances 
were such that it could filter its food out of the water by staying still. In other 
words, in order to live, immobility was key. Thus, from the perspective of the 
sponge back then, mobility did not matter; what did was the context in which it 
found itself and which enabled its sustenance. In fact, leaving the question of 
sustenance aside, if only momentarily, could we seriously argue it was not living 
before it started moving now that scientists have concluded it started moving at 
some point? This question may seem non-rational, and perhaps even 
nonsensical, but it is sensible in the manner I have now come to understand 
sense through my reading of Borges’ poem. Let us therefore contemplate the 
sense of this question. 
If we look at any object in terms of an ontologically predefined mobility 
that is structured on the binary mobile/immobile, let us say at the sponge I use in 
my home, it would seem obvious it is not moving, not living, etc. But, when I 
move from my living room to my kitchen to pick up the sponge from the kitchen 
table to clean the windows, is the sponge not moving towards me as I move 
towards the sponge? Is my ability to perceive the sponge moving towards me, or 
even to perceive the sponge perceiving itself moving towards me as I move 
towards the sponge, an illustration of my being “as such”, an illustration of my 
capacity to deceive because my perception pays no heed to the laws of physics, 
or could it be conceived of as something I do, that I experience, sense and, thus, 
as a law of perception that is – and this is key to my argument – only corrected 
or neutralized as a deception by the laws that are supposed to define me 
ontologically. Of course, this has only been a thought experiment or, better, an 
experiment of sense, a making sense of experience. The fundamental point is 
that to ask the question whether the sponge is not moving towards me as well is 
not to interrogate its mobility, is not to interrogate the laws of physics, if you 
will, but to interrogate its mobility as predefined ontologically; namely, as 
operating on the binary immobile/death, on the one hand, and mobile/living on 
the other. 
Hence, what both Ferry’s example of the figure of the plant and my 
contemplation on the figure of the sponge illustrate is that mobility does not 
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need to be defined ontologically, with immobility, on the one hand, and 
mobility, on the other. Rather, an arguably more convincing case can be made 
for conceiving of mobility as speed, flow, as movement in space, of being as 
sharing this space with others rather than of being in the world. Yet, if today we 
must reject the idea of the plant as not living for its immobility, it is not because 
we have now suddenly let go of living/mobility as ontologically predefined. 
Rather, as Ferry rightfully points out, our modern conception of the living, as 
denoting a capacity for finalized movement and the ability to act freely, is still 
part and parcel of our collective and juridical imagination. In short, the idea of 
the living is still structured around an ontologically predefined conception of 
mobility and the categorizations such a conception implies. In this view, the 
expansive model, with its potentially endless demarcation problem on the 
difference between the human and the animal is, again, only a troublesome 
symptom of a much wider problem. This problem, I suggest, is that we are still 
conceptualizing the living in the ontologically predefined vocabulary of a liberal 
rights discourse, which cannot accommodate a living mobility in terms of speed 
and flow, let alone address the question of the animal from within the juridical 
sphere we inhabit today. Let us further explore this issue through a contempla-
tion of the workings of, on the one hand, the binary living/non-living and, on the 
other, the binary living/dying and the way in which they function within our 
modern techno-juridico-politico context.  
I choose to do so by looking at what Jonathan Safran Foer identified as 
the animal we are most directly involved with today, the animals that we eat. As 
we observed earlier, these animals, which we use for our sustenance, for living, 
for our lifestyle, are, in more than 95% of all cases, factory-farmed animals. 
These are the animals that, whilst qualified ontologically as living, cannot be 
murdered, but can only become the objects of what Derrida in “Eating Well” has 
called a “noncriminal putting to death.” For Derrida, this noncriminal putting to 
death resulted from what he envisaged as the sacrificial discourse of 
carnophallogocentrism. Without wanting to rehearse Derrida’s elaborate and 
complex line of thought on this issue, suffice it to say that what Derrida meant 
by this was a discourse that constructs human subjectivity by allowing for the 
noncriminal putting to death of animals and, hence, of those humans that, at any 
given time, lose their human status and are viewed as animals.   
At first glance, this noncriminal putting to death seems to be an adequate 
description. In light of my present discussion on mobility, however, I find 
Derrida’s specific terminology problematic; first, because his noncriminal 
putting to death performs a revitalization of the ontological operation of the 
binary living/death within his very critique, which ultimately must render it 
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ineffective on a discursive level if not in practice. Second, because the term 
noncriminal revitalizes the vocabulary of a liberal rights discourse with its 
intentional subject. More specifically, it narrows the discussion on the animal 
question down to the punitive sphere of penal law, in which, generally, a wrong 
committed must be intended to be judged as criminal.140 Third, and more 
importantly, because the noncriminal putting to death of animals in factory-
farms today cannot be qualified as criminal, as Derrida’s provocative indictment 
seemingly wants to suggest, since, as we have seen in my second chapter, our 
very laws facilitate it. More specifically, nobody can seriously maintain it is 
noncriminal for being non-intentional. On the contrary, the putting to death of 
animals in the factory-farming-industry is intended from the beginning to the 
end of the process, which suggests, again, that the animal today refuses to be 




In this respect, I believe mobility, as a predefined ontological marker, has come 
back to haunt us today in a most literal way as our factory-farmed animals are 
not (living) animals in any traditional sense. Instead, we have now seen that they 
are always already defined ontologically as non-living, immobile and uniform 
material, both for the discursive and physical spaces in which they are cramped. 
I am not talking here about the literal and metaphorical spaces that enfold them 
and that operate as systems that effectively register their bodies as immobile 
bodies. These “enfoldings” do not just have an impact on those bodies by 
preventing them from moving and by destining them for immobility, but they 
also effectively diminish and alter the spaces their very bodies occupy. If we 
reframe this issue in Heideggerian terms, it is as if these animals are not only not 
allowed to exist, but it is as if they are not even allowed to be captive. In short, 
the processing of the “animal” that concerns us most directly today, and what 
happens within this process, cannot be thought as a noncriminal putting to death, 
because the ontological stage such a critique sets when read in terms of mobility, 
implies the animal has stopped living ever since the invention of factory- 
farming, and thus can no longer can be put to death, let alone be murdered. 
Hence, the figure of the animal contemplated by Heidegger, but also the figure 
of the animot proposed by Derrida, i.e. the figure of the animal as living, no 
                                                 
140 For a classic elaboration on the general tendency to understand law as primarily concerned 
with the punitive sphere and for a convincing argument why law should not be conceived of in 
such a reductive manner, see: H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). 
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longer bears any resemblance to what we must conceive of as the animal for the 
way it is used within our modern techno-juridico-political context.  
Overlooking the stretch from the earliest domestication of animals 
towards the only very recent advent of factory-farming, then, the animal has 
stopped living. It has stopped living in a double sense, ontologically, and in that 
it does not speak to us anymore. In the process of its processing, it has become a 
genetically engineered creature for which no suitable vocabulary, neither 
philosophical, nor juridical, has emerged. Instead, we are still thinking about the 
animal that has not yet withdrawn itself from itself and from the sphere of our 
experience. In fact, perhaps the best way to grasp the status of the “animals” 
today is by citing a supporter of Chelsea Football Club overheard complaining 
about his breakfast at an Amsterdam hotel: “I had a croissant and a carrot for 
breakfast. A carrot is not food, it is what food eats.” In my view, this comment 
illustrates the status of (factory-farmed) animals in a most acute way, namely as 
non-living raw material. At the same time, the idea that food eats is 
astonishingly poetic and, as such, catches us off guard, working to playfully 
complicate the ontological dimension as that which eats is generally conceived 
of as sustaining itself, as living. More importantly, it testifies, once again, to the 
totalitarian streak we identified within our modern discourse on factory-farming. 
This totalitarian streak appears to be constituted by the way in which factory-
farmed animals are demarcated as other than animals as a result of the 
complementary juridical and popular performances of this demarcation, rather 
than because of an underlying philosophical split between factory-farmed 
animals and other animals. On the contrary, we may conclude that within a 
modern animal rights discourse, the animal is still framed in terms that we have 
found to be still very traditional, namely as living.  
The point here, then, is that reading against Heidegger and Derrida as, I 
have done, now seems to require an urgent worrying of the concept of the 
animal in our time. Indeed, if even the animals that we are most directly 
involved with are not the animals we still take them to be, and if our pets are 
anthropomorphized creatures with a humanlike individuality, and hence, can be 
murdered, where on earth do we encounter the animal today? One might argue 
that the living animal we are discursively accommodating may still be 
encountered in wildlife, in those exotic creatures, tigers, for example, that are 
not mediated by human contact. But are there any such creatures left? Of course 
there are, but could they be accommodated under the category animal as it 
stands? Apart from the nostalgic and worn out “return to nature” attitude this 
would imply, a critique I do not wish to rehearse here, I do not think we should 
make the exception the rule, since it would not help us to renegotiate the space
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of the animal.141 Moreover, the sad fact remains that whenever we are 
confronted with “wildlife” it is more often than not because a “species” is on the 
verge of extinction, at which moment they are undergoing the same fate as our 
pets, in that they become individualized humanlike beings that merit legal 
protection under a liberal rights discourse. 
This conclusion, that the animal does not seem to exist or live anymore, 
must have implications for our traditional conception of the human, as it has 
forever been defined against the animal, both within and outside of the juridical 
sphere. This implies that we will not just have to worry the concept of the 
animal but all those concepts, human, animal, stone, again and again before we 
can even start to talk about animals as subjects of rights. A good point of 
departure for undertaking this massive task, in my view, and as I hope to have 
demonstrated, would be to return to Bentham’s footnote and to adopt his 
commitment to suffering in ways that accommodate a re-sensing of the relations 
between ourselves with the other within our thinking. In this respect, rethinking 
subjectivity as speech, whereby speech does not stand in a conceptual relation to 
language, a matter I purposely left open and wish to leave open here for others 
to explore, may be a thread to follow. One way of addressing this matter would 
be, again, to return to Bentham’s footnote: “But a full-grown horse or dog is 
beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than 
an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old” and start with the 
recognition that we do not have to read this line as accommodating a potentially 
endless demarcation polemic within the confinements of an expansive model. 
Rather, we could begin our exploration of subjectivity as speech by choosing to 
take Bentham’s notion of a “conversable animal” in a more literal way and 






In this final chapter, I have taken up the continuity of the traditional Human-
Animal opposition within an expansive model. In previous chapters, this 
appeared to be symptomatic of the way in which the question of animal rights is 
theorized in our time. It has become clear that this continuity of the traditional 
                                                 
141 For a well-documented research on the role of “Nature” and the various ways in which 
nostalgic ideas concerning “a return to Nature” are discursively informed by our construction of 
the natural as opposed to the cultural or artificial see: Kate Soper, What is Nature: Culture, 
Politics and the Non-Human (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1995). See also: 
Neil Evernden, The Social Creation of Nature (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). 
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Human-Animal opposition stems from an underlying demarcation problem that 
cannot be resolved as long as we think through the question of the animal from 
within a framework in which the stakes are set by tradition. This is evidenced by 
my analysis of the way in which Derrida deconstructed the Human-Animal 
opposition in Heidegger through the notion of animot. More specifically, my 
close reading of Derrida has shown that even the deconstruction of this Human-
Animal opposition is not enough if we wish to take on the question of the animal 
in a manner that may accommodate its position in our modern political techno-
juridical context. 
 In order to open up space for renegotiating the limits posed to our thinking 
through of the question of the animal, I have, in this chapter, radicalized my 
concern in the previous chapters with demarcation as a performative act 
constituted by tropological forces that constitute different types of allegorical 
reading. My strategy here has consisted of an attempt at moving beyond 
deconstruction by moving before it, an effort which has forced me to shift my 
focus from the tropological forces that sustain demarcation as performative acts 
towards an exploration of the way in which language is conceptualized within 
our thinking through of the question of the animal.  
 My reading of Borges’ poem The Other Tiger has been key to this effort. 
In Borges’ poem the relation between the human and the animal appeared to be 
complicated through the utterances of the figure of the “I” that operate the poem. 
My analysis of the complex roles of the figure of the “I” in Borges’ poem has 
ultimately led me to qualify this figure of the “I” as a dividual, multiple, 
heterogeneous “I,” which, as a poetical figure of mobility, operates various 
modalities of sense. I have then contrasted this poetical figure of the “I” with the 
way in which the philosophical figure of the “I” as a general singular has been 
taken up in relation to language in Derrida’s deconstructive reading of 
Heidegger. This has led me to conclude that the question of response, on which 
Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Heidegger was centred, is perhaps not the 
most important question to ask if we want to move beyond the endless 
renegotiating of how to demarcate the human from the animal that characterizes 
our modern animal rights debate. The question of response has appeared to be a 
question that, in its own specific way, installs a demarcation problem. It does so, 
not so much because the difference between reaction and response must 
ultimately remain undecidable, as Derrida rightfully argued. Nor does it do so 
because it ultimately comes up against the question of consciousness, as I 
argued. More fundamentally still, the demarcation problem it installs appears to 
stem from the fact that the question of response in Derrida’s reading – even 
though Derrida radically redefines response – remains indebted to a 
preordainedtraditional framework whereby language is registered as a concept 
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that can be abstracted from speech and which, therefore, cannot offer a way out 
of the Human-Animal opposition and its insistent demarcation problem. 
For this reason, I propose that we must think language as speech if we 
want to re-sense, rather than rethink, the question of the animal. It has not been a 
matter of denying the possibility of understanding language as a concept that can 
be abstracted from speech. Rather, I propose that our thinking through of the 
animal question in our modern political juridico-technical context demands an 
imaginative and counterintuitive leap of faith that consists of thinking through 
language as speech if we want to do justice to the dividual, multiple, 
heterogeneous figure of the “I,” and if we wish to move away from the 
traditional Human-Animal opposition and the general singular figure of the “I” 
that has appeared to govern it. Given the fact that in this same modern political 
juridico-technical context the traditional boundaries are increasingly under 
strain, and again taking my cue from Borges’ poem, my subsequent proposition 
has been that we must begin to rethink the Human-Animal opposition in terms 
other than those of the opposition itself and, hence, must look for a missing 
third. 
I have attempted to bring in this missing third by re-introducing the figure 
of the stone that Derrida, in his reading of Heidegger, left unturned. In an 
admittedly highly speculative gesture I have reconsidered Heidegger’s tri-
partition Man-Animal-Stone, which has led me to contemplate that the question 
of the animal cannot be taken on within a framework that is centred on an 
ontologically predefined mobility as opposed to immobility. I have then steered 
my argument back to what has gradually become my main object of concern in 
the preceding chapters, namely the performative instances of language – both 
within the popular and the juridical sphere – that operate the demarcation 
policies that discursively sustain the incomparable suffering of the vast majority 
of animals, which are factory-farmed animals. This is why it seems appropriate 
to end this final chapter by offering some remarks on factory-farming, which I 
have come to view as the most challenging issue within the animal rights debate.  
To begin with, if, today, factory-farmed animals are imagined as raw, 
organic material, as food, the legal thinking through of the subjectivities of 
animals seems pointless. Not just because, as Gary Francione has observed 
elsewhere, we eat animals and because they are legally our property, but, as I 
hope to have demonstrated through my analysis of Heidegger’s tri-partition, 
because there is no juridical language available for addressing the subjectivity of 
the non-living.142 In this respect, the language of a liberal rights discourse with 
                                                 
142 For a discussion of the problem of attributing rights to the animals we eat and that are our 
property see: Gary L. Francione, Rain without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights 
Movement (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996). 
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its autonomous individual, its intentional subject on which the expansive model 
is centred is only one side of the issue. A more fundamental side is the juridical 
categorization of the animal that follows from characterizing the animal in terms 
of world, for, as my reading of Heidegger has shown, any categorization in 
terms of world cannot but install a juridical order in which the category animal 
is ontologically predefined both as living and as standing in a relation of 
deprivation to the human. This, as I have established in the previous chapters, 
would indeed be the case within an expansive model as it masks the hierarchical 
subjection of the animal-other by presenting itself as a system of equality. In this 
final chapter, I have established that a non-ontological outlook on living, which 
becomes unavoidable if we want to think through the question of the animal 
from without the Human-Animal opposition, unmasks the way in which the 
animal is performed as living since our modern animal rights discourse 
effectively does not even allow the animal to be captive.  
The huge gap I identified between the way in which animal rights 
discourse registers our treatment of factory-farmed animals, both discursively 
and physically, is evidenced by our modern thinking through of animals across 
the political spectrum. Effectively, this spectrum is constituted by, on the one 
hand, those advocates of a limited legal protection of factory-farmed animals by 
way of rights, for example, to avoid more suffering than what is considered 
strictly necessary for “the animal” to be produced as food. On the other hand, we 
may identify the more radical animal rights activists and liberation movements, 
that wish to abolish factory-farming altogether. Both sides face two separate 
problems. First, they are bound by a liberal rights discourse that cannot address 
animal subjectivity as other than as in terms of dignity, intentionality, autonomy, 
etc.143 Second, when either group does try to appeal to the law within such a 
liberal rights discourse, let us say, with the admirable intention of protecting 
factory-farmed animals from unnecessary suffering, their critique becomes part 
and parcel of the juridical fiction that installs the animal as living. There is, in a 
non-ontological setting – the setting that I insist is required for thinking through 
animal subjectivity in the first place – no reason to do so, however, not in our 
modern imagination of those animals, and especially not in the practice on 
factory-farms.  
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In my introduction I proposed that the way in which animal rights are discussed 
today hinges on an irresolvable demarcation problem that is implied within a 
discourse that is still very much indebted to a traditional framing of the question 
of the animal. My wish to intervene in the discussions in order to progress an 
animal rights debate caught in a polemical deadlock, prompted a radical turn to 
language. This is why, in the above three chapters, I have explored the way in 
which tropological formations operate the fundamental juridical concepts 
implied within demarcation. This strategy ultimately forced me to consider the 
question of the animal as a problem of language itself, which I attempted 
through a close reading of Derrida’s deconstruction of Heidegger on animals.  
 In the chapters leading up to this overall conclusion, we established that 
the conceptualization of personhood within an expansive model was embedded 
in a philosophical discourse centred on the concept of dignity, which we 
retraced – via Kant – to the advent of human rights. In the first chapter, my 
exploration of the way in which the notion of “person” is performed, rather than 
taken as given, through a comparison of the trope of personification and 
anthropomorphism, has enabled me to tease out an important conceptual 
distinction between anthropomorphism and trope. This has helped me to develop 
another outlook on person; namely, as a name that is to be understood in a 
homonymic vein if we want to do justice to the fundamental arbitrariness any 
demarcation decision within the law implies.  
This has led me to conclude that the law, if it wants to come to 
responsible decisions, must acknowledge itself as “an expert in the 
unknowable,” since it cannot operate but in an arbitrary way. Hence, instead of 
compulsively invoking its mythical foundation each time a demarcation decision 
has to be made, the law should perhaps not address those questions it is not 
equipped to answer; that is, if it does not want its “natural” arbitrariness to be 
excessive and, hence, irresponsible. One poignant example of such a dynamic 
whereby arbitrariness turns to excess has been the prisoner’s council case, which 
I read through the lens of Barbara Johnson and which offered a striking parallel 
to the position of animals within the animal rights debate. The different 
homonymic notion of person I developed not only exposed the fundamental 
arbitrariness involved in the law’s decision not to grant the prisoner’s council 
personhood, it also illustrated that the law could not address the prisoner’s 
council question to get their cigarettes restored but that its decision on the 
prisoner’s council’s personhood led to the denial of their cigarettes anyway. It is 
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here that we may find arbitrariness becoming excessive and spinning off into 
irresponsibility. This irresponsibility became even more apparent when we 
explored the reasons for not granting the prisoner’s council personhood. It 
appeared that this decision was motivated by an interpretation strategy of legal 
texts that were formulated in such a way that there was enough room for the 
judge to make a policy decision that exempted the prisoners from qualifying for 
legal protection under personhood. 
In the second chapter, we explored the fundamental concepts of harm and 
cruelty and recognized the way in which those concepts that structure the animal 
rights debate were performed rather than given. This has become especially 
apparent within my reflection on the analysis of Wolfson and Sullivan’s 
research on the impact of animal cruelty laws in relation to factory-farming in 
both the United States and Europe. It appears that animal cruelty laws across 
both continents provide an exemplary case of the type of irresponsibility that is 
implied within an excessive form of arbitrariness. In this respect, we may now 
observe that animal cruelty laws generate the cruelty they are installed to protect 
against as they have appeared to create a legal climate of exemption, which 
effectively generates its own unprotected animals. My exploration of this 
climate of exemption for factory-farmed animals has also suggested that those 
animals we may have expected to be subsumed under the general singular the 
animal, making up the vast majority of animals, are actually registered as other 
than animal. This troubles the boundaries between the Human-Animal 
opposition in a fundamental way.  
 My subsequent zooming in on the exceptional status of factory-farmed 
animals through a close reading of George Orwell’s Animal Farm has not just 
fostered a better understanding of the demarcations between humans and 
animals, but it has also shown how, within this traditional demarcation, another 
demarcation, namely between animals, is always already implied and performed 
in relation to this opposition. Whereas Wolfson and Sullivan focused on the 
legal aspects of the climate of exemption that animal cruelty laws installed, I 
have attempted to explore the underlying forces that discursively install this 
climate of exemption. This has led me to identify a conceptual gap between 
harm and cruelty within the juridical sphere that hinges on the impossibility of 
the law to conceptualize animal dignity. Since this conceptual gap is reinforced 
by the way in which the relation between harm and cruelty is performed both 
within and outside of the strictly juridical sphere, but also within the context of 
the animal rights debate, I have come to qualify the way in which factory-
farmed animals are accommodated within juridical discourse as representing a 
totalitarian streak that has nested itself in the animal cruelty laws. At the same 
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time, it is constitutive of a much wider variety of disciplinary discourses that 
operate the biopolitical situation we now live in, globally.  
My findings here have not just led me to conclude that animals cannot be 
accommodated within an expansive model for the endless polemic on 
demarcation that such a model installs, but also that granting more animal rights 
is not the solution if we want to live in a world with animals in a responsible 
way. This is why, in the third chapter, I have proposed other ways of thinking 
through the way in which we might imagine the relation between ourselves and 
animals, through a reflection on their victimhoods as other than constructed 
through the fundamental concepts of harm and cruelty. Here, my alternative and 
necessarily heuristic notion of “pain” has opened up to imaginative 
identifications with the victimhoods of animals. These imaginative 
identifications, rather than having remained indebted to the traditional Human-
Animal opposition and all the demarcation problems implied, have offered the 
prospect of a zone of identification we might share with animals and hopefully 
spurred the idea that we may try to re-sense our relation in terms of connectivity, 
rather than opposition, through emphatic readings of the world we share with 
animals. In this re-sensing of the question of the animal, thinking has by no 
means appeared to be out of fashion but to operate as an important constitutive 
mode.  
Finally this re-sensing, rather than re-juridifying, of the question of the 
animal has begged more questions and territory to be explored than I could have 
imagined when I started this project. What has become clear, though, is that this 
re-sensing involves introducing a “third” in more than one way. On the one 
hand, the proposal to introduce this “third” may be understood as a reading 
strategy, where each time one reads one text through the lens of the other, rather 
than going to the “source” of a text. This is what I have aimed for in each and 
every chapter. On the other hand, and still more fundamentally, at a time when 
the boundaries between the human and the animal are increasingly blurred, this 
introduction of a “third” appears to be indispensable if we want to renegotiate 
the traditional Human-Animal opposition that the animal rights debate is still too 
exclusively caught up in. This is what I have attempted in my final chapter in the 
shape of a speculative analysis of Heidegger’s tri-partition, which I hope will 
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Samenvatting in het Nederlands 
 
Voorliggende studie intervenieert in het sinds de jaren zeventig steeds 
nadrukkelijker op de voorgrond tredende dierenrechtendebat. Dit debat is 
grensoverschrijdend in de zin dat het wereldwijd zowel binnen de academie, het 
publieke domein als in de politiek gevoerd wordt. Dat is ook niet zo 
verwonderlijk wanneer we bedenken dat dieren een economische waarde 
vertegenwoordigen en circuleren in een globale economie. Deze omstandigheid 
zorgt namelijk tegelijkertijd voor een spanning die erin bestaat dat lokaal 
culturele verschillen in opvattingen over dieren noodzakelijk door het globale 
dierenrechtendebat heen schemeren en zodoende elke poging te komen tot enige 
juridische objectivering van het dier bemoeilijken, wat vraagt om een juridische 
doordenking van hoe verschillen ten aanzien van de positie van het dier zowel 
over grenzen heen als lokaal kunnen worden bepaald.  
In het publieke domein wordt het dierenrechtendebat vaak aangewakkerd 
als gevolg van een via de media bemiddelde publieke verontwaardiging over 
wat op enig moment als ‘pertinente misstand’ wordt aangeduid. Het gaat dan 
bijvoorbeeld om ophef over het “ruimen” van varkens of kippen ter bestrijding 
van ziekten die de volksgezondheid bedreigen, de behandeling van dieren in de 
vlees- en bontindustrie, het doorfokken van huisdieren, het uitsterven van 
soorten en de vernietiging van leefomgevingen, of over de wijze waarop 
proefdieren worden gebruikt voor onderzoek. Het zijn juist dit soort typische 
aanleidingen voor publieke verontwaardiging geweest die hebben geleid tot het 
formuleren van allerlei dierenrechten en tot de oprichting van activistische 
groeperingen en politieke partijen die dierenrechten als prioriteit op hun agenda 
hebben gezet.  
Deze populaire ontwikkeling vindt in zekere zin haar pendant in de 
academische wereld, waarbinnen er de laatste jaren sprake is van een groeiend 
aantal nieuwe disciplines dat zich richt op de positie van het dier en waarbij 
dierenwelzijn en de meer specifieke doordenking van dieren als mogelijk 
rechtssubject onderwerp van een polemisch debat zijn geworden. Die polemiek 
bestaat er in de meest algemene zin in dat tegenstanders van dierenrechten de 
voorstanders verwijten dat ze in hun pleidooi voor ‘rechten’ dieren antropo-
morfiseren, waarbij dieren ten onrechte allerlei menselijke eigenschappen 
zouden worden toegedicht, terwijl voorstanders juist pleiten voor een kritisch 
antropomorfisme door te stellen dat in elk geval sommige dieren eigenschappen 
bezitten die voorheen als exclusief menselijk gezien werden.  
Deze polemiek zou nog overzichtelijk zijn ware het niet dat er binnen 
beide kampen al evenmin sprake is van overeenstemming voor wat betreft de 
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criteria die we precies moeten gebruiken om op een verantwoorde manier te 
kunnen bepalen of althans sommige dieren als zelfstandig subject van recht 
moeten worden gezien. Zo gebruikt de rechtsfilosoof Tom Regan de term 
‘being-subject-of-a-life’ om een aantal criteria te clusteren waaraan dieren 
zouden moeten voldoen om in aanmerking te komen voor zelfstandige rechten. 
Het gaat Regan vooral om een zekere mate van zelfbewustzijn, om dieren 
waarvoor het leven zogezegd een waarde voor hen zelf heeft in de zin dat ze 
bijvoorbeeld doelen kunnen nastreven en een aantoonbare geheugenfunctie 
uitoefenen. Voor Regan komt het er daarmee in de praktijk op neer dat alleen 
een selecte groep zoogdieren voor zelfstandige rechten in aanmerking komt. 
Anderen, zoals de filosoof Gary Francione, beweren juist dat het simpele 
gegeven dat een dier zou kunnen lijden al voldoende is de mens het recht te 
ontnemen het dier te gebruiken ten behoeve van zijn eigen doeleinden. Martha 
C. Nussbaum baseert haar doordenking van dierenrechten op een notie van 
menselijke waardigheid zoals die verankerd ligt in het recht en verkent hoe deze 
naar dieren uitgebreid zou kunnen worden.  
Deze benaderingen en de wisselende criteria die erbij worden aangelegd 
kennen hun eigen specifieke theoretische problemen op detailniveau. Het gaat 
me daarbij niet alleen om de uit de polemiek blijkende betwistbaarheid van 
criteria, maar ook om het daaraan gerelateerde praktische probleem van hoe te 
meten of een dier aan bepaalde criteria voldoet en op welke wijze aan de daaruit 
voortvloeiende rechtspositie gevolg zou kunnen worden gegeven. Deze 
ogenschijnlijk onoplosbare complexiteit stel ik weliswaar aan de orde, maar het 
doel van deze studie is niet een directe bijdrage te leveren aan de heersende 
polemiek binnen het actuele dierenrechtendebat.  Veeleer is het mijn bedoeling 
het debat verder te brengen door deze polemiek aangaande criteria te lezen als 
problematisch op een meer fundamenteel niveau. Mijn studie begint daarom met 
de bewust bescheiden vaststelling dat zowel de opkomst van het academische 
dierenrechtendebat als de publieke belangstelling voor de kwestie van het dier 
laat zien dat er een zekere urgentie wordt gevoeld om de ethische positie die we 
in de moderne tijd ten opzichte van dieren zouden moeten innemen te 
onderzoeken.  
Vooralsnog heeft dit geleid tot een zeer breed en gediversifieerd 
onderzoeksgebied. Het gevolg hiervan is dat het tegenwoordige dierenrechten-
debat gekenmerkt wordt door een soms wat lastig te doorgronden vermenging 
van vakgebieden als biologie, filosofie, rechten en literatuur vanwege de 
wisselende samenhang waarin deze disciplines de veelheid van posities stutten 
die worden ingenomen ten aanzien van dierenrechten. In deze studie probeer ik 
daarom in de eerste plaats enige ordening aan te brengen in het dierenrechten-
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debat door de fundamentele kwesties die er steeds weer in terugkeren te 
benoemen en te bevragen, om deze vervolgens vanuit een literaire invalshoek te 
analyseren en waar mogelijk verder te brengen. Ik haak hier in op twee relatief 
nieuwe disciplines die een prominente plek in het dierenrechtendebat zijn gaan 
innemen, te weten Animal Studies en Law and Literature Studies. Ik maak 
daarbij een beweging die noodzakelijkerwijs voor een deel parallel loopt met het 
actuele debat maar die tegelijk sterk afwijkt van de benaderingen die in het 
debat courant zijn.  
Die afwijkende benadering betekent concreet dat ik ingrijp op de oorzaak 
van bovengenoemde polemiek door het naar mijn gevoel belangrijkste onder-
liggende probleem dat binnen het huidige dierenrechtendebat telkens opnieuw 
aan de orde komt tot inzet van mijn onderzoek te maken. Het gaat daarbij om 
wat ik het demarcatieprobleem noem. Het demarcatieprobleem bestaat hierin dat 
er ter bepaling van onze positie ten aanzien van dierenrechten ergens een grens 
moet worden getrokken. En of deze grens nu tussen mens en dier wordt 
getrokken, zoals door de tegenstanders van dierenrechten, of tussen dieren 
onderling, zoals door de voorstanders, het trekken van die grens zal 
beargumenteerd moeten worden en dus idealiter op wetenschappelijke gronden 
moeten berusten als we willekeur willen vermijden.  
Echter, zoals blijkt uit de polemiek die het dierenrechtendebat kenmerkt is 
de vraag naar hoe we dieren moeten behandelen, welke rechten voor welke 
dieren zouden moeten gelden en waaraan ze die dan zouden ontlenen niet 
eenduidig te beantwoorden. Een verkenning van de verschillende hoedanig-
heden waarin gepoogd wordt deze vraag toch te beantwoorden kan daarom 
inzicht verschaffen in de wijze waarop het demarcatieprobleem de heersende 
polemiek structureert. In de meest algemene zin kan ten aanzien van dit punt 
gesteld worden dat ongeacht de wetenschappelijke positie die wordt ingenomen, 
de wijze waarop de relatie mens – dier wordt ingevuld de mate van morele 
consideratie en / of de rechten bepaalt die we althans sommige dieren zouden 
moeten toekennen. Dit betekent dat een sluitende argumentatie voor het al dan 
niet toekennen van rechten aan bepaalde dieren alleen geleverd kan worden 
wanneer we de relatie dier – mens objectief zouden kunnen duiden. Hier stuiten 
we op een onmogelijkheid en daarmee op de kern van het demarcatieprobleem.  
De reden hiervoor is dat het toekennen van rechten aan dieren een 
expansie zou betekenen van het juridische model zoals we dat eeuwenlang 
hebben gekend en dat vrijwel uitsluitend op de mens was geënt. Een dergelijke 
expansie gaat voorbij aan het feit dat de mens zichzelf historisch gezien steeds 
weer gedefinieerd heeft in oppositie tot het dier, wat de gronding voor de 
gelijkstelling van dieren en mensen onder een potentieel expansief juridisch 
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model frustreert. Met andere woorden: een expansief juridisch model maakt een 
objectieve positie principieel onmogelijk omdat het verschil tussen mens en dier 
het rechtenmodel fundeert in de zin dat een geloof in een unieke ‘menselijkheid’ 
het hebben van rechten rechtvaardigt. Dat betekent dat het binnenbrengen van 
dieren bij mensenrechten het fundament van het rechtenmodel zelf aantast 
omdat we als mens zelf in relatie tot het dier staan en we daarom geen 
buitenperspectief kunnen hanteren. 
 De oplossingsrichting die ik in deze studie voor deze principiële 
onmogelijkheid aandraag bestaat in het openbreken van de praktische en 
discursieve ruimte waarin mensen en dieren binnen een expansief model onder 
het mom van gelijkheid worden samengebracht. Dat doe ik door het 
demarcatieprobleem te lezen als symptomatisch voor de binnen het huidige 
dierenrechtendebat langs talige weg gefabuleerde ontkenning van verschillen in 
praktische en discursieve ruimten, zowel  tussen dieren en mensen als tussen 
dieren zelf. Deze fundamenteel andere lezing van het demarcatieprobleem 
betekent dat ik ga kijken naar literaire teksten waarin gereflecteerd wordt op 
demarcatie. Mijn doel is hier inzicht te verkrijgen in de wijze waarop in het 
dierenrechtendebat demarcatie wordt begrepen in termen van aan te leggen 
criteria en de daaraan inherente polemiek om vervolgens te verkennen hoe taal 
zelf verschil structureert. Het is deze alternatieve benadering van het demarcatie-
probleem die er hopelijk toe bijdraagt een andere weg in te slaan en zodoende de 
heersende polemiek  te ontstijgen.  
Binnen Animal Studies manifesteert het demarcatieprobleem zich in de 
vorm van een voortdurende verschuiving van criteria die de ene groep dieren 
recht op wettelijke bescherming zou geven en de andere groep niet.  In Law and 
Literature Studies, het veld waarop mijn studie meer direct aansluit, wordt de 
kwestie van het dier doorgaans op twee verschillende manieren ter hand 
genomen. Zo is er een stroming te onderscheiden die recht in literatuur 
onderzoekt en reflecteert op specifieke juridische kwesties en rechtszaken zoals 
die in de literatuur voorkomen door ze te herleiden naar juridische teksten. 
Daarnaast is er een stroming die recht als literatuur denkt en waarbij problemen 
in een juridische tekst worden besproken door middel van een narratologische, 
retorische en semiotische analyse van de tekst.  
 De overeenkomst tussen mijn onderzoek en de benaderingen in Law and 
Literature Studies is dat ik ook juridische en literaire teksten analyseer. Het 
verschil is dat ik niet zozeer de ene tekst als representatief van de andere lees, 
maar dat ik literaire werken inzet om een aantal van de fundamentele juridische 
concepten te bevragen die het dierenrechtendebat structureren en die daarin als 
onproblematisch worden voorgesteld. Deze her-problematisering heeft als doel: 
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het demarcatieprobleem inzichtelijk maken om te komen tot een fundamenteel 
andere visie op de mens – dier relatie en daarmee op het huidige 
dierenrechtendebat. Meer specifiek is mijn inzet hier weg te bewegen van de 
descriptieve alternatieven voor geschikte criteria die het tegenwoordige debat 
kenmerken. Daartoe plaats ik het  dierenrechtendebat in een talige context en 
onderzoek ik welke strategieën en aannames over taal ten grondslag liggen aan 
de positie van het dier zoals die in zowel juridische als literaire teksten wordt 
vormgegeven. Deze methode behelst dat ik niet zozeer vanuit de literatuur naar 
het recht kijk, maar veeleer dat literatuur ingezet wordt als middel om te 
doordenken hoe het dierenrechtendebat functioneert en een juridische orde 
voortbrengt die gebaseerd is op haar talige kracht.  
In de eerste drie hoofdstukken presenteer ik telkens een korte case-studie 
om  de aandacht te vestigen op steeds weer een ander aspect van demarcatie. De 
praktische vragen die deze case studies oproepen vormen een startpunt voor een 
steeds verdere theoretische verkenning van het demarcatieprobleem. In het 
vierde en laatste hoofdstuk verleg ik de aandacht van het doordenken van de 
mens - dier relatie naar een benadering die uitnodigt tot een fundamentele 
andere vorm van denken over de ethische positie van dieren. Dit betekent niet 
dat ik hier pasklare oplossingen voor het dierenrechtendebat kan aanreiken. Het 
betekent wel dat de argumentatieve gronding in de mens-dier relatie die 
onlosmakelijk met het demarcatieprobleem verbonden is niet langer houdbaar 
zal blijken te zijn en dat als alternatief voor de gestokte polemiek waarin het 
dierenrechtendebat is beland een andere, meer talig-sensitieve benadering ten 
aanzien van onze relatie met dieren verdedigd wordt.  
 In hoofdstuk 1 zoem ik in op zonder twijfel het meest beladen begrip 
binnen het recht in het algemeen en binnen het dierenrechtendebat in het 
bijzonder, het begrip personhood. In plaats van de criteria voor personhood tot 
onderwerp van discussie te maken, roep ik de vraag op wat het eigenlijk 
betekent om een mens of dier persoon te noemen, zowel in juridische als extra-
juridische zin, en hoe verschillende noties van persoon het demarcatieprobleem 
structureren. 
Binnen de talige benadering die ik voorsta verken ik dit probleem door de 
relatie tussen personificatie en antropomorfisme te onderzoeken. In mijn 
benadering sluit ik hier aan op “Anthropomorphism in Lyric and Law”, een 
essay van Barbara Johnson waarin eenzelfde vraag naar de relatie tussen 
personificatie en antropomorfisme wordt gesteld. Echter, waar Johnson haar 
essay eindigt met de vaststelling dat het verschil tussen antropomorfisme en 
personificatie onbeslisbaar blijft, beargumenteer ik aan de hand van een close 
reading van Johnson’s tekst dat er wel degelijk een praktisch onderscheid tussen 
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personificatie en antropomorfisme is te maken. En dat het dus gemaakt moet 
worden als we kritisch willen kijken naar de personifiëring van dieren binnen 
een expansief model en naar het demarcatieprobleem dat hierdoor wordt 
geïnstalleerd. Dit praktische onderscheid tussen antropomorfisme en 
personificatie vormt vervolgens de talige basis voor mijn ontwikkeling van een 
notie van persoon die principieel verschilt van hoe ‘persoon’ in het 
tegenwoordige dierenrechtendebat wordt gedacht en fungeert daarmee primair 
als aanzet tot het doordenken van andere aspecten van het demarcatieprobleem 
in de volgende hoofdstukken. 
In hoofdstuk 2 bevraag ik twee fundamentele juridische concepten die 
telkens weer terugkeren in het dierenrechtendebat, te weten harm en cruelty, 
termen die ik hier ter verduidelijking vertaal als aangedane pijn en wreedheid. 
De reden voor mijn focus op deze termen is dat ze naar mijn overtuiging - 
evenals persoon - binnen een expansief model niet zomaar naar het domein van 
de dieren kunnen worden getransponeerd omdat de betekenis ervan door deze 
expansie wezenlijk verandert en dus opnieuw gedacht moet worden. Deze 
betekenisverandering laat zich eenvoudig illustreren door te stellen dat voordat 
er sprake was van een expansief model de pijn waaraan dieren werden 
blootgesteld buiten de juridische orde viel omdat dieren geen subject van recht 
waren. De implicatie van een expansief model dat potentieel van toepassing is 
op althans een aantal dieren zou daarmee zijn dat de blootstelling aan pijn van 
dieren die binnen een dergelijk model geen personhood krijgen toegekend, door 
de juridische orde wordt gelegitimeerd.  
Met het oog op dergelijke potentiële betekenisverschuivingen onderzoek 
ik de conceptuele distinctie tussen aangedane pijn en wreedheid zoals die binnen 
het dierenrechtendebat talig wordt geïnstalleerd en verken ik welk effect dit 
heeft op de wijze van demarcatie, zowel tussen mens en dier als tussen dieren. Ik 
stel daartoe voor de inbedding van niet-menselijke dieren binnen een expansief 
model te lezen als het creëren van een enkele discursieve ruimte. In de literatuur 
zouden we dit een allegorische beweging noemen en dat is de aanleiding dat ik 
George Orwell’s Animal Farm (1945) inzet als literair model om de invloed van 
allegorisch denken op demarcatie binnen een expansief model te verkennen.  
In mijn benadering van Animal Farm wijk ik bewust af van de traditionele 
lezingen van Animal Farm als een allegorie van de koude oorlog. Dat doe ik 
door Animal Farm te lezen als een verhaal over dieren die in opstand komen en 
een eigen rechtsorde instellen ter bescherming tegen de pijn en wreedheid die ze 
op de boerderij ondergaan. Naast een talige verkenning van de conceptuele 
distinctie tussen aangedane pijn een wreedheid binnen allegorisch denken biedt 
deze lezing van Animal Farm me de gelegenheid te reflecteren op een probleem 
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dat binnen het huidige dierenrechtendebat niet of nauwelijks wordt 
geadresseerd, namelijk de positie van dieren in de voedselindustrie. Dat doe ik 
door te reflecteren op het concept van de boerderij zoals we dat ten tijde van het 
verschijnen van Animal Farm begonnen te kennen en de verandering die dit 
concept in onze tijd heeft ondergaan. Het gaat me daarbij niet om het innemen 
van een morele positie ten aanzien van de positie van dieren in de voedsel-
industrie, maar om de doordenking van de wijze waarop er binnen het 
dierenrechtendebat een demarcatie plaatsvindt ten aanzien van juist die dieren 
die kwantitatief de overgrote meerderheid van de dieren uitmaken. De relevantie 
van deze exercitie is niet alleen dat ermee wordt aangetoond dat de positie van 
juist deze dieren talig wordt geïnstalleerd via fundamentele concepten als 
aangedane pijn en wreedheid, maar ook dat de inconsistente wijze waarop dat 
gebeurt een blinde vlek in het dierenrechtendebat laat zien die vraagt om een 
heroverweging van deze fundamentele concepten.  
Dat is waarom ik me in hoofdstuk drie richt op wat deze concepten 
verbindt, namelijk de kwestie van het lijden als mogelijk criterium om dieren al 
of niet als rechtssubject aan te merken. Grofweg kan bij voorstanders van 
dierenrechten het uitgangspunt ten aanzien van lijden als volgt worden 
samengevat: dieren delen met mensen het vermogen tot lijden en daarom 
verdienen ze in elk geval enige juridische bescherming tegen blootstelling aan 
lijden. Dit geldt zowel de zoogdieren van Regan omdat bewustzijn ook altijd een 
bewustzijn van pijn impliceert, als bijvoorbeeld de positie van Francione en 
anderen. Deze moderne posities gaan dus binnen een breed spectrum van criteria 
terug op de kwestie van het lijden. Ze zijn daarmee schatplichtig aan de filosoof 
Jeremy Bentham, die aan het eind van de achttiende eeuw in een beroemde 
voetnoot de vraag opwierp of de vraag naar het lijden niet het toekomstige 
criterium zou kunnen worden om te bepalen of “the rest of animal creation” 
rechten zou moeten krijgen. Vanwege Bentham’s focus op lijden als potentieel 
alternatief voor capaciteiten als rationaliteit of het vermogen tot spraak, wordt 
zijn houding in het tegenwoordige dierenrechtendebat geïnterpreteerd als een 
radicale breuk met het gedachtengoed van Immanuel Kant, die in zijn werk 
rationaliteit als exclusief menselijke eigenschap opvoerde.   
In mijn lezing van de kwestie van het lijden ga ik ook terug op Bentham. 
Maar ik doe dat niet door het onderzoeken van lijden als mogelijk weten-
schappelijk verifieerbaar criterium. In plaats daarvan ontwikkel ik een notie van 
lijden die voortkomt uit mijn verkenning van de conceptuele distinctie tussen 
aangedane pijn en wreedheid die gebaseerd is op hoe de verbeelding van het 
slachtofferschap in onze relatie met anderen talig tot stand wordt gebracht. Meer 
specifiek verken ik hier in welke mate het verschil dat demarcatie impliceert 
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descriptief is en op welke wijze verschil wordt gemaakt door wat taal doet. Deze 
benadering van de kwestie van het lijden brengt mijn werk hier in een 
principiële discussie met theoretici als Singer, Rachels en Derrida.  Nadat ik 
inzicht heb verschaft in de wijze waarop de kwestie het lijden in het werk van 
deze theoretici gestalte krijgt motiveer ik waarom een andere benadering 
noodzakelijk is.  
Deze benadering geef ik vorm door George Orwell’s Shooting an 
Elephant (1936) in te zetten om mijn alternatieve notie van het lijden talig te 
doordenken. Deze talige doordenking betekent dat ik mijn eerdere bevindingen 
aangaande het verschil tussen antropomorfisme en personificatie test. Daarnaast 
onderzoek ik hoe mijn alternatieve notie van lijden via een verbeelding van het 
slachtofferschap van anderen gestructureerd wordt door de wijze waarop 
betekenisfiguren opereren en gelezen kunnen worden. Uit mijn lezing blijkt dat 
een alternatieve doordenking van het slachtofferschap van anderen niet langer 
vanuit de mens – dier relatie kan worden begrepen maar dat er steeds een derde 
element nodig is.  
In het vierde en laatste hoofdstuk poneer ik op basis van mijn bevindingen 
in de drie voorafgaande hoofdstukken dat de traditionele mens – dier relatie nog 
steeds onze juridisch orde bepaalt, terwijl onze moderne conceptualisering van 
het dier in niets meer lijkt op deze traditionele relatie. Met als doel de problemen 
die deze situatie voor het dierenrechtendebat oplevert te adresseren ga ik terug 
op het werk van Heidegger en op de drie elementen die deze aanvankelijk als 
uitgangspunt heeft genomen om de kwestie van het dier te doordenken, te weten 
mens – dier  en steen. Meer specifiek neem ik hier zelf de positie van een derde 
in door Heidegger’s tekst te lezen door de lens van het werk van Derrida, die in 
het vierde hoofdstuk van The Animal That Therefore I Am (2008) de mens-dier 
relatie in Heidegger deconstrueert. Het literaire werk dat ik inzet voor deze 
lezing is het gedicht El otro Tigre van Jorge Luis Borges (1960). Het gedicht 
verkent de mens dier-relatie als een probleem van taal en stelt zo een manier van 
denken over taal voor die fundamenteel verschilt van de wijze waarop zowel 
Heidegger als Derrida taal opvatten om deze relatie te denken. Dit stelt mij in 
staat Heidegger’s aanvankelijke onderscheid tussen mens – dier – steen te 
heroverwegen om daarmee een alternatief te formuleren voor de mens–dier 
relatie waarop de polemiek in het dierenrechtendebat vastzit. 
Hiermee wil ik laten zien dat het ter sprake komen van een expansief 
juridisch model sinds het actuele dierenrechtendebat is opgekomen niet slechts 
symptomatisch is voor de wijze waarop de mens – dier relatie onze juridisch 
orde installeert, maar dat deze ontwikkeling gelezen moet worden als een 
dringende behoefte aan een andere verdeling van ruimte, zowel discursief als 
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praktisch, in onze tijd. Dit is het punt waarop kunst, wetenschap en technologie 
kunnen interveniëren, in het uitonderhandelen van deze ruimten. En het is aan 
deze ontwikkeling dat mijn onderzoek een bijdrage vanuit literatuurweten-
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